{ "id": 3443684, "name": "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Continental Casualty Co.", "decision_date": "1985-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20140275", "first_page": "310", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 310" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3284388 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/275/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 1223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3276581 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 N.Y.S. 883", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 3189176 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/160/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8499164 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/88/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3301982 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/247/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5218849 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/28/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5602988 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 1020", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3385860 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ala. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 5282311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66" }, { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/270/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.W.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10147923 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/456/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Minn. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 895003 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/304/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.Y.S. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Misc. 2d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1137826 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/42/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5483786 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074014 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991510 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5393223 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126478 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5469361 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0671-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 808, "char_count": 16974, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.139472759338143e-07, "percentile": 0.578123280546472 }, "sha256": "004bdd38d535c312b3a93b7140969ef2d920c0255a3e852421d52c90d103da7d", "simhash": "1:3bf810bc858d3fde", "word_count": 2769 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:37.184543+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe present action concerns an insurance contract purchased from defendant, Continental Casualty Company (Continental) by plaintiff, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (ICG) in which Continental promised to indemnify ICG employees who suffered accidental death or serious injury in specified situations. When an employee of ICG was accidently killed and ICG was subsequently forced to pay death benefits to the heirs of the employee under the terms of a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement, Continental denied liability on the ground that the employee\u2019s death was not covered by the policy. ICG then brought a declaratory judgment action against Continental, alleging breach of contract. Continental moved to dismiss the action on the ground it was barred by a contractual limitation clause which provided that \u201c[n]o action *** shall be brought to recover on this policy *** unless brought within three years from the expiration of the time within which proof of loss was required by the policy.\u201d The trial court sustained Continental\u2019s motion and dismissed ICG\u2019s action. ICG now appeals.\nICG contends: (1) that the contractual limitation of actions clause is ambiguous with respect to its action; (2) that even if the clause is unambiguous, its action was filed within the requisite time period and (3) that Continental waived its limitation of actions and cannot revive it.\nThe record reveals that on February 10, 1971, plaintiff ICG entered into a bargaining agreement with labor organizations representing some of its employees, including members of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way (BMW). Under the terms of the bargaining agreement, ICG agreed to pay accident benefits when these employees were killed or injured while \u201criding in, boarding, or alighting from off-track vehicles authorized by [ICG] and are (1) deadheading under orders or (2) being transported at [ICG\u2019s] expense.\u201d Nothing in the agreement required ICG to provide the benefits through an insurance policy; the benefits were strictly a potential liability of the employer.\nICG subsequently purchased a group accident insurance policy from Continental in which Continental agreed with ICG, the policyholder, to insure \u201cinsured persons\u201d (members of various labor organizations who were employees of ICG) and promised to pay for loss resulting from injury to the extent therein limited and provided. The policy defined \u201cinjury\u201d as bodily injury. The policy provided for $100,000 in accidental death benefits to be paid to the insured employees of ICG where death occurred as a result of an \u201cinjury sustained in consequence of riding as a passenger or operator in or on, boarding or alighting from any off-track land conveyance for the purpose of deadheading under orders or being transported at the [policyholder\u2019s] expense other than as an operator or member of the crew in any conveyance operated for the carriage of passengers for hire.\u201d The contract also included a \u201climitation on actions\u201d clause which stated:\n\u201cNo action at law or in equity shall be brought to recover on this policy *** unless brought within three years from the expiration of the time within which proof of loss is required by the policy.\u201d\nRegarding proof of loss, the policy provided that \u201c[i]n the case of claim for any [loss other than loss of time from disability], written proof of such loss must be furnished to the Company within 90 days after the date of such loss.\u201d\nOn October 30, 1978, the collective bargaining agreement was amended to increase the death benefits from $100,000 to $150,000. The benefits under ICG\u2019s policy with Continental were amended so that they conformed with the labor agreement.\nOn March 25, 1980, Gary Martin, an employee of ICG and a member of BMW, was killed when a truck struck the backhoe he was operating while going from one work site to another. ICG presented a claim under the policy on behalf of Martin\u2019s heirs. On June 2, 1980, Continental rejected the claim, asserting that Martin was not deadheading when he was killed. Rather than proceeding against the insurance company under the policy, the heirs of Gary Martin opted for an alternative remedy available under the collective bargaining agreement and Federal labor laws. The BMW, on behalf of Martin\u2019s heirs, instituted a grievance procedure pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 et seq. (1976)) which established the \u201cRailroad Adjustment Board\u201d for settling \u201cminor disputes\u201d between a railroad and its employees. On February 26, 1982, the board ordered ICG to pay $150,000 (less appropriate setoffs) to Martin\u2019s heirs, holding that Martin\u2019s death came within the terms of the bargaining agreement because he died while he was riding in an off-track vehicle and was being transported at ICG\u2019s expense. Following the award, ICG again sought payment under the policy, but Continental denied the claim again on March 31,1982.\nOn August 19, 1983, ICG brought this declaratory judgment action. Continental moved to dismiss the action on the ground that ICG\u2019s action was barred by the \u201climitation on actions\u201d clause since its loss was sustained on the date Martin was killed, which was more than three years (plus the 90-day \u201cproof of loss\u201d period) prior to the initiation of suit. The trial court sustained Continental\u2019s motion and dismissed ICG\u2019s action.\nThe only issue we need determine on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing ICG\u2019s action. ICG maintains that the clause stating the contractual limitation period is ambiguous or, in the alternative, it does not apply to ICG\u2019s action, but only to actions brought on the policy by employees and personal representatives.\nIn reviewing a trial court\u2019s order granting a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a complaint, we must regard ICG\u2019s well-pleaded facts and their reasonable inferences as true. Clear-Vu Packaging, Inc. v. Na tional Union Fire Insurance Co. (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674, 434 N.E.2d 365, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 567.\nIn interpreting an insurance policy, the court\u2019s primary concern is to effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed by the contract. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 419 N.E.2d 601.) \u201cInsurance policies should be construed as a whole, giving effect to every part, as far as it is possible.\u201d (Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 115, 121, 294 N.E.2d 7, appeal denied (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 608.) Any ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed against the insurer, as the insurer drafted the policy. Kirk v. Financial Security Life Insurance Co. (1978), 75 Ill. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has pointed out: \u201cAn insurance policy is not to be interpreted in a factual vacuum; it is issued under given factual circumstances. What at first blush might appear unambiguous in the insurance contract might not be such in the particular factual setting in which the contract was issued.\u201d (Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 312 N.E.2d 247.) In determining if an ambiguity exists, the court should consider the subject matter of the contract, the facts surrounding its execution, the situation of the parties and the predominate purpose of the contract which is to indemnify the insured. Dora Township v. Indiana Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 921; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moore (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 250, 430 N.E.2d 641, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 565.\nIn the case at bar, Continental characterized the insurance policy in question as a \u201cgroup accident indemnity policy\u201d under which ICG was the policyholder who paid the premiums. Employees of ICG who were members of named labor organizations were the insured persons under the policy. Continental agreed to pay benefits for losses resulting from bodily injuries suffered by these employees. All indemnities were payable to the employees or their beneficiaries upon proof of the occurrence for which the claim is made. There is no provision which indicated that ICG was an insured person under the policy or that it was entitled to collect benefits. There was nothing in the policy to indicate that benefits would be paid to ICG if it was found liable to an injured employee by reason of the collective bargaining agreement or for any other reason.\nCourts have recognized that:\n\u201cUnlike the ordinary policy situation where the policyholder is also the insured, the group insurance policyholder is the employer who merely derives certain incidental good will benefits in his relationship with his employees by virtue of the policy, but he is neither the insured nor the beneficiary of the coverage which the contract of insurance undertakes to provide. It is, instead, the employees who are the insureds and who directly benefit under the terms of the policy. *** Since the employer-policyholder acquires only peripheral benefits, it is to be expected that he will be most concerned with obtaining the insurance at the lowest possible cost. The employee insureds, on the other hand, will be more concerned with the protective aspects of the policy.\u201d (Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (Sup. Ct. 1963), 42 Misc. 2d 616, 628-29, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 559, 570-71.)\nIn the case at bar, it is the employer who is concerned with the protective aspects of the policy. Neither our research nor that of the parties has uncovered any case which deals with rights of the employer to enforce the protective provisions of this type of group insurance.\nGroup insurance contracts in which the employee is the insured have been construed as creating a contract between the employer and the insurer for the benefit of the insured employees and not for the benefit of the one procuring the group policy. (44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance sec. 1842 (1982).) Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an employer may not be the real party in interest in suits for the disbursement of benefits under such a policy. (See Norby v. Bankers Life Co. (1975), 304 Minn. 464, 231 N.W.2d 665; Key Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), 456 S.W.2d 707, 709; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association v. Bullard (1960), 270 Ala. 558, 565-66, 120 So. 2d 714, 721-22; see also 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance sec. 1850 (1982).) Illinois law is unclear on this point. (See Mayfair Construction Co. v. Security Insurance Co. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 588, 366 N.E.2d 1020.) Therefore, the parties could not have incorporated industry custom or a common understanding regarding the rights of a policyholder under this type of group insurance as a means to clarify ICG\u2019s rights under the limitation clause. (See Nabor v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 288, 396 N.E.2d 1267; Caster v. Motors Insurance Corp. (1961), 28 Ill. App. 2d 363, 171 N.E.2d 425.) But, regardless of the exact perimeters of a policyholder\u2019s rights under a group policy, ICG is clearly a primary contracting party to this group insurance contract and, as such, retains rights under its contract with Continental by virtue of its payment of premiums in consideration for Continental\u2019s promise to provide insurance for its employees. (See 4 A. Corbin, Contracts sec. 812 (1951).) The fact remains that the right of ICG to enforce the protective provisions of the policy is not clearly spelled out in the insurance contract. Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the position of a policyholder of this type of group insurance and the lack of clarity regarding ICG\u2019s rights under the policy, we believe that an honest ambiguity exists concerning the impact of the contractual limitation clause on ICG\u2019s right to enforce the protective provisions of the policy.\nContinental maintains that the limitation clause is clear and must be enforced according to its plain language. However, an analysis of the plain language of the clause demonstrates its ambiguity. The clause limiting the time in which actions may be brought refers to actions \u201cbrought to recover on this policy.\u201d However, ICG\u2019s action is not an action to recover on the policy. An action on a promise to provide insurance may be distinct from an action on an insurance policy. (Irvin v. Metropolitan-Hibernia Fire Insurance Co. (1928), 247 Ill. App. 562, 566; see also De Luxe Motor Stages v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1967), 88 Ill. App. 2d 188, 193, 232 N.E.2d 141; Lawrence v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (Sup. Ct. 1916), 160 N.Y.S. 883, 895.) Moreover, contractual limitation periods generally do not apply to \u201cdifferent or collateral actions involving, in some measure, the policy proceeds or growing out of the insurer\u2019s duties to the insured.\u201d (Florsheim v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 298, 309, 393 N.E.2d 1223, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 620; see also 20A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice sec. 11603 (1980).) Inasmuch as ICG is not seeking policy proceeds and is not an insured, its action is collateral to an action for the policy proceeds or growing out of the insurer\u2019s duties to the insured.\nIn the case at bar, ICG is not attempting to recover on the policy because the death benefits are payable under the policy to ICG\u2019s employees, who are the insured persons and the only parties entitled to collect these benefits. The limitation in the policy is by its plain terms intended to cover an action for the policy proceeds. But Continental is not faced with a claim made on behalf of the deceased employee for the indemnification due under the policy. ICG paid the claim of the deceased employee under the terms of its collective bargaining agreement. ICG is suing in its own right for damages caused by Continental\u2019s alleged breach of its promise to provide insurance coverage to ICG\u2019s employees and not for the benefits enumerated in the policy. Inasmuch as the limitation clause applies only to actions brought to recover indemnification due to insured employees under the policy, while, on the contrary, this action is brought to recover damages for breach of the underlying promise to provide insurance coverage, the present action is not clearly subject to any limitation provided in the policy.\nIn addition, Continental obviously felt some confusion regarding ICG\u2019s right of action under the policy. At one time prior to the present action, Continental \u201cindicated that the suit might have to be filed by the individual to be valid.\u201d Continental has since changed its position, but this merely highlights the uncertainty surrounding ICG\u2019s rights with respect to the policy.\nContinental also argues that ICG may not recover because the \u201closs\u201d which ICG now claims is not a loss covered by the policy. Even if true, it is irrelevant since ICG is suing as a party to the insurance contract and not as an insured under this policy. Authorities have recognized that the liability of the insurer on its contract of insurance is distinct from the liability which may arise by virtue of its breach of that contract. (18 Couch on Insurance sec. 74.98 (2d ed. 1983); see also Bartkowski v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. (1934), 275 Ill. App. 497.) Moreover, Continental\u2019s argument that the loss which ICG now claims is not a loss covered by the policy bolsters our conclusion that ICG\u2019s action is not an \u201caction to recover on this policy.\u201d\nFor the above-stated reasons, we find the clause limiting the time within which actions may be brought to recover on the policy to be ambiguous. Consequently, it must be construed against Continental, the insurer and drafter of the policy. (Kirk v. Financial Security Life Insurance Co. (1978), 75 Ill. 2d 367, 389 N.E.2d 144.) We hold that ICG\u2019s action is not barred by the \u201climitation on actions\u201d clause in the policy.\nIn its complaint for declaratory judgment, ICG asked the court to declare that Continental had breached its contract with ICG. While it is within the power of the court to make a binding declaration of the parties\u2019 rights (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 701(a)), we cannot make such a determination based on the record now before us. We believe that a hearing should be held in order to determine the parties\u2019 intentions as to the coverage of the policy and whether Continental breached its contract with ICG. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcGLOON, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Winston & Strawn, of Chicago (R. Lawrence Storms and Edward J. Wendow, of counsel), for appellant.", "Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Thomas M. Hamilton, and Fritz K. Huszagh, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 84\u20140275\nOpinion filed March 25, 1985.\nRehearing denied April 23, 1985.\nWinston & Strawn, of Chicago (R. Lawrence Storms and Edward J. Wendow, of counsel), for appellant.\nHinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Thomas M. Hamilton, and Fritz K. Huszagh, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0310-01", "first_page_order": 332, "last_page_order": 338 }