{ "id": 3639182, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES F. CREIGHTON et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Creighton", "decision_date": "1985-11-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 84-334, 84-396 cons.", "first_page": "952", "last_page": "957", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 952" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 1258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3025213 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 1268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636392 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435580 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426382 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678397 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637199 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 10394, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8122418424769376e-07, "percentile": 0.7179696576904677 }, "sha256": "b4cc6d4a814a48f56c36b387958d7bf12407f8c791820b1d5d58c3edfacf01ce", "simhash": "1:8bee11d67747c7f1", "word_count": 1678 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:08.242422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES F. CREIGHTON et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders following two implied consent hearings held pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). The trial court found that the arresting officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the defendants were driving under the influence of alcohol. The State cites the following objections on appeal: (1) that the trial court had no authority to exercise judicial leniency as part of its ruling on implied consent, (2) that the trial court\u2019s findings of no probable cause were manifestly erroneous.\nThe cases of People v. Creighton,.No. 84 \u2014 334, and People v. Fabing, No. 84 \u2014 396, have been consolidated on appeal. Both defendants were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and issued a uniform traffic citation for that offense. They were both informed of the Illinois implied consent statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1) and asked to take a breathalyzer test. Both defendants refused to take the test, and in each case, the arresting officer completed an affidavit of refusal as required by the implied consent statute. Creighton and Fabing both pleaded guilty to charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, and each participated in the alcohol safety rehabilitation program.\nAfter their trials on criminal charges, each defendant had an implied consent hearing before the Honorable Cornelius Houtsma. Both defendants stipulated to the circumstances surrounding their arrests. However, the trial court exercised \u201cjudicial lenity\u201d in each case and, on that basis, found that the arresting officers had no probable cause to believe that the defendants were driving under the influence of alcohol. The State appeals from the trial court\u2019s findings of no probable cause.\nThe defendants have failed to present any arguments to counter the State\u2019s objections on appeal. Defendant Fabing submitted a document which contained no argument but merely purported to adopt Creighton\u2019s brief. Creighton submitted no brief at all.\nA court of review will not serve as an advocate for an appellee who files no brief. However, if a record is simple and issues can be disposed of easily, the appellate court may decide the merits of an appeal despite the fact that the appellee has not submitted a brief. (First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493.) If the appellant\u2019s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error, and contentions in the brief find support in the record, the judgment of the trial court may be reversed. (63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493.) In the present cases, the records are simple, and the appellant\u2019s brief is amply supported by pertinent authorities. Therefore, the merits of the State\u2019s appeal may be decided.\nThe State\u2019s first objection on appeal is that the trial court had no authority to base its findings of no probable cause upon an exercise of judicial leniency. Despite overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence of probable cause presented at both implied consent hearings, the judge found that the arresting officers had no probable cause to believe that the defendants had been driving under the influence of alcohol. In People v. Creighton, the court noted that the defendant had stipulated to the fact that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol, but the court found no probable cause \u201cas an excecixe of judg. lenity [sic].\u201d Similarly, in People v. Fabing, the court acknowledged that the defendant had \u201cno defense,\u201d but dismissed the proceeding on a finding of \u201cNo Probable Cause-basis Judicial lenity only [sic].\u201d The effect of the trial court\u2019s findings was that the driving privileges of both defendants remained intact. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(c).\nThe implied consent statute provides that after a defendant has refused to take a breathalyzer test, his driver\u2019s license will be suspended for six months unless he applies for a hearing before the court. This hearing, according to the statute, shall only cover the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest as evidenced by a Uniform Traffic Citation, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving under the influence of alcohol, and whether the person refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. If the court finds that all of these factual predicates are satisfied, then the Secretary of State must suspend the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c).\nIn an implied consent hearing, the court may not, at its discretion, decide whether to suspend a defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. (People v. Barry (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 494, 481 N.E.2d 19.) The suspension of driving privileges is a purely administrative function of the Secretary of State. (People v. Horberg (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 458, 462 N.E.2d 831, 833.) The implied consent hearing merely provides an impartial forum in which to determine whether the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test after having been lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. (123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 458-59, 462 N.E.2d 831, 833.) The judge\u2019s sole discretionary power under the statute is to recommend to the Secretary that the defendant receive a restricted driver\u2019s license because of undue hardship. People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 214, 347 N.E.2d 146.\nIt appears in the present cases that the trial judge attempted to use some discretionary power not authorized by the implied consent statute. Rather than making a strictly factual determination of probable cause, the court exercised leniency in deciding to dismiss the defendants\u2019 implied consent proceedings. Under the statute, however, the court had no power to treat these individual defendants with mercy, no matter how well-deserved or with what good intentions the judge exercised leniency. Instead of using its discretion, the court should have simply decided whether the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to think that the defendants were driving while impaired by alcohol.\nThe State\u2019s second objection on appeal is that the court\u2019s finding of no probable cause in these cases was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State\u2019s argument in this regard is persuasive. Although a court of review will not disturb the judgment below unless it is \u201cpalpably against the weight of the evidence,\u201d where a conclusion opposite of the court\u2019s finding is clearly called for by the record, the trial court\u2019s decision may be reversed. People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 712, 445 N.E.2d 878-79.\nIn the present cases, the manifest weight of the evidence points clearly toward findings of probable cause. Reasonable grounds to believe that a person is driving under the influence of alcohol is synonymous with \u201cprobable cause to arrest.\u201d {People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716, 445 N.E.2d 878, 882.) Probable cause is present where facts and circumstances known to an arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was committed by the person arrested. (People v. Moody (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 445 N.E.2d 275.) Since an implied consent hearing is a civil proceeding, distinct from a defendant\u2019s trial on criminal charges, the State need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to infer that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. People v. Golden (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 150, 155, 453 N.E.2d 15, 18.\nThe arresting officers in these cases had ample evidence on which to base the reasonable conclusion that the defendants were intoxicated at the time of their arrest. At his implied consent hearing, Creighton stipulated to the arresting officer\u2019s testimony. Captain Boyd observed the defendant speeding, and after he stopped Creighton, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol. He also noted that the defendant was swaying and staggering. The officer issued a citation to Creighton for driving under the influence of alcohol and requested that defendant take a breathalyzer test. Creighton declined to submit to the test.\nFabing stipulated to similar evidence at his hearing. The officer who arrested Fabing stopped the defendant after receiving a report that he had left the scene of an accident. A strong odor of alcohol emanated from Fabing, and the officer observed defendant stumble, fall, and use his car for support in an attempt to stand upright. Officer Lipinski gave the defendant a ticket for driving under the influence of alcohol, and defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test when requested to do so.\nIn addition to the foregoing evidence of intoxication, both defendants had already pleaded guilty in the same causes of action to criminal charges of driving under the influence of alcohol. A defendant\u2019s guilty plea to criminal charges of driving under the influence of alcohol may be used later at his implied consent hearing as evidence of probable cause for his arrest. People v. Chavez (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 598, 601, 480 N.E.2d 1268, 1271; People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716, 445 N.E.2d 878, 882; People v. Powell (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 418, 420, 437 N.E.2d 1258,1260.\nIn light of the defendants\u2019 admissions and their obvious physical manifestations of intoxication, it is clear that the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to arrest these two drivers. Moreover, since it is undisputed that the defendants were issued traffic citations and that they refused to take breathalyzer tests, the dismissal of their implied consent hearings was manifestly erroneous.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nHARTMAN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Peter J. Szatkowski, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES F. CREIGHTON et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 84 \u2014 334, 84 \u2014 396 cons.\nOpinion filed November 5, 1985.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Peter J. Szatkowski, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellees." }, "file_name": "0952-01", "first_page_order": 974, "last_page_order": 979 }