{
  "id": 3528917,
  "name": "WAYNE MATTER, Public Administrator, Administrator for the Estate of Charles E. Hanser, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EVELYN LARSON QUESNELL et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Matter v. Quesnell",
  "decision_date": "1985-05-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140673",
  "first_page": "388",
  "last_page": "390",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:42:49.711724+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WAYNE MATTER, Public Administrator, Administrator for the Estate of Charles E. Hanser, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EVELYN LARSON QUESNELL et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court entered default judgment for the plaintiffs, Wayne Matter et al. The defendants, Evelyn Larson Quesnell and Richard G. Furs, appeal from the court\u2019s denial of both their motion to vacate the default judgment and their motion for reconsideration of denial of the motion to vacate. We affirm.\nThe trial court entered a default judgment on all four counts of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint based on tortious conversion and fraud. Within 30 days of the default order, the defendants filed under section 2 \u2014 1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, eh. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1301(e)) to vacate the default. The defendants\u2019 motion alleged lack of notice and a meritorious defense. The court heard and denied the defendants\u2019 motion, finding that the defendants had been served but had not answered or appeared.\nWithin 30 days of the court\u2019s denial of the motion to vacate, all of the following occurred: the defendants filed a motion to reconsider the denial of vacation; the court heard and denied the motion to reconsider; and the defendants filed the instant notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, the defendants argue that the court should have considered, but did not consider, each of the instant motions as a motion under section 2 \u2014 1301(e). The defendants assert that they were not served and had no notice. They also assert both that they acted diligently in response to learning of entry of the default and that they have several specific defenses to the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. According to the defendants, given their presentation of those assertions to the trial court, the court erred in refusing to vacate the default.\nThe plaintiffs argue that the court properly ruled on the motion to vacate under section 2 \u2014 1301(e). The plaintiffs then dispute the defendants\u2019 characterization of the motion to reconsider. The plaintiffs argue that the court should have considered, and did consider, that motion as made under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1401). According to the plaintiffs, as the motion to reconsider was filed more than 30 days after entry of the default, the court properly denied the motion under the stricter standards applicable to section 2 \u2014 1401 motions. Lastly, the plaintiffs assert that the court\u2019s denial of the motion to reconsider was proper even under the comparatively liberal standard of section 2 \u2014 1301(e).\nWe note initially that in denying the motion to reconsider, the trial court judge gave no indication of the standards under which he considered the motion. We then make the preliminary finding that if the plaintiffs correctly characterize the motion for reconsideration as a motion under section 2 \u2014 1401, the trial court\u2019s denial of that motion under the standards of section 2 \u2014 1401 clearly was correct. The motion, amongst other possible failings, does not make the allegation of due diligence required for relief. Schmidt v. Siegal Trading Co. (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 611, 391 N.E.2d 32.\nFor purposes of our remaining analysis, however, we will not characterize the motion for reconsideration as a motion under section 2 \u2014 1401. That motion did not have the features of a new action to vacate. Rather, it related to and expanded on allegations of the existing section 2 \u2014 1301(e) motion to vacate. The motion was directed to the trial court\u2019s 30 days of retained jurisdiction over its denial of the motion to vacate. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1203; Weilmuenster v. H. H. Hall Construction Co, (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 101, 390 N.E.2d 579.) As such, it may be properly considered under the standards of section 2 \u2014 1301(e).\nIn deciding a section 2 \u2014 1301(e) (formerly codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 50(5)) motion to vacate a default judgment, it is the current trend for reviewing courts to determine whether substantial justice is being done between the parties and whether it is reasonable under the circumstances to compel the nonmoving party to go to trial on the merits. (Teitelbaum v. Reliable Welding Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 651, 435 N.E.2d 852.) On review, however, we need not refer to the imprecise substantial-justice standard where it is apparent from the record that the moving party has not acted with due diligence or shown the existence of a meritorious defense.\nUnder the circumstances, we do not believe the trial court acted improperly in refusing to vacate the default. Here, the plaintiffs made energetic efforts to defeat the defendants\u2019 apparent attempts to elude service. The trial court\u2019s conclusion that the defendants were properly served but failed to appear is supported by the record. Furthermore, the defendants\u2019 motion to vacate, and accompanying argument, included only unspecific and unsupported allegations of meritorious defense. (Compare Baltz v. McCormack (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 76, 383 N.E.2d 643.) While the motion to reconsider did make specific allegations of the defendants\u2019 meritorious defense, the defendants\u2019 delayed presentation of those specifics was unjustifiable, and showed a lack of the defendants\u2019 due diligence. Compare Plantaric v. Michaels (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 154, 424 N.E.2d 64.\nAlthough the courts are liberal in setting aside defaults, relief is not automatic. (Plantaric v. Michaels (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 154, 424 N.E.2d 64.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Mercer County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HEIPLE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel L. Bonnett, of Marquis, Bonnett & Skorepa, of Rock Island, for appellants.",
      "Roy H. Glockhoff, of Glockhoff & Haytcher, and Duane Thompson, of Laird, Chickris & Brooks, P.C., both of East Moline, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WAYNE MATTER, Public Administrator, Administrator for the Estate of Charles E. Hanser, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EVELYN LARSON QUESNELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140673\nOpinion filed May 14, 1985.\nDaniel L. Bonnett, of Marquis, Bonnett & Skorepa, of Rock Island, for appellants.\nRoy H. Glockhoff, of Glockhoff & Haytcher, and Duane Thompson, of Laird, Chickris & Brooks, P.C., both of East Moline, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0388-01",
  "first_page_order": 410,
  "last_page_order": 412
}