{
  "id": 3640032,
  "name": "JAMES A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. Retirement Board of Policemens' Annuity & Benefit Fund",
  "decision_date": "1985-10-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 84-2770",
  "first_page": "546",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:08.242422+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nUnder the Illinois Pension Code, a police officer disabled while engaged in an \u201cact of duty,\u201d as defined in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5 \u2014 113), is entitled to duty-disability benefits amounting to 75% of his salary at the time disability is allowed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5 \u2014 154.) A police officer disabled, while not engaged in an \u201cact of duty,\u201d receives ordinary disability benefits, which is 50% of his salary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5 \u2014 155.) The plaintiff, James A. Johnson, a policeman for the city of Chicago was disabled while on duty as a patrolman direeling traffic. In his claim for disability benefits, he alleged that he was disabled while engaged in an \u201cact of duty\u201d and therefore entitled to duty-disability benefits. The defendant, the retirement board of the policemen\u2019s annuity and benefit fund (board), admitted that Johnson was disabled while on duty but found that he was not engaged in an \u201cact of duty\u201d and, consequently, awarded him ordinary disability benefits. The circuit court of Cook County on administrative review affirmed the board\u2019s decision, and Johnson brings this appeal.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether Johnson\u2019s injury was sustained as the result of an \u201cact of duty\u201d in order to be entitled to duty-disability benefits.\nThe parties agree that Johnson\u2019s injury occurred while he was on duty as a traffic patrolman directing traffic at the intersection of Michigan Avenue and Wacker Drive. According to Johnson\u2019s testimony before the board, his injury was sustained when he was responding to a citizen\u2019s call for assistance at an automobile accident which had occurred on Wacker Drive. Johnson stated that as he was crossing Michigan Avenue he slipped on wet pavement and, in an attempt to balance himself, ruptured the distal tendon in his right bicep, resulting in the permanent loss of use of his right arm and hand. On cross-examination, Johnson conceded that the injury-on-duty report, completed by Johnson, and the incident report made out by Johnson\u2019s sergeant, did not indicate that Johnson had sustained his injury in response to a citizen\u2019s call for assistance or in the investigation of an automobile accident. In its holding, the board noted that, aside from Johnson\u2019s testimony, there was no evidence to support Johnson\u2019s assertion that his injury occurred in response to a citizen\u2019s request for assistance. The board concluded that the mere act of crossing the street while directing traffic was not an \u201cact of duty\u201d in order to qualify Johnson for duty-disability benefits.\nSection 5 \u2014 113 of the Illinois Pension Code defines \u201cact of duty\u201d as follows:\n\u201cAny act of police duty inherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman by the statutes of this State or by the ordinances or police regulations of the city in which this Article is in effect or by a special assignment; or any act of heroism performed in the city having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of a person other than the policeman.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5 \u2014 113.\nJohnson argues that regardless of whether his injury occurred when he was crossing the street in response to a citizen\u2019s call or when he was crossing the street while directing traffic is irrelevant to the determination of duty-disability benefits. Johnson contends that what is significant is that he was on duty discharging his responsibilities as a police officer at the time of his injury. Under Johnson\u2019s construction, the phrase \u201cact of duty\u201d is intended to encompass his injury, because the nature of the activity that he was engaged in, directing traffic, is by its very nature of special risk, as it is not assumed by the ordinary citizen. The board, however, would impose a much narrower interpretation of this section. The board contends that the phrase \u201cinherently involving special risk\u201d qualifies the term \u201cact of duty\u201d to include only those acts that are inherently dangerous, such as pursuing a suspect. The board argues that the mere act of crossing the street does not involve a special risk not ordinarily assumed by a citizen.\nWe do not believe that the phrase \u201cinherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life\u201d warrants the narrow construction given it by the board. A policeman is engaged in an activity inherently involving special risk whenever he is engaged in the performance of a duty peculiar to that of the office of a police officer, that is, to protect and serve the public. This activity inherently involves special risk not ordinarily undertaken by a citizen.\nAt the very least, Johnson\u2019s uncontradicted testimony established that he was crossing the street fulfilling his duties directing traffic when the injury occurred. Such activity was clearly not incident to a citizen in the ordinary walks of life. Rather, he was engaged in activities related to his duty as a police officer to protect and serve the public. A policeman is sworn to pursue this duty unselfishly though the employment may be dangerous. Indeed, Johnson here was expected to perform the requirements of his office, and he was in fact so engaged when he was injured.\nOur conclusion does not render the provision on ordinary disability benefits meaningless. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5\u2014 155.) If, for example, a police officer injures himself by crossing the street to mail a letter on the order of his superior, even though the injury occurred on duty and within the scope of his employment, he does not qualify for duty-disability benefits as the activity he was engaged in involved something ordinarily assumed by a citizen. On the other hand, a policeman who injures himself crossing the street while directing traffic assumes duties not ordinarily undertaken by a citizen.\nThe few cases that have interpreted the term \u201cact of duty\u201d under the Illinois Pension Code are not particularly instructive. (Fithian v. Retirement Board (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 950, 407 N.E.2d 737; Davis v. Retirement Board (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 221, 280 N.E.2d 735; Byrnes v. Retirement Board (1949), 339 Ill. App. 55, 89 N.E.2d 59.) The application of Byrnes and Fithian, which upheld the denial of duty-related death benefits, is limited to the unique factual circumstances presented in each case. In Byrnes, the policeman died, while on a fishing vacation, attempting to swim to shore to seek aid for his drowning fishing companion. In Fithian, the police officer was killed after the gun he was cleaning accidentally misfired. In neither case does the reviewing court provide any guidance as to why the denial of duty-related benefits was affirmed.\nHowever, the facts in Davis are somewhat analogous to the present case. In Davis, the court affirmed the award of duty-related death benefits in which the police officer\u2019s death occurred as the result of an investigation of a complaint of rape by one of his neighbors who had sought the officer\u2019s help because she knew that he was a policeman. Similarly, in the present case, Johnson\u2019s actions in directing traffic, like the investigation of a crime in Davis, which resulted in his injury, stemmed from an activity peculiar to his function as a police officer not ordinarily done by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life.\nIn conclusion, we hold that whenever a police officer is injured while performing his duty of protecting and serving the public, a duty peculiar to that of a police officer, he is entitled to duty-disability benefits. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108 1/2, par. 5 \u2014 154.) Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nReversed.\nJOHNSON and LINN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mark D. Olson, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "James D. Montgomery, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 84 \u2014 2770\nOpinion filed October 24, 1985.\nMark D. Olson, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames D. Montgomery, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0546-01",
  "first_page_order": 568,
  "last_page_order": 571
}