{
  "id": 8499131,
  "name": "MARY ELIZABETH CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA K. SHAW, Defendant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervening Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Connor v. Shaw",
  "decision_date": "1985-11-08",
  "docket_number": "No. 5\u201484\u20140454",
  "first_page": "429",
  "last_page": "433",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 429"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "400 N.E.2d 608",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "612"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 876",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3233304
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "880"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/80/0876-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "401 N.E.2d 639",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "643"
        },
        {
          "page": "641"
        },
        {
          "page": "641"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 394",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3227929
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "400"
        },
        {
          "page": "397"
        },
        {
          "page": "396"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/81/0394-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 532,
    "char_count": 9943,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.75,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.20455598460854e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5944806048537965
    },
    "sha256": "3523e045e7a08b2d45045e34a8dcc12d523d14f6d65e8ad4bd8cd186b5a2eb92",
    "simhash": "1:0fe758dccbc7cd48",
    "word_count": 1599
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:50.288778+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "EARNS and WELCH, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "MARY ELIZABETH CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA K. SHAW, Defendant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervening Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Department of Public Aid appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County denying in full its lien claim for medical expenses paid on behalf of plaintiff, Mary Connor, prior to settlement of her personal injury action. The claim was denied after the circuit court refused to admit into evidence the Department\u2019s certification regarding direct medical payments. The sole question on this appeal is whether the circuit court erred in so excluding the certification. We conclude that it did, and therefore reverse and remand with directions.\nThe facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. On February 5, 1981, a jury awarded plaintiff $150,000 for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident which occurred September 18, 1976. Thereafter, on June 3, 1982, the circuit court found this award to be excessive and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. The Department was granted leave to intervene in plaintiff\u2019s case two months later, on August 16, 1982. Intervention was permitted pursuant to section 11 \u2014 22 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 11 \u2014 22), which entitles the Department to a charge, or lien, \u201cupon all claims, demands and causes of action for injuries [to a public aid recipient] for the total amount of medical assistance provided the recipient from the time of injury to the date of recovery upon such claim, demand or cause of action.\u201d\nJust before the second trial on damages was set to begin, plaintiff settled her case for $30,000. On March 28, 1984, plaintiff moved for an adjudication of the Department\u2019s statutory lien claim against her settlement recovery. Plaintiff\u2019s motion was heard on April 4, 1984, at which time the Department formally offered into evidence its certification regarding direct medical payments as proof of the medical expenses it paid on plaintiff\u2019s behalf. The body of the certification reads as follows:\n\u201cI, Gregory L. Coler, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid under the authority of Section 10 \u2014 13.4 of the Public Assistance Code of Illinois do hereby certify that the Following Direct Medical Payments in the total amount \u2022 of $4,069.21 charged to the assistance payment account of Mary E. McMullen [Connor] 4 \u2014 36\u20148495 were paid in his or her behalf: from July 13, 1978 through August 7, 1982.\nThe attached sheets show the medical expenses paid by the Department on behalf of Mary E. McMullen [Connor] totals $4,069.21. These sheets are the legal records of the Department, and provide the information from which the charge is figured.\nThe records of these payments are now on file in the offices of The Illinois Department of Public Aid and as such are a part of the records and files under my keeping as Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid.\u201d\nThe certification is dated March 8, 1984, and bears the stamped, facsimile signature of Gregory L. Coler, Director of the Department.\nAttached to the certification are 19 pages of documents. These documents are photocopies of the Department\u2019s microfiche records which, as indicated in the certification, list the medical payments made on plaintiff\u2019s behalf from July 13, 1979, subsequent to the injuries giving rise to her lawsuit, through August 7, 1982, prior to the settlement of that suit. These documents also itemize payments made by the Department on behalf of plaintiff\u2019s daughter, Nicole. However, manual notations have been made on the documents to differentiate payments attributable to Nicole from those attributable to plaintiff, and handwritten subtotals are provided on each page as an aid to the court to show only those amounts claimed for medical payments on behalf of plaintiff. The Department offered no further evidence in support of its lien claim.\nPlaintiff objected to the admissibility of the Department\u2019s certification and the attached documents on the grounds that they were not competent evidence of the facts asserted therein. After the circuit court heard arguments by counsel, plaintiff\u2019s objection was sustained, and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff. In a \u201cjudgment order\u201d filed on June 27, 1984, the circuit court subsequently found \u201cthat the State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid has failed to prove and establish its lien and that such lien fails and should be denied.\u201d The court also denied the Department\u2019s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.\nThe Department contends that its certification, with attachments, is admissible into evidence and competent proof of its lien against plaintiff\u2019s settlement recovery pursuant to section 10 \u2014 13.4 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 10 \u2014 13.4). We agree. That statute expressly provides:\n\u201cThe books, papers, records and memoranda of the Illinois Department [of Public Aid] or of the administrative enforcement unit, or parts thereof, may be proved in any hearing, investigation, or legal proceeding by a photostatic or other copy thereof under the certificate of the Director of the Illinois Department. Such certified copy shall, without further proof, be admitted into evidence in the hearing before the Illinois Department or in any other legal proceeding.\u201d\nPlaintiff attempts to avoid the plain language of this statute by arguing that neither the handwritten notations and subtotals, nor the microfiche documents themselves, constitute actual \u201crecords\u201d of the Department. Plaintiff\u2019s view is that these, at best, are merely third party summaries or \u201crecords of records.\u201d Apparently plaintiff believes that the Department was obligated to offer copies of the actual documents underlying these records. This contention is without merit.\nSection 10 \u2014 13.4 of the Public Aid Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 10 \u2014 13.4) does not require the Department to produce copies of every document utilized in every payment to a public aid recipient. The reason is straightforward. What gives reliability to certifications made under that statute is not the detail of the supporting documentation, but the fact that they are attested to by a public official, the director, in connection with performance of his statutory duties. Thus, in Department of Public Aid v. Estate of Wall (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 394, 401 N.E.2d 639, this court specifically held that even a typed summary of expenditures, when properly certified by the Director of the Department, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. The language of the certification here is drawn almost verbatim from that at issue in Department of Public Aid v. Estate of Wall (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 394, 401 N.E.2d 639. Under these circumstances, and considering the vastly more comprehensive documentation submitted in this case, to accord the Department\u2019s certification any less weight would indeed be anomalous.\nPlaintiff next argues that the Department\u2019s certification, with attachments, was properly excluded by the circuit court for failure to comply with the requirements of section 8 \u2014 401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 401). Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, and we believe the statute to be inapplicable. Section 8 \u2014 401 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 401) deals with the admissibility of account books or records, or copies thereof, kept in the usual course of business, where a claim or defense is founded upon a book account or other record. As we held in Department of Public Aid v. Estate of Wall (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 394, 400, 401 N.E.2d 639, 643, however, \u201cWe are not concerned [here] with transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business. The adversarial aspects of the market place are missing. Rather, we are concerned with the conduct of governmental affairs by an agency of State government. Their activities *** are fixed and determined by statute.\u201d What does apply here is the public records exception to the hearsay rule, recognized at common law. The Department\u2019s certification, with attachments, is clearly admissible under this exception, just as it is under section 10 \u2014 13.4 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 10 \u2014 13.4). See Department of Public Aid v. Estate of Wall (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397, 401 N.E.2d 639, 641.\nPlaintiff offers a number of subsidiary arguments to justify the circuit court\u2019s judgment, but we have carefully reviewed the record and the controlling law and find them to be likewise without merit.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Department\u2019s certification is admissible into evidence and competent proof of the Department\u2019s lien claim against plaintiff\u2019s settlement recovery. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a proper adjudication of the Department\u2019s lien pursuant to section 11 \u2014 22 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 11 \u2014 22). In this adjudication, the circuit court may not refuse to recognize the probative value of the Department\u2019s certification. (See Department of Public Aid v. Estate of Wall (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 394, 396, 401 N.E.2d 639, 641.) To the contrary, the circuit court must allow the full amount of the lien sought by the Department, as documented in its certification, unless plaintiff meets her burden of producing evidence sufficient to support a lien reduction. See Jackson v. Thatcher (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 876, 880, 400 N.E.2d 608, 612.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nEARNS and WELCH, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Vincenzo Chimera, Assistant Attorney General, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Joseph W. Hickman, of Benton, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARY ELIZABETH CONNOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA K. SHAW, Defendant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervening Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201484\u20140454\nOpinion filed November 8, 1985.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Vincenzo Chimera, Assistant Attorney General, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoseph W. Hickman, of Benton, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0429-01",
  "first_page_order": 451,
  "last_page_order": 455
}