{ "id": 3601076, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL LOUCKS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Loucks", "decision_date": "1985-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201484\u20140828", "first_page": "530", "last_page": "533", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 530" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 Or. App. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 2101385 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/39/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 So. 2d 1037", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9593532 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/392/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Cal. Rptr. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Cal. App. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2232804 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/274/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3074986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" }, { "page": "771-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483119 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1062-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/1059-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 432, "char_count": 7517, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.160755251022821e-07, "percentile": 0.8632711791305208 }, "sha256": "6cf918c3140cd6850768ed939a9f425a166869cc62e5ebf3eb1a86a9e0c06240", "simhash": "1:b08af20f565667f7", "word_count": 1233 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:44:15.524885+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL LOUCKS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JONES\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an interlocutory appeal brought by the State from an order of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant, Daniel Loucks, to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In his motion the defendant alleged that his conduct \u201cimmediately prior to being stopped was not such as could be reasonably interpreted to constitute probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop.\u201d The State raises the single issue of whether the trial court\u2019s granting of the defendant\u2019s motion was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe record is supplemented by a statement of facts agreed to by the parties as \u201csubstantially the facts presented before the Court.\u201d The parties agreed that on October 2, 1984, Officer Cassidy, while on routine patrol in the city of Murphysboro, observed the defendant driving an automobile that was \u201cweaving within his own lane\u201d continuously for a distance of about two blocks. Suspecting that the driver, whom he did not know, was intoxicated, the officer stopped the vehicle. The officer could not detect an odor of alcohol about the driver, who thereafter identified himself as Daniel Loucks, the defendant. \u201cAs a part of this traffic stop,\u201d the officer ran a license check on the defendant and then arrested him for driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked.\nThe State relies on People v. Houldridge (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1061, 454 N.E.2d 769, 770, in which a deputy sheriff had observed a defendant\u2019s vehicle while descending a hill \u201cswerve or slide from the north to the south side of the road.\u201d After running a license plate check on the vehicle, the deputy was advised by the radio operator that its registration had expired. After stopping the vehicle the deputy smelled the odor of burned cannabis coming from the vehicle and made other observations not pertinent here. Each of the defendants in Houldridge was arrested and charged with possession of cannabis. The driver, defendant Houldridge, was not charged with an expired registration violation because, after the deputy had arrested the defendants, he found that the area on the rear number plate where the sticker was to be applied was dirty and that the registration sticker was valid. The court began its analysis by stating:\n\u201cWe find no basis for holding that the initial stop of the vehicle in which defendants were traveling was illegal. Generally, a police officer may briefly detain an individual where the officer believes on the basis of articulable facts that there is a substantial possibility that that individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense. (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868; People v. Jones (1982), 102 Ill. App. 3d 246, 429 N.E.2d 1101.) More specifically, erratic driving, such as weaving across a roadway or even weaving within the lane of traffic within which a vehicle is traveling, provides a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. (People v. Boddie (1969), 274 Cal. App. 2d 408, 80 Cal. Rptr. 83; State v. Morrison (La. 1980), 392 So. 2d 1037; State v. Perry (1979), 39 Or. App. 37, 591 P.2d 379.) ***\nIn the present case, the weaving of the defendants\u2019 vehicle from one side of the road to the other, coupled with the information that the vehicle\u2019s registration may have been expired which [the deputy] obtained via his police radio, was more than adequate to provide [him] with a reasonable basis for believing that the vehicle was being operated in violation of the law and was thus subject to an investigatory stop.\u201d (117 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062-63, 454 N.E.2d 769, 771-72.)\nThe defendant argues in his brief that\n\u201c[t]he record here does not indicate that the trial court rejected Houldridge; it does not show that the court found that weaving within one\u2019s own lane does not provide a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. Instead, the court found that the defendant\u2019s conduct did not establish probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop.\u201d\nThe defendant argues further that \u201c \u2018weaving\u2019 is a highly subjective judgment\u201d and that \u201ca determination of probable cause based on \u2018weaving\u2019 is one of degree\u201d and asserts that the trial court held that the \u201cdegree\u201d of weaving here did not constitute probable cause to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. However, the record does not suggest that any evidence was presented concerning the \u201cdegree\u201d of the defendant\u2019s weaving, as for example whether the weaving was slight or pronounced. Thus, we find the defendant\u2019s argument in this respect unpersuasive.\nWeaving within the lane of traffic in which a vehicle is traveling provides a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, and in the instant case the evidence was undisputed that the vehicle the defendant was driving was weaving within its own lane of travel continuously for a distance of about two blocks. Such erratic driving provided Officer Cassidy with articulable facts that there was a substantial possibility that the defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense. The undisputed evidence showed that Officer Cassidy had sufficient basis for making an investigative stop of the defendant\u2019s motor vehicle.\nThe defendant maintains further that\n\u201cthe officer\u2019s actions beyond those necessary to confirm or disprove his suspicion of the driver\u2019s intoxication and the request for the defendant\u2019s license were beyond the scope of the investigative stop. Simply put, under the circumstances of this case, the officer\u2019s act of running a radio check on the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license violated the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Once the officer\u2019s suspicion that the defendant was intoxicated was disproved, the justification for any further investigation was gone. At that point, there was no longer an \u2018articulable suspicion\u2019 that criminal activity was about to occur or had occurred. Thus, the detention of the defendant while a license check was being made was beyond the scope of Terry and constituted an unlawful seizure.\u201d\nHowever, the record here does not indicate whether the officer did, in fact, run the license check after he had satisfied himself that the defendant was not intoxicated or whether he had run the check, or had begun to run it, before he had so satisfied himself. The record states only that \u201c[a]s a part of this traffic stop\u201d the officer ran a license check. The defendant made no such assertion in his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence or, so far as the record shows, at any time in the trial court. Therefore, we decline to consider the question.\nWe hold that the trial court\u2019s order quashing arrest and suppressing evidence was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the order is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nKASSERMAN and WELCH, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JONES" } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and John H. Benham, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Randy E. Blue and Patricia M. Sarter, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL LOUCKS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201484\u20140828\nOpinion filed August 7, 1985.\nRehearing denied August 23, 1985.\nJohn R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and John H. Benham, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nRandy E. Blue and Patricia M. Sarter, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0530-01", "first_page_order": 552, "last_page_order": 555 }