{ "id": 3567860, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD PETER VILT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Vilt", "decision_date": "1985-12-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-83-0127, 3-85-0079 cons.", "first_page": "868", "last_page": "878", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3135199 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708271 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2701393 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 844", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6355104, 6353346, 6352195, 6353541, 6354822, 6353190, 6352841, 6354601, 6353929, 6354412, 6352652, 6353006, 6353743, 6354160, 6352434 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0844-15", "/us/464/0844-07", "/us/464/0844-01", "/us/464/0844-08", "/us/464/0844-14", "/us/464/0844-06", "/us/464/0844-04", "/us/464/0844-13", "/us/464/0844-10", "/us/464/0844-12", "/us/464/0844-03", "/us/464/0844-05", "/us/464/0844-09", "/us/464/0844-11", "/us/464/0844-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971950 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3206427 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 967", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3268949 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962537 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997079 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 497", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185127 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957586 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "429" }, { "page": "1069" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 1166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "457 N.E .2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3630450 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0834-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 21805, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6041949514960222e-07, "percentile": 0.6843763864225288 }, "sha256": "f629c015c998c9783d2ada7e16b61c1179e09b7b9001e91935ca2f78f05927c3", "simhash": "1:a3dfbfde2b0e8f3d", "word_count": 3661 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:01.821667+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD PETER VILT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Donald Peter Vilt, on July 29, 1980, was charged by indictment with two counts of deviate sexual assault and single counts of rape and aggravated kidnaping. The victim of these offenses was 17-year-old Theresa Peeler. These charges alleged various sex offenses committed against the victim, and as to the kidnaping charge, the aggravation consisted of a completed rape.\nPrior to the trial of the defendant, the State filed a motion in limine wherein it was asked that pursuant to the rape shield statute the defense be not permitted to elicit evidence of the prior sexual activity of the victim and further that the victim not be asked with whom she lived or had lived in the past. This motion was granted by the trial court. During cross-examination of the victim, the State claimed a violation of the motion in limine when counsel for the defendant inquired of the defendant as to whom she had been living with in Valparaiso, Indiana. The victim responded with a person\u2019s name, and counsel for defendant asked whether that person was her boyfriend and further whether the victim had terminated previous employment in order to live with her boyfriend. The State moved for a mistrial, which the trial judge granted after terming defense counsel\u2019s questions as a \u201cflagrant violation\u201d of the in limine order and a violation of the rape shield statute.\nPrior to a new trial, the defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictment, contending that the trial judge had improperly declared a mistrial and hence the second trial placed him in double jeopardy. This motion was denied on January 18, 1982.\nThe new trial commenced in September 1982. The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant not guilty of deviate sexual assault (fellatio) but guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor based on the fellatio count; guilty of deviate sexual assault and contributing to the delinquency of a minor based on an anal intercourse count; not guilty of rape but guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor based on having sexual intercourse with the victim, and not guilty of aggravated kidnaping.\nThe trial court vacated the conviction for deviate sexual assault (anal intercourse) and contributing to the delinquency-of-a-minor conviction. The defendant was sentenced to a term of 325 days of imprisonment and a fine of $900 on counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.\nFrom this conviction and sentence imposed thereon the defendant appealed, which was docketed as No. 3 \u2014 83\u20140127. The State appealed from the trial court\u2019s vacation of the conviction for deviate sexual assault, which resulted in a reversal of the trial court\u2019s order and a remand to the trial court for additional proceeding. (See People v. Vilt (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 832, 457 N.E .2d 136.) After remand and additional proceedings, the defendant on the conviction of deviate sexual assault was sentenced to a term of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment, said sentence to run concurrently with a 12-year sentence imposed on the defendant in another case, to-wit, Kankakee County circuit court case No. 80 \u2014 CF\u2014175, affirmed on appeal by order of this court on October 7, 1983, as case No. 82 \u2014 550, People v. Vilt (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 1166 (Rule 23 order). From this conviction of deviate sexual assault and the sentence imposed thereon the defendant appeals in case No. 3 \u2014 85\u20140079, which has been consolidated for determination with case No. 3 \u2014 83\u20140127.\nThe acts of the defendant as established during his trial and from which these appeals stem are as follows.\nTheresa Peeler, age 17, on April 17, 1980, went to a Job Service office in Kankakee. She was approached by the defendant, who advised her about the possibility of obtaining a job at the local Holiday Inn. She accepted the defendant\u2019s offer of a ride to the Inn in order to check on the availability of the job. She entered the defendant\u2019s light green truck, which had a florist sticker on the window. Evidence would establish that the defendant was the proprietor of a commercial landscaping business.\nThe defendant drove toward Indiana with the explanation that he had to go out of his way in order to deliver a box. He ultimately stopped on a dirt road, restrained the victim Peeler, tied her hands with her belt and removed all of her clothing. He then compelled the victim to perform an act of oral sex upon him. He next ordered the victim to the rear of the truck, where he had anal sex with her. Evidence would establish that at this time another truck came by them. The victim, still bound, was made to \u201cduck\u201d as the other vehicle passed them. The defendant then proceeded to drive back to Kankakee and order the victim to perform another act of oral sex on him while he was driving. The defendant thereafter stopped the truck in a wooded area, ordered the victim to again go to the back of the truck, and after complying with the order, the defendant again had anal sex with the victim. Shortly thereafter the defendant had vaginal intercourse with the victim.\nThe defendant ultimately returned the victim to the Job Service office. The victim then drove home arriving there at about 6 p.m. Her father and three brothers were at the home, but she did not mention her experiences to them. She bathed and then called her mother in Indiana, who contacted the police.\nAfter talking to the police, the victim was taken to a hospital. An examination disclosed that the victim had fresh bruises, scrapes, vaginal bruising and a bite mark on her breast. Medical personnel noted some non-functional tears in the rectum, and there was some indication of rectal bleeding.\nThe defendant was contacted by officers from the sheriff\u2019s office and he agreed to participate in a \u201clineup\u201d for identification purposes. After such participation he was arrested and charged with the offenses which have heretofore been set forth.\nFurther recitation of evidence adduced at trial will be set forth as the same becomes pertinent to the determination of the issues raised in this appeal.\nThe defendant first asserts that his convictions should be reversed since they resulted from a second trial conducted in violation of the double jeopardy rule since there was no manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial in defendant\u2019s first trial on the charges.\nWe have heretofore set forth the action of the defense counsel which gave rise to this issue. The trial court determined that the violation of the in limine order concerning the rape shield statute was flagrant and of such seriousness as to dictate a declaration of mistrial.\nA mistrial should be granted whenever there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial or the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated. (Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U.S. 458, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 93 S. Ct. 1066.) In Somerville the United States Supreme Court recognized that the granting of a mistrial is within the trial court\u2019s discretion and double jeopardy does riot arise unless such discretion was abused. (410 U.S. 458, 461, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 429, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 1069. ) A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial. Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U.S. 458, 464, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 1070.\nIn the instant case the trial judge entered an order granting the State\u2019s motion for an order in limine in order to protect the victim\u2019s statutory rights by the rape shield statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7.) Questions were propounded to the victim which the trial court termed, and correctly so, as a \u201cflagrant violation\u201d of the in limine order. The trial court did not act precipitously but permitted both parties to research the mistrial question and further entertained the attorneys\u2019 arguments on the matter. The trial court was aware of the procedure whereby an attempt to cure the tainted trial could have been made by giving cautionary instructions to the jury. Obviously, the court concluded that such instruction would not eliminate the prejudicial effect caused by the violation of the order in limine. The law recognizes that judges are not clairvoyant. A mistrial in the instant case may or may not have been necessary. However, the overriding interest in the even-handed administration of justice requires that a reviewing court accord the highest degree of respect to a trial judge\u2019s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by an improper line of questioning. Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U.S. 497, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 98 S. Ct. 824.\nThe interrogation of the victim by counsel for the defendant deprived the victim of rights guaranteed by statute, and hence we quarrel not with the court\u2019s declaration of a mistrial and further conclude that the retrial of the defendant did not subject him to double jeopardy.\nThe defendant further contends that he was not proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of deviate sexual assault. The defendant attempts to support this contention primarily by an analysis of the verdicts returned by the jury. The jury found the defendant not guilty of rape (sexual intercourse), not guilty of sexual assault (oral contact or fellatio), but did find him guilty of deviate sexual assault (anal intercourse). The jury also found defendant guilty of the included offenses of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor based upon rape and both types of deviate sexual assault.\nThe defendant admitted having anal intercourse with the victim Theresa Peeler but testified that such act was accomplished with the victim\u2019s consent and was not performed against her will. Stated otherwise, the defendant argues that the act of anal intercourse was not accomplished \u201cby force or threat of force\u201d which are the statutory elements of the offense. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 3(a).\nThe defendant stresses the fact that the jury chose not to credit the testimony of the victim Theresa Peeler regarding the exertion of force for acts of fellatio and vaginal intercourse which preceded, separated and followed the acts of anal intercourse and hence such findings should give rise to skepticism and this court must look elsewhere for essential evidence which would support a finding of force.\nCounsel for defendant during presentation of oral argument stressed the point that we are not confronted with an inconsistent verdict situation. We disagree, for it is clear that the guilty verdicts for deviate sexual assault (anal intercourse) and contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor for committing the same acts are inconsistent. As previously noted, one verdict required the element of force or lack of consent while the other is based upon a consensual deviate sexual act with a minor.\nIt is well established that inconsistent verdicts do not per se result in their rejection. The question is whether they are so logically inconsistent as to cast doubt upon a complainant\u2019s credibility, thus showing that a defendant had not been found guilty beyond' reasonable doubt. (People v. Buford (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 46, 441 N.E.2d 1235.) In Buford, we find a factual situation similar to that presented in the instant case. The defendant in Buford was convicted of rape and attempted violence but acquitted of deviate sexual assault, armed robbery and unlawful use of weapons. A question of inconsistency was presented in that the offenses charged had dissimilar elements. The reviewing court determined that the verdicts were not so logically inconsistent as to create an inference that there was reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. The reviewing court stated:\n\u201cWe also note that the verdict may have reflected the jury\u2019s belief that the conviction for rape and armed violence would provide sufficient punishment to the defendant, and that \u2018[t]he jury\u2019s historic power of lenity must prevail *** over the traditional doctrine concerning legally and logically inconsistent verdicts.\u2019 (People v. Murray (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 521, 536, 340 N.E.2d 186.)\u201d People v. Buford (1983), 110 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56, 441 N.E.2d 1235, 1242.\nOne can speculate and arrive at many explanations as to why the jury in the instant case returned what appears to be logically inconsistent verdicts. However, this court will not engage in speculation as to the jury\u2019s reasoning. That it found defendant not guilty of rape (sexual intercourse) and not guilty of deviate sexual assault (fellatio) but guilty of sexual deviate assault (anal intercourse) and guilty of contributing on all offenses is strong indication that the jury concluded the victim did not resist enough except when the defendant attempted to and did commit the acts of anal intercourse.\nThe defendant would have this court reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury with the proviso that we first put aside and not consider the victim\u2019s testimony. This we are not inclined to do. It is primarily the function of the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and to determine the weight of the evidence. (People v. O\u2019Brien (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 256, 392 N.E.2d 967.) A court of review will not set aside a finding of guilty unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the findings or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Payton (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 181, 405 N.E.2d 18.) In the instant case, the victim after arriving home within a few hours set in motion the process which resulted in defendant\u2019s arrest. It is not disputed that the defendant used deception when he lured the victim into his vehicle. The defendant tied the victim\u2019s hands behind her back and removed her clothing. The defendant threatened reprisals against the victim should she call the police. Medical testimony established that the victim had fresh bruises on her back, knees, wrists and a bite mark on her left breast. The anus of the victim revealed two fissures (small tears) in the skin, and a small amount of blood was being exuded.\nConfronted with such evidence we do not find merit in the defendant\u2019s contention that he was not found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the deviate sexual assault on the anal intercourse charge.\nThe defendant further asserts that he was denied a fair trial in that the trial court permitted the introduction of other evidence of forcible sexual activity on his part and barred evidence of other consensual sexual activity.\nThe defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the State from presenting evidence as to his sexual activity on July 2, 1980, with Tami George, and with another woman on December 28, 1984. The trial court denied this motion on the modus operandi and common design exception to the rule barring other crime evidence.\nTami George, a young lady, testified that the defendant approached her at the Job Service Center in Kankakee. That the defendant offered her a job and insisted that she accompany him immediately or she would lose the job opportunity. That she entered a green truck (as did the victim in the instant case) and that she was driven to a rural area. That she was restrained from leaving the truck and was immobilized by having her hands tied behind her back. That defendant removed her clothing and forced her to perform acts of oral copulation. That the defendant had intercourse with her without her consent. That she was forced to kneel on her hands and knees and he had anal contact with her (not anal intercourse), after which he spanked her on the buttocks. As in the instant case, the defendant pulled Tami George\u2019s hair, causing pain.\nDefendant\u2019s objection to the Tami George testimony was that there was no issue as to his identity, that the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value.\nIn closing argument to the jury the prosecutor argued that the testimony of Tami George was limited to the issues of the defendant\u2019s intent, motive, design and knowledge. The jury was also so instructed by the trial court.\nOur supreme court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime. People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489; People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, cert, denied (1983), 464 U.S. 844, 78 L. Ed. 2d 136,104 S. Ct. 145.\nThe defendant\u2019s actions with Tami George are strikingly similar with his actions with the victim in the instant case, and hence such evidence was admissible to prove modus operandi, intent and lack of consent to the defendant\u2019s sexual acts.\nThe defendant claims that the alleged error in admitting the testimony of Tami George could have been overcome or offset had the testimony of Carolyn Goetschel been permitted. Ms. Goetschel would have testified that she had consensually engaged in sexual activity with the defendant; however, when the defendant asked her to engage in bondage, she refused and the defendant did not employ force. Defendant argues that such testimony would have shown that he harbored \u201cbondage fantasies\u201d but that he would not press them upon an unwilling participant.\nApparently the testimony of Ms. Goetschel was designed to demonstrate that defendant\u2019s character was such that he would not force sexual activity upon a young lady. The character of a defendant is proved by evidence of general reputation and cannot be proved by isolated incidents. (People v. Lyons (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 396, 122 N.E.2d 809; People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709.) The trial court properly excluded the Goetschel testimony.\nLastly the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for statutory credit for time served. This issue resulted from the following scenario of events. In October 1982, defendant was found guilty of deviate sexual assault (anal intercourse) and three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Defendant was sentenced to 325 days of imprisonment on one of the contributing counts. The trial court refused to set appeal bond, and defendant began to serve and did serve the sentence in full.\nIn the interim the State appealed the trial court\u2019s order vacating the deviate sexual assault charge. This court reversed the trial court and ordered reinstatement of the charge. (People v. Vilt (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 832, 457 N.E.2d 136.) The mandate in this matter was issued on May 3,1984.\nOn May 3, 1984, this court also issued its mandate in a related case. (People v. Vilt (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 1166 (Rule 23 order).) In this case the victim was Tami George, and concurrent terms of 12 years for deviate sexual assault and eight years for aggravated kidnaping were imposed. The defendant, who had been free on an appeal bond (in the Tami George case, No. 82 \u2014 550), surrendered himself and began serving his sentence on May 9,1984.\nOn January 23, 1985, the defendant was sentenced in the instant case to a term of 15 years of imprisonment on the deviate sexual assault conviction, and said sentence was to run concurrently with a 12-year sentence in a related case. The defendant was given credit for the 325-day sentence which he had previously served on the related misdemeanor (contributing) offense.\nDespite a specific request, the defendant was not given credit for time served while awaiting sentencing, to-wit, from May 9, 1984, to January 23, 1985. Defendant claims that the trial court was in error when it denied his request.\nIn addressing this question we are guided by the statutory provisions of our Criminal Code of 1961 pertaining to sentencing. Both the defendant and the State cite section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) of the Code which provides:\n\u201cThe offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20147(b).\nBoth defendant and the State cite cases in support of their respective views. The cases cited appear to express divergent views. This court, however, has addressed this issue in the case of People v. Stuckey (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 260, 417 N.E.2d 203. In Stuckey it was determined that the defendant was not entitled to statutory credit for time served under an unrelated conviction. In the instant case, from May 9, 1984, to January 23, 1985, the defendant was not in custody as a result of his conviction for deviate sexual assault against the victim Theresa Peeler, but was in custody as the result of the sentences imposed in the unrelated Tami George case.\nFollowing this court\u2019s views expressed in the case of Stuckey, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request for credit for time served from May 9,1984, to January 23,1985.\nFor the reasons set forth, the defendant\u2019s convictions in cases No. 3 \u2014 83\u20140127 and No. 3 \u2014 85\u20140079 and the sentences imposed thereon by the circuit court of Kankakee County are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Verlin R. E Meinz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "William Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD PETER VILT, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNos. 3-83-0127, 3-85\u20140079 cons.\nOpinion filed December.20, 1985.\nRehearing denied February 7, 1986.\nRobert Agostinelli and Verlin R. E Meinz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nWilliam Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0868-01", "first_page_order": 890, "last_page_order": 900 }