{
  "id": 3529593,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT DIXON, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dixon",
  "decision_date": "1985-05-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140151",
  "first_page": "450",
  "last_page": "453",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:42:49.711724+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT DIXON, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant, Albert C. Dixon, was convicted of the offense of burglary. The defendant was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant asserts that he must be granted new post-trial and sentencing hearings because his private counsel labored under a conflict of interest during these proceedings.\nThe defendant\u2019s trial was held before the Honorable Stephen J. Covey. During the hearing on post-trial motions, the defendant presented a pro se motion for a new trial in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The defendant alleged specifically that counsel had incorrectly advised the defendant to waive a jury trial and represented that the defendant\u2019s resulting bench trial would be before Judge Paolucci.\nFollowing the presentation by the defendant of his oral motion, counsel for the defendant responded to the defendant\u2019s allegations. The following colloquy was heard:\n\u201cMR. GIBSON: Well, I would simply indicate to the Court that if I could on my own behalf\u2014\nTHE COURT: Sure.\nMR. GIBSON: The first place, [sic] were viewed by myself, the case indicated to me that we would be best after all going in front of a judge, by obtaining a bench trial in front of anyone.\nTHE COURT: Yes.\nMR. GIBSON: Secondly, Mr. Dixon certainly had the opportunity to attempt to stop the proceedings, raise this point when the trial started and indeed you were sitting in that chair.\u201d\nThe trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe defendant now urges on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion since counsel for the defendant was laboring under a conflict of interest during post-trial proceedings. Failure to replace defense counsel, according to the defendant, resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel during the post-trial and sentencing hearings.\nThe defendant relies on our decision in People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill App. 3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178. In Fields, we held that a defendant was entitled to new hearings on his post-trial motion and on sentencing because his attorney during those proceedings operated under a conflict of Interest. Fields\u2019 attorney had denied the allegations made by the defendant in a post-trial motion that the attorney had rendered ineffective assistance.\nThe defendant asserts that the decision in Fields is dispositive of the issue now before us. We agree that Fields is factually similar to the case at bar. We decline, however, to interpret Fields as creating a per se conflict of Interest whenever a defense attorney\u2019s competence is questioned by his client during post-trial proceedings.\nIn Fields, we held that the defendant\u2019s attorney labored under a conflict of interest because the attorney opposed the allegation that he was incompetent. However, in People v. Johnson (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610, this court held that there was no conflict of interest where the defendant alleged in a post-trial motion that his counsel was incompetent and counsel denied the factual allegations underlying the defendant\u2019s claim of incompetence. In reaching this decision, the court found, that \u201cthe underlying allegation of incompetence determines whether an actual conflict of interest exists.\u201d 98 Ill App. 3d 228, 232, 424 N.E.2d 610, 614.\nWe reaffirm the principles set forth in Johnson for determining when counsel\u2019s opposition to a post-trial motion alleging incompetence constitutes a conflict of interest. The fact that counsel responds to the allegations of incompetence creates no greater conflict of interest than the fact that counsel has been alleged to be incompetent in the first place.\nIn the instant case, the underlying allegation did not create a conflict of interest. Even assuming the allegations to be true, the defendant had no right to trial before a specific judge. Any alleged misinformation from counsel as to which judge would preside at his bench trial did not render the defendant\u2019s jury waiver invalid. The defendant failed to demonstrate incompetence and, thus, failed to show a conflict. The defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the hearing on his post-trial motion and the sentencing hearing.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE, P.J., and BARRY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert Agostinelli and Verlin R. F. Heinz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Peter H. Tumminaro, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT DIXON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140151\nOpinion filed May 17, 1985.\nRobert Agostinelli and Verlin R. F. Heinz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Peter H. Tumminaro, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0450-01",
  "first_page_order": 472,
  "last_page_order": 475
}