{ "id": 3533259, "name": "DONALD J. LADESIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SERVOMATION CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ladesic v. Servomation Corp.", "decision_date": "1986-01-29", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20141470", "first_page": "489", "last_page": "493", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 489" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3230866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 F.2d 729", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1158735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/129/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 A.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.J. Super. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 445742 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/16/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 F. Supp. 1286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3559451 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/562/1286-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3123022 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.E. 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 841335 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/196/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 F.2d 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1123130 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/708/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5450045 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "602-03" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5206078 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/23/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379381 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0871-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 9927, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5860830797432777e-07, "percentile": 0.8176542338954896 }, "sha256": "3a616acefb0c25512fdbe98fa7bb7810e9b0120800d91fc8647c6bb41958243b", "simhash": "1:1a3d784c0f253f07", "word_count": 1519 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:30.289204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DONALD J. LADESIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SERVOMATION CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Donald J. Ladesic, filed an action in four counts for damages allegedly caused by his wrongful termination from employment with defendant Servomation Corporation. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the entire complaint. Plaintiff appeals only the dismissal of count I alleging Servomation\u2019s breach of an oral contract for permanent employment, and count III alleging the individual defendants\u2019 inducement of breach of contract.\nCount I contained the following allegations. Servomation, a food catering company, employed plaintiff as sales director of educational accounts. Servomation communicated a policy of guaranteed job security to its employees, with discharge occurring only for good cause. In November 1982, a competing food catering company offered employment to plaintiff with more benefits. Plaintiff informed Servomation of his intention to accept the offer, but top management personnel convinced plaintiff to remain at Servomation.\nThe complaint went on to state that plaintiff and Servomation entered into an \u201coral and implied\u201d contract for employment; that the contract terms required plaintiff to reject the competing company\u2019s offer of employment; that in exchange, Servomation gave plaintiff permanent employment, to end only if plaintiff retired or gave four weeks\u2019 notice, or if Servomation found that plaintiff was performing unsatisfactorily; and that, on April 16, 1984, Servomation discharged plaintiff without any justification.\nCount III of the complaint alleges that three Servomation employees, defendants Sam Ranieri, John Tomlin and Jim Kern, undermined plaintiff\u2019s efforts to perform satisfactorily, knowing this would result in plaintiff\u2019s termination; and that the three employee\u2019s actions included informing plaintiff they planned to \u201cclip his wings,\u201d attacking his sales proposals, conspiring to keep plaintiff\u2019s sales quota too high to allow for his satisfactory performance, eliminating experienced managers who might \u201cout-perform them\u201d and causing plaintiff\u2019s sales output to decrease from $4,000,000 per year to $150,000.\nUnder certain circumstances, an oral agreement for permanent employment is enforceable in Illinois if there is both a clear and definite agreement and sufficient consideration. (Titchener v. Avery Coonley School (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 871, 350 N.E.2d 502.) The primary issue before us is whether sufficient consideration supports the alleged oral contract for permanent employment. A split exists in Illinois authority on the question of whether foregoing another employment opportunity sufficiently supports a promise of permanent employment.\nIn Heuvelman v. Triplett Electrical Instrument Co. (1959), 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 161 N.E.2d 875, this court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the employer, stating at page 236 that \u201c[i]t is not sufficient consideration for a contract of permanent employment to forego another employment opportunity.\u201d There, the employee alleged that he rejected an offer from a competitor in exchange for defendant\u2019s oral promise of permanent employment.\nIn Titchener v. Avery Coonley School (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 871, 350 N.E.2d 502, this court again affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant employer, finding at page 875 that there was not \u201cspecial bargained for detriment to plaintiff as consideration for the alleged promise\u201d of permanent employment. In Titchener, the employee alleged that she had relinquished her tenured position with another school partially in exchange for defendant\u2019s oral promise of permanent employment.\nIn Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998, the court departed from this rule. Without citing Titchener, the Martin court stated that the Heuvelman rule had \u201cnot been analyzed or reviewed in later Illinois cases,\u201d and that the rule was \u201coverbroad\u201d and \u201ca misstatement of the consideration concept.\u201d (109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601, 440 N.E.2d 998.) \u201cNotwithstanding the Heuvelman dictum that it is insufficient consideration to forego other employment opportunities, we believe that when the employee gives up another offer in exchange for and in reliance upon the employer\u2019s promise of permanent employment that contract, if proved, is enforceable.\u201d 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602-03, 440 N.E.2d 998.\nThe Martin court reasoned that sufficient consideration exists because the employer agrees to relinquish its right to terminate plaintiff at will in exchange for the retention of a valuable employee. We find this reasoning to be faulty because it merely portrays the employee promising to give the employer the \u201cretention of a valuable employee,\u201d and does not show the employee surrendering anything of value. Initially we note that the employees in Martin and in the present case made no such promise, alleging instead that they were free to leave the employer at any time. Furthermore, even when an employee does make such a promise he suffers no detriment. Plaintiff must allege a sacrifice in reliance on the employer\u2019s promise. (See Smith v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1983), 708 F.2d 258.) Moreover, a satisfactory performance contract may be terminable at will when the satisfaction is measured subjectively. (Kendall v. West (1902), 196 Ill. 221, 63 N.E. 683; Ray v. Georgetown Life Insurance Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 863, 419 N.E.2d 721; see also Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 562 F. Supp. 1286.) Thus, the employer also would be sacrificing nothing.\nThe Martin court also opined that sufficient consideration exists because the employee agrees to relinquish his right to accept a more lucrative position in exchange for job security with his present employer. We also find this reasoning to be faulty because the employee is not rejecting a more lucrative position. Instead, he is merely comparing the benefits of one position with another, since any employee accepting one job offer necessarily rejects others. Smith v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1983), 708 F.2d 258; Heuvelman v. Triplett Electrical Instrument Co. (1959), 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 161 N.E.2d 875.\nThe Martin court reasoned further that the rule requiring additional consideration, apart from the exchange of service for wages, to support a permanent employment contract is a misconception. \u201cIt is actually a rule of convenience to be applied if the parties\u2019 intent regarding the permanent nature of employment is not clear. If the parties\u2019 intention is clearly manifested there is no requirement for \u2018additional\u2019 consideration.\u201d (Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602, citing Eilen v. Tappin\u2019s, Inc. (1951), 16 N.J. Super. 53, 83 A.2d 817; Eggers v. Armour & Co. (8th Cir. 1942), 129 F.2d 729 (construing Iowa law).) We do not agree. To hold that the parties\u2019 \u201cclearly manifested\u201d intention is a substitute for consideration would quickly lead to the abolishment of the consideration requirement. We know of no Illinois law permitting us to find that the requirement of consideration in an oral contract for permanent employment is a rule of convenience which a court can choose to use at some arbitrary point. Moreover, the requirement of a clear intent to make a contract actually addresses the existence of the employment agreement, not the existence of consideration. The contract, assuming it exists, is unenforceable if no valid consideration is alleged. The plaintiff must prove the existence of both adequate consideration and definite and certain promises. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 562 F. Supp. 1286; Titchener v. Avery Coonley School (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 871, 350 N.E.2d 502.\nFederal courts construing Illinois law on the issue have also followed the Heuvelman-Titchener rule requiring consideration, and have not followed Martin. In Smith v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1983), 708 F.2d 258, the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of a complaint alleging an oral contract for lifetime employment, stating at page 263 that \u201c[ujnder Illinois law an oral promise of permanent employment given in exchange for a promise to work is unenforceable.\u201d In Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 562 F. Supp. 1286, the court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s count alleging the breach of an oral contract for continued employment. The Gordon court addressed the Martin holding in a footnote, noting Martin\u2019s criticism of Heuvelman and failure to cite Titehener. We are in agreement with the holdings of Heuvelman and Titehener and with these Federal decisions. We hold that plaintiff\u2019s failure to demonstrate valid consideration for the alleged permanent employment contract required dismissal of count I of his complaint.\nPlaintiff also appeals the dismissal of count III alleging tortious interference with his contractual relationship with Servomation. An essential element Of this tort is the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. (Pfendler v. Anshe Emet Day School (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 818, 401 N.E.2d 1094.) Because we find the contract is invalid, we also find that the trial court properly dismissed the tort cause of action.\nIn view of our holding, we need not address the Statute of Frauds argument raised by defendants.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nRIZZI, P.J., and McGILLICUDDY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerome Marvin Kaplan, of Chicago (Linda S. Kagen, of counsel), for appellant.", "Robert B. Ulrich, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, of Chicago, and Mark E. Lutz, of Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, and Wilbur L. Collins, of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, both of Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD J. LADESIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SERVOMATION CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 85\u20141470\nOpinion filed January 29, 1986.\nJerome Marvin Kaplan, of Chicago (Linda S. Kagen, of counsel), for appellant.\nRobert B. Ulrich, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, of Chicago, and Mark E. Lutz, of Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, and Wilbur L. Collins, of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, both of Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0489-01", "first_page_order": 511, "last_page_order": 515 }