{ "id": 3599858, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN T. PAXTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Paxton", "decision_date": "1985-08-14", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140302", "first_page": "680", "last_page": "684", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 680" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660554 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193382 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 9754, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3930317945177499 }, "sha256": "55bdc964dfd1326264191ae28af15488b16262798c7f1fcdee43fb05259fc745", "simhash": "1:dc2bc36d72da05f4", "word_count": 1521 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:44:15.524885+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN T. PAXTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 25, 1982, defendant Stephen T. Paxton was charged in the circuit court of Peoria County with having committed burglary in violation of section 19 \u2014 1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1(a)). Defendant filed a petition electing to undergo treatment as an addict pursuant to the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.8 et seq.). After a hearing, the court found the defendant eligible to make the election and referred the defendant for an evaluation by the Dangerous Drug Commission or its designee to determine whether the defendant was an addict and whether he was likely to be rehabilitated through treatment. A report dated August 20, 1982, and signed by Elizabeth Alsup-Crawley, of T.A.S.C. (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes), appears next in the record. It contains the requisite findings and recommends \u201csix months or longer residential treatment at Interventions, Inc./Crossroads.\u201d\nAt a subsequent hearing, the court accepted the defendant\u2019s election. The defendant, upon receiving appropriate admonitions, pleaded guilty to burglary. After accepting the plea, the court placed defendant on supervision for a period of two years and named T.A.S.C. as the agency responsible for treatment.\nPeriodic progress reports from T.A.S.C. were filed with the court from September 1982 until December 1983, when a report from Elizabeth Alsup-Crawley informed the court that the defendant failed to improve in treatment and had been discharged from the T.A.S.C. program effective November 17, 1983. On December 19, 1983, the State\u2019s Attorney petitioned for termination of the defendant\u2019s supervision pursuant to section 9 of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.9). At the defendant\u2019s hearing of January 27, 1984, the State called Alsup-Crawley, who had responsibility for monitoring defendant\u2019s progress in the T.A.S.C. program. Alsup-Crawley testified that defendant had reached a third \u201cjeopardy status\u201d which resulted in automatic discharge from T.A.S.C. Defendant\u2019s first and second jeopardy status had resulted from failure to make progress in treatment and returning late from an overnight pass, respectively. She could not specify the details of defendant\u2019s conduct which resulted in the third jeopardy status, and could state only that defendant\u2019s counselor at the last treatment facility had reported that defendant \u201chad not fulfilled the commitments and was not making progress in treatment.\u201d The counselor did not testify. Over defense counsel\u2019s objection that the conclusionary testimony of Alsup-Crawley effectively deprived the defendant of due process of law, the court ruled that under the circumstances the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to terminate supervision and resume criminal proceedings pursuant to the statutory scheme.\nDespite the adverse ruling, defense counsel requested an opportunity to be heard. The defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he had started working at the Pizza Hut the day before T.A.S.C. terminated him. At he time of the hearing, defendant was also in training for a position as sales representative for the Iowa Manufacturing Solar Company. Defendant no longer used alcohol, was regularly attending weekly meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, and he had not used drugs since his arrest for burglary. Defendant believed that his third jeopardy status had resulted because he had a \u201cbad attitude\u201d and his counselor (\u201cJoan somebody or other\u201d) did not feel he was working on his problem of relating with women.\nAt the conclusion of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court found that the State had sustained its burden and terminated defendant\u2019s supervision. In reaching his conclusion, the trial judge made the following observations:\n\u201cI think the young man has rehabilitated himself. I think sentencing him to prison is a waste of time. But I am trying to follow the Statute. I am trying to get the questions decided by the Appellate Court right on the issue. And let them tell us what this law is. I think that if TASC, this will be the reason for my ruling, if TASC reports back to the Court that he cannot be rehabilitated or cannot successfully complete the program or that the individual cannot be further treated, then I terminate the supervision.\u201d\nThe defendant was subsequently sentenced to three years, the minimum prison sentence for burglary, without objection from the State. (A prior burglary conviction precluded probation.) The court observed that with credit for the time spent on supervision and good time, no actual prison time would be served.\nIn this appeal, the defendant presents three arguments challenging the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence at the termination hearing, the trial court\u2019s ruling on defense counsel\u2019s due process objections, and the trial court\u2019s ruling that it was without authority to continue defendant\u2019s supervision given the State\u2019s proof that the designated treatment program had determined defendant could be treated no further. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nInitially, we reject defendant\u2019s unsupported contention that proof that he was drug-free and had obtained employment before the supervisory period had ended, without more, precluded a determination that defendant could not be further treated at the rehabilitation facility. Obviously, the treatment program\u2019s rehabilitative goal is to treat not only the symptoms of addiction, but to attempt to expose its cause to the addict so that he/she might not necessarily repeat the pattern of drug use upon release. The defendant\u2019s evidence of freedom from drugs and alcohol and the fact that he was employed did not overcome the State\u2019s evidence that the treatment program had, in fact, determined that he could no longer be treated.\nThe ultimate issues before the trial court were whether the program terminated the defendant upon the finding that he could not be further treated and whether that subjective determination was made arbitrarily. (See People v. Beckler (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 436, 459 N.E.2d 672, and People v. Sinclair (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 688, 407 N.E.2d 225.) The statutory provision here at issue is contained in the last paragraph of section 9 of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act: \u201cIf, before the supervisory period expires, the licensed program designated by the Commission determines that the individual cannot be further treated, it shall so advise the court. The court shall thereupon terminate the supervision, and the pending criminal proceedings may be resumed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.9.) As observed by the court in Beckler, \u201cthe placing of the absolute control of [the] determination in the discretion of the licensed program designated by the Commission, a discretion which may be subject to arbitrary exercise or abuse, requires certain minimal due process protection.\u201d Within the ambits of that protection is the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (People v. Beckler (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440, 459 N.E.2d 672, 675.) Where, as here, the evidence of the reasons for defendant\u2019s discharge from the treatment program was based entirely upon speculation and hearsay testimony, we do not find that minimal due process protection was afforded. Defendant was entitled to confront and cross-examine the counselor whose report to Alsup-Crawley resulted in defendant\u2019s automatic discharge from T.A.S.C. Alsup-Crawley admitted at the hearing that she lacked knowledge of facts underlying defendant\u2019s third \u201cjeopardy status.\u201d The defendant opined that his attitude and relations with women resulted in his discharge from the last treatment facility. We do not find that the defendant\u2019s speculation of the counselor\u2019s conclusions constitutes a fair substitute for the right to confront and cross-examine the counselor in court.\nThe State argues that Beckler held that the termination proceedings should be flexible, thereby admitting hearsay testimony that might not be admissible at trial. However, in light of the general lenient purpose of the Act (People v. Caldwell (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 455 N.E.2d 893, citing People v. DuMontelle (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205), the flexibility in such proceedings should be applied in a defendant\u2019s favor.\nFinally, we agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in ruling that it had no discretion in conducting the proceedings before him upon the State\u2019s proof that the T.A.S.C. program determined that the defendant could not be further treated and that he had been unsuccessfully discharged. The statutory language cannot be read so narrowly. The trial court\u2019s discretion in such matters lies in its determination of the fairness or arbitrariness of the treatment program\u2019s subjective decision. If, upon remand, the court finds that the defendant\u2019s discharge from the program resulted from the fact that he was rehabilitated, and not for another reason related to the rehabilitation goal, then it may, in its discretion, deny the State\u2019s petition.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court of Peoria County and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Frank W. Ralph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN T. PAXTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140302\nOpinion filed August 14, 1985.\nRobert Agostinelli and Frank W. Ralph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0680-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 706 }