{ "id": 3565098, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOHAMMED SAYEED KHAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "PEOPLE v. KHAN", "decision_date": "1985-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 83-2438", "first_page": "754", "last_page": "763", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 754" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "417 U.S. 963", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519616, 1519837, 1519593, 1519992, 1519679, 1519839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0963-02", "/us/417/0963-01", "/us/417/0963-03", "/us/417/0963-04", "/us/417/0963-06", "/us/417/0963-05" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 1098", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6498, 5732, 7367, 6376, 7528, 6719, 6768, 6064, 7159, 7641, 8090, 5724, 6143 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/1098-13", "/us/429/1098-07", "/us/429/1098-10", "/us/429/1098-12", "/us/429/1098-06", "/us/429/1098-05", "/us/429/1098-03", "/us/429/1098-01", "/us/429/1098-02", "/us/429/1098-08", "/us/429/1098-04", "/us/429/1098-11", "/us/429/1098-09" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. 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MOHAMMED SAYEED KHAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Mohammed Sayeed Khan was convicted of criminal housing management (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 5.1) and reckless conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 5) relating to his management of an apartment building located at 3266-70 North Clark Street and 907-909 West School Street in Chicago. Defendant was sentenced to court supervision for a period of one year and fined $750. He appeals from his convictions of both criminal housing management and reckless conduct.\nThe evidence presented at trial established that during the pertinent time period defendant was the beneficiary of the land trust in which the subject premises were held. On May 19, 1982, defendant\u2019s building was inspected by a licensed architect and a building inspector of the city of Chicago. Both of these individuals found evidence that portions of the rear porch of the building were rotted, deteriorated, or missing, that the corridors of the building were littered with refrigerators, mattresses, and other items of debris, that in the walls of some corridors and apartments there were holes, broken plaster, sunken floors, broken entry doors, and water damage, and that there was a lack of window glass, hot water or toilets, in some of the apartments. The building was not provided with smoke detectors.\nA tenant of the building also testified to similar conditions. She stated that the defendant often made his monthly collection of the rent himself from his tenants in their apartments in the building.\n\u2022 The defendant presented no evidence on his own behalf. The trial court found him guilty of criminal housing management and reckless conduct. He was sentenced to one year of court supervision and fined $750. Defendant appeals from his convictions.\nDefendant first challenges the constitutionality of the criminal housing management statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 5.1) on the ground that it is void as unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, sec. 2). The Act defines the offense of criminal housing management as follows (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 5.1(a)):\n\u201cA person commits the offense of criminal housing management when, having personal management or control of residential real estate, whether as a legal or equitable owner of residential real estate or as a managing agent or otherwise, he knowingly permits by his gross carelessness or neglect the physical condition or facilities of the residential real estate to become or remain so deteriorated that the health or safety of any inhabitant is endangered.\u201d\nA criminal statute violates the requirements of due process if it fails to give defendant notice of the action or conduct that is proscribed. (People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 191, 205, 414 N.E.2d 731; People v. Vandiver (1971), 51 Ill. 2d 525, 530, 283 N.E.2d 681.) Thus the law must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and must provide explicit standards for police officers, judges and juries to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2299; Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 499, 513, 349 N.E.2d 61; People v. Tibbitts (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 56, 59-60, 305 N.E.2d 152.) In short the statute must convey a \u201csufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.\u201d United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 8, 91 L. Ed. 1877, 1883, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 1542; People v. Caffrey (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 526, 530, 455 N.E.2d 60.\nDefendant challenges the specificity of the criminal housing management provision on the ground that certain portions of the statute are so vague and general that they are insufficient to provide adequate warning of the conduct proscribed therein. Specifically, defendant claims that the terms \u201cto become or remain deteriorated\u201d and \u201cdangerous and hazardous\u201d are not susceptible of sufficient definition to give proper notice of the nature of the crime.\nWe are unpersuaded by defendant\u2019s contention that the statute is unconstitutionally vague in this regard. Due process does not require an impossible level of specificity in penal statutes (People v. Caffrey (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 526, 530, 455 N.E.2d 60), nor does it compel a mechanical application of analysis. (Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flip-side, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 489, 498, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193.) Instead it calls for an interpretation of statutory language according to its ordinary and commonly understood meaning (People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 275, 280, 356 N.E.2d 8, cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 1098, 51 L. Ed. 2d 545, 97 S. Ct. 1116) in light of the conduct charged. (United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. (1963), 372 U.S. 29, 33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-66, 83 S. Ct. 594, 598.) Consequently, neither the enumeration of specific types of deterioration, the time period of this deterioration, nor the manner or extent to which inhabitants might be endangered are necessary for purposes of constitutionality here. Due process does not require such precision or \u201claundry list\u201d of conditions, since such a task would be impossible. (See People v. Caffrey (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 526, 530, 455 N.E.2d 60; People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, 396, 240 N.E.2d 595, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1083, 21 L. Ed. 2d 776, 89 S. Ct. 867; People v. Davis (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 260, 265, 435 N.E.2d 838; People v. Schoos (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966-67, 305 N.E.2d 560, appeal dismissed (1974), 417 U.S. 963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1135, 94 S. Ct. 3165.) It is clear that the legislature enacted the subject statute in order to prevent persons who control residential property from permitting it to deteriorate such that it posed a danger to the health and safety of residents. Since the enumeration of all such conditions was impractical, the legislature reasonably chose sufficiently broad language to encompass all such situations therein.\nDefendant next challenges the sufficiency of the statute on the ground that it defines the offense as one where the owner or manager of residential property \u201cknowingly commits *** gross negligence.\u201d Defendant claims that since negligence is defined inter alia as a \u201cfailure to be aware\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 7), the statute is vague because one cannot \u201cknowingly fail to be aware.\u201d\nThe terms \u201cgross carelessness\u201d and \u201cgross neglect\u201d or \u201cgross negligence\u201d are the historical predecessors of the term \u201crecklessness\u201d and have the same meanings. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 3, Committee Comments, at 257-60 (Smith-Hurd 1972); see also People v. Adams (1919), 289 Ill. 339, 345-46, 124 N.E.2d 575.) Recklessness is defined as a \u201cconscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 6.) We decline to adopt defendant\u2019s interpretation that the criminal housing management statute is inherently contradictory in this regard. The provision simply attaches criminal liability where one is consciously aware of the risk of danger resulting from deteriorated conditions, and further disregards that risk.\nDefendant also claims that his convictions should be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the reckless conduct charges. Defendant contends that the complaint was defective in that it charged him only with certain failures to act, whereas reckless conduct is committed where one performs an act which causes harm or endangers safety.\nSection 12 \u2014 5(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that \u201c[a] person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 5.) The Code\u2019s use of the term \u201cact\u201d includes \u201ca failure or omission to take action.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 2.) Thus the crime of reckless conduct occurs where one omits or fails to take certain actions, and this omission or failure causes another harm or endangers safety. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s claim in this regard is without merit.\nDefendant also argues that his convictions violate equal protection and double jeopardy. Initially defendant contends that his convictions were violative of equal protection principles because \u201csome people who have 50 [building code] violations [are] brought down *** for civil proceedings and *** some people [are] *** charged criminally.\u201d Defendant further claims that the trial court erred when it denied him an opportunity to cross-examine one of the State\u2019s witnesses regarding other prosecutions in Cook County on charges of criminal housing management.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has observed that \u201c[t]he State\u2019s Attorney is the representative of the People and has the responsibility of evaluating the evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what offense can properly and should properly be charged.\u201d (People v. Rhodes (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 231 N.E.2d 400.) Consequently, selective prosecution is permissible as long as it is not based on clearly impermissible grounds such as discrimination on the basis of race, religion, the exercise of first amendment rights, or bad faith. See United States v. Blitstein (10th Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 774, 782, cert. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1102, 66 L. Ed. 2d 828, 101 S. Ct. 898.\nWe observe that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the State\u2019s Attorney selectively prosecuted the defendant, nor to show that any selectivity was founded on impermissible grounds. Furthermore, defendant\u2019s attempt to present such evidence through cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness regarding his knowledge of other criminal housing prosecutions was properly barred by the trial court as beyond the scope of direct examination. (See People v. Hanna (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 602, 611, 457 N.E.2d 1352.) Moreover, we observe that defendant presented no evidence in his own case to demonstrate selective prosecution on the part of the State\u2019s Attorney. Accordingly, we find no basis for defendant\u2019s argument in this regard.\nDefendant also contends that his prosecution and convictions were erroneous because they violated the principle of double jeopardy. (U.S. Const., amend. V.) In this respect he argues that it was apparent during trial that he was concurrently being \u201cprosecuted\u201d in civil court for violations of the Chicago Building Code.\nWe note first that there is not the slightest bit of evidence in the record to establish the existence of any civil proceedings against defendant for building code violations. In any event, even assuming the existence of such proceedings, such dual pursuance of defendant was not improper, since the proscription against double jeopardy applies only to multiple criminal prosecutions (see People v. Young (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 984, 989, 452 N.E.2d 718) and does not bar the institution of both civil and criminal proceedings. See People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Bell (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021, 460 N.E.2d 478.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to nol-pros the charge of notice of building code violations against the defendant at the conclusion of the State\u2019s case in chief. He claims that the court instead should have entered a finding of not guilty on the charge of notice. He contends that the court\u2019s failure to do so places him in further jeopardy that he may yet be prosecuted for these offenses.\n\u201cIt is a familiar and firmly established principle that the State\u2019s Attorney, as a member of the executive branch of government, is vested with exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] That discretion includes the decision whether to prosecute at all, as well as to choose which of several charges shall be brought. [Citations.]\u201d (People ex rel. Daley v. Moran (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46, 445 N.E.2d 270.) Accordingly, the decision to nol-pros lies within the discretion of the State\u2019s Attorney. (People v. Gossage (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 188, 191, 470 N.E.2d 548.) Consequently, the State\u2019s decision to nol-pros certain charges against defendant here affords no basis for reversal of his convictions of other offenses.\nDefendant argues that the State\u2019s nondisclosure of certain evidence mandates reversal of his convictions.\nIllinois Supreme Court rules regarding discovery in criminal cases are not applicable in misdemeanor cases. (People v. Elbus (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 104, 107, 451 N.E.2d 603.) Instead, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that in such cases, the State is required to furnish a defendant with a list of witnesses, any confessions of the defendant, and evidence negating defendant\u2019s guilt. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 114 \u2014 9, 114 \u2014 10.) Furthermore, any authority of a trial court to order pretrial discovery, absent specific rules, is not relevant after adoption of the Supreme Court Rules. People v. Williams (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 161,165, 429 N.E.2d 487.\nThe record shows that the defendant here was supplied by the State with a list of potential witnesses, a statement that defendant had made no confession, and that the State possessed no evidence which negated defendant\u2019s guilt. It further reflects that defendant was provided with two bills of particulars stating the date, time, location, and specific nature of defendant\u2019s acts on which prosecution was based. In addition he was tendered a copy of a report authored by one of the State\u2019s witnesses prior to that witness\u2019 testimony at trial. In view of such disclosures, we find no basis for defendant\u2019s argument. His contention that he should have been tendered the contents of an interview with a witness who testified at trial and photographs that were admitted into evidence is also without merit, since no disclosure of such evidence or information was required. See People v. Elbus (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 104, 108-09, 451 N.E.2d 603; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 114-9, 114-10.\nDefendant also contends that the nondisclosure was \u201ctantamount to denying the defendant his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. \u201d Such argument is patently without merit and affords no basis for reversal.\nDefendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because, according to him, the trial court abandoned impartiality and assumed the rule of prosecutor. Specifically, he contends that the trial court improperly (1) restricted his cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness who testified regarding conditions at the premises in question; (2) characterized the testimony of this witness during direct examination; and (3) admitted State\u2019s evidence not qualified as a business record.\nThe record shows that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness regarding his knowledge of specific provisions of the Chicago Building Code. Such cross-examination sought irrelevant information and was properly barred by the trial court. See People v. Rudi (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 856, 860, 419 N.E.2d 646.\nDefendant\u2019s claim that the trial court \u201ccharacterized the testimony of the State\u2019s witness in a manner denoting partiality on the part of the trial court\u201d is also without foundation. Where a case is tried without a jury, the danger of prejudice from questions by the court is lessened. (People v. McCommon (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 853, 868, 399 N.E.2d 224.) Here the judge merely attempted to clarify some details in the witness\u2019 testimony regarding the conditions of the premises and related matters, which were in any event corroborated by properly admitted photographic evidence. Our review consequently discloses no impropriety on the part of the trial court. See People v. Hughes (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1000-01, 460 N.E.2d 485.\nIn addition, defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erroneously permitted into evidence a trust agreement and an assignment of beneficial interest regarding the subject premises is also without foundation. The record establishes that a land trust officer for the bank named as trustee of the land trust testified that both documents were made in the regular course of business and that it was the regular course of business to make such records. Consequently, the evidence was properly admitted into evidence. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 5(a); People v. Lewis (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 477, 484, 367 N.E.2d 710.\nDefendant argues that the trial court improperly quashed a pretrial subpoena duces tecum which he sought to enforce against one of the State\u2019s witnesses in order to compel his production of a report authored by the witness. Such evidence was not subject to pretrial discovery by the defendant. (People v. Elbus (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 104, 451 N.E.2d 603; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 114-9, 114-10.) Furthermore, the record indicates that the defendant failed to make the showing necessary to warrant the issuance of such a subpoena. See United States v. Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 92 S. Ct. 3090; People v. Cannon (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 663, 665, 469 N.E.2d 375.\nLastly, defendant argues that he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges of reckless conduct and criminal housing management.\nThe sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. (People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 524, 456 N.E.2d 1369, cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Illinois (1984), 466 U.S. 981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 836, 104 S. Ct. 2364.) A reviewing court will not disturb its determination unless the evidence of guilt is so unreasonable or unsatisfactory that this creates a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Bartall (1982), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 308, 456 N.E.2d 59.) It is neither the duty nor the privilege of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment as to the weight of the disputed evidence or the credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact who heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses. People v. Kosik (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 930, 938, 443 N.E.2d 238.\nBased upon the evidence admitted at trial, we find no ground for reversal in this regard. The testimony of a bank officer of the bank in which the property was held, and properly admitted business documents of the bank regarding the lane) trust and assignment of beneficial interest, showed that the defendant was the beneficiary of the land trust in which the apartment building was held and had the responsibility of management and control of the premises. Testimony of a tenant of the building indicated that the defendant visited the premises on various occasions and collected rent from the tenant in her apartment. In addition, testimony of a building inspector and a licensed architect, both of whom inspected the site, established the deteriorated condition of the building. Photographs taken by these individuals also showed in detail the state of disrepair of numerous sections of the building, both on the exterior and in the interior. Based on this record, we cannot say that the evidence of guilt was so unreasonable or unsatisfactory that it created a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt of reckless conduct and criminal housing management.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJOHNSON and LINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alfred L. Levinson and Mitchell F. Asher, both of Beaubien & Asher, of Palatine, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOHAMMED SAYEED KHAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 83\u20142438\nOpinion filed September 26, 1985.\nAlfred L. Levinson and Mitchell F. Asher, both of Beaubien & Asher, of Palatine, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0754-01", "first_page_order": 776, "last_page_order": 785 }