{ "id": 3493319, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY D. GRUNER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gruner", "decision_date": "1985-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141025", "first_page": "1042", "last_page": "1054", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 1042" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3118273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5439017 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2847097 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148980 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982 Ill. Laws 328", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1982 Ill. Laws 231", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1982 Ill. Laws 1233", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1065", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624913 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3107250 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 L. Ed. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3106, 3091, 2397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0937-02", "/us/435/0937-01", "/us/435/0937-03" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5471389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1143, "char_count": 29688, "ocr_confidence": 0.704, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0602568141549659e-07, "percentile": 0.5569033175293231 }, "sha256": "1fbee3578761c171a89e9d0748c972d7c363121f67f7ee62ff8b3e968c6a9fb1", "simhash": "1:9c2671df12078c90", "word_count": 5137 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY D. GRUNER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCHNAKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Barry D. Gruner, was charged by information with reckless homicide. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9\u20143.) Following a jury trial he was convicted of that offense and sentenced to a 30-month term of probation, which included a six-month jail sentence. He was also fined $1,000. The defendant appeals, contending (1) that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the concentration of alcohol in his breath as shown by a test administered to him after his arrest; and (3) that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the concentration of alcohol in the decedent\u2019s blood.\nThis case arose out of a collision between the defendant\u2019s car and a car driven by Ricky Geren. Geren died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision. The accident occurred on April 9, 1983, in the early morning hours, on Route 14, just west of Borden Street in Cary. At the location of the collision, Route 14 is a two-lane road that runs in a northwest-southeasterly direction.\nThe State presented two occurrence witnesses, Diane Van Allen, who had been a passenger in the decedent\u2019s car on the night in question, and Christine Militello, who had been driving her car behind Geren\u2019s at the time of the accident.\nVan Allen testified that on the night in question she and her friend, Debbie Stoddard, went to Harrigan\u2019s, a tavern in Crystal Lake, sometime between 11 p.m. and midnight. Van Allen was driving her car, and Stoddard was a passenger. Van Allen had previously been at the Bring Her Inn in Crystal Lake, where she had one beer. While she was at Harrigan\u2019s, Van Allen had three more beers.\nAt about 1 a.m., she saw Ricky Geren in the tavern. She played darts and visited with him, Stoddard, and others. Van Allen, Stoddard, and Geren eventually decided to go dancing at Peabody\u2019s, a bar in Cary, and they left Harrigan\u2019s at about 1:50 a.m. Van Allen stated that when she first saw Geren in Harrigan\u2019s, he had a mixed drink in his hands, and that he had one more before they left. She stated, however, that he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol.\nWhen they left Harrigan\u2019s, it was agreed that Stoddard would drive Van Allen\u2019s car, and Van Allen would ride in Geren\u2019s car, a red Corvette. Stoddard left about five minutes before Geren and Van Allen.\nVan Allen testified that as she and Geren approached the scene of the accident from the west, they were traveling 30 to 35 miles per hour. The speed limit at that location was 30 miles per hour. It was raining. Geren and Van Allen were talking to each other. She testified that Geren \u201cwas glancing at me, back and forth between me and the road.\u201d She then saw a car approaching from the east more than halfway in their lane. The other car was about two car lengths away. Geren jerked the steering wheel violently to the right, and the cars collided. The other car hit the Corvette on the driver\u2019s side. After the collision, the Corvette did not travel much, if at all. Geren was unconscious immediately after the crash.\nOn cross-examination, Van Allen stated that at Harrigan\u2019s Geren told her that he had just purchased the Corvette a week before and wanted to show it to her. She said that when they left, Geren had not finished the second drink she saw him with. She did not smell alcohol on his breath at that time or later on in the car.\nWhen they were driving east toward the accident, Geren had the radio on. Van Allen characterized the rain as \u201csteady.\u201d She testified that when Geren would look at her, he would take his eyes off the road for a second or two. After one of these glances, Van Allen heard Geren say \u201cshit.\u201d She looked forward and then saw the other car. She was able to determine that the other car was partially in the eastbound lane because she could see the center line. After Geren jerked the steering wheel to the right, the Corvette went partially onto the shoulder of the road before the impact.\nChristine Militello, who had been driving her car behind the Corvette at the time of the accident, testified that on the night in question from about 10 p.m. until about 11:45 p.m. she was at Cat Ballou\u2019s, a tavern in Crystal Lake. Militello had two beers there. When she left, she went to Harrigan\u2019s, arriving at about 12:10 a.m. Militello testified that she had nothing to drink at Harrigan\u2019s. She listened to music and visited with friends.\nAccording to Militello, at about 1:30 a.m. she left Harrigan\u2019s to meet her sister at Peabody\u2019s. She was driving her Dodge Omni and was alone. She noticed a Corvette traveling east ahead of her. There were no cars between her Omni and the Corvette. It was raining. As they approached the scene of the accident, both cars were traveling about 30 to 35 miles per hour. Militello testified that she saw a car approaching from the east \u201chalf over into the eastbound lane.\u201d She saw the Corvette start to swerve to the right, and then the collision occurred. The left front of the westbound car hit the left side of the Corvette right around the front wheel. The westbound car \u201ckept running along the side of the Corvette,\u201d \u201ccame around the back\u201d of it, and cut in front of Militello\u2019s car, and pulled over onto the shoulder of the eastbound lane. She did not see the westbound car swerve after it hit the Corvette.\nMilitello testified that she drove into the westbound lane to avoid the car which cut in front of her. She drove back into the eastbound lane and then parked in a nearby driveway. Militello got out of her car and went over to the Corvette, where she saw Geren unconscious. Van Allen, who was very upset, said to her, \u201cOh, my God, did you see that car over in our lane?\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Militello characterized the rain just prior to the accident as \u201cjust above a drizzle.\u201d She said that visibility was very good.\nThe State presented evidence that the defendant was the driver of the westbound car, which was a Ford Thunderbird. Several witnesses testified that after the collision he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. There was testimony that his cheeks were flushed and his eyes bloodshot. Officer Giallombardo of the Cary police department testified that the defendant did not perform well on certain field sobriety tests. The State also introduced the results of the defendant\u2019s breath test which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.15, based on the definition set forth in section 11\u2014501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014501.2.) According to that provision, a person is presumed to be under the influence of alcohol if the concentration is 0.10 or more. (The jury was instructed that this presumption was not binding on it, and that other evidence on the question of intoxication could properly be considered.)\nOfficer Dennis Keys, the evidence technician for the Cary police department, testified concerning his investigation of the scene. He stated that the body of the Corvette was made of fiberglass and that the debris at the scene consisted mostly of fiberglass which had broken off the body of the Corvette. The debris was located primarily in the eastbound lane of Route 14. One piece of debris, also fiberglass, was found on the shoulder of the westbound lane. Officer Keys expressed his opinion, based on the location of the vehicles and debris after the collision, that the impact occurred in the eastbound lane.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Keys was asked whether the impact could have occurred a \u201cmatter of inches\u201d south of the center line, and he replied, \u201cI wouldn\u2019t be able to speculate on that at all due to the weather conditions.\u201d\nThe defense presented one occurrence witness, the defendant himself. He testified that on the day in question he met his friend, Robert Salzman, at the latter\u2019s place of business in Elk Grove Village. They had planned to shop for uniforms for their softball team that afternoon. They left Salzman\u2019s place of business at about 3:30 p.m. and went to Bennigan\u2019s, a tavern in Schaumburg, each of them driving his own car. They stayed at'Bennigan\u2019s for an hour to an hour and a half, and during that time the defendant had two beers and a cup of clam chowder.\nFrom Bennigan\u2019s they went to a sporting goods store in downtown Palatine to look at uniforms. They were at the store for about a half hour, and upon leaving took with them two or three pamphlets advertising uniforms.\nThe two then proceeded to Gimmicks, a bar on Route 14 in Palatine, arriving at about 6:30 p.m. The defendant stayed there until about 1:45 a.m. While there, he looked at the brochures with Salzman, played pool and video games, and visited with other patrons of the tavern. The defendant testified that while he was at Gimmicks he had seven beers and two large pieces of deep-dish pizza.\nWhen he decided to go home, the defendant told Salzman he was leaving because he had a golf date in the morning. The defendant testified that when he left the bar, it was pouring rain. He drove westbound on Route 14 toward his home in Cary. On the way, he passed numerous traffic lights and went through the business district of Fox River Grove. When he reached Cary, he was driving very slowly. Visibility was down to about 25 feet because of the rain. The defendant was using the white fog line at the side of the road as a reference point. As he approached the scene of the accident, he could not see the center line.\nThe defendant testified that as he was driving westbound, he saw a \u201cbody of red\u201d about five feet ahead of him, and then the collision occurred. At the moment of impact he was in his own lane, although he might have been very close to the center line. He stated that he felt the left front end of his Thunderbird go up in the air. The left front of his car moved along the side of the Corvette and then dropped to the pavement. At that point he was unable to steer. His tire was locked in a position that forced his car to jump into the eastbound lane, and his car traveled forward for about 50 to 100 feet before it stopped. He then pulled it over onto the shoulder of the eastbound lane, where he sat and waited until a police officer arrived a few minutes later.\nAs a result of the collision, the defendant received a superficial wound on the top of his head. The defendant denied that he performed poorly on the field sobriety tests.\nOn cross-examination, the defendant testified that when he first saw the \u201cbody of red\u201d of the Corvette, it was almost parallel to his car. He stated that the initial impact might have occurred in the center of the road. He also said that he had been going 25 to 30 miles per hour at the time of the collision.\nThe defense also presented the testimony of the defendant\u2019s friend, Salzman, which essentially corroborated that given by the defendant concerning events occurring before his departure from Gimmicks. Salzman stated that in his opinion the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol when he left. Salzman said that his friend\u2019s face was not flushed and his speech was not slurred, and that he had no difficulty walking.\nThe defense also introduced, by way of stipulation, that there was some alcohol in the decedent\u2019s blood, but the trial court prohibited the defense from presenting evidence of the concentration of alcohol, which had been determined to be 0.18.\nWhitey Hursh, a tow truck driver who responded to the scene at the request of the Cary police department, also testified for the defense. He stated that when he arrived at the scene, Officer Keys directed him to pick up the debris. According to Hursh, the debris was scattered from right about the center line towards the south side of the road.\nThe defense also presented evidence that on the morning after the collision, when the Corvette was being towed into an auto body shop to be photographed, the dust cap fell from the left front wheel. There was a castle nut covered with grease inside the dust cap. Several witnesses testified that the threads on the castle nut were not stripped. It is undisputed that the threads of the spindle onto which the castle nut fit were also not stripped. Daniel Streit, an auto mechanic and the owner of the body shop, testified as follows:\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: If the castle nut came loose [while the Corvette was being driven] it would loosen the bearings which would come out of the rotor which in turn would have to make it [the wheel] start wiggling and the only thing that would hold it on at that point would be the calipers which are the brakes that go in the calipers.\nMR. SHORT [defense counsel]:\nQ. If someone were to make a violent or any movement of a Corvette especially, turning in any direction, what would the result be as far as that left front wheel?\nA. It would definitely turn that way.\nQ. Would it lock the wheel?\nA. It would lock.\u201d\nIn rebuttal, the State introduced a dust cap, castle nut, and pieces of a cotter pin. The State\u2019s witnesses testified that these items were from the left front wheel of the Corvette, and the witnesses established a satisfactory chain of custody for them. A forensic scientist with the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement had cleaned off the grease. The threads on the castle nut were completely stripped with the exception of one small section. Royce Donner, a professional engineer, testified for the State that in his opinion the damage to the castle nut was caused by the collision.\nThe defendant contends that the foregoing evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The offense of reckless homicide is defined in section 9\u20143 of the Criminal Code of 1961 as follows:\n\u201cA person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9\u20143.)\nThe mental state of recklessness is defined in section 4\u20146, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cA person *** acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 4\u20146.\nIn the instant case there was ample evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. In addition, two eyewitnesses testified that the collision occurred in the decedent\u2019s lane of traffic. Although the collision occurred at nighttime when it was raining, Christine Militello, the driver of the the car directly behind the decedent\u2019s Corvette, testified that visibility. was very good. Under these circumstances, the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Davis (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 129, 434 N.E.2d 13 (reckless homicide convictions affirmed where the defendant, while intoxicated, drove his car into the victims\u2019 lane of traffic, striking their car).\nWhile in the instant case the defendant presented conflicting testimony on the question of his intoxication and the location of the collision, it was the prerogative of the jury to resolve the conflicts as it did. It was also the jury\u2019s prerogative to resolve the conflicting evidence concerning whether the left front wheel assembly of the Corvette was defective prior to the collision. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses and will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 937, 55 L. Ed. 2d 533, 98 S. Ct. 1513.) In our judgment, the State\u2019s evidence was not at all improbable and was sufficient to prove the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.\nPeople v. Walljasper (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 81, 422 N.E.2d 251, cited by the defendant, is readily distinguishable from the instant case. In Walljasper the cause of the accident was an icy patch of roadway which the defendant would not have been able to negotiate safely even if he had been completely sober. In fact, another driver had lost control of her vehicle on the same icy patch shortly before the fatal accident. In the instant case, if the conflicts in the evidence are resolved in the State\u2019s favor, as they apparently were by the jury, there is no indication that anything other than the defendant\u2019s recklessness could have caused his car to travel into the opposite lane.\nThe defendant\u2019s next contention is that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the concentration of alcohol in his breath, i.e., 0.15, as shown by a test administered to him after his arrest. On the second day of trial, the defense presented a motion to exclude the test results. The motion alleged that after the collision the defendant was arrested for a violation of section 11\u2014501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 95V2, par. 11\u2014501) (driving while under the influence of alcohol) or a local ordinance equivalent. He was charged with such offense by the city of Cary, but the charge was nol-prossed when the State decided to bring the reckless homicide charge. According to the defendant\u2019s motion, after he was arrested, the police read him the nine-paragraph warning required by section 11\u2014501.1 of the Code as amended by Public Act 82\u2014221. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014501.1.) One of those warnings was that, if he took the breath test, the results could be introduced in evidence against him \u201cto support the charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\u201d The defendant sought to exclude the results of the breath test under subsection (c) of that statute, which provided in pertinent part, \u201cNo evidence of any test taken pursuant to this Section is admissible in any criminal proceeding except in a proceeding under Section 11\u2014501.\u201d Since the charge under that provision had been nol-prossed, the defendant argued, the trial was not a \u201cproceeding under Section 11\u2014501,\u201d and the test results were inadmissible. He also maintained that use of the test results in the reckless homicide prosecution would violate his constitutional rights because his consent to take the test was limited so that it would be valid only in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The defendant\u2019s motion to exclude the test results was denied, and as noted above, they were admitted into evidence at trial. In this court, the defendant presents essentially the same arguments he presented at trial on this issue.\nWe will first address the contention that the test results should have been excluded under section 11\u2014501.1 as amended by Public Act 82\u2014221. Public Act 82\u2014221 was passed by our General Assembly on June 18, 1981. Later that same day our legislature passed Public Act 82\u2014311, which also amended section 11\u2014501.1 (see People v. Frye (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 859, 447 N.E.2d 1065). Both laws took effect on January 1, 1982, over a year before the accident involved herein took place. Whereas section 11\u2014501.1, as amended by Public Act 82\u2014221, includes the language upon which the defendant relies, limiting the use of tests taken under that section to \u201cproceeding[s] under Section 11\u2014501,\u201d as amended by Public Act 82\u2014311, section 11\u2014501.1 does not include that exclusionary rule. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95V2, par. 11\u2014501.1.\nSection 6 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to the construction of the statutes\u201d provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cTwo or more Acts which relate to the same subject matter and which are enacted by the same General Assembly shall be construed together in such manner as to give full effect to each Act except in case of an irreconcilable conflict. In case of an irreconcilable conflict the Act last acted upon by the General Assembly is controlling to the extent of such conflict. ***\nAn irreconcilable conflict between 2 or more Acts which amend the same section of an Act exists only if the amendatory Acts make inconsistent changes in the section as it theretofore existed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1, par. 1105.)\nOf the two Acts amending section 11\u2014501.1, Public Act 82\u2014311, which does not include the exclusionary provision upon which the defendant relies, was \u201cthe Act last acted upon by the General Assembly,\u201d and thus would be controlling in the case of irreconcilable conflict. (People v. Frye (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 447 N.E.2d 1065.) The defendant argues, however, that the two Acts are not in irreconcilable conflict, and that we should, therefore, give effect to the exclusionary provision in section 11\u2014501.1 as amended by Public Act 82\u2014 221.\nWe need not consider the defendant\u2019s interesting arguments in this regard, although it should be noted that in Frye the court concluded that \u201c[reconciliation of the two [Acts] is well beyond the best powers of even a Byzantine theologian.\u201d (People v. Frye (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 859, 447 N.E.2d 1065.) The reason this question need not be considered is that over a year after our General Assembly passed the two Acts discussed above, it enacted Public Act 82\u2014783, which took effect prior to the accident involved herein. (1982 Ill. Laws 1233.) Article III of the latter act states that it \u201cprovides for the non-substantive revision *** of Sections of Acts necessitated by the amendment *** of Sections by two or more Public Acts of the 82nd General Assembly, which multiple action was not resolved by one of the Acts affecting the particular Section.\u201d (1982 Ill. Laws 231-32.) Section 37 of article III provides that section 11\u2014501.1 is amended to read as it was amended by 82\u2014311. (1982 Ill. Laws 328-35.) Our legislature has, therefore, chosen between the two prior versions of section 11\u2014501.1, and it has selected the one which does not include the exclusionary provision upon which the defendant relies. Accordingly, section 11\u2014501.1 as amended by Public Act 82\u2014221 is not applicable to this case and cannot provide a basis for exclusion of the results of the defendant\u2019s breath test.\nThe defendant has cited no authority in support of his contention that admission of the test results into evidence violated his constitutional rights. The entire argument on this point in the defendant\u2019s brief is as follows:\n\u201cTo hold otherwise [than requested by the defendant] would disregard the basic reason why implied consent Statutes have been constitutionally upheld in the face of the constitutional right against self incrimination.\nIf both the refusal to take the test and the test results are admissible in evidence against the Defendant, how is his constitutional right against self-incrimination satisfied?\nHe impliedly consents, in return for a driver\u2019s license to take the test or lose his license for a period of time. It can hardly be said that he impliedly consents to take the test or must confess against himself as being intoxicated in a reckless homicide felony case.\nWhen the officer, as required by Statute, explains that a refusal may result in a six month suspension, this is not the equivalent of saying take the test and you might go to the penitentiary [sic]? The Statutory warning says nothing about the results of the test being used in a felony criminal trial.\nEven if.the Court is to say that the latter passed Statute [Public Act 82\u2014311] controls, will the refusal to take the test or the test results both be admissible in a prosecution for reckless homicide where the alleged violation of [section 11\u2014501] was dismissed and not tried simultaneously?\u201d\nIt is clear that the defendant\u2019s argument on this point, aside from its lack of citation of authority, does little more than posit questions and state conclusions, and it is devoid of any meaningful legal analysis. Under these circumstances, we will not rule on the merits of the argument. People v. Ortiz (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 466, 414 N.E.2d 1072.\nThe defendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the concentration of alcohol in the decedent\u2019s blood. The accident which gave rise to the criminal charge in the instant case occurred at about 2 a.m. on April 9, 1983. The decedent, Ricky Geren, was pronounced dead at Good Shepherd Hospital in Barrington a short time later, and his body was subsequently taken to the Lake County coroner\u2019s facility. At 11 a.m. the same day the chief medical investigator for the Lake County coroner took a blood sample from the body. Tests performed on that sample showed an alcohol concentration of 0.18, which was higher than that of the defendant.\nPrior to trial, the State moved to exclude this evidence on the grounds that (1) the blood sample was not drawn from the decedent within six hours of the accident causing his death, or at the direction of a licensed physician, as required by section 10 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to coroners\u201d (hereinafter the Coroner\u2019s Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 31, par. 10); and (2) the chief medical investigator for the Lake County coroner was not qualified by the Department of Public Health under section 11\u2014501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014501.2) to withdraw blood samples. The State informed the trial court that, aside from the excessive delay, it had no quarrel with the method by which the blood sample was taken, and that, as far as the State knew, it had no quarrel with the analysis of the sample. The defendant opposed the State\u2019s motion, and the trial court granted it, excluding the specific test results, but permitting the defendant to show that blood samples taken from the decedent\u2019s body after the accident showed \u201csome alcohol.\u201d\nIn this court the defendant contends that neither the Coroner\u2019s Act nor the Illinois Vehicle Code required the exclusion of the test results, and that he was improperly deprived of an opportunity to present relevant evidence in his defense on the question of whether he caused the accident which resulted in the death. In response, the State raises an issue it did not present to the trial court by arguing that the degree of intoxication of the decedent driver was not relevant. The State also relies on the statutes it cited to the trial court and argues that if the exclusion of this evidence was error, it was harmless error.\nIt is our judgment that, considering the totality of the evidence introduced in this case on the question of whether the defendant caused the accident and death, the exclusion of the test results, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824.) In this regard it should be noted that the State was not required to prove that the defendant\u2019s acts were the sole and immediate cause of death, but rather that they were a contributing cause such that death did not result from a cause unconnected with the defendant. People v. Brown (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 730, 293 N.E.2d 1; People v. Kent (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 733, 444 N.E.2d 570.\nDiane Van Allen, the passenger in the decedent\u2019s car, testified that the defendant\u2019s car was more than halfway in the decedent\u2019s lane prior to the collision. She said that she knew the defendant\u2019s car was in the wrong lane because she could see the center line. Christine Militello, who happened to be driving her car behind the decedent\u2019s Corvette, testified that the defendant\u2019s Thunderbird was \u201chalf over\u201d into the decedent\u2019s lane. Militello said that visibility was fairly good at the time of the crash.\nOfficer Dennis Keys, the evidence technician, testified that the debris from the collision was all in the decedent\u2019s lane of traffic except for one piece on the shoulder of the defendant\u2019s lane. He gave his opinion, based on the location of the debris and the cars after the collision, that the accident occurred in the decedent\u2019s lane. The only evidence to the contrary was the defendant\u2019s testimony that he was in his own lane at the moment of impact. Yet, the defendant also testified that visibility was very poor for him, and he admitted that, as he approached the scene of the collision, he could not see the center line.\nIn light of this evidence, even if the jury had been informed of the degree of the decedent driver\u2019s intoxication as shown by the test results, the jury could not but have found that the defendant drove his car into the wrong lane and thereby contributed to cause the accident and death. Accordingly, the exclusion of the results of the testing of the decedent\u2019s blood, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Boyce (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 740, 420 N.E.2d 687.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH, P.J., and REINHARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCHNAKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Short, of McHenry, for appellant.", "Theodore Floro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko, William L. Browers, and Sally A. Swill, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY D. GRUNER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 83\u20141025\nOpinion filed February 19, 1985.\nRichard J. Short, of McHenry, for appellant.\nTheodore Floro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko, William L. Browers, and Sally A. Swill, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1042-01", "first_page_order": 1064, "last_page_order": 1076 }