{ "id": 3441444, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reynolds", "decision_date": "1985-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20141339", "first_page": "559", "last_page": "563", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 559" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524067 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 So. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1741048, 9643386 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/54/0502-01", "/so2d/310/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ala. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala. App.", "case_ids": [ 1741048 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/54/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ga. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1115216 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/226/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435580 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984379 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0513-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 11149, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1850200046748689e-07, "percentile": 0.5897148829912477 }, "sha256": "572a3075d5a6d00631700c2b5f797eef193d3aa1909f35e6de5990df9c8c1d01", "simhash": "1:2f27aaee5553a955", "word_count": 1854 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:37.184543+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter negotiations with the State through his counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and improper lane usage. He was placed on supervision for one year, referred to the Alcoholic Evaluation Program, and was fined $250 by Judge William J. O\u2019Connell. Other charges were stricken with leave to reinstate on motion by the State and the hearing on a charge of failure to comply with the Illinois implied consent statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1) was continued for approximately one year.\nAfter a subsequent evidentiary hearing on March 1, 1984, Judge Edwin J. Richardson found that defendant was able but refused to submit to a breathalyzer test on the date of his arrest, and his driver\u2019s license was ordered suspended. On appeal, defendant contests the license suspension, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court\u2019s finding that he refused to submit to a request to take a breathalyzer test, and that the implied consent statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.\nAt the implied consent hearing, a Sauk Village police officer testified that on the afternoon of January 1, 1983, he stopped defendant for speeding, passing another car in a well-marked no-passing zone, and weaving across the center line. When he asked defendant to produce his driver\u2019s license, he smelled a \u201cstrong odor of alcohol\u201d on defendant\u2019s breath. Defendant admitted that he had \u201chad a few drinks,\u201d and \u201cneeded support\u201d to walk to the back of the car. Defendant then was advised both at the arrest scene and at the police station of the implied consent statute; specifically, he was requested to take a breathalyzer test and told of the consequences of refusing to submit to that test. Defendant refused to take that test at the arrest scene and at the police station. Four traffic citations were issued, and a report and sworn affidavit indicating defendant\u2019s refusal were prepared and signed at the station.\nOn cross-examination, the officer stated that while in the course of transporting him to the station, defendant told him he had \u201can asthma problem\u201d and \u201cwas having problems breathing.\u201d Defendant said he \u201ccould not\u201d take the test while in the squad car because he could not breathe and needed medical attention. Defendant told him that he had medication on his person and requested permission to use it so that he could breathe. The officer denied that permission. Defendant continued to request that he be allowed to use his medication; however, the officer did not permit him to do so until he arrived at the police station after a brief ride, even though defendant \u201cwas laboring in his breathing.\u201d The officer inspected the medication, a spray can that defendant used, and recorded its name on his report, \u201cMedihaler-Iso[proterenel Sulfate],\u201d which he was told was asthma medication. Sauk Village paramedics were called to the police station. The paramedics came after defendant had used his medication, and he then refused to be transported by or to take medical aid from the ambulance attendant. Later, after taking the medication at the station, he \u201cwas able to breathe much easier.\u201d The officer told the breathalyzer operator that he had permitted defendant to take his medication, \u201cso [that] he could make the determination to see if it was not substantial [sic] to take the breathalyzer.\u201d\nOn redirect examination, the officer testified that the second time he asked defendant to take the test, five or 10 minutes after he used his inhaler, the officer did not \u201cnotice anything unusual\u201d about defendant\u2019s breathing. Defendant \u201cindicated\u201d thereafter that he didn\u2019t want to take the test.\nDefendant testified at the hearing. He suffered from asthma all his life. The attacks were bad enough a number of times so as to require hospitalization. At the scene of his arrest, his asthma attack became \u201cvery severe\u201d when he was handcuffed and put in the squad car. The medication referred to by the officer had been prescribed for his condition, and he carried it in his pocket. He repeatedly asked the officer to be allowed to use the medication, which was refused him until he got to the police station. On the way to the station the officer radioed ahead to have paramedics meet them there. He \u201ccouldn\u2019t breathe whatsoever\u201d when he arrived at the station. He was in \u201cvery bad shape\u201d and he \u201ccouldn\u2019t think.\u201d When he was requested again by the officer to take the breathalyzer test, he said he \u201ccan\u2019t breathe\u201d or \u201cblow in any pipe.\u201d He heard the officer and another officer saying they were not sure that they could administer the breathalyzer test because of the medication and the \u201cconditions involved.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, he testified that after such an attack, it usually took \u201ca day or two\u201d before he could resume breathing normally. He had been rushed to the intensive care unit a number of times for asthma attacks. Although \u201ca period of time\u201d elapsed between his taking medication at the station and the second request by the officer that he take the breathalyzer test, he was still gasping for air. On redirect, he testified that at that time he \u201cwas unable to\u201d blow into the tube, and was barely able to breathe. Stress is one of the elements which affect his asthmatic condition.\nThe circuit court found that defendant\u2019s breathing returned to normal after taking his medication and that he could have taken the breathalyzer test but refused.\nDefendant asserts that the circuit court\u2019s finding that he was able but refused to take the breathalyzer test was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record evidence here shows that defendant was experiencing an asthma attack during the course of his arrest. Both he and the arresting officer so testified. The State argues that defendant\u2019s refusal of medical attention from an ambulance attendant indicates that he recovered shortly after his arrest. In contraposition was defendant\u2019s evidence .that he had suffered from asthma all his life, had carried necessary medications with him and, through previous experience, knew what to do to restore his breathing. Evidence as to the seriousness of the attack and the extent to which it rendered defendant unable to take the test thus was in conflict and properly was to be determined by the trier of fact. Since implied consent hearings are to proceed in the same manner as other civil proceedings and the Supreme Court Rules on civil appeals (87 Ill. 2d R. 301 et seq.) are applicable (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 501.1(c); People v. Malloy (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 513, 519, 395 N.E.2d 381), this court cannot disturb the circuit court\u2019s findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (People v. Schuberth (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304, 450 N.E.2d 459; People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 717-18, 445 N.E.2d 878); we hold they are not.\nDefendant insists that under the evidence submitted, he clearly was \u201cunable\u201d to take the sobriety test and therefore did not \u201crefuse\u201d to take it within the meaning of the statute, citing Burson v. Collier (1970), 226 Ga. 427, 175 S.E.2d 660, and State v. Rajala (1975), 54 Ala. App. 502, 310 So. 2d 223. In Burson, defendant twice was unable to complete a breath test because he suffered from emphysema and in Rajala, the asthmatic and emphysematous defendant was unable to blow enough air into the breathalyzer to complete the test.\nThe facts in the instant case are otherwise. Here, after a trial upon the merits, the circuit court chose to believe evidence that defendant\u2019s breathing returned to normal and that he could have taken the test but refused. Defendant elected to stand upon his own testimony that it took \u201ca day or two\u201d before he could resume normal breathing, rather than submitting substantive medical evidence of his condition. The circuit court was faced with the problem of accepting the version of the arresting officer or that of defendant and relied upon the former. If there is any medical evidence which demonstrates that one who suffers from asthma cannot perform the breathalyzer test until \u201ca day or two\u201d after an attack, it should have been presented to the circuit court at trial, but was not. Had defendant thus shown his inability to take the test with such evidence, the circuit court would have been justified in finding him \u201cunable\u201d to do so. See, e.g., People v. Schuberth (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 302, 305, 450 N.E.2d 459. Cf. Burson v. Collier (1970), 226 Ga. 427, 175 S.E.2d 660 and State v. Rajala (1975), 54 Ala. App. 502, 310 So. 2d 223.\nAlso questioned by defendant is the accuracy of the breathalyzer test, which he asserts may have been compromised by his having inhaled medication. He maintains that the police could have just as easily and efficiently administered a blood or urine test that would not have exacerbated his medical condition. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).) Of course, those tests might have been initiated by the paramedics who had been called to the police station by reason of the alleged severity of the attack and the selection of which remaining alternative tests should be given would not have been at defendant\u2019s instance (see People v. Kiss (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 462 N.E.2d 546), but would have remained the option of the State. Absent evidence that defendant\u2019s breathing returned to normal, the State\u2019s failure to initiate other tests could have become important to the disposition of this case; however, in view of our conclusion that the circuit court\u2019s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the availability of alternative tests is of no moment here.\nFor the same reasons set forth in the preceding paragraph, defendant\u2019s assertion that the implied consent law as applied to him violated his fourteenth amendment rights of due process and equal protection is unpersuasive. That argument is based upon the police officer\u2019s failure to arrange for testing alternatives to the breathalyzer because such other tests would not have further aggravated defendant\u2019s breathing. As above noted, because the circuit court had the right to believe under the evidence that defendant\u2019s breathing returned to normal and could have taken the breathalyzer but refused, there was no occasion for an alternative test to have been administered. Defendant did not ask for them and, under the record evidence, the authorities need not have offered them. We find no constitutional impediment to the implied consent statute as applied in this case.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nPERLIN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Gierach, of Gierach & Schussler, Ltd., of Oak Lawn, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Karen C. Wirth, and Peter D. Zaper, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 84\u20141339\nOpinion filed April 16, 1985.\nJames E. Gierach, of Gierach & Schussler, Ltd., of Oak Lawn, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Karen C. Wirth, and Peter D. Zaper, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0559-01", "first_page_order": 581, "last_page_order": 585 }