{ "id": 3641210, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Young", "decision_date": "1985-10-03", "docket_number": "No. 5-84-0457", "first_page": "75", "last_page": "80", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 75" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489255 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201711 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501902 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1217" }, { "page": "1217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5540003 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658-59" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S. Ct. 122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 L. Ed. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6236936, 6233801, 6234506, 6235977, 6235405, 6235120, 6235696, 6237298, 6234803, 6237685, 6236603, 6234141, 6236254 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0836-11", "/us/404/0836-01", "/us/404/0836-03", "/us/404/0836-08", "/us/404/0836-06", "/us/404/0836-05", "/us/404/0836-07", "/us/404/0836-12", "/us/404/0836-04", "/us/404/0836-13", "/us/404/0836-10", "/us/404/0836-02", "/us/404/0836-09" ] }, { "cite": "266 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904105 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2512187 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/391/0101-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 533, "char_count": 10937, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10490592308663556 }, "sha256": "43ddbc2aeaf50486c55df57813f50cf09f71b67604aea200609c6c600701a541", "simhash": "1:30a49d9d778d9c71", "word_count": 1801 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:08.242422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, James E. Young, was charged in Jackson County with one count of theft over $300. On July 1, 1983, the trial court entered an order granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. On July 6, 1984, the trial court entered an order granting defendant\u2019s motion in limine, prohibiting the State from introducing certain evidence at trial. The State appeals the granting of the motion in limine by the trial court.\nThe following evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing:\nOfficer Stearns testified that on January 31, 1983, he was in his squad car at the east end of University Mall in Carbondale. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Officer Stearns observed a subject, whom he knew as James Young, wearing a midlength blue coat and standing in the shadows on the east side of the mall. When defendant noticed the squad car, he walked into the east entrance of the mall. Officer Stearns then alerted police officers on the east side of the mall of defendant\u2019s \u201csuspicious\u201d actions.\nAt approximately 6:53 p.m., Officer Stearns observed a black male wearing a sweatshirt walking south along the east side of the mall. He was also observed by Detective Dismore, who was in an unmarked squad car. The man was carrying a large object in his hands.\nDetective Dismore drove by the man twice and radioed Officer Stearns that he could not be sure of the identity of the subject, but that it looked like James Young. Officer Stearns then drove his marked police car towards the man but lost sight of him as he continued toward a darkened area around the southern end of the Meis department store. As defendant walked into the lighted area on the east side of the Meis store, Officer Stearns saw him, and identified this man as James Young.\nOfficer Stearns stopped defendant and asked him what he had done with the package he had been carrying. Defendant denied possessing a package. Detective Dismore then notified Officer Stearns that he had found a package in the bushes along the south side of the Meis store. Defendant was then handcuffed and arrested.\nThe package was a large brown and black plastic garbage bag that contained a Sears videocassette recorder bearing a Sears price tag of $895. There was no receipt in the bag. Officer Stearns and Detective Dismore then escorted defendant to Sears where they met with the Sears security officer. The security officer stated that the videocassette recorder looked as though it was a Sears model and that it was not Sears policy to wrap any video recorder it sells in garbage bags. Eventually, the manager of the Sears video department stated that the videocassette recorder was a store display model and had not been sold.\nThe videocassette recorder was dusted for prints. One of the palm prints taken from the recorder matched a palm print taken from defendant upon his arrest.\nSoon after the arrest, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. He requested that the court suppress the following evidence; (1) physical evidence discovered directly or indirectly as a result of the detention and arrest; (2) statements and utterances of the defendant during the detention and following the arrest; (3) witnesses discovered as a result of the arrest; (4) photographs, fingerprints, and other information, the products of the processing of the defendant following his arrest.\nOn July 1, 1983, an order was issued granting the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The order stated that although the investigative stop made by Officer Stearns was valid, Officer Stearns did not possess sufficient articulable facts to support probable cause for arrest. The order stated that defendant\u2019s arrest was quashed and that \u201cany evidence obtained as a result of his illegal arrest\u201d would be suppressed from use of any subsequent hearing or trial. The State\u2019s motion to reconsider was denied on August 3, 1983, and the State failed to appeal this decision.\nOn July 5, 1984, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the court prohibit the State from introducing any testimony about comparison between defendant\u2019s palm or fingerprints, \u201cwhen or wherever obtained,\u201d and any palm or fingerprints removed from the Sears videocassette recorder; any statements or utterances made by defendant during his detention and arrest; and any testimony or statement from witnesses \u201cdiscovered as a result\u201d of defendant\u2019s arrest. The trial court granted the motion.\nThe only issue raised is whether the trial court erroneously granted defendant\u2019s motion in limine. However, the first question we must address is whether the 1983 order granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence included those items suppressed in the 1984 order granting defendant\u2019s motion in limine, and whether the State, by failing to appeal the 1983 order, has waived its right to appeal. We find the State did not waive its right to appeal the 1984 order. We note a distinct difference in the wording of the two motions. The 1983 motion focused on the evidence found \u201cas a result of illegal arrest,\u201d whereas the 1984 motion requested among other things that the court prohibit the State from introducing any testimony about comparison between defendant\u2019s palm or fingerprints, \u201cwhen or wherever obtained.\u201d Although we agree that these motions do overlap information obtained as a \u201cresult of the arrest\u201d of the defendant, they are not the same.\nThe court\u2019s 1983 order is clear and unambiguous, and the language of the order cannot be controlled by any intent or purpose that counsel for defendant had in mind. (See People ex rel. Waite v. Bristow (1945), 391 Ill. 101, 110, 62 N.E.2d 545, 549-50.) The State relied on the unambiguous language of the 1983 order that only the evidence found \u201cas a result of illegal arrest\u201d would be suppressed and did not appeal the 1983 order. The State did. timely appeal the 1984 order, and we must now address whether the 1984 motion in limine should have been granted.\nThe order granting the motion in limine prevented the State from introducing as evidence at trial or referring to: (A) \u201cAny testimony about, or physical evidence of, comparisons between the defendant\u2019s palm or fingerprints removed from one Sears \u2018Betavision\u2019 videocassette recorder, model #564-530-6-0902, serial #30171717, (B) Statements and utterances of the defendant during the detention and arrest of the Defendant, (C) Testimony or statements from witnesses discovered as a .result of the Defendant\u2019s arrest.\u201d\nWe note that the State concedes any statements or utterances made by defendant subsequent to his arrest and any fingerprints taken from defendant following his arrest are suppressed, and therefore we need not address that issue.\nIt has been held that when an improper arrest occurs, the power of the court to try the defendant is not impaired. (See People v. Finch (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 425, 266 N.E.2d 97, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 836, 30 L. Ed. 2d 68, 92 S. Ct. 122; People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 651, 658-59, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1217.) The proper remedy is not to exclude all evidence following the arrest (People v. Hornal (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 308, 316, 330 N.E.2d 225, 231) but to exclude all evidence that directly flowed from the improper arrest. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407.) Assuming the defendant\u2019s arrest was improper because of a lack of probable cause, none of the evidence herein specified by the State flowed from that arrest.\nFirst, the videocassette recorder was found before defendant was arrested and independently from him. Nothing defendant said or did during his arrest led the police to the videocassette recorder. Thus the discovery of the videocassette recorder did not directly flow from the improper arrest. See People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 651, 659, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1217.\nSimilarly the defendant\u2019s palm prints were in the police file prior to defendant\u2019s arrest and thus did not flow from the arrest and should not be suppressed. People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212.\nThe statements made by Sears personnel concerning the videocassette recorder likewise did not flow from defendant\u2019s arrest. Detective Dismore discovered a garbage bag in the bushes containing a Sears brand videocassette recorder. There was no sales receipt in the bag. Logically the police went to Sears to inquire about this videocassette recorder because of the brand name; hence, the statements made by Sears personnel did not stem from defendant\u2019s illegal arrest.\nAdditionally, the palm prints lifted from the videocassette recorder should not be suppressed. The police found the videocassette recorder in a garbage bag, apparently abandoned in a public place, and the dusting of the videocassette recorder for prints did not flow from the illegal arrest of the defendant. (People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212.) Even if the defendant had not been arrested, the police would have inevitably discovered that the palm prints present on the videocassette recorder matched the police file prints belonging to defendant. As previously mentioned, the police already had defendant\u2019s palm prints on file and, in all probability, would have checked the defendant\u2019s file prints because they had seen him at the mall that evening. See Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501.\nFinally, we must consider whether defendant\u2019s post-stop statement denying knowledge about the package should be suppressed. The trial court found that the stop was a proper investigatory stop. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868.) However, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s 1983 motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant\u2019s motion requested among other things that \u201cstatements and utterances of the defendant during the detention and following the arrest\u201d be suppressed. Therefore the statement that was made during defendant\u2019s detention was suppressed by the 1983 order and cannot be appealed at this time. See People v. Dorsey (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 128, 130, 472 N.E.2d 101, 103.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.\nEARNS and EASSERMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Randy E. Blue and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 84\u20140457\nOpinion filed October 3, 1985.\nJohn R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nRandy E. Blue and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0075-01", "first_page_order": 97, "last_page_order": 102 }