{ "id": 3601366, "name": "ADAM MARTIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BRANDON PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Adam Martin Construction Co. v. Brandon Partnership", "decision_date": "1985-07-23", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20142236", "first_page": "324", "last_page": "328", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 324" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3112914 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/236/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2853312 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/109/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5779167 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/24/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1887, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5649798 ], "year": 1887, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/319/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.E. 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5238874 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/338/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5278911 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/51/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4931184 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/25/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3264387 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/1046-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 503, "char_count": 10150, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.066051270360294e-07, "percentile": 0.7571485827938231 }, "sha256": "feb3da1f927447ff61956e48e92855c1a05c264f239d968b7f4e14030cb76f93", "simhash": "1:ca97c5f52ac2eafd", "word_count": 1644 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:44:15.524885+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ADAM MARTIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BRANDON PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing arbitration of a mechanic\u2019s lien foreclosure action, the circuit court entered judgment on the arbitrator\u2019s awards to plaintiff and defendant, and ordered that the judgment for defendant be set off against the judgment for plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals from the order setting off the judgments, raising as issues whether: (1) a set-off constitutes a \u201cmodification\u201d of an arbitrator\u2019s award within the meaning of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 10, pars. 101 through 123); and (2) attorney fees should be exempted from a set-off where the arbitrator\u2019s award does not expressly provide for such fees.\nOn October 5, 1979, plaintiff general contractor initiated the instant action for foreclosure of a mechanic\u2019s lien. Pursuant to the terms of the construction contract to which plaintiff and defendant were parties, the circuit court referred the matter to arbitration on February 26, 1980. In arbitration, in addition to the matters raised in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, defendant submitted a demand for arbitration of its claim brought under the liquidated damages clause of the contract. After hearings, the arbitrator on May 18, 1983, issued awards requiring plaintiff to pay defendant $26,585.79 and defendant to pay plaintiff $27,655.10.\nOn August 1, 1983, the court found that it had no jurisdiction to grant a set-off with respect to the arbitrator\u2019s award. On August 11, 1983, the court entered a judgment for $26,585.79 in favor of defendant and a separate judgment for $27,655.10 in favor of plaintiff, nunc pro tunc as of August 1, 1983. On August 11, 1983, defendant filed a motion for declaratory judgment and other relief which, among other things, sought to have defendant\u2019s judgment set off against plaintiff\u2019s.\nOn April 26, 1984, the circuit court entered a written order which found in pertinent part that: defendant\u2019s motion for declaratory judgment was in the nature of a motion for reconsideration of that part of the court\u2019s August 1, 1983, order which declined to set off the parties\u2019 judgments; the court had jurisdiction to consider this motion; this motion was not an attempt to modify the arbitrator\u2019s award; the arbitrator\u2019s award made no award to plaintiff for attorney fees and costs; no attorney fees were awarded and none were exempt from set-off; the awards to the parties arose from the same set of facts and were appropriate for a set-off; and the court erred on August 1, 1983, by finding that it lacked jurisdiction to order a set-off. The court accordingly ordered that: defendant\u2019s motion for declaratory judgment and other relief be granted; the judgments entered on August 11, 1983, be ratified and affirmed; language in the August 1, 1983, order finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a set-off be stricken, as the \u201cset-off of judgments does not constitute a modification of the arbitrator\u2019s award\u201d; the August 1, 1983, order be ratified and affirmed in all other respects, and the arbitrator\u2019s award be confirmed; and defendant\u2019s judgment be set off against plaintiff\u2019s, and that plaintiff shall have execution on the balance due of $1,069.31.\nAfter plaintiff\u2019s motion for reconsideration and to vacate was denied, this appeal followed.\nI\nPlaintiff contends that the set-off ordered here constitutes an impermissible modification of the arbitrator\u2019s award.\nSection 11 of the Act provides that the circuit court shall confirm an arbitral award unless \u201cgrounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting\u201d it. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 10, par. 111.) Plaintiff urges that defendant neither alleged nor argued that the instant award was in any way defective so as to permit judicial modification or correction. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 10, par. 113(a).) The circuit court, however, \u201cconfirmed\u201d the arbitrator\u2019s award, finding that the set-off here did not constitute a \u201cmodification\u201d of the award. Authority supporting or contradicting the court\u2019s characterization of the set-off as a \u201cconfirmation\u201d of the award was neither cited nor found; nevertheless, the court\u2019s action here was proper.\nSection 14 of the Act provides that \u201c[u]pon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 10, par. 114.) As defendant correctly notes, the arbitrator, whose role is limited to making findings, has no power to implement his decisions. Such power is reserved for the court, which here implemented the arbitrator\u2019s decision by confirming the awards and ordering the set-off. The amounts awarded to each of the parties by the arbitrator were not disturbed and were therefore confirmed; the set-off, applying these same amounts, was \u201cin conformity\u201d with the order confirming the award. No substantive rights of the parties were affected by this procedure. (See Wilcox Co. v. Bouramas (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1050, 392 N.E.2d 198.) Moreover, the court\u2019s ordering of the set-off derives from the court\u2019s inherent and statutory authority over the enforcement of its judgments. (Matson v. Oberne (1887), 25 Ill. App. 213, 216; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 12 \u2014 176. See 49 C.J.S. Judgments sec. 566(b) (1947).) Applied to the precise amounts awarded by the arbitrator, the set-off thus comports with section 14, which permits judgments entered on arbitral awards to be \u201cenforced as any other judgment.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 10, par. 114.\nAn analogous case supports the circuit court\u2019s action here. In S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Consolidated Construction Co. (1964), 51 Ill. App. 2d 246, 201 N.E.2d 183, the circuit court, in an action to confirm an arbitrator\u2019s award, properly adjudicated the account between the parties by ordering the sum awarded to defendant by the arbitrator to be deducted from the larger sum owed to plaintiff by defendant; the appellate court there rejected defendant\u2019s argument that plaintiff was limited only to confirmation of its award. Similarly, the circuit court here did not err by ordering the set-off.\nII\nPlaintiff insists nevertheless that a set-off was improperly ordered under the facts of this case.\nUnder sections 12 \u2014 176 and 12 \u2014 177 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code), judgments between the same parties may be set off against each other, so that the larger judgment is reduced by the amount of the lesser judgment; the balance due on the larger judgment then is enforceable in the same manner as if there had been no set-off. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, pars. 12-176 and 12-177.) Under section 12 \u2014 178(5) of the Code, set-offs are not permitted \u201cas to so much of the first judgment as is due to the attorney in that action for his or her fees and disbursements therein.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 12 \u2014 178(5).) The purpose of exempting attorney fees from the set-off provision is to render the attorney claim for fees preferred as against his client\u2019s judgment creditors. Silverman v. City Engineering Construction Co. (1930), 338 Ill. 154, 157, 170 N.E. 250; Siegel v. Meyer (1943), 319 Ill. App. 102, 105, 48 N.E.2d 595; Brent v. Brent (1887), 24 Ill. App. 448, 453.\nPlaintiff urges that the instant set-off was erroneous in that the award assigned to it by the arbitrator presumptively included attorney fees. Because the arbitrator\u2019s decision did not specify whether fees or costs were included in plaintiff\u2019s award, plaintiff argues, the award of a gross sum of money is presumed to be a complete adjustment of all the matters arbitrated, citing Stearns v. Cope (1884), 109 Ill. 340, 348, and City State Bank v. Detrick (1925), 236 Ill. App. 350, 359-60. Plaintiff claims that its request for fees in the prayer for relief in its complaint was sufficient to raise the issue of fees for arbitration, and that the gross sum awarded plaintiff therefore included attorney fees. We disagree.\nThe circuit court expressly found that the arbitrator\u2019s decision made no award for fees and costs, and that plaintiff had not presented any petition for fees or for modification of the arbitrator\u2019s award to include a finding for fees, nor did plaintiff allege that the arbitrator failed to consider that portion of its prayer for relief in its award. It cannot be said that these findings were erroneous. There is no indication that the matter of fees was actually raised at the arbitration hearing, or that plaintiff asked for the hearing to be reopened after the arbitrator announced his decision. Moreover, neither of the cases relied upon by plaintiff to support the proposition that a gross award of money presumptively includes all matters arbitrated involved requests for fees and costs. (See Stearns v. Cope (1884), 109 Ill. 340; City State Bank v. Detrick (1925), 236 Ill. App. 350.) Here, the record does not support plaintiff\u2019s argument that the matter of fees and costs was actually or presumptively arbitrated.\nFinally, as the circuit court found, the amount of the fee award was a question for the arbitrator to address, not the court. As section 12 \u2014 178 exempts from set-off only that portion of an arbitrator\u2019s award designated for fees and costs, acceptance of plaintiff\u2019s argument that unspecified fees and costs were presumptively included in its award would require exemption of the entire award. This would frustrate the equitable purposes of the set-off procedure' and would mean that if plaintiff were insolvent, it would be able to collect its judgment against defendant while defendant would be without remedy against plaintiff. (See Matson v. Oberne (1887), 25 Ill. App. 213, 217.) The set-off here was properly ordered.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBERLIN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Harold I. Levine, Ltd., of Chicago (Harold I. Levine, of counsel), for appellant.", "R. S. Maione, of Drugas, Maione, Morgan & Hyink, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ADAM MARTIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BRANDON PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 84\u20142236\nOpinion filed July 23, 1985.\nHarold I. Levine, Ltd., of Chicago (Harold I. Levine, of counsel), for appellant.\nR. S. Maione, of Drugas, Maione, Morgan & Hyink, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0324-01", "first_page_order": 346, "last_page_order": 350 }