{ "id": 3438697, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANITA OWENS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Owens", "decision_date": "1985-03-06", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201484\u20140462", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "384", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 381" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2844380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378433 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 1130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127856 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852935 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 1169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 434, "char_count": 7641, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3399572373768698e-07, "percentile": 0.6309311855633282 }, "sha256": "6c589acb233c4e37e42d28776d8ca93c6f752310248b00158cae36a6b81e873f", "simhash": "1:2c027846fff76d37", "word_count": 1262 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:35.805575+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANITA OWENS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue addressed in this appeal is whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires a State\u2019s Attorney to offer a convicted defendant an opportunity to plead guilty to all foreseeable charges within that county prior to sentencing on the offense of which defendant was convicted. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u2014 2(a).) We find the statute imposes no such duty on State\u2019s Attorneys. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.\nOn July 21, 1983, defendant Juanita Owens was charged with forgery. The indictment alleged that defendant delivered a check to a grocery store employee, knowing the check was not authorized or drawn by its purported maker. On September 15, 1983, defendant pleaded guilty to the forgery charge.\nOn December 9, 1983, after a hearing, the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s guilty plea and sentenced her to five years\u2019 imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentences she was then serving, crediting defendant with time served from July 21, 1983. Defendant pointed out to the court that she had been in custody since mid-May 1983. The court responded that July 21 was the date of the indictment. Defendant stated she still wished to plead guilty.\nThe State\u2019s Attorney summarized the basis of the charge, and defendant agreed to the summary. The victim reported her checkbook and identification stolen. That same evening a woman, later identified as defendant, wrote a check on the victim\u2019s account at a grocery store. Two days later, defendant and another woman were arrested. The police recovered some of the victim\u2019s checks.\nOn May 9, 1983, defendant was convicted of separate forgery charges involving the same account. During the trial, the State introduced testimony about the instant forgery. The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished order. People v. Owens (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 1169 (Rule 23 order).\nOn October 14, 1983, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, in the instant case. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate judgment.\nOn June 1, 1984, the trial court held a hearing on both matters. It took judicial notice of the May 9 McLean County conviction and the appellate court order. Defense counsel argued that section 3 \u2014 3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 required the State to prosecute all of the charges related to the theft-forgery of the victim\u2019s checks at the same time. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 3(b).) The court found separate offenses were involved. It denied the motion and dismissed the petition.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that under section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, the State was required to offer her the opportunity to plead guilty to the instant charges prior to sentencing on the May 9 forgery conviction. She argues that prosecuting the offenses separately was fundamentally unfair because the State knew about the instant offense and in fact used testimony about the instant offense in the earlier trial. The State first argues that the defendant\u2019s voluntary guilty plea waived the issue, and she did not argue the issue below or raise it in her post-conviction relief petition. On the merits, the State argues the section does not require the State\u2019s Attorney to offer defendant an opportunity to plead guilty on all potential charges.\nGenerally, a voluntary guilty plea waives all errors, defects, and irregularities in the proceedings which are not jurisdictional in nature. This includes constitutional errors. (People v. Brown (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505, 244 N.E.2d 159, 160; People v. McKean (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 504, 418 N.E.2d 1130, 1132; 87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).) Defendant does not argue her plea was involuntary. The record demonstrates that it was a voluntary plea, and the trial court properly admonished defendant. 87 Ill. 2d R. 402.\nHowever, where the error involves a substantial right of the accused, a reviewing court may, at its discretion, consider the merits of defendant\u2019s claim. (People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432; 87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) Such an instance exists in this case.\nGenerally, failure to raise an issue in a motion to withdraw guilty pleas and petitions for post-conviction relief waives review of the issue. (People v. McKean (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 418 N.E.2d 1130; People v. Fuca (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 182, 251 N.E.2d 239; 87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).) However, the same concerns which apply to the voluntary guilty plea apply here.\nSection 5 \u2014 4\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections states:\n\u201cAfter conviction and before sentencing, the defendant shall be permitted, subject to the approval of the State\u2019s Attorney, to plead guilty to other offenses he has committed which are within the same county. If the defendant is not formally charged with such offenses, an information shall be filed on the basis of defendant\u2019s admission of guilt. Submission of such a plea shall constitute a waiver of all objections which the defendant might otherwise have to the charge. If such a plea is tendered and accepted, the court shall sentence the defendant for all offenses in one hearing under Section 5 \u2014 8\u20144.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-4-2(a).)\nDefendant argues that she was in effect sentenced to extra months\u2019 imprisonment because the State\u2019s Attorney did not give her the opportunity to plead guilty on the instant charge prior to sentencing on the May 9 conviction.\nThis section has not been interpreted by the court. The purpose of section 5 \u2014 4\u20142(a) is to provide for consolidation of all outstanding charges against the defendant for a single sentencing. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20142(a), Council Commentary, at 349 (Smith-Hurd 1982).) The first step in statutory analysis is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. (People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141, 445 N.E.2d 1174, 1175.) Statutory language is Considered first. Where the language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other construction aids. People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 445 N.E.2d 1174.\nIn the instant case, the statute says defendant shall be allowed to plead guilty to other offenses with the approval of the State\u2019s Attorney. In effect, both parties must agree before sentencing on other offenses \"will be held simultaneously with sentencing on the convicted offense. The section provides an opportunity for joint sentencing but does not require it.\nFrom the section\u2019s language, defendant\u2019s guilty plea on unrelated offenses during the period after conviction but before sentencing is subject to the approval of the State\u2019s Attorney. Therefore, the defendant does not have a statutory right to plead guilty and be sentenced simultaneously for the unrelated offenses. Concomitantly, the State\u2019s Attorney has no statutory duty to offer the defendant an opportunity to enter a guilty plea on all potential charges. Additionally, we note that creation of such a duty would result in increased administrative difficulties at the trial level.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, P.J., and MILLS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Ronald C. Dozier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANITA OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201484\u20140462\nOpinion filed March 6, 1985.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRonald C. Dozier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 403, "last_page_order": 406 }