{ "id": 3600978, "name": "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ROCKFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, WINNEBAGO-BOONE COUNTIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF BOONE AND WINNEBAGO COUNTIES et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Education v. Regional Board of School Trustees", "decision_date": "1985-08-02", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20140651", "first_page": "486", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 486" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2894791 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558970 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 973", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5496706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0973-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2995548 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629285 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990377 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5470279 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127690 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519654 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519212 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625413 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0240-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 19079, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.032345618557184e-07, "percentile": 0.7467441151974498 }, "sha256": "880ef5c6d5f37557b3d232dcfc941bc85e252fb6df1ae28474da17686882f602", "simhash": "1:9bbaa95ebf5a55bb", "word_count": 3042 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:44:15.524885+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ROCKFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, WINNEBAGO-BOONE COUNTIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF BOONE AND WINNEBAGO COUNTIES et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPF\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, board of education of Rockford School District No. 205, Winnebago-Boone Counties (Rockford district), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus and permanent injunction alleging that the hearing board, selected by defendant, regional board of school trustees of Boone and Winnebago Counties (regional board), to hear plaintiff\u2019s resolution objecting to detachment of certain real estate from the Rockford district, was not chosen in accordance with section 7 \u2014 2.5 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5). The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, finding that pursuant to the language of section 7 \u2014 2.5, the plaintiff did not have the right to reject defendant regional board\u2019s two appointees to the hearing board. This appeal followed.\nThe issue on appeal concerns the interpretation of the words \u201cdistricts affected,\u201d as they appear in section 7 \u2014 2.5 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5). Plaintiff contends that the language of section 7 \u2014 2.5 is not ambiguous, that it favors plaintiff\u2019s interpretation that the term \u201cdistricts affected\u201d encompasses a special charter district, such as the Rockford district, and that, as a district affected, plaintiff\u2019s approval of defendant regional board\u2019s two appointees to the hearing board was required. Conversely, plaintiff argues that if section 7 \u2014 2.5 is held to be ambiguous and in need of interpretation and construction, the rules of statutory construction support plaintiffs interpretation.\nPetitioners, who were intervenors at the trial level and who constitute the additional defendants-appellees in this appeal, filed a petition for detachment of certain territory from the Rockford district (a special charter district). Plaintiff objected to the detachment and adopted a resolution objecting to detachment which it filed with defendant regional board. Pursuant to section 7 \u2014 2.5 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5), which includes the procedure involved in selecting members of a hearing board to hear the petition and objection, plaintiff appointed two legal voters from the Rockford district to be members of the hearing board. Defendant regional board also appointed two legal voters from the districts under its jurisdiction to be members.\nPlaintiff adopted a resolution rejecting defendant regional board\u2019s two appointees on the basis that under section 7 \u2014 2.5 the appointments were subject to plaintiff\u2019s approval. In an accompanying letter, plaintiff requested that the regional board tender two more appointees for confirmation by plaintiff. The ex officio secretary of the regional board informed plaintiff that the regional board\u2019s appointees were not subject to plaintiff\u2019s approval. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus and permanent injunction, seeking the trial court to declare that the hearing board be selected in accordance with its interpretation of section 7\u2014 2.5 of the School Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5.\nAt a hearing, the trial court concluded that the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d used in section 7 \u2014 2.5 of the School Code did not include special charter districts, such as the Rockford district and, therefore, plaintiff possessed no right to reject the regional board\u2019s two appointees to the hearing board, since only \u201cdistricts affected\u201d had the right of approval. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5.) As a result, the trial court found that plaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.\nSections 7 \u2014 2.3 through 7 \u2014 2.7 provide for the annexation to and detachment of property in a special charter school district. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, pars. 7 \u2014 2.3 through 7 \u2014 2.7.) \u201c \u2018Special charter district\u2019 means any city, township or district organized into a school district, under a special Act or charter of the General Assembly or in which schools are now managed and operating within such unit in whole or in part under the terms of such special Act or charter.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 1 \u2014 3.) The portion of section 7 \u2014 2.5 which is in contention states:\n\u201cHowever, if an objection to the proposed annexation or detachment of territory is filed with either the special charter district or the regional board of school trustees, the regional board of school trustees, within 15 days after receiving the objection, shall appoint 2 legal voters from the district or districts under their jurisdiction and involved in the proposed annexation or detachment of territory, subject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected, and the board or governing body of the special charter district shall appoint 2 legal voters from the special charter district.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5.)\nOf primary importance in this appeal is the emphasized portion of the sentence set out above.\nPlaintiff first contends that the language of section 7 \u2014 2.5 is not ambiguous and, therefore, needs no judicial construction but rather should have been given the plain meaning intended by the legislature. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5.) That meaning, according to plaintiff, is that the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d refer to the district from which territory is to be detached as well as to the district to which the territory is to be annexed, and, therefore, both districts have the right to approve the defendant regional board\u2019s two appointees. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that if the statute is held to be ambiguous, application of the rules of statutory construction favors plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of selection 7 \u2014 2.5.\nDefendant agrees that the statute is unambiguous but argues that the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d was correct. The essence of defendant\u2019s position is that the trial court considered the full statutory section and not just the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d to determine that the legislative intent was to provide a balanced hearing board and that this objective could not be accomplished if, in addition to being able to pick two appointees of its own, the special charter district also possessed the right to approve defendant\u2019s appointees. Consequently, defendant maintains that the plain meaning of the words \u201csubject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected\u201d is that the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected, other than the board of the special charter district, is required. Defendant also maintains that if the statute is ambiguous, statutory construction favors its position.\nThis court has found no Illinois cases to date which interpret this specific provision of the School Code:\n\u201cIn construing a statutory provision not yet judicially interpreted, a court is guided by both the plain meaning of the language in the statute as well as legislative intent. [Citations.] The statutory language is the best indication of the drafters. [Citation.]\u201d (Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 245, 446 N.E.2d 1271.)\nWhen the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court\u2019s only function is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. (Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 463, 470, 452 N.E.2d 49.) An appellate court cannot restrict or enlarge the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. People v. McCray (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 451 N.E.2d 985.\nAlthough both parties claim that the language of the statute is not ambiguous, their arguments and reason for being in this court would seem to belie this fact. \u201cAmbiguity\u201d is defined as \u201cthe condition of admitting of two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 66 (1981).) Clearly, from their arguments here, section 7 \u2014 2.5 appears to be capable of being understood in more than one way. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5; Penman v. Board of Trustees (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 139, 144, 418 N.E.2d 795.) We believe that the words \u201csubject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected\u201d which immediately follow the phrase \u201cfrom the district or districts under their [the regional board\u2019s] jurisdiction and involved in the proposed annexation or detachment of property\u201d directly refer to that phrase. Nevertheless, ambiguity in the use of the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d in the phrase in question could be said to exist by virtue of the fact that plaintiff, as a special charter district, is one of the districts affected by either the detachment or annexation of the territory under this section. A resort to the rules of statutory construction appears appropriate in this case.\nThe cardinal rule of all statutory construction is that the true intention of the legislature must be ascertained and given effect. (People ex rel. Scott v. Larance (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 171, 174, 434 N.E.2d 5; Harvey Firemen\u2019s Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363, 389 N.E.2d 151.) The initial and primary source for determining legislative intent is the plain meaning of the language used. (Board of Education v. Carter (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 857, 859, 458 N.E.2d 50.) Usually, it is unnecessary to look beyond the language of the statute to learn the legislative intent, but when differing interpretations are proffered, as is the case here, legislative intent must be gathered not only from the language used, but also from the reasons for the enactment and the purposes to be thereby attained. Pielet Brothers Trading, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755, 442 N.E.2d 1374.\nThe legislative intent of section 7 \u2014 2.5 is to provide for the selection of members to a hearing board which is to hear and decide an objection filed to the proposed annexation or detachment of territory from a special charter school district. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 7 \u2014 2.5.) The plain language of the statute indicates that the hearing board is to consist of seven members; two appointed by the defendant regional board, two appointed by the plaintiff special charter district, and three more selected by the four appointees. We believe that the obvious purpose of this selection process is to give the special charter district and the other district or districts involved in the annexation or detachment an equal number of representatives on the hearing board and, in addition, to choose three neutral members. The evil to be remedied by this process is to prevent the selection of a board which would be completely favorable to one party\u2019s position before an objection to a petition for annexation or detachment was ever heard.\nDespite the fact that the object of this statute is to create an impartial hearing board, the plaintiff maintains that the rules of statutory construction favor its position. Plaintiff contends, as the district from which the subject territory is to be detached, it is included in the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d in the phrase \u201csubject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected.\u201d To uphold plaintiff\u2019s construction would have the effect of not only permitting plaintiff to choose two representatives from its own district but also allowing it to control the selection of the representatives from the other district or districts. This result would not promote the statute\u2019s purpose of creating an impartial hearing board for it would be possible, under plaintiff\u2019s construction, to have a hearing board comprised of four members favorable to its position who, in turn, would control the selection of the final three.\nMoreover, if the appointees of the nonspecial charter districts were subject to the approval of the special charter district, then the special charter district appointees, in turn, should be subject to the approval of the boards of education of the nonspecial charter districts in order to give effect to the statute\u2019s purpose of creating an impartial hearing board. That this is not intended appears evident from that portion of the sentence in question which deals with the special charter district. That portion states: \u201c[A]nd the board or governing body of the special charter district shall appoint two legal voters from the special charter district.\u201d No phrase \u201csubject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected\u201d appears in the preceding statement. The fact that this phrase does not appear in that portion of the sentence dealing with the special charter district\u2019s appointees reinforces defendants\u2019 contention that \u201cdistricts affected\u201d in the portion of the sentence dealing with the regional board\u2019s appointees refers only to approval by the boards of education of the districts other than the special charter districts. To adopt plaintiff\u2019s construction of the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d and to still create an impartial hearing board defendant would also have to possess this equal right of approval and yet it appears evident from the plain language of the statute that defendant possesses no such right. Although words may be added, deleted or changed in a statute to effectuate the legislative intent (Orbach v. Axelrod (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 973, 980, 427 N.E.2d 399), it is not within the province of this court to enlarge the meaning of the statute by adding language aimed at correcting any supposed omission or defect. In re Estate of Swiecicki (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709, 460 N.E.2d 91.\nAdditionally, by applying the \u201clast antecedent doctrine\u201d to the words in question, it is clear that the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d refer only to those districts involved in the annexation or detachment of property which are under defendants\u2019 jurisdiction. The \u201clast antecedent rule\u201d requires that relative or qualifying words, phrases, or-clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and not as extending to or including other words, phrases or clauses more remote, unless the intent of the General Assembly disclosed by the context and reading of the entire statute requires such exclusion or inclusion. (People v. Thomas (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 68, 72, 256 N.E.2d 794.) It is this court\u2019s opinion that proper application of this rule indicates that the qualifying words \u201csubject to the approval of the boards of education of the districts affected\u201d refer to the phrase \u201cfrom the district or districts under their [regional board\u2019s] jurisdiction and involved in the proposed annexation or detachment of territory.\u201d Applying the \u201clast antecedent rule\u201d in this manner, it is clear that the plaintiff as a special charter district could not be considered as a \u201cdistrict affected\u201d because plaintiff is not under the jurisdiction of defendant. Section 6 \u2014 2 of the School Code, which provides for the creation and membership of the regional board of trustees, states in relevant part:\n\u201cThere is created a regional board of school trustees for that territory in each educational service region exclusive of any school district organized under Article 34 and exclusive of any school district whose school board has been given the powers of school trustees. Any school district whose board of education acts as a board of school trustees shall have within its district the powers and duties of a regional board of school trustees.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 6 \u2014 2.0.)\nSection 32 \u2014 1.2, which deals with the powers and duties of special charter districts, states:\n\u201cA school board of any special charter district that is elected by the voters shall have the powers and duties of school trustees.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 32 \u2014 1.2.)\nWe take judicial notice that plaintiff\u2019s school board is elected and, therefore, has the powers of school trustees. Thus, because plaintiff is not under the jurisdiction of defendant regional board of trustees, it cannot be considered as within the class of \u201cdistricts affected\u201d as defined in the sentence in question of section 7 \u2014 2.5.\nFinally, mention should be made of the additional issue raised by the additional defendants-appellees, the original petitioners for detachment of certain property from plaintiff. These defendants assert that a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal is a fundamental requirement of due process and that plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of section 7 \u2014 2.5 would operate to defeat this requirement. In effect, additional defendants reiterate the regional board\u2019s position that plaintiff\u2019s construction of section 7 \u2014 2.5 would have the result of creating a hearing board whereby the majority of its members would be sympathetic to plaintiff\u2019s position. We believe that our earlier discussion in this opinion dealing with the need for an impartial hearing board makes it unnecessary to discuss this additional issue.\nThis court is in accord with the trial court\u2019s finding that the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d do not include the special charter district. In our opinion the relevant language \u201cdistricts affected\u201d seems plain and distinctly indicates that only the boards of education of districts under defendants\u2019 jurisdiction and from whom the defendants\u2019 appointees have been selected should have the right to approve or reject defendants\u2019 appointees. Bearing in mind the language of the statute, the evil to be remedied by its enactment, and the purpose of the statute, we conclude that the words \u201cdistricts affected\u201d do not refer to a special charter district and that if the legislature had intended to give a special charter district the authority to approve the regional board\u2019s appointees it would have expressly done so. Even if this court determined that two different constructions could be placed on these words, we would select that which leads to a logical result and avoid the one that would render the operation of the law difficult. (Orbach v. Axelrod (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 973, 978, 427 N.E.2d 399.) We believe the logical result is that advocated by defendant regional board, because it allows for the selection of the impartial hearing board to hear and decide an objection to a petition for detachment or annexation of territory from a special charter school district.\nFor the reasons set forth, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTROUSE and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPF" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pedderson, Menzimer, Conde, Stoner & Killoren and James M. Hess, both of Rockford, for appellant.", "John R. Kinley and Russell D. Anderson, both of Williams & McCarthy, and Bradley T. Koch and Roberta L. Holzwarth, both of Holmstrom & Green, both of Rockford, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ROCKFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, WINNEBAGO-BOONE COUNTIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF BOONE AND WINNEBAGO COUNTIES et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 84\u20140651\nOpinion filed August 2, 1985.\nPedderson, Menzimer, Conde, Stoner & Killoren and James M. Hess, both of Rockford, for appellant.\nJohn R. Kinley and Russell D. Anderson, both of Williams & McCarthy, and Bradley T. Koch and Roberta L. Holzwarth, both of Holmstrom & Green, both of Rockford, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0486-01", "first_page_order": 508, "last_page_order": 516 }