{ "id": 3637056, "name": "LINDA RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD HAHN et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Richmond v. Hahn", "decision_date": "1985-07-22", "docket_number": "No. 3-84-0400", "first_page": "947", "last_page": "951", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 947" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490609 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594440 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959745 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 965", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5679004 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3157944 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3206108 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3271060 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344456 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0448-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 497, "char_count": 8635, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.979887114567119e-08, "percentile": 0.46352393517923246 }, "sha256": "b7e4bbe75ce8658691608ecb8f7167873cc1f5c62ccbd3bb5671642b50d6ecf9", "simhash": "1:8fac94d3b6c136c6", "word_count": 1349 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:11.266607+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LINDA RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD HAHN et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her complaint alleging intentional interference with contractual relations. We reverse and remand.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant Catholic Diocese of Joliet (Diocese). She was a teacher at St. Martin of Tours School in Kankakee. Defendant Donald Hahn (Hahn) was the principal at St. Martin\u2019s. Plaintiff had taught at St. Martin\u2019s in the 1982-83 school year. She signed a contract renewal for the 1983-84 school year in April 1983.\nIn August 1983, plaintiff was contacted by James De Zwann, the principal of Shabbona School, a public school in Bourbonnais. De Zwann offered plaintiff a teaching position at Shabbona. Shabbona offered a considerably higher salary as well as better teaching conditions. Plaintiff accepted.\nShe then informed Hahn that she was resigning her position at St. Martin\u2019s. Hahn recommended to the board of trustees of St. Martin\u2019s that plaintiff not be released from her contract. Hahn contacted De Zwann to protest the hiring of plaintiff. Hahn stated that the Diocese would seek the revocation of plaintiff\u2019s teaching certificate. Defendants made similar threats repeatedly, even though they were able to replace plaintiff within two days.\nAs a result, plaintiff was temporarily relieved of her duties at Shabbona and was given two weeks to resolve the problem with St. Martin\u2019s. Despite plaintiff\u2019s actions, the problem was never cleared up. Shabbona then broke its agreement with plaintiff. Subsequently, the Diocese informed her that her contract was cancelled.\nThese are the basic facts as alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss under sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619). The trial court granted the motion based on section 2 \u2014 615. The motion based on section 2 \u2014 619 was specifically denied. Plaintiff brings this appeal.\nOur standard of review is whether, on the facts alleged, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there was any possibility of recovery demonstrated under the theory alleged. Sherman v. Field Clinic (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 392 N.E.2d 154; Venturini v. Affatato (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 547, 405 N.E.2d 1093.\nA plaintiff\u2019s complaint must allege all the essential elements of the theory of recovery. The essential elements in tortious interference with contractual relations are:\n1. Existence of a valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and another;\n2. Defendants\u2019 awareness of the contract;\n3. Defendants\u2019 intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of that contract;\n4. A subsequent breach of the contract by the third party, caused by defendants\u2019 actions;\n5. Damages.\nBelden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551, 413 N.E.2d 98; Walsh v. Fanslow (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 417, 462 N.E.2d 965.\nOther cases have required a showing of malice on the defendant\u2019s part. This has been held to be the equivalent of intentional action. H. F. Philipsborn & Co. v. Suson (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 465, 322 N.E.2d 45; Audition Division, Ltd. v. Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 254, 458 N.E.2d 115.\nWe must construe the complaint liberally with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 106.) A motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts. Johnson v. Franzen (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 513, 397 N.E.2d 825.\nAfter reviewing plaintiff\u2019s complaint in this case, we find that she has pleaded all the elements of tortious interference with contractual relations. She has alleged that a valid contract existed between her and Shabbona School. She stated that defendants knew of this contract. She expressly and impliedly stated that defendants intentionally, unjustifiedly, and maliciously induced Shabbona School to breach its contract with plaintiff. She alleged that defendants\u2019 actions caused her damages.\nDefendants\u2019 contend that plaintiff has not alleged that the actions were unjustified. In paragraph 25 of the complaint, plaintiff has specifically alleged that the actions were unjustified and without good cause. Plaintiff also alleged facts, that, if proved, would substantiate such an allegation. Paragraph 11 claims that the actions of the defendants were capricious in that prior to her attempt to leave St. Martin\u2019s, 21 other teachers had left within the past three years without incident. Finally, paragraphs 15 through 18, read liberally, show how defendants\u2019 conduct was intentional and malicious.\nDefendants further argue that their actions are justified as a matter of law. That issue is not before us. Such an issue was not raised in the pleadings, nor was it raised by the successful motion to dismiss. A motion under section 2 \u2014 615, as this was, is to be decided on the face of the pleading. Under section 2 \u2014 619, which was specifically denied by the trial court, a motion can be accompanied by other documents such as affidavits. Our examination of the complaint shows that it properly set forth all necessary elements which, if proved, would support plaintiff\u2019s claim. For the lower court to dismiss on this motion was error.\nWe do not decide this case on the merits. It is at the earliest of stages. Whether the facts she has alleged can be proved remains to be seen. Plaintiff has successfully pleaded her case. She is entitled to an opportunity to prove her allegations.\nFor this reason, the order dismissing the complaint by the circuit court of Will County is reversed. This cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nA motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615) admits to all facts well pleaded and is to be decided on the face of the pleadings. Exhibits attached to a complaint become a part thereof for all purposes and factual matters contained in exhibits which are inconsistent with allegations of the complaint serve to negate such allegations. Sharkey v. Snow (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 448.\nAn essential element of tortious interference with contractual relations is defendant\u2019s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of a contract between plaintiff and another. The plaintiff alleges this element in paragraph 25 of her complaint. However, the terms of her employment contract with defendant contradict her claim that defendants\u2019 actions were unjustified.\nParagraph 6 of the complaint incorporates the contract by reference. Therefore, the contradictory terms of the contract should be considered in reviewing the trial court\u2019s decision to grant the defendants\u2019 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss.\nAccording to the contract, the defendants reserved the right to report the unprofessional conduct of a teacher to the appropriate educational authorities, thereby subjecting the offending teacher to a possible suspension of her teaching certificate. The plaintiff\u2019s employment contract incorporated by reference the Diocesean personnel policy handbook. The handbook states that a teacher who terminates employment not in accord with Diocesean policy is guilty of unprofessional conduct.\nIt is clear from the complaint and exhibits in the present case that the plaintiff breached her contract by unilaterally terminating her employment in violation of Diocesean personnel rules. This action by the plaintiff triggered defendants\u2019 right to report plaintiff\u2019s unprofessional conduct to the proper authorities in accord with its personnel policy. Defendants were justified in contacting the principal of the Shabbona School to inform him of plaintiff\u2019s breach and of defendants\u2019 decision to enforce its rights under the contract.\nPlaintiff\u2019s allegation of unjustified interference by defendants is contradicted by the exhibit attached to the complaint. The majority chooses to ignore the ramifications of this conflict by restricting its attention to the allegations of the complaint. The trial court properly considered the complaint and exhibit as a whole and concluded that plaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to allege a crucial element of a cause of action for tortious interference with contract. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy T. McLaughlin, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James C. Byrne, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD HAHN et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3-84-0400\nOpinion filed July 22, 1985.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied August 26, 1985.\nHEIPLE, P.J., dissenting.\nTimothy T. McLaughlin, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames C. Byrne, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0947-01", "first_page_order": 969, "last_page_order": 973 }