{ "id": 3529950, "name": "VALLEY MOULD & IRON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Valley Mould & Iron Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Commission", "decision_date": "1985-04-19", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141536", "first_page": "273", "last_page": "286", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 273" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469406 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 F.2d 302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 533929 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/683/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 F.2d 203", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1847831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/702/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Stan. L. Rev. 1129", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Stan. L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11328080 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" }, { "page": "218-19" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 L. Ed. 207", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769263 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "968" }, { "page": "2950" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "967-68" }, { "page": "2950" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "968" }, { "page": "2950" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592288 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 F.2d 769", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 529460 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/684/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6198755 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "1482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184064 ], "weight": 35, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "215" }, { "page": "1093-94" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1095" }, { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "214-15" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "1094" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1095" }, { "page": "254-55" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "1094-95" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "217-18" }, { "page": "1095-96" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "1096" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "1094" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 324", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1670 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11712736 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10002 ], "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607888 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624610 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0019-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1186, "char_count": 30635, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7157504061429078e-07, "percentile": 0.703083461622666 }, "sha256": "4c2676ded10fde5444683670b6481f7a5f954a86e17f905b1424e4090ef0ac4d", "simhash": "1:79a134fe2a0aa1c0", "word_count": 5030 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:42:49.711724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VALLEY MOULD & IRON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from an order of the trial court affirming a decision of the Human Rights Commission (Commission) that plaintiff violated section 3(a) of the Fair Employment Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 853(a)) in that it discriminated against defendant Columbus Pitts (Pitts) on the basis of his race (black), with respect to his discharge from plaintiff\u2019s employment. On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) that the Commission erred in concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not articulate a legitimate reason for Pitts\u2019 termination from employment; and (2) that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in its favor because it articulated a legitimate unrebutted reason for Pitts\u2019 discharge.\nOn December 10, 1978, Pitts began his employment with plaintiff as a chipper in its stool department. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Pitts bid on the job of coremaker, and was awarded this position on December 21, 1978. As a coremaker, Pitts was responsible for the operation of a machine known a the no-bake blender (blender) for one eight-hour shift per day. This blender mixes sand with resin and acid to produce a substance which is discharged into coreboxes to form concrete-like sandcores. These cores are used to make indentations or lifting devices on the large cast-iron ingot moulds manufactured by plaintiff.\nPitts was terminated on January 16, 1979, for allegedly breaking the blender. At the time of his discharge, Pitts was a probationary employee. In his charge before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), Pitts alleged that he was discharged because of his race and not because of his work performance. The FEPC issued a complaint against plaintiff, and at a hearing thereon before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the following testimony was heard.\nAnthony Sanetta,. plaintiff\u2019s plant superintendent, was called by Pitts as an adverse witness. He testified that plaintiff operates three eight-hour shifts daily. Every morning, Sanetta receives reports from all general foremen. During the period between December 10, 1978, and January 15, 1979, Sanetta spoke with Pitts regarding his alleged damaging of wooden coreboxes. Sanetta was told by Tim Storey, plaintiff\u2019s equipment manager, that Pitts was damaging the coreboxes by using a sledgehammer to open them.\nEdward Kutnick, plaintiff\u2019s personnel manager, was also called as an adverse witness. On January 15, 1979, he received an order from Superintendent Sanetta to terminate Pitts for burning out the blender\u2019s motor. This was the only reason given to him. At the administrative hearing, he produced the personnel records of four men \u2014 Gonzalez, Ratliff, Escobedo and Garcia. He testified that all four of these men worked on the blender during the period between its initial installation in 1977 and December 18, 1978. None of these men were ever fired for burning out the blender\u2019s motor. He believed that others had been terminated for burning out the motor, but he could not recall any names. Kutnick stated that he assumed that any and all performance reprimands were given to Pitts in writing per union provisions. Kutnick admitted that plaintiff did no aptitude testing outside of its maintenance department, and that all other jobs are based upon bid agreements. The method used to replace a terminated employee is also based on these agreements. Those who work in the department where the job is open are given the first opportunity to bid on the job. If no one in that department bids on the job, then it opens for plant-wide bidding. Notice of the job opening is posted on a bulletin board. Following Pitts\u2019 termination, only Mr. Rudin, a white, bid on the opening caused by Pitts\u2019 discharge.\nNicholas Coppage testified as an adverse witness. He was hired as a foreman for plaintiff on December 10, 1978, at the age of 19, and received three weeks of on-the-job training. Coppage testified that the blender trough was frozen when he reported for the midnight shift on January 15, 1979. He stated that the blender \u201cfreezes\u201d when the chemical reaction between the resin, acid and sand occurs too fast. If the blender\u2019s trough is not evacuated in time, the materials remaining within the trough harden. Once this occurs, a coremaker must climb up to the trough and try to loosen the material. He further testified that the blender was frozen on a shift prior to his, and he did not know who caused this condition. He admitted that when Pitts began work with him on the midnight shift, the trough was already frozen; that Pitts spent his entire shift trying to unfreeze the trough; and that it was still frozen at the end of Pitts\u2019 shift at 8 a.m. on January 15, 1979. He did not recall telling Pitts to start the blender, and he never saw Pitts try to activate the motor. Further, he never told anyone that Pitts burned out the motor; to his knowledge, no motor burned out on his shift.\nCoppage identified several maintenance reports which indicated that the blender was inoperative on January 2, 1979, because of frozen lines; that the motor on the blender burned out on January 7 and 8, 1979; and that the fuse for the blender\u2019s motor was removed on January 14, 1979, during the shift which preceded Pitts\u2019 and Cop-page\u2019s shift. There was no notation of the fuse\u2019s replacement during the midnight shift. Coppage admitted that the blender could not operate without its fuses.\nC. Timothy Storey, plaintiff\u2019s equipment supervisor, testified as an adverse witness that he considers himself an expert on the blender\u2019s operation. Although he admitted that there are no written instructions on the operation of the blender, he testified that each time a new operator begins the job, he receives training on the machine. Storey testified that when he arrived at work on January 15, 1979, at 8 a.m., Pitts came to his office to inform him that the blender was already frozen when he arrived for his shift, and that he had spent the entire shift trying to chip out the machine. Pitts also told him that he told his foreman about the condition of the machine. Storey testified that he conducted an investigation as to the blender\u2019s breakdown on January 15, 1979; the investigation was precipitated by a total lack of production by the blender for two shifts on January 14. He inspected the blender on January 15 and found it inoperable; he noticed mechanics working on it, but did not know what condition the motor was in. He next spoke to Mr. Ratliff, the blender\u2019s operator for the shift before Pitts\u2019. He testified that Ratliff informed him that the blender froze during his shift, and that he had unsuccessfully attempted to unfreeze it. Storey also testified that he spoke to foreman Coppage within the next few days. After his conversation with Coppage, he recommended to Superintendent Sanetta that Pitts be terminated. The report of termination stated \u201cFirst turn [shift] 1-15-79 drive motor burnup.\u201d Storey admitted that he did not see Pitts operating the blender at any time on January 15, 1979, and that he did not see who operated the motor when it burned up. When questioned as to the basis for his statement on Pitts\u2019 termination letter (\u201cFirst turn [shift] 1-15-79 drive motor burnup\u201d) which he signed, Storey denied that the statement was based on a conversation that he had with Coppage, and denied that it was based on any observation of Pitts that he himself made on either January 14 and 15.\nIn reference to other burnouts which allegedly occurred on the blender, Storey testified that the motor had burned out on January 7, 8 and 11. He could not attribute the January 7 burnout to anyone, but he blamed Garcia for the January 8 burnout, and had written Pitts\u2019 name on his diary with reference to the January 11 incident. Garcia was not fired for the burnout. He stated that his diary showed an entry of \u201cblender down 8 hours 4 p.m.-12 a.m. on Jan. 14th,\u201d and listed the shifts and names of the operators \u2014 Gonzalez, Ratliff and Pitts. Storey testified that the blender\u2019s motor had never burned out prior to January 7. Further, he admitted that the motor had burned out on January 17, after Pitts had been terminated, but that he did not know who was responsible. Regarding his prior statement to FEPC that he determined Pitts was responsible for the motor\u2019s burning out as a result of his conversation with Coppage, Storey could not recall if Coppage said Pitts was operating the motor when it burned out. He admitted that Pitts never confessed to him that he burned out the motor, but stated that his conversation with Coppage was important in his recommendation that Pitts be discharged.\nRatliff, a blender operator since December 1978, testified that the blender also broke down on December 10 and 15, 1978. Ratliff testified that on January 14, 1979, Augustine Gonzalez was working the blender on the 8 a.m.-4 p.m. shift. This shift was immediately before Ratliff\u2019s 4 p.m.-12 midnight shift; when Ratliff reported to work that day, the blender was already inoperable. He stated that he told his foreman that the machine , was broken; when Pitts relieved him at midnight he informed Pitts that the machine was broken before he got to work, and who had broken it. He placed the blame for the blender\u2019s breakdown on Gonzalez.\nRatliff, who is black, was previously disciplined in connection with his operation of the blender. He received a written warning and later a suspension for \u201cdisregard of orders.\u201d Ratliff had no knowledge of any other nonblack blender operators who were ever severely disciplined. On cross-examination, he stated that to his knowledge, the only reason that the blender wasn\u2019t operating on January 14, 1979, was that it was frozen. However, he made no inspection of the blender\u2019s motor or its electrical system.\nColumbus Pitts testified that he was never late for work as a coremaker; that he never missed any days of work during this time; and that he was never warned about his work until the time he was discharged. He stated that plaintiff\u2019s management told him that he was discharged because he broke the blender. Pitts testified that a week before his discharge, plaintiff sent two whites into the department for blender training; Pitts was told to show them how to operate the blender. One of these trainees was the man who replaced Pitts upon his discharge.\nIn plaintiff\u2019s case, Storey testified that the decision to terminate Pitts was based on a \u201cseries of events,\u201d including Pitts\u2019 destruction of the coreboxes. He stated that there are four fuses for the blender\u2019s motor. Further, he testified that Pitts knew that he had not burned out the blender\u2019s motor, because he had told Storey that he \u201ctried it.\u201d Pitts was the first person ever to be terminated in connection with an incident with the blender. Two other men were terminated after Pitts, but neither for motor burnout. A copy of a written warning pertaining to Pitts\u2019 destruction of the coreboxes was admitted to show that he had received a written warning. Storey acknowledged that both Gonzalez and Garcia worked for plaintiff for 20 years.\nIn rebuttal, Pitts testified that he did not recall ever being given the written warning concerning the corebox destruction.\nThe administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that black employees, including himself, were inequitably investigated and disciplined for breakdowns of the blender; that plaintiff had failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for such disparate treatment or for Pitts\u2019 discharge; that Pitts had shown plaintiff\u2019s claim of unsatisfactory work performance to be pretextual; and that plaintiff had violated section 3(a) of the Fair Employment Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 853(a)) by discriminatorily discharging complainant on the basis of his race.\nHer findings and conclusions were adopted by the Human Rights Commission (successor to FEPC), and the trial court found that its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This appeal followed.\nOpinion\nThe Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) is similar to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000a et seq. (1976)), and Illinois courts have routinely consulted and relied upon Federal experience when determining whether discrimination violates Illinois law. (See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 19, 22, 446 N.E.2d 543; Board of Education v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 446, 452, 398 N.E.2d 619.) Both statutes prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Under title VII, a claim of employment discrimination can be brought under either the \u201cdisparate treatment\u201d theory (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817) or under the \u201cdisparate impact\u201d theory (Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), 401 U.S. 424, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158, 91 S. Ct. 849). In th\u00bf case before us, the Commission found discrimination to have been proved under the disparate treatment theory.\nAs the Supreme Court explained in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (1977), 431 U.S. 324, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396, 97 S. Ct. 1843, disparate treatment means \u201cthe employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.\u201d (431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396, 415 n.15, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15.) In order to prevail, the employee bears the burden of persuasion throughout the hearing that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 253, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 215, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-94.) To meet this ultimate burden of persuasion, the employee \u201cmay succeed *** either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer\u2019s proffered explanation [for discharge] is unworthy of credence.\u201d (450 U.S. 248, 256, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 217, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095.) Since this motive or intent is seldom capable of proof by .direct evidence, the Supreme Court has established a legal framework which allows a court to infer discriminatory motive on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 214-15, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093.\nThe Supreme Court has grappled with the issue of burdens of proof in disparate treatment actions in a series of cases commencing with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817, and, most recently, culminating in United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens (1983), 460 U.S. 711, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403, 103 S. Ct. 1478, the Supreme Court developed a procedure frequently used to prove discrimination in disparate treatment actions.\nThe three-step burden of proof analysis created by the court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. and later refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089, requires first, that the employee establish a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. The elements of a prima facie case as set forth in McDonnell Douglas have been adapted and broadly applied to a variety of employment decisions, including termination, where:\n\u201c[the employee] proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is a member of a protected class, was qualified for the position held, and was discharged and replaced by a person outside of the protected class or was discharged while a person outside of the class with equal or lesser qualifications was retained, then [the employee] has established a \u2018prima facie case\u2019 of discrimination.\u201d Lee v. Russell County Board of Education (11th Cir. 1982), 684 F.2d 769, 773; see also Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Golden (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 300, 448 N.E.2d 958.\nThe employee\u2019s establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089.) Once the employee carries the initial burden and shows a prima facie case, step two shifts the burden to the employer to \u201carticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason\u201d for the alleged discriminatory action. (Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978), 438 U.S. 567, 578, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 968, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2950.) If the employer fails to meet this burden, the employee\u2019s prima facie case stands unrebutted and judgment must be entered for the employee as a matter of law. (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 254, 67 L. Ed. 207, 215-16, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094.) If the employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption created by the prima facie showing drops from the case and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. (United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens (1983), 460 U.S. 711, 715, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403, 410, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482.) The employee must have an adequate \u201copportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision [to discharge],\u201d but rather a pretext. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 256, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 217, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095.\nIn the instant case, plaintiff concedes that Pitts has established his prima facie case for discriminatory discharge. Plaintiff contends that the issue in dispute is whether it articulated a legitimate reason for terminating Pitts where the supervisors who terminated him did not have first-hand knowledge of all the events which caused his termination. It posits that both the Commission and the circuit court adopted and affirmed the ALJ\u2019s recommended order solely upon their determination that the ALJ\u2019s findings of fact were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, without any regard to the legal reasoning behind the order. As a result, plaintiff contends, there can be no finding of discrimination as a matter of law upon our review, because the ALJ erred when she determined that plaintiff had not \u201carticulated\u201d a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its discharge of Pitts.\nWe note at this juncture that the ALJ\u2019s order stated in part:\n\u201cRespondent was hindered in the presentation of its defense by the fact that the witnesses it selected lacked first-hand knowledge of the events upon which the decision to terminate complainant was based. In the absence of additional witnesses or business records respondent\u2019s two witnesses could articulate this factual predicate only as what they thought they had heard before they terminated complainant and not as the truth of the matters asserted to them.\n* * *\nIt is therefore of paramount importance to the effective administration of employment discrimination laws that the complainant\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him be preserved to the fullest possible extent by strict construction of evidence rules prohibiting hearsay in every case. I therefore hold that an employer\u2019s \u2018legitimate non-discriminatory reason\u2019 for terminating a protected worker cannot be considered \u2018articulated\u2019 within the meaning of the FEPA and Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), unless and until it is presented at hearing by a person evidencing first-hand knowledge.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the ALJ\u2019s holding placed too stringent a burden upon it \u2014 one that made it necessary to prove that Pitts had burned out the blender\u2019s motor \u2014 before a finding could be made that it had \u201carticulated\u201d a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Pitts\u2019 discharge. We disagree with this analysis of the ALJ\u2019s holding.\nAt the time of the ALJ\u2019s order of February 1981, the Supreme Court\u2019s most recent opinions as to what constituted an \u201carticulated legitimate nondiscriminatory\u201d reason were Furneo Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978), 438 U.S. 567, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 98 S. Ct. 2943, and Board of Trustees v. Sweeney (1978), 439 U.S. 24, 58 L. Ed. 2d 216, 99 S. Ct. 295, the latter relied upon by the ALJ in her order. In both Furneo and Sweeney, the Supreme Court directly addressed the burden of proof problem in disparate treatment cases, reaffirming its adherence to the three-step analysis in McDonnell Douglas. In each case, however, the court\u2019s language failed to enunciate a rale which lower courts could apply consistently. See Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 (1980).\nIn Furneo, the court stated: \u201c[I]t is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race.\u201d (Emphasis added.) {Furneo Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978), 438 U.S. 567, 577, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 967-68, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2950.) The Furneo court also repeated the language of McDonnell Douglas, stating, \u201cTo dispel the adverse inference ***, the employer need only \u2018articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee\u2019s rejection,\u2019 \u201d (438 U.S. 567, 578, 57 L. Ed. 2d 957, 968, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2950.) While the Furneo court made clear that proof of the prima facie case imposed some burden on the employer to come forward with evidence to dispel the \u201cadverse inference,\u201d it was unclear whether the burden was simply one of producing sufficient evidence to escape any adverse directed verdict of or producing sufficient evidence to persuade the trier of fact of the lawfulness of the action. 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 n.30 (1980).\nFive months later in Sweeney, the court, in a per curiam decision, held that the First Circuit had erred in requiring an employer to prove absence of discriminatory motive to rebut the prima facie case. It further stated that: \u201c[w]hile words such as \u2018articulate,\u2019 \u2018show,\u2019 and \u2018prove,\u2019 may have more or less similar meanings *** we think that there is a significant distinction between merely \u2018articulating] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason\u2019 and \u2018prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive.\u2019 \u201d Board of Trustees v. Sweeney (1978), 439 U.S. 24, 25, 58 L. Ed. 2d 216, 218-19, 99 S. Ct. 295, 295.\nFinally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089, the Supreme Court clarified the level of proof necessary for the employer to rebut the prima facie presumption:\n\u201cIt is sufficient if the [employer\u2019s] evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the [employee]. To accomplish this, the [employer] must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the [employee\u2019s] rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the [employer], If the [employer] carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 216, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094-95.\nThe employer\u2019s admissible evidence must allow the trier of fact to rationally conclude that the employment decision was not motivated by discriminatory animus. (450 U.S. 248, 257, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 217-18, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095-96.) The Burdine court did not believe that limiting the employer\u2019s evidentiary obligation to a burden of production would unduly hinder the employee, because \u201cthe [employer\u2019s] explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific.\u201d 450 U.S. 248, 258, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 218, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1096.\nIn the present case, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred as a matter of law when she held that Supervisor Storey\u2019s testimony concerning his beliefs and opinions was inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff cites Jones v. Los Angeles Community College District (9th Cir. 1983), 702 F.2d 203, and Ostroff v. Employment Exchange, Inc. (9th Cir. 1982), 683 F.2d 302, for the proposition that hearsay may articulate a legitimate reason for discharge, and posits that evidence of Storey\u2019s conversations with Coppage and Pitts was offered to show the basis upon which he made his recommendation to terminate Pitts. Plaintiff reasons that the conversation should serve to constitute an articulated \u201clegitimate nondiscriminatory reason\u201d under Burdine. We disagree.\nWe believe that the ALJ properly considered the nonhearsay purpose of Storey\u2019s testimony (see Jones v. Los Angeles Community College District (9th Cir. 1983), 702 F.2d 203; and Ostroff v. Employment Exchange, Inc. (9th Cir. 1982), 683 F.2d 302) regarding the basis for Pitts\u2019 discharge as being his conversation with foreman Coppage, but rejected the testimony as \u201cincoherent\u201d when (1) Coppage denied ever discussing Pitts\u2019 performance with Storey and (2) Storey admitted that he did not get the opportunity to speak with Coppage about the blender breakdown until after Pitts was discharged. Given the overwhelming disavowal at hearing of Storey\u2019s earlier version of the discharge, we conclude that plaintiff failed to raise even a genuine issue of fact concerning Storey\u2019s basis for terminating Pitts, and so fell short of the Burdine standard.\nBy the time that plaintiff presented its own case, Storey had recanted his earlier position that his basis for Pitts\u2019 discharge was his conversation with Coppage, and had offered a new position that Storey\u2019s basis for Pitts\u2019 termination was a \u201cseries\u201d of events. This generalized \u201cseries\u201d of events certainly was not \u201cclear and reasonably specific\u201d enough to meet the Burdine standard.\nOur careful scrutiny of the entire record reveals that the ALJ understood the limited purpose of hearsay evidence, and that she admitted such evidence for such purposes. For example, the ALJ analyzed a business records objection thus:\n\u201cI think a big distinction has to be made between the actual information on which the company thinks its decision is based and what they knew at the time.\n* * *\nI think that you\u2019re entitled [to admission of the business record] because employers necessarily don\u2019t always base all their employment decisions on first-hand information. To state, \u2018Well, I got this information from Joe Jones,\u2019 and that sort of thing is entirely appropriate. But I think you\u2019ve got to distinguish that from the contents itself. The contents itself is something that the right of cross-examination has to be reserved on very carefully.\n* * *\nIt\u2019s a two-step process, and I don\u2019t have any trouble -with that because I realize that\u2019s a problem big employers have. The bossman doesn\u2019t see everything, and that\u2019s perfectly understandable. That sort of evidence does come in. But I have trouble with the hearsay aspect of the rest of it.\u201d\nFrom the analysis above, it is clear that the ALJ did not place an improper burden upon plaintiff \u2014 to prove that Pitts burned out the motor; rather, the ALJ sought credible testimony to establish Storey\u2019s basis for recommending Pitts\u2019 discharge, and clearly did not find it.\nTherefore, Storey\u2019s reason becomes unclear and does not raise a genuine issue of fact under Burdine so as to rebut Pitts\u2019 prima facie case. Although the ALJ\u2019s phrasing was somewhat strong, we believe the proper legal standards were actually applied, and find that neither the ALJ nor the Commission and circuit court erred as a matter of law. Since the employee\u2019s prima facie case stands in the absence of plaintiff\u2019s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, judgment must be affirmed. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 254, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 216, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094.\nAssuming arguendo that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in her determination that plaintiff failed to articulate a \u201clegitimate nondiscriminatory reason\u201d for its discharge of Pitts, we believe that the judgment must be affirmed on the basis of the alternative finding that plaintiff\u2019s proffered explanation was pretextual. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817.) Plaintiff presented no evidence that the blender\u2019s motor burned out on January 15, 1979, yet there was testimony that a fuse had been removed from the motor prior to Pitts\u2019 shift. Removal of the fuse from the blender would render the motor inoperable, negating any possibility that Pitts burned out the motor on his shift. In addition, a motor continued to burn out after Pitts left plaintiff\u2019s employ. With reference to other discharges for motor burnouts, it is clear that Mr. Garcia was never disciplined nor discharged for his role in a previous burnout. In addition, Mr. Ratliff testified that the blender broke down on January 14, 1979, during Mr. Gonzalez\u2019 shift, yet only Pitts was discharged.\nIn light of the foregoing, we find that the Commission and circuit court\u2019s determination that plaintiff discriminated against Pitts on the basis of his race was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 60, 76, 426 N.E.2d 877.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court affirming the decision of the Human Rights Commission is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMEJDA, P.J., and SULLIAAN, J., concur.\nOn July 1, 1980, the Fair Employment Practices Act was superseded by the Illinois Human Rights Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) The Illinois Human Rights Act provides that complaints issued under the Fair Employment Practices Act, as the complaint in the instant case, shall be assumed by the Human Rights Commission. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 68, par. 9 \u2014 102.) Section 3 of the Fair Employment Practices Act is substantially the same as section 2 \u2014 102(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 102(A)).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bradford L. Livingston, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, and Allan Gunn, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Thomas P. Marnell, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Human Rights Commission.", "Melvin Gaines, of Chicago, for appellee Columbus Pitts." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VALLEY MOULD & IRON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 83\u20141536\nOpinion filed April 19, 1985.\nBradford L. Livingston, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, and Allan Gunn, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Thomas P. Marnell, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Human Rights Commission.\nMelvin Gaines, of Chicago, for appellee Columbus Pitts." }, "file_name": "0273-01", "first_page_order": 295, "last_page_order": 308 }