{ "id": 3531724, "name": "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellant, v. JAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Kane County, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellant; HON. JOHN A. KRAUSE, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant; THE ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant-Appellant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellee; THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants-Appellants and Counterdefendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "County of Kane v. Carlson", "decision_date": "1986-02-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 85\u20140228, 85\u20140230 cons.", "first_page": "814", "last_page": "822", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 814" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "327 Ill. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5192400 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/327/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494155 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134941 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155853 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2774874 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809328 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983409 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994664 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3223489 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415144 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436512 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551-52" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494155 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0417-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 810, "char_count": 20718, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.048693744702018e-07, "percentile": 0.5534129595972583 }, "sha256": "f8959866d136234d94e597d86edb137e844b8dad723e1248d897f44de67c7326", "simhash": "1:93623879a08e6e1a", "word_count": 3308 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:30.289204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee and Counterdefendant-CrossAppellant, v. JAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Kane County, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellant; HON. JOHN A. KRAUSE, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant; THE ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant-Appellant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellee; THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants-Appellants and Counterdefendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Kane County (the county), brought an action in the circuit court of Kane County seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (the Board) from proceeding on a petition by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) requesting a representation election for the deputy clerks (deputy circuit clerks) in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Kane County (the circuit clerk). The county\u2019s complaint named the Board, AFSCME and the circuit clerk as defendants, and the chief judge of the circuit court for the sixteenth judicial circuit (the chief judge), which includes Kane County, was subsequently joined as a defendant. The circuit court granted the injunction; the Board and AFSCME appealed; and the circuit clerk cross-appealed.\nThe parties have raised several issues in this appeal. They include whether the injunction was improperly granted because administrative remedies were not exhausted; whether the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider AFSCME\u2019s petition because the deputy circuit clerks were not \u201cpublic employees\u201d under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1601 et seq.); whether, if it is applicable to the deputy circuit clerks, the PLRA violates the separation of powers provision of our State constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1); and whether the circuit clerk is the sole employer of the deputy circuit clerks. We reverse.\nThe application of the exhaustion doctrine to this case will be addressed first as the resolution of that question is determinative of the scope of our review. In cases involving administrative action, a party ordinarily must pursue all administrative remedies available prior to seeking relief in the courts. (Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 551-52.) The reasons for this rule are: \u201c(1) it allows full development of the facts before the agency; (2) it allows the agency an opportunity to utilize its expertise; and (3) the aggrieved party may succeed before the agency, rendering judicial review unnecessary.\u201d (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358.) There are exceptions to the general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, two of which apply in the case at bar.\nOne of these exceptions is that administrative remedies need not be exhausted where a party attacks an agency\u2019s assertion of jurisdiction \u201con its face and in its entirety on the ground that it is not authorized by statute.\u201d (Cable Television Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 814, 817, 403 N.E.2d 287, 289, quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 541, 551.) In the instant case, the issue raised with respect to whether deputy circuit clerks are \u201cpublic employees\u201d under the PLRA is such an attack on the Board\u2019s assertion of jurisdiction and so must be decided.\nThe other exception is applicable to certain kinds of attacks on the constitutionality of a statute. Courts of this State have formulated this exception in various ways. Some have said that it applies where a statute \u201cis attacked as unconstitutional in its entirety\u201d (see, e.g., Graham v. Illinois Racing Board (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 566, 573) while others have said that it applies where a statute is attacked as unconstitutional in its terms (see, e.g., Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 552) or on its face (see, e.g., Bio-Medical Labo ratories, Inc. v. Trainor (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548) as opposed to in its application. The latter formulations seem to more accurately reflect the scope of the exception, since the reason an attack on the constitutionality of a statute as applied must be made before an administrative agency in the first instance is that \u201c[i]n such cases the validity or invalidity depends almost wholly upon a determination of factual matters in which the specialized agency is though to be more proficient.\u201d (Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 493, 495.) In the case at bar, the attack on the constitutionality of the PLRA will be considered only insofar as it concerns the validity of the statute on its face rather than in its application.\nHaving determined the scope of review in this case, it is next necessary to determine whether the PLRA gives the Board jurisdiction in labor matters concerning deputy circuit clerks. The circuit court held that it does not. It is appropriate to consider this question at this juncture since, as the circuit court recognized, a holding that the PLRA does not grant jurisdiction to the Board would make it unnecessary to decide the constitutional question.\nThe question of the Board\u2019s jurisdiction in this case turns on whether deputy circuit clerks are \u201cpublic employees\u201d under the PLRA. The PLRA defines \u201cpublic employee\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Public employee\u2019 or \u2018employee,\u2019 for the purposes of this Act, means any individual employed by a public employer, including interns and residents at public hospitals, but excluding all of the following: elected officials; executive heads of a department; members of boards or commissions; employees of any agency, board or commission created by this statute; non-State peace officers; all peace officers in the State Department of Law Enforcement; non-State firefighters and paramedics employed by fire departments and fire protection districts; employees appointed to State positions of a temporary or emergency nature; all employees of school districts and higher education institutions; managerial employees; short-term employees; confidential employees; independent contractors; and supervisors except as provided in this Act.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(m).)\nNone of the specified exceptions seems to apply to deputy circuit clerks and, indeed, the parties do not claim that any does. Rather, the county contends deputy circuit clerks are \u201cappointees\u201d rather than \u201cemployees,\u201d and both the county and the chief judge contend deputy circuit clerks do not work for a \u201cpublic employer.\u201d\nThe county\u2019s claim that \u201cappointees\u201d are not \u201cemployees\u201d for purposes of the PLRA is without support in the statute. In fact, the legislature expressly excluded from the definition of public employee \u201cemployees appointed to State positions of a temporary or emergency nature.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(m).) The quoted language demonstrates that the legislature intended the term \u201cemployee\u201d to include persons appointed to positions. Indeed, to interpret the statute as generally not including appointees would render the quoted exclusion superfluous. Accordingly, it is apparent that the legislature intended the PLRA to apply to persons holding positions to which they were appointed unless the positions fall within one of the specific exclusions set forth in the statute.\nThe chief judge and the county also contend that the PLRA does not apply because the deputy circuit clerks are not employed by a \u201cpublic employer.\u201d The PLRA provides:\n\u201c \u2018Public employer\u2019 or \u2018employer\u2019 means the State of Illinois; any political subdivision of the State, unit of local government or school district; authorities including departments, divisions, bureaus, boards, commissions or other agencies of the foregoing entities; and any person acting with the scope of his or her authority, express or implied on behalf of such entities in dealing with its employees; provided, however, that the term \u2018Public employer\u2019 or \u2018employer\u2019 as used in this Act does not mean and shall not include educational employers or employers as defined in the \u2018Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act\u2019 enacted by the 83rd General Assembly as now or hereafter amended.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(n).)\nFrom the proceedings below, it appears that three entities claim to be the employer of the deputy circuit clerks: the county, the circuit clerk, and the chief judge. The county is clearly a \u201c[unit] of local government\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 1) and so, if the employer of the deputy circuit clerks, would be a \u201cpublic employer\u201d for purposes of the PLRA. The chief judge is a member of the judicial branch, and the circuit clerk is a nonjudicial officer of the judicial branch of the government of the State of Illinois (Ill. Const., art. VI, secs. 7 and 18). The deputy circuit clerks are also nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of this State\u2019s government. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 18; 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2290-91 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings); 6 Proceedings 1061.) Under these circumstances, the offices of the chief judge and the circuit clerk can only be deemed to be authorities of the State of Illinois and the chief judge and circuit clerk, insofar as they act as employers in their official capacities, are \u201cperson[s] acting within the scope of [their] authority *** on behalf of *** [authorities of the State of Illinois] in dealing with its employees.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(n); see Ellis v. Board of Governors (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 387, 391-94 (Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities held to be the State for purposes of sovereign immunity).) Therefore, to the extent that the chief judge or the circuit clerk may be employers of the deputy circuit clerks, they are public employers and the deputy circuit clerks public employees under the PLRA. We do not express any view as to whether there may be multiple employers under the PLRA nor as to what entity or entities employ the deputy circuit clerks because those questions should be addressed first in proceedings before the Board.\nThe limited constitutional question presented by this case in its current procedural posture must now be addressed. The argument in this regard is that the provisions of the PLRA requiring collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment and a grievance procedure in collective bargaining agreements constitute, where deputy circuit clerks are the employees, an overly burdensome infringement on the powers of the judicial branch of State government and the PLRA thus violates the separation of powers provision of this State\u2019s constitution. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, pars. 1602, 1604, 1607, 1608; Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1.\nWith respect to the wages of the deputy circuit clerks, the constitution specifically authorizes action by the General Assembly. The constitution provides:\n\u201cThe salaries of clerks and other non-judicial officers shall be as provided by law.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 18(c).)\nAs noted earlier, deputy circuit clerks are nonjudicial officers within the meaning of section 18 of article VI of the constitution. The requirement that the salaries be \u201cas provided by law\u201d means that they are to be set by the General Assembly via the lawmaking process. (Quinn v. Donnewald (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 179, 186-87.) This requirement may be satisfied in various ways. For instance, the legislature may properly require the counties to pay for the salaries and expenses of circuit clerks (Drury v. County of McLean (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 417, 425), or it may establish a board whose salary recommendations go into effect so long as they are not disapproved by both houses of the General Assembly (Quinn v. Donnewald (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 179). There would appear to be no constitutional impediment to the legislature\u2019s providing by law that deputy circuit clerks\u2019 salaries be determined by a process including collective bargaining. We also note that the General Assembly has specific authority to act with respect to a portion of the other conditions of the deputy circuit clerks\u2019 employment, as the constitution says:\n\u201cThe General Assembly shall provide by law for the election, or for the appointment by Circuit Judges, of clerks and other non-judicial officers of the Circuit Courts and for their terms of office and removal for cause.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 18(b).)\nAt the very least, in those areas where the constitution specifically grants the legislature authority to provide by law, the general proscription of the separation of powers provision has no application.\nThere are, of course, other aspects of labor relations with the deputy circuit clerks, aspects the constitution does not state the General Assembly is to provide for by law. With respect to these aspects, certain limitations contained in the statute are significant. A public employer\u2019s obligation to bargain collectively does not compel the employer \u201cto agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1607.) More significantly:\n\u201cThe duty \u2018to bargain collectively\u2019 shall also include an obligation to negotiate over any matter with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law. If any other law pertains, in part, to a matter affecting the wages, hours and other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be construed as limiting the duty \u2018to bargain collectively\u2019 and to enter into collective bargaining agreements containing clauses which either supplement, implement, or relate to the effect of such provisions in other laws.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1607.)\nThe constitution is law \u2014 the supreme law \u2014 of this State. (People ex rel. Miller v. Hotz (1927), 327 Ill. 433, 437. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1607 (PLRA duty to bargain collectively includes \u201cobligation to negotiate over any matter with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law\u201d) with Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1710(b) (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act section on the duty to bargain collectively provides in part that \u201c[t]he parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Illinois\u201d).) (Emphasis added.) The duty to bargain collectively under the PLRA then specifically excludes those areas concerning wages, hours and other conditions of employment where such bargaining would violate another law, including the separation of powers provision of the constitution. Consequently, the provisions of the PLRA requiring collective bargaining do not, on their face, violate the constitution.\nInsofar as the grievance procedure provision of the PLRA (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1608) is concerned, it is possible that a collective bargaining agreement with the deputy circuit clerks will not include a grievance procedure since the parties may mutually agree not to have one. Moreover, even if a grievance procedure were included in an agreement, it is impossible to know at this juncture the nature of those provisions. Since there may not be a grievance procedure in the agreement and we do not know what such a procedure will require if there should be one, we believe it inappropriate to pass on the constitutional question raised with respect to the grievance procedure provision of the PLRA.\nWe conclude that the PLRA is valid on its face and that any constitutional separation of powers defect in the statute will only occur in its application. We express no view on whether, and to what extent, the separation of powers provision of the constitution may limit the application of the PLRA where deputy circuit clerks are the employees involved.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed and the injunction is dissolved. On the court\u2019s own motion, three justices concurring therein, this cause is certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 316 (87 Ill. 2d R. 316) and article VI, section 4, of our constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(c)) as involving questions of such importance that they should be decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois.\nReversed.\nHOPE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINDBERG" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent, in part, from the opinion of the court. While I agree that deputy circuit clerks are \u201cpublic employees\u201d within the context of the PLRA, I do not agree with the apparent conclusion of the majority that the chief judge or circuit clerk are necessarily \u201cpublic employers,\u201d as defined in the Act, and subject to its proscriptions. I also do not consider that the chief judge or circuit clerk \u201ccan only be deemed as authorities of the State of Illinois,\u201d within the context of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(n)) nor that only those offices and the county may be designated as the public employers of deputy circuit clerks.\nDeputy clerks are patently public employees and are appointed by and work for the circuit clerk, who is a nonjudicial member of the judicial branch of State government. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 18; Drury v. County of McLean (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 417, 424.) In my view, the deputy clerks are thus employees of the State of Illinois, or a political subdivision of the State, requiring that the judicial branch be considered as their \u201cpublic employer\u201d within the meaning of section 1603(n) of the Act.\nOur constitution provides a certain degree of separation between the three branches of State government, stating:\n\u201cThe legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1.)\nThe constitution further mandates that:\n\u201cGeneral administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 16.)\nand that general administrative authority of a chief judge over his court is subject to the authority of the Supreme Court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 7(c).\nOur supreme court may ultimately choose to exercise its constitutional authority over the administration of the circuit court in this matter should the State Labor Relations Board designate as \u201cpublic employer\u201d an entity which the court deems inappropriate to the effective administration of the judicial function. This court should not here suggest that the chief judge or circuit clerk may be properly designated by the State Labor Relations Board as public employers of the deputy circuit clerks and thus be subject to the direction and sanctions of the Board in employment matters. It seems particularly inappropriate that a chief judge be so enmeshed in these nonjudicial functions, which provide for contempt and injunctive proceedings against a public employer, at the request of the board, in the court which he administers. As noted in the majority opinion, this matter will be addressed by the Board and then it may be determined whether, as applied, the PLRA conforms to the separation of powers standards of the Illinois Constitution.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert W. Cushing, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois State Labor Relations Board.", "Wendell W. Clancy and John J. Hoscheit, both of Clancy, McGuirk & Hulee, of St. Charles, for appellant Jan Carlson.", "Gilbert A. Cornfield, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for other appellants.", "Robert Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (David R. Akemann and William F. Barrett, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee County of Kane.", "Gerald M. Sheridan, Jr., of Wheaton, and Robert F. Casey, of Casey, Krippner & Callahan, of Geneva, for appellee John A. Krause." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee and Counterdefendant-CrossAppellant, v. JAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Kane County, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellant; HON. JOHN A. KRAUSE, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant; THE ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant-Appellant and Counterdefendant-Cross-Appellee; THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants-Appellants and Counterdefendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNos. 85\u20140228, 85\u20140230 cons.\nOpinion filed February 7, 1986.\nNASH, P.J., dissenting.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert W. Cushing, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois State Labor Relations Board.\nWendell W. Clancy and John J. Hoscheit, both of Clancy, McGuirk & Hulee, of St. Charles, for appellant Jan Carlson.\nGilbert A. Cornfield, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for other appellants.\nRobert Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (David R. Akemann and William F. Barrett, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee County of Kane.\nGerald M. Sheridan, Jr., of Wheaton, and Robert F. Casey, of Casey, Krippner & Callahan, of Geneva, for appellee John A. Krause." }, "file_name": "0814-01", "first_page_order": 836, "last_page_order": 844 }