{ "id": 3565295, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELINO TOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tomas", "decision_date": "1985-08-19", "docket_number": "No. 5-83-0722", "first_page": "1054", "last_page": "1059", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 1054" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 Cal. Rptr. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Cal. App. 3d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2078425 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/124/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Cal. Rptr. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Cal. App. 3d 1019", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11040617 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/449/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 F.2d 386", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2220239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/434/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Cal. Rptr. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Cal. App. 3d 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2159992 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/153/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Cal. Rptr. 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" }, { "page": "912" }, { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 P.2d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1201" }, { "page": "1202" }, { "page": "1202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Cal. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4471456 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/35/0785-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 597, "char_count": 12779, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.904908091204199e-08, "percentile": 0.4608075605952316 }, "sha256": "28eb041ebb6f4fb2c0d63c563ba4ae8d073bf1c652cde611a1692412dda93bd6", "simhash": "1:2401ed81fb2488a5", "word_count": 2027 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:17.169731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELINO TOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JONES\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe instant case is one of first impression in Illinois involving the issue of whether the non-English-speaking defendants were deprived of their rights to effective assistance of counsel and to be present and participate at their trial when the trial court used their court-appointed interpreter to translate the proceedings at trial rather than appointing a second interpreter for that purpose. The defendants contend that this action by the trial court was improper in that it prevented them from communicating with counsel during trial when the interpreter was engaged in translating testimony for the court. We affirm.\nOn July 6, 1983, the defendants, Marcelino Tomas and Luis Sanchez, were charged by information in Jackson County with the offenses of rape, unlawful restraint and battery. On July 7, 1983, defense counsel filed a motion to appoint a translator, alleging that the defendants were migrant farm workers from Mexico and that neither of them could speak or understand the English language. The court granted the motion and appointed Frank Pereira, who had served as interpreter at the defendants\u2019 first appearance, to assist in the defense of the case.\nAt the beginning of the defendants\u2019 preliminary hearing on July 19, 1983, defense counsel stated, in response to the court\u2019s inquiry, that Mr. Pereira had done no work for the defendants other than translating their conversations with counsel. The court then stated:\n\u201cIn view of his skill that he\u2019s demonstrated at the previous hearing, I would like to pre-empt his services for the court. I\u2019m sure that even if you did use him for your purposes, he would be merely a translator and not a partisan, or I could make him \u2014 I could convince him that that\u2019s what his role would be without any difficulty ***.\u201d\nDefense counsel agreed that this was in keeping with^ her intentions regarding Mr. Pereira\u2019s services if the case should proceed beyond preliminary hearing.\nDuring .the hearing Mr. Pereira translated the proceedings, including the questions to and answers of the sole, complaining witness, from English into Spanish for the defendants. Following this testimony the court found probable cause to sustain the charges against the defendants. Mr. Pereira was again present to translate the proceedings from English into Spanish and from Spanish into English at the defendants\u2019 arraignment on July 28, 1983, at a pretrial conference on August 23, 1983, and at a hearing on defendant Tomas\u2019 motion to suppress on August 26,1983.\nPrior to the voir dire examination of prospective jurors on August 31, 1983, the court explained that Mr. Pereira would translate the proceedings for the benefit of both the defendants and the court, noting that \u201che [Mr. Pereira] is seated at the table next to the defendants for their convenience, but he is an officer of the court, my representative.\u201d At the defendants\u2019 jury trial the following day, the court \u201c[a]gain reminded] the jurors that Mr. Pereira *** is an officer of the court [and] is seated at the defense table merely as a convenience to the court and to the defendants. He is not employed by the defendants.\u201d\nDuring both voir dire examination and the trial itself, Mr. Pereira continued the previous procedure of translating all questions and answers as they were given from English to Spanish or from Spanish to English as required. In addition to the other evidence presented, the jury heard testimony from two of the defendants\u2019 co-workers, who testified in Spanish. Prior to their testimony the court observed that since their testimony would be in Spanish, \u201cthe interpreter [would] be interpreting for us, rather than for the defendants.\u201d\nDuring trial the court repeatedly cautioned both counsel and witnesses to allow time for translation, and Mr. Pereira on several occasions asked for questions to be repeated so that he could translate them. At one point during the complaining witness\u2019 testimony, the court ordered a break in the testimony for the interpreter to converse with the defendants, and on another occasion the court ordered a recess at Mr.' Pereira\u2019s request so that he could converse with the court outside the jury\u2019s hearing. At the request of the defendants\u2019 counsel, neither counsels\u2019 opening statements nor their arguments during trial were translated. While counsels\u2019 closing arguments were likewise not translated, the court directed Mr. Pereira to take notes during the arguments so that he could summarize them for the benefit of the defendants.\nThe jury found the defendants guilty of all three charges, and the defendants were subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for rape, three years\u2019 imprisonment for unlawful restraint, and 364 days\u2019 imprisonment for battery.\nOn appeal from their convictions the defendants contend that the trial court erred in not appointing a second interpreter to assist the defendants during trial when the court \u201cborrowed\u201d their interpreter to translate the trial proceedings. The defendants assert that the court\u2019s failure to do so prevented them from communicating with their attorney during substantial portions of the trial \u2014 namely, the examination of witnesses \u2014 in violation of their constitutional rights to be present at and participate in their trial. The defendants urge this court, therefore, to follow the California decisions of People v. Aguilar (1984), 35 Cal. 3d 785, 677 P.2d 1198, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908, and People v. Romero (1984), 153 Cal. App. 3d 757, 200 Cal. Rptr. 404, where, in similar situations, it was held that the use of one interpreter to translate both for the defendant and for prosecution witnesses violated the defendant\u2019s State constitutional right to an interpreter throughout trial.\nAs indicated above, we are aware of no Illinois case that has addressed the issue of the right of a non-English-speaking defendant to the exclusive use of an interpreter during trial. While the decided cases from other jurisdictions have recognized that a defendant\u2019s right to confront his accusers, to cross-examine witnesses and to the assistance of competent counsel are all jeopardized if he cannot understand the language of the court, witnesses and counsel (United States ex rel. Negron v. New York (2d Cir. 1970), 434 F.2d 386; Martinez v. State (Ind. App. 1983), 449 N.E.2d 307), no case has been cited in which the use of a single interpreter to translate the entire proceeding against a defendant was held to be a deprivation of those rights. Rather, we believe the procedure employed here to translate for the defendants during trial was sufficient to safeguard the rights in issue and to afford the defendants a fair trial.\nIn the instant case the interpreter, Mr. Pereira, was present in court during the entire proceeding to translate English testimony into Spanish for the defendants and Spanish testimony into English for the court, jury and counsel. This translation was simultaneous with the testimony and verbatim. (Cf. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York (2d Cir. 1970), 434 F.2d 386 (defendant denied constitutional right of confrontation where interpreter merely provided defendant with periodic summaries of the testimony).) From the record it appears that Mr. Pereira was seated beside the defendants at counsel table and was thus available to them for consultation with their attorney. (Cf. People v. Romero (1984), 153 Cal. App. 3d 757, 200 Cal. Rptr. 404 (defendant effectively denied right to interpreter where lone interpreter stood beside witnesses while translating testimony into English and defendant unable to communicate with attorney at counsel table).) While it is evident that Mr. Pereira could not translate discussions between the defendant and their attorney at the same time as he was translating witness testimony, neither could the defendants or their attorney listen to the testimony while conversing among themselves. The defendants could, however, and did on at least one occasion, interrupt the testimony in order to use Mr. Pereira\u2019s services to communicate with their attorney. Thus, we do not believe, under the facts of this case, that the interpreter\u2019s role in translating witness testimony in any way interfered with the defendants\u2019 immediate ability to understand the testimony and communicate with counsel so as to be present at and participate in the proceedings against them.\nWhile the defendants\u2019 argument that they were denied proper access to an interpreter is couched in terms of \u201ctheir\u201d interpreter being used by the court as \u201cits\u201d interpreter, we regard this distinction to be largely semantical and of no import. The interpreter was appointed to assist the defendants in preparing for trial and to make the court proceedings known to them. He had no other part to play and was strictly a conduit of communication between the defendants and their attorney. Notwithstanding the court\u2019s reference to \u201cborrowing\u201d or \u201cpreempting\u201d the defendants\u2019 interpreter to translate both pretrial hearings and the trial itself, the court specifically indicated that Mr. Pereira was to continue to assist the defendants and their attorney in translating their conversations and in interviewing witnesses. Mr. Pe-reira\u2019s duties also included informing the defendants of in-court proceedings, and, so long as he continued to be available for such purposes, we see no error in his also so informing the court. We would observe, moreover, that the defendants point to no instance in which they were prejudiced because \u201ctheir\u201d interpreter also served the court, and the record fails to demonstrate any deprivation of substantial rights requiring reversal.\nThe California cases cited by the defendants, People v. Aguilar and People v. Romero, involving similar situations in which the courts held that two interpreters, a \u201cdefense\u201d interpreter as well as a \u201cproceedings\u201d or \u201cwitness\u201d interpreter (see People v. Aguilar (1984), 35 Cal. 3d 785, 790, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908, 911), were necessary for non-English-speaking defendants, ar\u00e9 distinguishable from the instant case in that those decisions involved the interpretation of a State constitutional provision not at issue here. The California constitutional guarantee of the right to an interpreter \u201cthroughout the proceedings\u201d (Cal. Const, art. I, sec. 14) was held to require \u201cnothing short of a sworn interpreter at defendant\u2019s elbow\u201d at all times during the proceeding. (People v. Aguilar (1984), 35 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 677 P.2d 1198, 1202, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912, quoting People v. Menchaca (1983), 196 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691; People v. Romero (1984), 153 Cal. App. 3d 757, 761, 200 Cal. Rptr. 404, 406.) These decisions, however, were not premised upon the Federal constitutional right to be present at trial, and, indeed, the Meta Aguilar court, quoting People v. Chavez (1981), 124 Cal. App. 3d 215, 221, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310, noted that \u201cprior to the 1974 amendment of article I, section 14, an interpreter was only required wherever it was \u2018necessary\u2019 as a matter of due process *** [whereas that article] now grants a non-English speaking defendant the distinct right to an interpreter \u2018throughout the proceedings.\u2019 \u201d People v. Aguilar (1984), 35 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 677 P.2d 1198, 1202, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912.\nNo such \u201cdistinct right\u201d is present here, as the Illinois statute regarding the appointment of interpreters provides merely for the appointment of an interpreter \u201cwhom [the defendant] can understand and who can understand him\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 165\u2014 11) and states that the interpreter shall be sworn to translate \u201call questions propounded or answers given as directed by the court\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 165 \u2014 12). As discussed previously, we believe the procedure followed in the instant case was sufficient to satisfy the Federal constitutional requirements that the defendants understand and have the opportunity to participate in the proceedings against them, and we accordingly decline to follow the California rule requiring two or more interpreters at trial.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the defendants\u2019 convictions in the circuit court of Jackson County.\nAffirmed.\nKASSERMAN and WELCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JONES" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy E. Blue and Daniel M. Kirwan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellants.", "John R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELINO TOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201483\u20140722\nOpinion filed August 19, 1985.\nRehearing denied September 3, 1985.\nRandy E. Blue and Daniel M. Kirwan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellants.\nJohn R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1054-01", "first_page_order": 1076, "last_page_order": 1081 }