{ "id": 3532287, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DOWDY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dowdy", "decision_date": "1986-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201483\u20141029", "first_page": "631", "last_page": "639", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 631" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2995569 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2764822 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 1310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 L. Ed. 2d 708", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 1036", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11376608, 11377281, 11377058, 11377123, 11376774, 11376647, 11377223, 11377354, 11377003, 11376941, 11376881, 11376818, 11376692, 11376724, 11376439 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/1036-02", "/us/465/1036-14", "/us/465/1036-11", "/us/465/1036-12", "/us/465/1036-06", "/us/465/1036-03", "/us/465/1036-13", "/us/465/1036-15", "/us/465/1036-10", "/us/465/1036-09", "/us/465/1036-08", "/us/465/1036-07", "/us/465/1036-04", "/us/465/1036-05", "/us/465/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121756 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3134578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482377 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352956 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591032 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5610498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5533340 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146347 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525919 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378761 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392468 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0050-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 855, "char_count": 18206, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0389114389604131e-07, "percentile": 0.5502409599941928 }, "sha256": "e42de6e88e99af430eba031dd07c96c0daf0dad537f86c3617ea106128a722ee", "simhash": "1:e207c1a8dc7ebcee", "word_count": 3101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:30.289204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DOWDY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of forgery by a jury in Kane County on September 27, 1983. He was sentenced to 30-months probation and, as a condition thereof, 180 days in the Kane County jail. Sentence was later modified to reflect credit for time served.\nThe defendant was charged with the intent to defraud the Bank of Sugar Grove on June 3, 1983, by knowingly delivering to it a check in the amount of $300 drawn on the joint account of Addie and Lloyd Roberts. The only name printed on the check was \u201cAddie Roberts\u201d and, although she was deceased in 1981, Lloyd Roberts was an authorized signator and at the bank\u2019s suggestion, he continued to use the checks in order to use up his supply of them.\nDefendant admitted at trial that he wrote the check out to himself as payee, signed the name \u201cAddie Roberts\u201d and included in the memo notation space on the check the phrase: \u201cFor yarding.\u201d The check was endorsed \u201cMichael Dowdy\u201d and underneath there was a driver\u2019s license, social security and phone numbers. The defendant knew Addie Roberts was deceased. He claimed at trial, however, that he received the blank check from Lloyd Roberts, and that Roberts gave him the authority to fill it out, told him to sign Addie\u2019s name and that if the bank had any question, that it could call him and he would clear it up. The primary issue at trial was whether the defendant had the intent to defraud the Bank of Sugar Grove.\nThe Sugar Grove police chief, Neal Lippold, testified at trial that the defendant contacted him \u201cabout the thing that was happening in Sugar Grove.\u201d After Miranda warnings were given, the defendant told Lippold he got the June 3 check from Lloyd Roberts for work he had done for Roberts. He testified he helped Roberts perform various odd jobs, and that Roberts paid him differing amounts for this work on occasion, and that Roberts owed him about $150 at the time of the incident in question. Lippold testified the defendant told him he had taken four checks from Roberts\u2019 truck.\nLloyd Roberts, a 67-year-old retired janitor, testified he did not pay the defendant anything for helping him with various odd jobs, or promise to pay him for same. On occasion, they ate meals together, socialized and attended church together. Roberts was a friend of the defendant\u2019s family and had known him for several years prior to the forgery incident. Roberts denied he had given the defendant the check or the authority to fill it out, nor had he ever given the defendant any other of the checks which were sometimes kept in the glove compartment of his truck, or on top of his dresser. Roberts testified he signed his own name, not his wife\u2019s, when he wrote checks; that he wrote checks in sequence; that he did not keep his own checking balance record; and, prior to April of 1983, on occasion, he had signed and given someone a blank check to fill out.\nAccording to the defendant\u2019s testimony at trial, Roberts gave him the check because the defendant wanted to buy a $300 car which he had test-driven over to Roberts\u2019 house on the morning in question. Evidence was admitted of three other checks subsequently drawn on the Roberts\u2019 account, on June 22, 23 and 24, written by the defendant, and delivered to the First Security Bank of Aurora. The defendant was not charged in connection with those checks. The checks were all signed \u201cAddie Roberts,\u201d and the named payee was \u201cBilly Dowdy,\u201d the defendant\u2019s father. Each of these three checks was endorsed with the signature \u201cBilly Dowdy,\u201d and Mr. Dowdy\u2019s Aurora bank account number. Defendant admitted he filled out these checks and cashed them at the Aurora bank. He testified at trial that he did so because \u201cMr. Roberts said that he needed money and he didn\u2019t want to go to Sugar Grove and that he didn\u2019t know where to cash the check and I figured my dad had money in the account and it would go through here and no one else would know about it.\u201d Defendant testified that Roberts gave him a portion of the proceeds of each of these three checks as payment for services rendered. A teller from the Aurora bank testified that on one of the occasions in question, she recalled the defendant, driving a red truck, was accompanied by a male passenger who was over 60 years of age.\nIn this appeal, defendant contends (1) it was an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion to limit his cross-examination of Lloyd Roberts concerning his financial status where such inquiry was made in order to establish that Roberts had a motive to falsely accuse him of forgery; (2) that it was error for the court to exclude evidence that the defendant\u2019s father had repaid the bank and that the bank, therefore, did not wish to prosecute the instant forgery charge where the State \u201copened the door\u201d to such evidence, and (3) that a new trial must be ordered because the trial judge mistakenly read to the jury the State\u2019s refused instruction concerning proof of other offenses, instead of the one modified and tendered by the defendant, and accepted by the court.\nDefendant concedes that the scope of cross-examination is generally discretionary with the trial judge, contending generally, however, that a criminal defendant should be given the widest latitude in cross-examination (People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50; People v. Mason (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 396), and that a person charged with a crime should be allowed to make all proper defenses (People v. Watson (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 228). He argues the court\u2019s limitation on his cross-examination of Lloyd Roberts prevented him from bringing to the jury\u2019s attention evidence of instances in which Roberts\u2019 account had been overdrawn. The only specific instance of such overdraft shown in the record was that mentioned in defendant\u2019s opening argument; that is, in April of 1983. Defendant contends such evidence was both reasonable and relevant to a showing that Roberts might have accused Dowdy falsely \u201cin order to avoid further financial troubles.\u201d\nThe State's waiver argument is unavailing, for the record shows this issue was raised in the defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. Nonetheless, we find unpersuasive the defendant\u2019s argument that reversal is required.\nCross-examination to show interest, bias, or motive on the part of a witness is a matter of right, subject to the broad discretion of the trial court to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing interrogation and, assuming a proper subject matter, to control the extent of cross-examination. (People v. Gordon (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 92.) It is a right protected by both the Federal and Illinois constitutions. (U.S. Const., amend. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 8; People v. Gonzalez (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 332.) The proposed cross-examination must relate to a proper subject matter; however, the evidence of bias or motive must be direct and positive, not remote and uncertain. People v. Hiller (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 322; People v. Lenard (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1046.\nHere, defendant sought to cross-examine Roberts about whether he gave his girlfriend a check to fill out in connection with the purchase of a car, and whether Roberts\u2019 checking account was overdrawn in April as a result. Defendant\u2019s stated purpose in pursuing that course of questioning was to show that Roberts was reckless in his checking account practices, was a spendthrift, was overextended and, consequently, that his motive in testifying against the defendant was to \u201cboost his account\u201d by the $300 amount of the check allegedly forged by the defendant.\nWe find the trial court properly determined that evidence that the witness\u2019 checking account was overdrawn in April did not allow the inference that Roberts\u2019 schemed to accuse the defendant of forgery in order to relieve himself of a debt owed to the defendant. The $300 check, in fact, was honored by the Bank of Sugar Grove; clearly the witness had sufficient funds in his account at the time of the incident in question to cover the check. If defendant had evidence other than the April overdraft which would have borne more directly on whether the witness had a then-present motive to repudiate his alleged debt to the defendant, he failed to offer it. As it was presented to the trial court, the evidence sought to be admitted was only direct and positive as to the state of the witness\u2019 checking account in April, but was irrelevant as to the state of the account in June, and immaterial to the issue of whether the witness had given the defendant the authority to write the check in June. It is not an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion to exclude speculative and uncertain evidence. People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 933.\nWe note the defendant was allowed to inquire as to the witness\u2019 various sources of income, his expenditures, and his checking account record-keeping and practices. Consequently, a large portion of the image of the witness the defendant hoped to convey to the jury was actually accomplished. In such a case, minor technical errors, if any, in the court\u2019s ruling as to cross-examination cause no prejudice to the defendant. (See People v. Rossini (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 617, 621.) It is well established that claimed error in restricting the scope of cross-examination will rise to the level of reversible error only if the defendant manifestly suffered prejudice as a result of the limitation. (People v. Crosser (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 24, 30.) No manifest prejudice is evident here, and no abuse of the court\u2019s discretion may be said to have occurred.\nDefendant next contends he received an unfair trial because the State \u201copened the door\u201d to evidence of whether the bank had been repaid when it elicited from the defendant on cross-examination the facts that he received cash for the checks, but he did not repay the bank.\nPrior to trial, the court had granted the State\u2019s motion in limine to prohibit the defendant from asking Lloyd Roberts or either of the two banks \u201cas to whether or not they desired to drop criminal charges in this case due to the fact that the defendant\u2019s father repaid the bank the amount of the loss in the case.\u201d\nDefendant argues that once the State brought up the matter of repayment, it \u201copened the door,\u201d and it was error for the court not to allow him to show that his father had made such a repayment.\nThe State asserts the issue was not included in the defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and, therefore, was waived, citing People v. Pallardy (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 725. Defendant counters that the issue was raised in paragraph 4 of his motion for new trial. That paragraph does not, however, raise the issue specifically argued here, but we believe it is nevertheless sufficiently interrelated to merit consideration. The issue raised in the post-trial motion on its face relates to the court\u2019s order prohibiting the defendant from questioning the banks or Roberts about their desire not to testify against the defendant. True, the apparent reason they did not wish to do so was that defendant\u2019s father repaid the loss. Defendant\u2019s argument at trial with regard to the State\u2019s \u201copening the door,\u201d however, was not that he should be allowed to ask the defendant if his father repaid the bank, but that the State\u2019s question had opened the door to the issue that \u201ccertain people involved in this case never wanted to pursue these charges.\u201d The defendant asked the court to reverse its earlier order in limine, find the State had opened the door on the matter, and allow him to call witnesses as to the fact.\nThe argument defendant presents in his brief here, however, is that the door opened by the State left the jury with the impression that the defendant had acted \u201cin bad faith.\u201d Defendant argues that had he been allowed to \u201cshut the door,\u201d so to speak, by evidence that his father had already made repayment, the jury\u2019s impression of his \u201cbad faith\u201d would have been corrected since it would have been clear it was unnecessary for him to make repayment.\nIn People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45, cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1036, 79 L. Ed. 2d 708, 104 S. Ct. 1310, cited by the defendant in support of his argument, the trial court originally suppressed weapons discovered in the course of a search of an apartment of one of the defendants after determining that the search was Ulegal. During trial, defense counsel cross-examined one of the arresting officers concerning whether the defendants and the apartment were searched. The trial judge found that the purpose and effect of the defendant\u2019s cross-examination was to create the clear and unmistakable impression that nothing was recovered in the course of the search and, accordingly, the court allowed the State to rebut the false implication which was created by the defense counsel\u2019s questions.\nThe stated purpose of the prosecutor\u2019s question to the defendant here was to establish that he had the intent to defraud the banks. The prosecutor was not attempting to create a \u201cfalse implication\u201d that the defendant acted in \u201cbad faith,\u201d he was attempting to create the actual implication that the defendant acted in bad faith in that he had the intent to defraud. It is difficult to see how the defendant\u2019s cause would have been aided had he been allowed to explain that his father repaid the money, since such evidence would simply be further contradiction of his defense at trial that he wrote the checks so that Roberts would not have to go back to Sugar Grove to get cash and that Roberts gave him only a portion of the proceeds of each check in payment for work he had done for him. Cf. People v. Bailey (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 18, 25 (defendant\u2019s unsolicited tender of personal checks was found to be an incriminating circumstance inconsistent with a clear conscience).\nWe find no error in the court\u2019s refusal to accede to the extremely broad relief which was requested by the defendant at trial; i.e., to call witnesses to testify they did not wish to press charges against him due to his father\u2019s repayment. We note additionally the jury was indirectly made aware of the likelihood that defendant\u2019s father had repaid the bank.\nDefense counsel, attempting to impeach Chief Lippold\u2019s testimony by reference to the chief\u2019s written report, asked him:\n\u201cQ. [Defense counsel] Did you not write the following words, \u2018Michael explained that his father had agreed \u2014 \u2019\nA. [Chief Lippold] To pay back\u2014\nQ. \u2018 \u2014 to pay the amount of these two checks, $260 dollars,\u2019 and then the sum is written out, \u2018two hundred and sixty dollars to the First Security Bank of Aurora, the bank that cashed these documents.\u2019 Further, the \u2014 well, I\u2019ll leave it at that point, right there. Did you not write that?\nA. I wrote that down, yes I did. Do you want me to explain?\nQ. Mr. Wechter [the prosecutor] will have a chance to question you if you wish to explain anything further.\u201d\nOn redirect, Lippold testified defendant made that statement, but Lippold had no knowledge whether Billy Dowdy agreed or not.\nDefendant\u2019s last contention is that he should be granted a new trial because the court read to the jury the wrong proof of other offenses instruction, even though it had previously accepted his modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (2d ed. 1981). His version provided that evidence that the defendant had been involved in offenses other than that charged in the information was received solely on the issue of defendant\u2019s \u201cdesign\u201d; the refused version tendered by the State provided the evidence was received on the issue of \u201cintent, design and motive.\u201d\nThe State points out, and we agree, that this issue was waived because the defendant did not object at trial or in his post-trial motion. Further, no substantial or plain error is evident since, as the State notes, it appears the correct version of the instruction was tendered in written form to the jury. Although defendant argues the record does not support the State\u2019s assertion in this regard, we note the record contains a copy of each version. The State\u2019s version is clearly marked \u201cRefused\u201d and is stamped \u201cFiled in open court\u201d and dated. A copy of the instruction, which was apparently the defendant\u2019s version, is bound in the record as the last instruction in the series of instructions, although it is unnumbered, unidentified as to the tendering party, is not file-date stamped or marked \u201cGiven.\u201d None of the other instructions in the series were marked \u201cGiven,\u201d either, and none appear to be originals.\nSupreme Court Rule 451(c) (87 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)) provides:\n\u201c(c) Section 2 \u2014 1107 of the Code of Civil Procedure to Govern. Instructions in criminal cases shall be tendered, settled, and given in accordance with section 2 \u2014 1107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but substantial defects are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require.\u201d\nIn turn, section 2 \u2014 1107 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1107) provides in pertinent part that the court shall mark the margin of the original and copy of each instruction with the notation \u201cRefused\u201d or \u201cGiven\u201d and that the original written instruction shall be taken by the jury into the jury room and later returned with its verdict into court. \u201cThe originals and copies of all instructions, whether given, modified or refused, shall be filed as a part of the proceedings in the cause.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 1107(b).) The obvious irregularity and incompleteness of this record is a circumstance which is chargeable to the defendant as appellant, and any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record is resolved against the appellant. People v. Turner (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 519.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLINDBERG and STROUSE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Robert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Patrick Delfino and Marshall Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DOWDY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201483\u20141029\nOpinion filed January 27, 1986.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nRobert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Patrick Delfino and Marshall Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0631-01", "first_page_order": 653, "last_page_order": 661 }