{ "id": 3442932, "name": "LADEREK GUYTON, a Minor, by his Mother and Next Friend, Mary Guyton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL ROUNDY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Guyton v. Roundy", "decision_date": "1985-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20140488", "first_page": "573", "last_page": "579", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 573" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2524790 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533848 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/102/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3241411 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2947974 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904697 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5453792 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3408174 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3149024 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3273489 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475820 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5449385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490683 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676285 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427298 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0165-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 727, "char_count": 14735, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.124534671057535e-07, "percentile": 0.574302015291239 }, "sha256": "e568cf7ed4645206e8313c8001defd4cfa487e3505fe06ac5fc3adae3dd38158", "simhash": "1:737580cc279fa544", "word_count": 2380 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:37.184543+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LADEREK GUYTON, a Minor, by his Mother and Next Friend, Mary Guyton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL ROUNDY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment to both defendants.\nIn June 1983, plaintiff filed his two-count third amended complaint in which he alleged: In February 1980, plaintiff was nine years old and attended Ignace Jan Paderewski elementary school. His teacher, defendant Roundy, \u201cordered and compelled\u201d plaintiff to move a \u201clarge\u201d desk from her classroom to another classroom. While moving the desk plaintiff fell, and was injured. In count I plaintiff contended that defendant, Chicago Board of Education (board), \u201cthrough its agent and servant Hazel Roundy was guilty of one or more of the following acts of negligence:\n\u201c(a) Negligently and carelessly ordered the plaintiff to carry a large desk beyond his capacity or skill to handle;\n(b) Negligently and carelessly failed to provide adequate supervision of the plaintiff so as not to bring harm to him and others;\n(c) Negligently and carelessly operated and controlled the activities of the students in a manner which would not prevent harm to plaintiff and others;\n(d) Negligently and carelessly failed to keep a proper lookout during the activities of her students so as not to prevent harm to plaintiff and others.\u201d\nCount II alleged the same facts, and contended that defendants were guilty of wilful and wanton conduct in that they:\n\u201c(a) Wilfully and wantonly ordered plaintiff to carry a large desk outside the classroom knowing that this activity could cause him injury since the desk was too large for him to carry;\n(b) Wilfully and wantonly ordered plaintiff to engage in a dangerous activity, to wit, moving heavy furniture;\n(c) Wilfully and wantonly ordered plaintiff to perform an activity, such as moving heavy furniture, which was beyond the scope of their duty and obligation in providing an education for plaintiff.\u201d\nRoundy filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching as exhibits thereto her affidavit, the transcript of plaintiff\u2019s deposition, and two pictures of the desk involved. In her affidavit, Roundy stated that on the date in question, her own classroom had too many desks and another classroom across the hallway was in need of more desks. She requested three or four students, including plaintiff, to assist her in moving some desks to the other classroom. She asserted that the desks involved \u201cwere small student desks,\u201d and that the top of the desks measured 14 inches by 22 inches. She stood in her classroom doorway so she could observe both the classroom and the students moving the desks the \u201c20 or 30 paces\u201d across the hallway to the other classroom. She saw plaintiff fall. She saw nothing on the hallway floor to trip plaintiff, nor was he \u201cshoved or pushed\u201d by anyone else. She further contended that she had in the past requested students to move similar desks, all without incident, and that \u201cplaintiff was having no difficulty moving the desk until he tripped and fell.\u201d Her statement that \u201cit appeared that [plaintiff] tripped over his own feet\u201d was subsequently stricken by the trial court as a conclusion.\nIn relevant part, plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony was that he had not moved desks on previous occasions; that Roundy did not give him any instructions as to how the desk was to be moved; and although he did not think he was strong enough to move the desk, he did not so advise Roundy. He did not know what caused him to fall.\nThe board also filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it could be liable only under a theory of respondeat superior and that because Roundy\u2019s motion for summary judgment should be granted, the board\u2019s motion should also be granted.\nIn response to the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff filed an unverified pleading in which he asserted that Roundy\u2019s actions were \u201cbeyond the scope of her duty and obligation in providing an education to the plaintiff, and further there are questions of fact which preclude the granting\u201d of defendants\u2019 motions.\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment, finding, as to count I, that teachers are not liable for ordinary negligence in matters within the teacher-student relationship; and, as to count II, that the complaint did not allege facts demonstrating wilful and wanton conduct by defendants. Plaintiff appeals.\nThe relevant provision of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 122, par. 34 \u2014 84a) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cTeachers and other certified educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools, ***. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the'absence of their parents or guardians.\u201d\nIn Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705, our supreme court held that this statute \u201cconfer[s] upon teachers and other certified educational employees immunity from suits for negligence arising out of \u2018matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.\u2019 In order to impose liability against such educators, a plaintiff must prove wilful and wanton misconduct.\u201d 63 Ill. 2d 165,173.\nIn Hadley v. Witt Unit School District 66 (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 19, 20-21, 462 N.E.2d 877, the court stated:\n\u201cOne matter is very clear: teachers are not liable for ordinary negligence in the performance of their supervisory duties. [Citations.] The School Code confers upon a teacher the status of a parent or guardian with regard to \u2018all activities connected with the school program.\u2019 [Citation.] The status in loco parentis shields a teacher from liability in both nondisciplinary and disciplinary matters.\u201d\nThis immunity is based on public policy considerations. \u201cIn the interest of student-teacher harmony, litigation between them should not be encouraged \u2014 absent wilful and wanton conduct.\u201d Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 165,171, 395 N.E.2d 538.\nPlaintiff asserts that the statutory immunity recognized in Kobylanski applies only to matters relating to the \u201cdiscipline in and conduct of\u201d the schools and school children, and that the activity here in issue falls outside of that protective scope. Plaintiff contends that the trial court here should not have granted summary judgment as to count I of the complaint (alleging negligence) because moving desks should be considered to be an activity which is \u201coutside of the student-teacher relationship\u201d and therefore the statutory immunity does not apply. Plaintiff correctly notes that courts have found some activities to be outside of the scope of section 34 \u2014 845a. For example, Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323, and Lynch v. Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447, upheld actions for negligence against school boards for providing allegedly defective equipment to students. Conceding that these cases are not directly on point with the instant case, plaintiff argues that they indicate the \u201cwillingness\u201d of courts to allow exceptions to the immunity recognized in Kobylanski. Plaintiff urges this court to find that the activity here \u2014 moving desks \u2014 should likewise be deemed to be outside of the protection provided in Kobylanski.\nRoundy responds that the cases cited by plaintiff all relate to situations \u201cwhere the student-teacher relationship was obviously not involved,\u201d while in the present case the teacher\u2019s request that a student move a small desk across a hallway is related to a teacher\u2019s responsibility to maintain an orderly classroom and consequently falls within the student-teacher relationship.\nThere is no single test for determining the scope of the duties encompassed by the statute; courts have stated that teachers are immune from negligence in activities which are \u201cconnected with the school program\u201d (O\u2019Brien v. Township High School District 21b (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 462, 467, 415 N.E.2d 1015) and activities which involve the \u201cteacher-student relationship in matters relating to the teacher\u2019s personal supervision and control of the conduct or physical movement of a student ***.\u201d Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 52, 373 N.E.2d 1323.\nIn our opinion, the activity here in issue, the moving of a single student\u2019s desk by a student, is not \u201cbeyond\u201d or \u201ctotally outside the ambit of a teacher\u2019s supervisory function\u201d and does fall within the parameters of a supervisory activity which is \u201cconnected with the school program.\u201d (O\u2019Brien v. Township High School District 21b (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 462, 467-68, 415 N.E.2d 1015; see also Booker v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 381, 394 N.E.2d 452.) We conclude that, under these facts, defendants were immune from liability for negligent conduct. Therefore, the trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendants on count I of the complaint.\nIn count II, plaintiff alleged that Roundy\u2019s actions constituted wilful and wanton conduct. Plaintiff contends that the question of whether Roundy\u2019s conduct amounted to wilful and wanton was for a jury to decide, and that therefore the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Plaintiff also contends that there existed issues of material fact which should have defeated the motion for summary judgment, pointing to plaintiff\u2019s statement that he was having \u201cdifficulty\u201d moving the desk, while Roundy\u2019s affidavit states she did not observe plaintiff having any difficulty in moving the desk.\nDefendants respond that the court properly entered summary judgment in their favor on count II because even construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no indication here of any wilful and wanton misconduct.\nIn Lynch v. Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 429, 412 N.E.2d 447, the supreme court quoted with approval a definition of wilful and wanton conduct from an earlier decision:\n\u201cA wilful or wanton injury must have been intentional or the act must have been committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to discover the danger through recklessness, or carelessness when it could have been discovered by ordinary care.\u201d\nIn order to state a cause of action for wilful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff must allege facts \u201cfrom which the law would raise a duty and which would show that the intentional breach of the duty resulted in injury. The mere conclusory allegation of wilful and wanton conduct is not sufficient. [Citation.]\u201d (Booker v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 381, 385, 394 N.E.2d 452.) Summary judgment will be granted when there are no issues of material fact, and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plastics & Equipment Sales Co. v. DeSoto, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 415 N.E.2d 492.\nThe issue presented is whether the pleadings, depositions and affidavits \u201cwill support a finding of an issue of fact as to whether the defendant was guilty of willful and wanton conduct.\u201d (Poynter v. Kankakee School District No. 111 (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 46, 48, 370 N.E.2d 667.) To defeat summary judgment, the disputed factual issue must be material to the essential elements of either the cause of action or the defense thereto. First National Bank v. Lambert (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 177, 440 N.E.2d 306.\nWe do not find that plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a material issue of fact. Plaintiff did not file a counteraffidavit, but relied on plaintiff\u2019s deposition statement that he was having \u201cdifficulty\u201d moving the desk. We find unsupported conclusions are insufficient to raise a material issue of fact. See, Anderson \u201cSafeway\u201d Guard Rail Corp. v. Champaign Asphalt Co. (1971), 131 Ill. App. 2d 924, 928, 266 N.E.2d 414.\nWhile the question of whether or not certain conduct amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct is normally a jury question (Hadley v. Witt Unit School District 66 (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 19, 462 N.E.2d 877, reviewing courts have not hesitated to affirm a trial court\u2019s determinations that allegations in a complaint failed, as a matter of law, to allege wilful and wanton misconduct. Booker v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 381, 394 N.E.2d 452; Clay v. Chicago Board of Education (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 437, 318 N.E.2d 153; Cipolla v. Bloom Township High School District No. 206 (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 434, 388 N.E.2d 31.\nOur courts have repeatedly held that a teacher\u2019s failure to supervise student activities during which a student was injured does not in itself constitute wilful and wanton conduct. See Booker v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 381, 394 N.E.2d 452 (elementary school teacher not guilty of wilful and wanton conduct when she appointed as monitor for students\u2019 entry into a bathroom a student whom she knew had allegedly threatened plaintiff on prior occasions, and on this occasion plaintiff was assaulted in the bathroom); Clay v. Chicago Board of Education (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 437, 318 N.E.2d 153 (conduct of teacher in absenting herself from classroom during which time plaintiff was assaulted by a student who had been previously involved in similar behavior did not constitute wilful and wanton conduct); see also Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No. 12 (1968), 102 Ill. App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780; Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899.\nIn our opinion, the conduct here complained of\u2014 Roundy\u2019s alleged failure to properly supervise plaintiff\u2019s activity \u2014 did not constitute wilful and wanton misconduct.\nWe conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to allege facts which constituted wilful and wanton conduct, and granted defendant\u2019s summary judgment on count II of the complaint.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P.J., and BILANDIC, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Burke & Burke, Ltd., of Chicago (Dennis J. Burke, of counsel), for appellant.", "DeJong, Poltrock & Giampietro, of Chicago (Wayne B. Giampietro and Mildred F. Haggerty, of counsel), for appellee Hazel Roundy.", "Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, of Chicago (Fredrick J. Fraterrigo and Gary M. Feiereisel, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Board of Education." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LADEREK GUYTON, a Minor, by his Mother and Next Friend, Mary Guyton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL ROUNDY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 84\u20140488\nOpinion filed March 19, 1985.\nRehearing denied April 16,1985.\nBurke & Burke, Ltd., of Chicago (Dennis J. Burke, of counsel), for appellant.\nDeJong, Poltrock & Giampietro, of Chicago (Wayne B. Giampietro and Mildred F. Haggerty, of counsel), for appellee Hazel Roundy.\nFraterrigo, Best & Beranek, of Chicago (Fredrick J. Fraterrigo and Gary M. Feiereisel, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Board of Education." }, "file_name": "0573-01", "first_page_order": 595, "last_page_order": 601 }