{ "id": 3529882, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1985-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140404", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "273", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 725", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519549 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476013 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3230013 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148794 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201711 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ga. 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1136648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/233/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3132288 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S. Ct. 304", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 L. Ed. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 942", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11396928, 11397024, 11396713, 11397066, 11396809, 11396850, 11396979, 11396886, 11396765 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0942-06", "/us/389/0942-08", "/us/389/0942-01", "/us/389/0942-09", "/us/389/0942-03", "/us/389/0942-04", "/us/389/0942-07", "/us/389/0942-05", "/us/389/0942-02" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.W.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Mich. App. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2025256 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/6/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388810 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3149164 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971786 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179979 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3114941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493967 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5642733 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/1053-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500122 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5451395 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0901-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 933, "char_count": 17834, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.043064645401759e-08, "percentile": 0.4246620169747348 }, "sha256": "a49d788ec4cd8f04b368747fd860f489ba5572f523faf59eafec59814451dd69", "simhash": "1:abc0a63fbf4831f1", "word_count": 2997 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:42:49.711724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThe defendant, William L. Wilson, appeals his convictions for felony murder and armed robbery following a jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County. The jury further decided that the death penalty should not be imposed, and the defendant was sentenced to natural life imprisonment for the felony murder. A 60-year consecutive sentence for armed robbery was also imposed on the defendant, but the State has since confessed error with regard to the armed robbery conviction and sentence as being a lesser included offense of felony murder. People v. Abrams (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 901, 441 N.E.2d 352; People v. Devine (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 914, 424 N.E.2d 823.\nOn appeal the defendant contends, as did his brother, David R. Wilson, who was similarly convicted and sentenced and whose appeal is the subject of a separate opinion, that his arrest lacked probable cause and that his statements made and evidence seized subsequent to his arrest should have been suppressed. In addition, the defendant argues that a second search of his residence was improper and that the evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed. Finally, the defendant argues that his sentence of natural life imprisonment was excessive.\nIn reviewing the facts presented, we note that the defendant makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty verdicts if defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and evidence obtained was properly denied. Therefore, the limited issue before us is the propriety of the trial court\u2019s pretrial ruling denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe People first called Officer Michael Bornsheuer, who testified that as a police officer for the city of Peoria he had a conversation with Detective Dale Whitledge at approximately 3 p.m. on November 1, 1983, and as a result of which he and other officers went to two residences on Wayne Street in Peoria for the purpose of a \u201cstake out.\u201d Before leaving the station, Bornsheuer had been furnished mug shots of the defendant and his brother, who were to be arrested in connection \u201cwith a homicide investigation.\u201d After waiting 15 to 20 minutes, the officer saw the defendant and his brother come out of one of the residences on Wayne Street, and an arrest was made of both individuals. The defendant\u2019s brother was wearing tennis shoes whose tracks appeared to match those found in the victim\u2019s blood at the scene of a murder the day before at the Bi-Sel Novelty Store in Peoria. The defendant was observed wearing brown suede-type shoes which appeared to have blood on them. One of his fingers was bandaged.\nDetective Dale Whitledge testified that at approximately 4:20 p.m. on the afternoon of October 31, 1983, he was called to the Bi-Sel Novelty Store in Peoria, where he found Marion Wood, a man 55 to 60 years of age, lying dead on the floor in front of the store. The decedent had many stab wounds on his body, face and back. The victim\u2019s throat had been slashed. The decedent had also been stabbed in one of his eyes. The body was still warm, suggesting that the murder had occurred recently. There were tennis shoe prints in blood beside the victim\u2019s body. Whitledge examined the cash register in the store and found only various papers and some pennies. The crime scene was processed for fingerprints. A receipt book bearing the date of the murder indicated that a knife had been sold for $9.30.\nA next-door neighbor, Mr. Swearingen, reported that the decedent had been alive as late as 3 p.m. and that he had found the victim dead on the floor at about 4 p.m. and called the police.\nHerman Capshaw later told the police that he had been in the store on the afternoon Wood was killed and that there had been two men in the store talking to Wood about buying a television set. Capshaw\u2019s description of the men generally matched the description of the defendant and his brother. The men had left without making a purchase but told Wood that they would return before closing time. After the two men left, Wood told Capshaw that it was a shame someone so young had been in prison. The investigating officers therefore concluded that the victim knew at least one of the two men. Capshaw arrived at the shop between 2:30 and 3 p.m. and left about 3:30 to 3:40 p.m.\nAn interview with Barbara Skeen at a business immediately west of the novelty store indicated that she had been at the Pour House Tavern, approximately 40 to 50 feet from the victim\u2019s shop, and overheard a woman named Evelyn telling two customers that her son had come home the evening before with blood all over him and a severe cut on his finger.\nThe police contacted Evelyn Wood at the Pour House Tavern, who identified herself as the defendant\u2019s mother. She stated that her daughter-in-law, Cheryl Wilson, had come to her house on the morning of November 1, 1983, the day after the murder, and told her that her husband, the defendant, had come home the night before with blood all over his clothes and a severe cut on his index finger. Cheryl had told her mother-in-law that her husband claimed he had been in a fight with some blacks who had raped a five-year-old girl on Main Street. Evelyn told the police that both her sons had been in trouble with the police before and that they had been drinking in the Pour House Tavern on the day of the nearby murder.\nThe description of her sons matched that given by Capshaw as the two men in the shop with the decedent just before his death. Mrs. Wood said David was red haired, carried a chain-type wallet with a buck knife on a sheath in his belt, and that the defendant was thinner and shorter than David, with black hair and a beard.\nA Miss Crim told Whitledge that she had been the bartender at the Pour House Tavern on the day of the murder and that both defendants had been in the tavern drinking beer from approximately 11 a.m. until 3 p.m.\nWhitledge also interviewed Richard Curtis, an employee of a nearby Firestone store, who told him that on the afternoon of the murder he had seen two men matching the description of the defendant and his brother walking down an alley near the novelty store. One of the men, the bigger one, carried a chain-type wallet with a knife pouch worn upside down so that if the sheath were unsnapped, the knife would fall out.\nWhen Whitledge returned to the police station, he was told that a fingerprint found at the scene was left by the defendant\u2019s brother, David.\nArmed with the foregoing information, the police decided to take the defendant and his brother into custody.\nWe believe that exigent circumstances required that the police act quickly to apprehend the persons who had murdered the decedent. The evidence obtained at the scene of the crime indicated that the attack had been a vicious assault, with multiple stab wounds on the victim\u2019s body, face and head. The decedent\u2019s throat had been slashed and he had been stabbed in the eyes. Certainly the police could reasonably have concluded that the assailants were armed and dangerous. While it may have been preferable, in hindsight, once they discovered that the defendant\u2019s brother\u2019s fingerprint had been left on a glass display case in the novelty store (which had been left open with a knife missing), to pause and conduct a photographic lineup with Mr. Capshaw and the other witnesses in the area before arresting the defendant and his brother, it is no less clear that the trial court properly determined that at least probable cause existed for the arrests now being challenged.\nIt is not necessary that the information available to the police prove a defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify an arrest. (People v. Coleman (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 364 N.E.2d 742.) Practically speaking, both the trial court and this court are reviewing the officer\u2019s conduct after the fact, and a determination of whether probable cause existed must likewise be based upon the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 352, 432 N.E.2d 861; People v. Gray (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 879, 420 N.E.2d 856.\nProbable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an arresting officer\u2019s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested committed the offense. People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 352, 362, 432 N.E.2d 861, 866.\nIn judging whether probable cause existed, it must be recognized that police officers must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them and that the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals. People v. Walls (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 256, 408 N.E.2d 1056; People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 342 N.E.2d 356.\nDuring oral argument, defendant\u2019s counsel indicated that while there may have been probable cause to arrest defendant\u2019s brother since his fingerprint was found at the scene of the murder, there was no corresponding fingerprint evidence which placed the defendant at the scene of the crime.\nWhile we understand the defendant may be compelled to make such an argument, even at his brother\u2019s expense, in order to escape the consequences which inevitably flow from an adverse ruling, we nevertheless believe that the defendant\u2019s argument is without merit for several reasons. First of all, it was the defendant\u2019s own wife who indicated to her mother-in-law, Evelyn Wood, that her husband had come home the day of the murder covered with blood and a severe cut on his index finger. Secondly, a number of witnesses, including Capshaw, Grim and Curtis, all gave descriptions to the police which matched the defendant\u2019s description, of two men at and near the scene of the murder just prior to the murder.\nAssuming, arguendo, that probable cause was lacking at the precise moment of defendant\u2019s arrest, it certainly existed immediately thereafter when the officers legally detained the defendant and his brother on the day after the murder. The officers knew that certain tennis shoe prints had been left in the blood-soaked carpet around the victim\u2019s body, and when the defendant\u2019s brother was stopped in the company of the defendant, the tennis shoes he was wearing had soles whose tracks appeared to match those found at the scene in the victim\u2019s blood. Furthermore, the arresting officers observed that the defendant was wearing brown suede-type shoes which appeared to have blood on them. The defendant had a bandage on his index finger just as his wife had described to her mother-in-law.\nWe believe that these specific and articulated facts available to the officers supported an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Certainly the fruits of their observations at the time of the defendant\u2019s initial detention ripened into sufficient probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest. People v. Payton (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 78, 414 N.E.2d 283.\nThe defendant\u2019s explanation for the cut on his finger and the blood on his clothes was highly improbable based upon the information known to the officers, i.e., the police knew that the report of an attack upon the little girl did not mention the defendant or his brother; there had been no mention of a suspect; and no report of the incident had been furnished by either defendant.\nFinally, at trial, a police officer who investigated the alleged sexual assault testified that on the night of the victim\u2019s murder, the defendants were present when she responded to the report of the assault. In reviewing the propriety of the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, we may consider evidence which was later presented at trial. People v. Billings (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 414, 367 N.E.2d 337.\nFollowing the defendant\u2019s arrest, each signed a consent to search their respective residences. The police found clothing with what appeared to be dried blood on it in the defendant\u2019s house. They also found a paper bag containing pairs of socks, toys and cigarette lighters like those on display in the novelty store, plus a lock-blade knife with blood on it in the blower unit of the furnace in the defendant\u2019s residence.\nDale Whitledge, one of the investigating officers, left the defendant\u2019s house between 6:15 and 6:30, and it was unclear whether the laboratory unit was still there at that time. At 7:35 p.m., Officer Charles Cannon, acting upon information supplied by the defendant\u2019s brother, was directed to go to defendant\u2019s residence to retrieve evidence of the blood-covered knife from the blower unit of the defendant\u2019s furnace. The knife was not seized until an additional written consent was obtained from the defendant\u2019s wife.\nWhen the defendant was told that his brother had confessed to the murder and robbery and implicated him, he acknowledged his participation in the crime.\nWhile the defendant does not challenge the validity of the first search of his residence following his arrest and consent, he claims the second search conducted by Officer Cannon was improper.\nThe trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the later search on the ground that the defendant\u2019s earlier consent, which was not challenged, was sufficient for the subsequent entry. In addition, the court believed that the defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s consent was knowingly and voluntarily given.\nThe fourth amendment\u2019s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated under the facts of the instant case because there was a pre-existing valid consent from the defendant.\nWhile we recognize that as a general rule of law a consent to search usually involves an understanding that the search will be conducted forthwith and that only a single search will be made (2 W. La Fave, Search and Seizure 633 (1978); People v. Nawrocki (1967), 6 Mich. App. 46, 150 N.W.2d 516, cert, denied, 389 U.S. 942, 19 L. Ed. 2d 296, 88 S. Ct. 304), this is not to say that this court has not upheld subsequent second searches under appropriate circumstances. People v. Lee (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 894, 417 N.E.2d 1090.\nIn the instant case, a police officer re-entered the defendant\u2019s residence within an hour after the initial search and remained there for only a brief period to secure specific evidence based upon information provided by the defendant\u2019s brother. The defendant had initially signed a blanket and comprehensive consent form which was never withdrawn. People v. Lee (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 894, 896, 417 N.E.2d 1090, 1092; Ferguson v. Caldwell (1975), 233 Ga. 887, 213 S.E.2d 855.\nFinally, we believe the evidence would inevitably have been discovered, since the source of the information came from an individual so closely connected with the commission of the crime. The defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s consent to the search prior to the seizure of the evidence further insured its inevitable discovery. Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501; People v. Farmer (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 262, 414 N.E.2d 779; People v. Ruberto (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 636, 401 N.E.2d 1306.\nThe defendant\u2019s final claim of error involves an alleged abuse of discretion in the imposition of a sentence of natural life imprisonment. People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541.\nAs we pointed out in our companion opinion in People v. Wilson (1985), 132 111. App. 3d 862, the murder of the victim in the instant case, while allegedly not premeditated, was extremely brutal. In sentencing the defendant to natural life imprisonment, the trial court specifically noted the wanton brutality of the crime, the defendant\u2019s lack of remorse and eagerness \u201cto party\u201d following the victim\u2019s murder. The trial judge considered the defendant\u2019s claim of rehabilitative potential but further observed that the ends of justice must also be weighed, i.e., that the deterrence factor required a lengthy sentence.\nThe defendant\u2019s claim of a rehabilitative potential was severely compromised by his extensive prior criminal record, which included convictions for possession of stolen property, armed robbery, burglary, theft and possession of cannabis. The defendant\u2019s prior sentences of probation, imprisonment for three years and parole had utterly failed to deter him from the heinous crime committed here.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141) permits the imposition of a natural life sentence when the trial court finds that the murder was \u201caccompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior.\u201d The record indicates that the trial court relied upon this section in imposing the sentence, and in our opinion, the trial court was clearly justified in doing so. As we have indicated in our companion opinion regarding the defendant\u2019s brother, it is not within our province to reduce the defendant\u2019s sentence merely as an act of judicial clemency. People v. Barber (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 767, 452 N.E.2d 725.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence of the circuit court of Peoria County are affirmed with respect to the defendant\u2019s conviction for felony murder, and reversed with respect to the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for armed robbery.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nSTOUDER and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur J. Inman, of Peoria, for appellant.", "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140404\nOpinion filed May 3, 1985.\nRehearing denied June 12, 1985.\nArthur J. Inman, of Peoria, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 287, "last_page_order": 295 }