{
  "id": 3565068,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTY DUBUISSON, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dubuisson",
  "decision_date": "1985-09-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-85-0043",
  "first_page": "305",
  "last_page": "308",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 305"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "337 N.E.2d 63",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 324",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2871109
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/33/0324-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "423 N.E.2d 538",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 728",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3111209
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/97/0728-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1054",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 426",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5475376
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/104/0426-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "362 N.E.2d 472",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3374234
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/48/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "402 N.E.2d 290",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 571",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3231353
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/81/0571-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "458 N.E.2d 87",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 26",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3593165
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/120/0026-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "300 N.E.2d 294",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 469",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5340815
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/13/0469-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 434,
    "char_count": 7121,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.763,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 8.001611999815488e-08,
      "percentile": 0.46409153583857593
    },
    "sha256": "ad29e8b4bcb5cf90b5be5c8ba45d0f6ae05ce175326a6b6d0e5a0fa167efb04e",
    "simhash": "1:8842a51503c68574",
    "word_count": 1140
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:17.169731+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTY DUBUISSON, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Marty Dubuisson, appeals from the court\u2019s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and from his sentence. We affirm.\nThe defendant was originally charged with delivery of more than 30 grams of a substance containing cocaine, a Class X offense. The defendant entered a blind plea of guilty to the offense of unlawful delivery of more than 10 grams, but not more than 30 grams, of a substance containing cocaine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(b)(2)), a Class 1 felony. Following a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced the defendant to four years\u2019 imprisonment with two years\u2019 mandatory supervised release. The defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion. The defendant brought the instant appeal. We affirm.\nThe defendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, the defendant argues that his plea was not voluntary as the prosecution breached the plea agreement by presenting evidence in aggravation at the sentencing hearing.\nA defendant\u2019s guilty plea is rendered invalid if adduced by an unfulfilled promise of the prosecutor. (People v. Dickinson (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 469, 300 N.E.2d 294.) A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating to the trial court the necessity of withdrawing his plea. (People v. Smithey (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 26, 458 N.E.2d 87.) It is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. We will not disturb the court\u2019s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Hiera (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 571, 402 N.E.2d 290.\nThe record shows adequate admonishments and facts to support the defendant\u2019s plea. The record further shows that in attempting to demonstrate his need to withdraw the plea, the defendant offered only unsubstantiated suggestions that his plea was conditioned on a prosecution promise not to present sentencing evidence in aggravation. We find no abuse in the court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment rather than to probation. In this argument, the defendant emphasizes his youth and asserts that his background and attitude make him a good candidate for rehabilitation on probation. The defendant also asserts that the sentencing court was predisposed to sentence him to imprisonment. We disagree.\nSection 5 \u2014 6\u20141(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that a sentencing court shall impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge unless it finds either that the offender\u2019s imprisonment is necessary to protect the public or that such a sentence deprecates the seriousness of the offense and is inconsistent with the ends of justice. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(a).) The granting of probation is within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. We will not reverse the court\u2019s decision absent failure or abuse of discretion. People v. Girard (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 1, 362 N.E.2d 472.\nWe find no failure or abuse of discretion here. Unlike the record in defendant\u2019s authority of People v. Kendrick (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 426, 432 N.E.2d 1054, the record here does not show that the court had any predisposition to sentence the defendant to prison. Rather, the record shows that the court considered all the evidence in mitigation and in aggravation before deciding to impose a sentence of imprisonment. The evidence in aggravation, including evidence of the circumstances of the instant offense in which the defendant sold two ounces of cocaine for $4,000, supports the court\u2019s conclusions that a sentence of imprisonment was necessary for the protection of the public and that probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense.\nThe defendant\u2019s third and final argument is that the defendant\u2019s sentence was disproportionate considering the term of probation imposed upon the codefendant, Lorene Marr. According to the defendant, he and Marr were similarly situated at sentencing except that Marr was more culpable than he. The following additional facts are relevant to this issue.\nThe evidence before the court established that the codefendant, Marr, took a drug enforcement agent to the defendant\u2019s residence, accepted $4,300 from the agent, went inside the defendant\u2019s residence with the money, and brought back to the waiting officer over 30 grams of a substance containing cocaine. Following Marr\u2019s immediate arrest, Marr had $300 in her possession; the defendant had $4,000 in his residence. The evidence also showed that a similar exchange, involving the same three persons but a smaller amount of cocaine-containing substance, occurred approximately one week prior to the instant offense. In regards to those two incidents, the codefendant, Marr, was convicted on guilty pleas to two Class 1 felony offenses of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. She was sentenced to a term of probation.\nFundamental fairness requires that similarly situated defendants ought to receive similar sentences. (People v. Bares (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 728, 423 N.E.2d 538.) However, the disparity between sentences for codefendants will not be disturbed when warranted by differences in the nature and extent of each defendant\u2019s participation in the offense or by the history and character of the defendants. People v. Stambor (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 324, 337 N.E.2d 63.\nWe find no basis to disturb the defendant\u2019s sentence. The record supports the conclusions of the trial court that the defendant, Dubuis-son, and his codefendant, Marr, were not similarly situated at sentencing. In denying the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court found Marr to be young, caught up in a lifestyle induced by her boyfriends, and truthful concerning her remorse and recently altered lifestyle. Also, the court found Marr\u2019s role to be that of a conduit rather than that of a dealer. On the other hand, the court found the defendant to be an intelligent, educated young man freely determined to profit from dealing in illegal drugs. Further, the court found untruthful the defendant\u2019s testimony regarding topics such as the extent of his drug dealing. Based on the defendants\u2019 differing histories and roles in the offense, the record supports the court\u2019s denial of probation to the defendant Dubuisson despite its grant of probation to Marr.\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE, P.J., and SCOTT, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Anthony Jamison, of Braud, Warner, Neppl & Westensee, Ltd., of Rock Island, for appellant.",
      "James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTY DUBUISSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201485\u20140043\nOpinion filed September 16, 1985.\nAnthony Jamison, of Braud, Warner, Neppl & Westensee, Ltd., of Rock Island, for appellant.\nJames T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0305-01",
  "first_page_order": 327,
  "last_page_order": 330
}