{ "id": 3531448, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES ARNHOLD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Arnhold", "decision_date": "1986-01-31", "docket_number": "No. 81\u20140381", "first_page": "840", "last_page": "848", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 840" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5642285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173132 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168184 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904822 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934870 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414551 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105923 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "987-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3412075 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 U.S. 507", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6143405 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/266/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 Ill. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2599904 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/360/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098641 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3124135 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2697183 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3279111 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3412075 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098641 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3124135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2697183 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525801 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "551-52" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0548-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 782, "char_count": 19114, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.39291808132443246 }, "sha256": "e6ab4e36b0f7daa5f11d69e2b7699b45db9a73dc4e9d18421a1959de9cedd544", "simhash": "1:62e1951eee0be322", "word_count": 3184 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:30.289204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES ARNHOLD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Charles Arnhold, and four codefendants were found guilty of aggravated kidnaping and conspiracy to commit theft by a jury following a trial in the circuit court of Du Page County. Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent 28- and 2-year terms of imprisonment for these offenses and was also ordered to pay a $5,000 fine for the aggravated kidnaping. Defendant appeals arguing that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to examine handwriting exhibits during deliberations when the exhibits had not previously been examined by the jury in open court, and (3) the trial court erred in permitting testimony about a photographic identification of defendant conducted while defendant was in custody and a lineup was feasible. We affirm.\nThis court has already reviewed, and affirmed, the convictions of defendant\u2019s four codefendants. Codefendant John Bella\u2019s conviction was affirmed in a published opinion which sets forth the facts on which the convictions were based. (People v. Bolla (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 442, 448 N.E.2d 996.) For purposes of this appeal, it suffices to note that Edward Kvavli, a wealthy restaurante\u2122- and tavern owner, was abducted on May 29, 1980, and held for $600,000 ransom. Kvavli was released the next day on the understanding that he would raise, and pay to his abductors $600,000 or they would kill Kvavli, Kvavli\u2019s sister and Kvavli\u2019s nephew. Defendant and his four codefendants were arrested a few days later after the completion of a previously arranged drop of the money the abductors were demanding.\nDefendant first argues that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5.) Defendant was arrested on the charges at bar on June 3, 1980, and bonded out on July 18, 1980. He was arrested on unrelated charges on July 24, 1980, and withdrew his bond for the initial charges on August 21, 1980. On October 15, 1980, defendant filed several motions which tolled the speedy trial term.\nFor defendant to prevail on his claim, three periods of time must be included in computing the statutory term: (1) the period from defendant\u2019s initial arrest on June 3 to his bonding out on July 18; (2) the period from defendant\u2019s July 24 arrest on unrelated charges to his withdrawal of his bond for the initial charges on August 21; and (3) the period from defendant\u2019s withdrawal of his bond to his October 15 filing of his motions. The State argues that the first of these three periods should be excluded and at oral argument urged this court to overrule our then recent decision in People v. Sonntag (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, 470 N.E.2d 631, which is adverse to the State\u2019s argument. It will be unnecessary to reconsider Sonntag as the State urges, however, because the second period necessary to defendant\u2019s claim must be excluded from computation of the term.\nThe pertinent provisions of the Speedy Trial Act provide:\n\u201c(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by defendant ***.\n* * *\n(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Section.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 103 \u2014 5(a) and (e).)\nThe dispositive question in the case at bar is whether a defendant on bond on one charge who is taken into custody on a second charge is, without more, also in custody on the first charge. There is a split of appellate court authority on this question. (People v. Day (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 571, 583, 394 N.E.2d 1378, 1388.) One line of authority holds that when a defendant on bond on one charge is taken into custody on a second charge he is automatically simultaneously in custody on both charges. (See, e.g., People v. Wilson (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 466, 468, 311 N.E.2d 759, 761; see also People v. Brown (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 609, 418 N.E.2d 1093, aff\u2019d on other grounds (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, 255 (the question at bar apparently was not raised in the supreme court as that court said the appellate court\u2019s conclusion on that matter \u201cis not here in dispute\u201d); and Heaney v. Northeast Park District (1935), 360 Ill. 254, 260 (\u201cA decision by a court of review is not an authority upon a question neither considered nor decided by it. [Citations.] *** questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents ***\u201d), quoting with approval Webster v. Fall (1925), 266 U.S. 507, 69 L. Ed. 411, 45 S. Ct. 148.) The other line of authority holds to the contrary. People v. Cooper (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 354, 355-58, 371 N.E.2d 987, 987-89.\nWe choose to follow Cooper because it is more in harmony with the Speedy Trial Act\u2019s overall structure than cases such as Wilson and Brown. The Speedy Trial Act is characterized by a sharp distinction between defendants who are in custody and those who are on bail. The State is required to bring a defendant who is in custody to trial within 120 days from the date on which he was taken into custody. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a).) In contrast, a defendant on bail must be tried within 160 days from the date on which he demands trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(b).) To construe the phrase \u201csimultaneously in custody on more than one charge\u201d to encompass a situation where a defendant is in custody on one charge but still on bond on another would do violence to a statutory scheme which carefully and sharply distinguishes between defendants in custody and those on bond.\nDefendant was thus not in custody on the charges at bar for the period between his July 24 arrest on unrelated charges and his August 21 withdrawal of his bond for the charges at bar. This period, accordingly, must be excluded in computing the 120 day term. This is dispositive of the issue raised because the other two periods combined total less than 120 days. This being true, it is unnecessary to address the State\u2019s argument that the first period of custody should be excluded from the computation of the term.\nDefendant next argues that \u201c[t]he trial court erred in allowing handwriting exhibits to be examined by the jury without first allowing such examination in open court.\u201d The allegation closest to this assertion of error in defendant\u2019s post-trial motions was that \u201c[t]he Court erred in allowing handwriting exhibits of both known and questioned handwriting [sic] documents to be examined by the jury \u2014 although a handwriting expert had already testified as to his analysis.\u201d This claim that the jury should not have been given the exhibits because the expert had already given his opinion is quite different from the claim on appeal that the jury should not have been given the exhibits during deliberations because they had not examined them previously in open court. The issue raised has therefore been waived by defendant\u2019s failure to raise it in his post-trial motions. People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 282.\nMoreover, the claimed error is not cognizable as plain error. (87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) The plain error rule permits a reviewing court, as a matter of grace in a criminal case, to consider unpreserved errors which deprived a defendant of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial or which occurred in a case in which the evidence was closely balanced. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 283.) A six-page handwritten note was found when defendant was searched at the time of his arrest. The note detailed a plan to kidnap Kvavli. The writing on the note was compared by handwriting expert Joseph Wichmann to liquor license applications which, the evidence indicated, had been filled out by codefendant Leo Bonvini. Wichmann was of the opinion that the same person who wrote the note had completed the applications. Defendant does not argue that the exhibits or Wichmann\u2019s testimony were inadmissible nor even that the exhibits could not have been shown to the jury under any circumstances. Rather, he makes the limited claim that the jury should have been shown the exhibits first in open court. Such an error could not have deprived defendant of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial. Also, the evidence at trial \u2014 including the evidence defendant had possessed the note, the evidence with respect to Kvavli\u2019s out-of-court photographic lineup identification of defendant and Kvavli\u2019s in-court identification of defendant while defendant was seated among spectators in the courtroom \u2014 was not so closely balanced that the mere linkage of the note to Bonvini, which was all the handwriting evidence did, could have prejudiced defendant. The issue therefore will not be reviewed as plain error.\nDefendant\u2019s third and final argument is that Kvavli\u2019s identification of defendant from a photographic lineup should have been suppressed because defendant was in custody and a lineup was otherwise feasible. Although the Illinois Supreme Court does not appear to have reversed any convictions solely on that basis, that court has often held that, when a suspect is in custody and a corporeal lineup is otherwise feasible, photographic identification techniques should not be used absent extenuating circumstances. (People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 471; People v. Williams (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 1, 9; People v. Jackson (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 143, 147-48; People v. Holiday (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 300, 306-07.) However, a violation of this rule will not result in reversal of a conviction where the witness who made the improper photographic identification also makes a reliable in-court identification. See People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437.\nIn the case at bar, Kvavli identified defendant first at a corporeal lineup; however, this identification was suppressed because defendant\u2019s right to the presence of counsel was violated. (United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, 87 S. Ct. 1951; Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 92 S. Ct. 1877.) Kvavli subsequently identified a photograph of defendant-showing the appearance of defendant\u2019s facial and head hair at the time of his arrest rather than their different appearance at the time of corporeal lineup \u2014 from a photographic lineup. Finally, after the court permitted defendant to be seated among spectators for purposes of Kvavli\u2019s in-court identification, Kvavli again identified defendant.\nThe only suggestiveness defendant claims may have undermined the reliability of Kvavli\u2019s in-court identification is the repeated showing of defendant to Kvavli in the various identification procedures. This, without more, is insufficient to so undermine the reliability of the in-court identification as to make it inadmissible. (See People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437 (in-court identification admissible after two photographic identifications, one of which was improper, had been made); People v. Moore (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 952, 365 N.E.2d 1356.) Consequently, even if the photographic identification in the case at bar was improper, reversal would not be warranted because Kvavli also made a reliable in-court identification.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nUNVERZAGT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINDBERG" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STROUSE,\ndissenting:\nI must respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues. They have determined that our recent decision in People v. Sonntag (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, is irrelevant to a disposition of this case, and I disagree. Even the State, during oral argument, admitted that it could not prevail in the present case unless we reconsidered and overturned Sonntag.\nIn Sonntag, this court addressed a question similar to that raised here. The issue in Sonntag was whether a defendant may combine two separate periods of incarceration, interspersed by defendant\u2019s release on bond and termination of bond by violation of its conditions, arising out of the same initial charge in computing the 120-day period. (People v. Sonntag (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, 553.) In Sonntag, defendant was charged with and incarcerated for aggravated battery and other misdemeanor offenses. He filed a petition to raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial, and the court granted a hearing on it. He was subsequently released on a recognizance bond, with certain conditions imposed, and, upon violating one of the conditions, his bond was revoked and he was incarcerated until his trial. In computing the days he spent in custody, defendant combined the two periods of incarceration, both before being released on bond and after his bond was terminated. 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551-52.\nThe State in Sonntag argued, as here, that section 103 \u2014 5(a), pertaining to trial for persons in custody, contemplates a continuous period of 120 days\u2019 incarceration from the date defendant was originally taken into custody. It argued that defendant\u2019s release on bond terminated the running of the 120-day term. People v. Sonntag (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, 552.\nThe Sonntag court rejected the State\u2019s argument that a continuous period of incarceration is required under section 103 \u2014 5(a), stating:\n\u201cThe 120-day period prescribed in section 103 \u2014 5(a) commences to run on the date defendant is in custody for the offense for which discharge is sought. [Citation.] Although defendant was released on a recognizance bond for a period of time until that bond was terminated by the court for failure to comply with its conditions, we believe that the delay in trial occasioned by defendant by his release from custody should only temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the time within which he should be tried. *** Thus, under the particular circumstances present here, we conclude that the defendant may combine two separate periods of incarceration in determining whether he has been in custody in violation of the 120-day statutory period prescribed in section 103 \u2014 5(a).\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Sonntag (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 548, 554.\nI recognize that the two periods of incarceration in Sonntag arose out of the same initial charge when defendant\u2019s bond was terminated because of violation of the bond conditions, whereas, in the present case, defendant\u2019s second period of incarceration was a result of his arrest on unrelated charges. In my opinion, the Sonntag rationale applies to the facts of the present case, and no distinction should be made on the basis that defendant\u2019s second incarceration was for unrelated charges. Accordingly, I would combine defendant\u2019s two separate periods of incarceration in determining whether his right to a speedy trial has been violated.\nThe next question is whether defendant was \u201cin custody\u201d for the present charges between July 24, the date he was arrested and incarcerated on unrelated charges, and August 21, the date he voluntarily withdrew his bond on the initial charges. Defendant contends he was \u201csimultaneously in custody\u201d on more than one charge, pursuant to section 103 \u2014 5(e) of the Speedy Trial Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(e)) during this 28-day period after his arrest on the second charges and before withdrawal of his bond on the first charges.\nDefendant cites People v. Brown (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 609, aff\u2019d (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, and People v. Wilson (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 466, in support of his position. In both Brown and Wilson, the defendant was arrested and incarcerated on the initial charges, later released on bond, and, during that time, reincarcerated on unrelated charges. In both cases, defendant\u2019s bond on the initial charges remained in effect during the second period of incarceration. The appellate court in Brown addressed the question of the irreconcilability of People v. Wilson (1974), 19 Ill. App 3d 466, and People v. Cooper (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 354, as to the interpretation of \u201csimultaneously in custody upon more than one charge\u201d when defendant is technically on bond for one of the charges. The Brown court, in a well-reasoned opinion, rejected the reasoning of Cooper and instead adopted the following language from Wilson:\n\u201cThe fact that the defendant is technically on bond for one of the charges should not defeat the purpose of [section 103\u2014 5(e)]. *** [W]e hold that, when a defendant is simultaneously charged with more than one offense and when he is in custody, he is \u2018simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge\u2019 within the meaning of subsection (e).\u201d People v. Wilson (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 466, 468, see People v. Brown (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 609, 614, aff\u2019d (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, 255.\nIn affirming People v. Brown, our supreme court stated that the question at bar \u201cis not here in dispute.\u201d It is clear from the facts in Brown, however, that the supreme court could not have reached its decision without implicitly approving the rationale of the appellate court in adopting the Wilson reasoning rather than that of Cooper. I interpret this as an implicit rejection of the Cooper reasoning.\nIn my opinion, defendant was \u201csimultaneously in custody\u201d within the meaning of section 103 \u2014 5(e) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(e)) between the date of his incarceration on the subsequent unrelated charges (July 24) and the date he voluntarily withdrew his bond on the initial charges (August 21). I would include this 28-day period in computing the total number of days defendant was in custody prior to trial.\nIn sum, I would calculate defendant\u2019s time in custody as follows. Defendant was initially incarcerated for 45 days, from June 3, 1980, to July 18, 1980, when he was released on bond. He was in custody another 83 days, from his incarceration on unrelated charges on July 24, 1980, to his filing of various motions on October 15, 1980. Since the total time in custody was 128 days, in excess of the 120-day statutory term, I would conclude that defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial has been violated and that the statute requires his discharge without remand.\nAccordingly, I would reverse defendant\u2019s conviction.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STROUSE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charmaine Tellefsen, of Carponelli, Krug, Adamski & Goodstein, of Chicago, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES ARNHOLD, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 81\u20140381\nOpinion filed January 31, 1986.\nSTROUSE, J., dissenting.\nCharmaine Tellefsen, of Carponelli, Krug, Adamski & Goodstein, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0840-01", "first_page_order": 862, "last_page_order": 870 }