{ "id": 3640429, "name": "MARJORIE LONG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Long v. Yellow Cab Co.", "decision_date": "1985-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 83-2145", "first_page": "324", "last_page": "329", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 324" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3181898 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 1085", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5473963 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1096" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/1085-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1028", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5610021 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/1028-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5657947 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5431124 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0384-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 12644, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.843663346294331e-08, "percentile": 0.45851418364545576 }, "sha256": "2e8b4fc79568e0117fc7338e2ee9a1598e25ed12b91f1b4e4625230b5a86a4e1", "simhash": "1:3fb54ff2dacd105d", "word_count": 2023 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:08.242422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARJORIE LONG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINLAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Marjorie Long, brought an action against the defendant, Yellow Cab Company and Michael Asante, alleging injuries suffered while she was a passenger in a taxicab owned by defendant and driven by Asante. After trial, the jury returned a verdict against defendant for $108,700. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) plaintiff improperly presented evidence regarding the occurrence of the collision which was irrelevant and prejudicial; and (2) misconduct by plaintiff\u2019s counsel prejudiced defendant and resulted in an excessive verdict.\nWe affirm.\nPlaintiff called Michael Asante as an adverse witness. He testified that on November 1, 1977, he drove a Yellow taxicab. While traveling on Kennedy expressway, with plaintiff as a passenger, the taxicab struck a concrete wall. After the collision plaintiff appeared to be in pain. The witness tried to help plaintiff, but she asked not to be touched. Defendant objected to counsel\u2019s question regarding the degree of pain plaintiff seemed to have experienced. The objection was sustained, and the jury was admonished to disregard the question. An ambulance arrived at the scene within a few minutes. The plaintiff was taken out of the taxicab in a stretcher and was taken to a hospital. Immediately after the witness completed his testimony, and while in the presence of the jury, plaintiff\u2019s counsel moved to have Asante dismissed as a defendant. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Defendant\u2019s motion was denied.\nDr. Jonathan Bock-Seng Po testified by evidence deposition that he is a radiologist practicing in California. In October of 1977 plaintiff was referred to him by Dr. Norman Marback. X rays of plaintiff\u2019s back taken in October showed \u201cno fractures and no other abnormalities ***.\u201d However, X rays of plaintiff\u2019s back taken on November 1, 1977, after the instant collision, showed a fracture of a vertebra which appeared to be of recent origin.\nDr. Norman Marback testified by evidence deposition that he is a chiropractic orthopedist practicing in California. He treated plaintiff after the accident on November 1. Plaintiff complained of stiffness in her lower back, throbbing, spurts of pain, spasms, shooting pain in her right leg and weakness in her hands. He treated plaintiff with ultrasound, massage, and manipulation of her neck.\nDr. Marback also testified he had initially treated plaintiff on October 11, 1977. On October 6, her car had been-hit in the rear by another car. Plaintiff particularly complained of pain of her neck. However, in her medical history, plaintiff also indicated she was experiencing.pain in her back. Dr. Marback ordered X rays be taken of plaintiff\u2019s cervical spine, thoracic spine, lumbosacral spine, and pelvis. The X rays were normal. Dr. Marback diagnosed that plaintiff received a cervical sprain-in the October 6 accident. He treated plaintiff with manipulation of her neck.\nDr. Marback examined plaintiff again on January 18, 1978. After the examination, and after reviewing the X rays taken of the plaintiff immediately after the November 1 accident, Dr. Marback confirmed the diagnosis of Dr. Po that plaintiff suffered a fractured vertebra in the November accident. Furthermore, Dr. Marback concluded: that plaintiff will continue to have problems in her back; that she was probably in pain at the time of the trial; that there will be exacerbations of her injury; and that her condition will probably be permanent.\nDr. Samuel Gerber, a radiologist at Northwest Hospital, also testified. He identified the X rays taken of plaintiff at Northwest Hospital on November 1, 1977. Dr. Gerber stated that because of the location of plaintiff\u2019s vertebral fracture, and her general physical condition, it would be \u201calmost impossible\u201d for a chiropractor to have caused plaintiff\u2019s fracture through manipulation.\nDr. Gerber also testified he examined X rays taken of plaintiff on January 28, 1983. His diagnosis was that plaintiff was developing \u201cpost traumatic arthritis\u201d in the fractured vertebra. Dr. Gerber\u2019s prognosis was that the arthritis would cause plaintiff pain, that the arthritis was permanent, and that the arthritis was progressive. He indicated that the pain would be exacerbated if plaintiff were to lift weights. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked the witness whether the pain would interfere with picking a child out of a crib. Defendant\u2019s objection to the question was sustained and the jury was admonished to disregard the question. Later, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on that question. The motion was denied.\nPlaintiff testified she was 28 years old at the time of the accident. Before the accident she was active in sports. She played tennis regularly and played in tournaments. She also ran and rode her bicycle regularly. During her testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because plaintiff was crying in front of the jury. The trial judge denied defendant\u2019s motion but asked the plaintiff to restrain herself.\nPlaintiff was wearing a rain coat during her testimony which she stated she was wearing because the cold hurt her back.\nPlaintiff further testified that on November 1, 1977, she entered a yellow taxicab in front of her-hotel to go to an address on Higgins Road. The driver asked her the fastest route to her destination. After plaintiff told the driver she did not know, he asked her to look up the address in a book. She moved to the center of the back seat of the taxi to converse with the driver.\nWhile traveling on the Kennedy Expressway, the driver changed lanes. The taxi began to spin counterclockwise and struck an abutment. Plaintiff testified she was thrown to the left side of the taxi and then to the right side of the taxi. She felt \u201cincredible pain\u201d when she struck the right side of the taxi and her legs felt numb. She remained in the hospital for nine days.\nPlaintiff also testified she was required to wear a brace continually through March of 1978. She wore the brace intermittently for another year. She does exercises recommended by her doctor to alleviate pain in her back. Her doctor informed her that she should do the exercises for the rest of her life. The judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection and admonished the jury to disregard plaintiff\u2019s answer. Plaintiff also stated that she could no longer play tennis and that running and riding her bicycle cause pain in her back. The plaintiff also said that on the way to the hospital she felt sorry for Asante, and told him the accident was not his fault. Defendant made no objection to that statement.\nDr. Sydney Morgenstern, an orthopedic surgeon, testified he treated plaintiff at Northwest Hospital on November 1, 1977. Plaintiff was complaining of pain and numbness at that time. After he consulted a neurosurgeon about plaintiff, Dr. Morgenstern concluded that the numbness and' pain plaintiff was experiencing were caused by a concussion of plaintiff\u2019s spinal cord which accompanied the fracture of her vertebra. The effects of. the spinal concussion were temporary. Dr. Morgenstern later examined plaintiff on January 24, 1983, and studied recent X rays of plaintiffs back. While he did not find neurological damage, Dr. Morgenstern indicated that plaintiff was developing arthritis in the injured vertebra. He believed the arthritis is permanent and will cause plaintiff pain.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney made various statements in his closing argument which defendant urges are improper. Included among those statements are: counsel\u2019s reference to plaintiff\u2019s \u201cspiritual pain\u201d; his suggestion that plaintiff\u2019s reaction to her injury to be \u201cOh God, how can I handle that\u201d; his reference to plaintiff\u2019s \u201cnew cross\u201d to bear; his statement that the jury could not consider what award they would want if they had been injured as plaintiff; and his statement \u201cthe echoes from two thousand years ago are still reverberating in this room. What she told Michael Asante is, \u2018I forgive you.\u2019 \u201d Defendant\u2019s objection to each of these comments was sustained, and the court admonished the jury to disregard them. Also, plaintiff\u2019s counsel stated that the injury to plaintiff\u2019s back would interfere with her rights as a possible future mother. Defendant\u2019s objection to that comment was overruled. After plaintiff\u2019s closing argument, defendant again moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied.\nInitially, defendant argues that because defendant \u201cadmitted liability\u201d the evidence regarding the circumstances of the accident was irrelevant and prejudicial to defendant.\nIn this context, defendant relies on Bullard v. Barnes (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485. In Bullard, plaintiff\u2019s decedent was killed when the car he was driving was forced off the road by a truck driven by defendant. Defendant admitted liability and the only issue at trial was the pecuniary loss resulting from decedent\u2019s death. We reversed and remanded, holding that testimony regarding the circumstances of the accident and that defendant left the scene of the accident was irrelevant to the issues at trial and inflammatory. (112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 393.) We find Bullard inapposite from the case at bar.\nWe disagree with counsel\u2019s assertion that defendant \u201cadmitted liability\u201d in the case at bar. Defendant did admit the negligence on the part of Asante and that Asante was the agent of defendant. However, defendant disputed that plaintiff\u2019s injury was caused by the November 1 accident. Throughout the trial, defendant tried to establish that plaintiff\u2019s injury may have been caused either by the earlier accident or the chiropractic manipulation of plaintiff\u2019s back. Under these circumstances, the evidence of the occurrence of the accident and the pain plaintiff suffered immediately after the collision are relevant to the issue of whether injury was in fact caused by the November accident. Furthermore, Bullard was a wrongful death case where the extent of the injury is not at issue. On the contrary in the case at bar the extent of plaintiff\u2019s injury is critical to the amount of damages to which she should be entitled. See Bullard v. Barnes (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 393.\nDefendant also argues that the behavior of plaintiff\u2019s counsel, as outlined above, constitutes misconduct which prejudiced defendant and resulted in an excessive award. We disagree.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objections to virtually every question and remark which defendant now alleges were improper. By sustaining defendant\u2019s objections and admonishing the jury not to consider the improper statements, the trial court cured the errors, if any, caused by those statements. (Simmons v. City of Chicago (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 676, 455 N.E.2d 232.) When the trial court sustains objections and instructs the jury to disregard the improper statements, \u201cthere is no reason to believe that the jury was prejudiced.\u201d (Wright v. Yellow Cab Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 242, 258, 451 N.E.2d 1313.) Furthermore, the trial court is in the best place to determine the possible prejudice defendant may have suffered. (See Bentley v. City of Chicago (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 398 N.E.2d 912.) By denying defendant\u2019s repeated motions for mistrials, the trial court determined that the defendant was not unduly prejudiced.\nIn addition we do not believe the jury award was excessive. The determination of proper damages rests largely within the discretion of the jury, and a reviewing court will set aside an award as excessive only if the award is so large as to \u201c \u2018shock the judicial conscience.\u2019 \u201d Kosch v. Monroe (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1096, 433 N.E.2d 1062, quoting Hartigan v. Robertson (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 732, 739, 409 N.E.2d 366.\nIn the case at bar, the record indicates that plaintiff suffered a fractured vertebra in her back, she was developing progressive arthritis in her back, she was forced to wear a brace for a year and a half, she was forced to curtail many of her avocations and other activities, and she was going to experience considerable pain in the future. Furthermore, the defendant did not present any evidence to contradict plaintiff\u2019s expert testimony as to the extent of her injuries. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the jury award of $108,700 shocks the judicial conscience.\nFor these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINLAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jesmer & Harris, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Perz & McGuire, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARJORIE LONG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 83 \u2014 2145\nOpinion filed September 30, 1985.\nJesmer & Harris, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPerz & McGuire, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0324-01", "first_page_order": 346, "last_page_order": 351 }