{ "id": 3496328, "name": "GEORGE MEADOWS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT U-46, COUNTIES OF KANE, DuPAGE and COOK, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Meadows v. School District U-46", "decision_date": "1986-02-27", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20140039", "first_page": "335", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 335" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290333 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 2d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588383 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2805533 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 F.2d 949", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1861907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/707/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599812 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "471-73" }, { "page": "473-74" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "474-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2547553 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0269-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 685, "char_count": 17822, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1863928032648026e-07, "percentile": 0.5903469661744758 }, "sha256": "51652d15169677e3fd84cf3374a1e679d7d39e5d90e24f8e1195da6c74f970f7", "simhash": "1:4eaf836ea243a6d6", "word_count": 2896 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:34.513048+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE MEADOWS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT U-46, COUNTIES OF KANE, DuPAGE and COOK, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STROUSE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a writ of mandamus of the circuit court of Kane County which compelled defendants to follow certain procedures of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 1 \u2014 1 et seq.) with regard to the transfer of plaintiff from his administrative position to a teaching position.\nPlaintiff, George Meadows, is a certified employee of School District U-46. Prior to a reclassification by defendants, the board of education of School District U-46 and its members (hereinafter collectively referred to as the board or defendants), plaintiff had been assigned as a principal with the school district since 1964. On March 31, 1984, the board notified plaintiff of its intent to reclassify him as a teacher, and offered him private and public hearings before the board pursuant to section 10 \u2014 23.8b of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 10 \u2014 23.8b) relating to reclassification of principals. Plaintiff\u2019s reclassification would result in a reduction in salary based on the new position. Plaintiff was serving as principal at that time under a single-year contract.\nPlaintiff requested and received a private hearing before the board on May 14, 1984, after which the board affirmed its intention to proceed with the reclassification. Plaintiff, however, demanded that he be furnished specific charges, a bill of particulars, and a hearing before a disinterested hearing officer, all pursuant to section 24 \u2014 12 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 12) relating to tenured teacher dismissal. The board refused this demand on the basis that section 10 \u2014 23.8b, and not section 24 \u2014 12, is the exclusive remedy for a principal in cases of reclassification and reduction in salary, and scheduled plaintiffs section 10 \u2014 23.8b public hearing for June 21, 1984.\nOn June 15, 1984, plaintiff initiated this action by filing in the circuit court of Kane County a complaint seeking a judgment of mandamus requiring defendants to follow the procedures of section 24 \u2014 12 and an injunction restraining them from conducting the June 21 hearing and taking other actions relating to the reclassification, pending a section 24 \u2014 12 hearing. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted as to the prayer for injunctive relief but denied as to the prayer for mandamus. After defendants answered, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 11, 1984, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants and ordered defendants to follow the procedures of sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12. On January 8, 1984, defendants filed their notice of appeal praying that the order of December 11 be reversed.\nDefendants\u2019 sole contention on appeal is that section 10 \u2014 23.8b of the School Code is the only statute applicable to plaintiff\u2019s reclassification and, thus, the trial court erred in ordering them to comply with the procedures of sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12. Plaintiff\u2019s position is that, because he is a certified employee of the school district, he is entitled to have the issues of demotion and reduction of his salary heard by an impartial hearing officer, as mandated by sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24-12.\nSection 10 \u2014 23.8b of the School Code provides procedural protections for principals reclassified in position by demotion or reduction in rank with a commensurate salary reduction. The statute states:\n\u201cSec. 10 \u2014 23.8b. Reclassification of principals. No principal who has completed 2 or more years of administrative service in the school district may be reclassified by demotion or reduction in rank from one position within a school district to another for which a lower salary is paid without written notice from the board of the proposed reclassification by April 1 of the year in which the contract expires.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this notice, the principal may request and receive a private hearing with the board to discuss the reasons for the reclassification. If the principal is not satisfied with the results of the private hearing, he may, within 5 days thereafter, request and receive a public hearing on the reclassification. Any principal may be represented by counsel at a private or public hearing conducted under this Section.\nIf the board decides to proceed with the reclassification, it shall give the principal written notice of its decision within 15 days of the private hearing or within 15 days of the public hearing held under this Section, whichever is later. The decision of the board thereupon becomes final.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 10 \u2014 23.8b.)\nThis provision was added to the School Code in 1975.\nSections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 of the School Code provide for the removal or dismissal of teachers in contractual continued service (tenure). The term \u201cteacher\u201d is defined as \u201cany or all school district employees regularly required to be certified under laws relating to the certification of teachers\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 11), and the term includes, inter alia, superintendents and principals (Lester v. Board of Education (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 269, 279-80). Section 24 \u2014 11 also defines the power of the school board as follows:\n\u201cThis Section and succeeding Sections do not modify any existing power of the board except with respect to the procedure of the discharge of a teacher and reductions in salary as hereinafter provided. Contractual continued service status shall not restrict the power of the board to transfer a teacher to a position which the teacher is qualified to fill or to make such salary adjustments as it deems desirable, but unless reductions in salary are uniform or based upon some reasonable classification, any teacher whose salary is reduced shall be entitled to a notice and a hearing as hereinafter provided in the case of certain dismissals or removals.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 24\u2014 11.)\nSection 24 \u2014 12 contains the actual procedures for removing or dismissing a tenured teacher. It provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cIf a dismissal or removal is sought for any other reason or cause, including those under Section 10 \u2014 22.4, the board must first approve a motion containing specific charges by a majority vote of all its members. Unless the teacher within 20 days requests in writing of the board that no hearing be scheduled, the board shall schedule a hearing on those charges before a disinterested hearing officer on a date no less than 30 nor more than 60 days after the enactment of the motion. Written notice of such charges shall be served upon the teacher at least 21 days before the hearing date. Such notice shall contain a bill of particulars. The secretary of the school board shall forward a copy of the notice to the State Board of Education. Within 10 days after receiving this notice of hearing, the State Board of Education shall provide a list of 5 prospective, impartial hearing officers. *** The Board and the teacher or their legal representatives within 5 days shall alternately strike one name from the list until only one name remains. The teacher shall have the right to proceed first with the striking. The State Board of Education shall promulgate uniform standards and rules of procedure for such hearings. *** The hearing officer shall hold a hearing and render a final decision. The hearing shall be public at the request of either the teacher or the board. The teacher has the privilege of being present at the hearing with counsel and of cross-examining witnesses and may offer evidence and witnesses and present defenses to the charges.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 12.)\nSections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 were enacted with the School Code in 1961.\nIn the present case, plaintiff is a certified employee of the school district and has been employed by the district since 1956; since 1964, he has been employed as a principal, but never under a multiyear contract. At the time the board notified plaintiff of its intent to reclassify him as a teacher, he was serving as principal under a single-year contract.\nThe issue before this court is whether the board is required to comply with the procedures set forth in section 10 \u2014 23.8b for reclassification of principals or, instead, the procedures set forth in sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 for removal or dismissal of tenured teachers. The primary distinction between the two procedures is that section 10\u2014 23.8b mandates a \u201cpublic hearing\u201d before the school board on the reclassification, whereas section 24 \u2014 12 provides for \u201ca hearing *** before a disinterested hearing officer.\u201d\nSections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 are in direct conflict with section 10\u2014 23.8b. Each mandates procedures inconsistent with the other for an instance such as the present case, where a principal with two or more years of administrative experience is reclassified to a lower position for which a lower salary is paid.\nPlaintiff\u2019s position with regard to this alleged inconsistency is that section 10 \u2014 23.8b applies only to principals serving under multiyear contracts. Plaintiff cites section 10 \u2014 23.8a, which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cBy accepting the terms of a multi-year contract, the principal waives all rights granted him under Sections 24 \u2014 11 through 24 \u2014 16 of this Act for the duration of his employment as principal in the district.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 10 \u2014 23.8a.)\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument is that since he did not have a multiyear contract, he clearly retains and has not waived his due process rights granted in sections 24 \u2014 11 through 24 \u2014 16. Plaintiff attempts to link section 10 \u2014 23.8b to section 10 \u2014 23.8a, and implies that the two sections similarly apply only to principals under multiyear contracts.\nThis reading of the statute is not supported by the plain language of sections 10 \u2014 23.8a and 10 \u2014 23.8b. First, it should be noted that the two sections are not merely subparagraphs of one paragraph relating to principals under multiyear contracts. The two sections are codified as separate statutes, and they were enacted separately and became effective in separate years. Second, the focuses of the two sections are disparate, as indicated by their titles; section 10 \u2014 23.8a is entitled \u201cPrincipal under multi-year contract\u201d whereas section 10 \u2014 23.8b is entitled \u201cReclassification of principals.\u201d Third, by its own language, section 10 \u2014 23.8b is not restricted to principals under multiyear contracts, but instead applies to any \u201cprincipal who has completed two or more years of administrative service in the school district.\u201d Clearly, section 10 \u2014 23.8b is not limited to principals with multiyear contracts.\nA recent decision of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, provides some guidance on the issue before this court in the present case. In Swanson, plaintiff was a principal for over two years who had been reclassified and assigned to a teaching position with a concomitant reduction in salary. Pursuant to section 10 \u2014 23.8b of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 10 \u2014 23.8b), plaintiff requested and received both a private hearing and a public hearing. At the public hearing, the school board\u2019s attorney read the reasons for the board\u2019s decision to reclassify plaintiff, and plaintiff testified, contradicting the reasons stated for his reclassification. Plaintiff then called the superintendent of schools as a witness, but, over plaintiff\u2019s objection, the board refused to allow plaintiff to directly examine or cross-examine him. Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 468-69.\nPlaintiff argued before the circuit court that the public hearing was inadequate because plaintiff was denied the opportunity to examine the board and the superintendent on the factual basis of their decision. The circuit court agreed, holding that the board failed to comply with section 10 \u2014 23.8b and ordered the board to conduct another public hearing. Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 469.\nThe primary issue raised on appeal was whether a \u201cpublic hearing\u201d as mandated by section 10 \u2014 23.8b means an \u201cevidentiary hearing,\u201d as argued by plaintiff, or whether it means an \u201copportunity to be heard in a public forum,\u201d as argued by the school board. The appellate court extensively reviewed the legislative history of section 10-23.8b (Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 471-73) and concluded that the legislature intended the term \u201cpublic hearing\u201d to mean nothing more than an opportunity to be heard in a public forum.\nThe Swanson court further noted that section 10 \u2014 23.8b provides procedural safeguards not previously afforded principals, namely, notice and an opportunity to discuss the reclassification with someone other than the superintendent. (Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 473-74.) It also concluded that the statutory language does not imply a right to contest the board\u2019s reasons for reclassifying a principal because no issue exists as to the validity of the reasons. Rather, the statute provides only for a discussion of the reasons. 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 476.\nThe court drew a clear distinction between administrators, who have no tenure in their administrative positions, and school employees on tenure, stating:\n\u201cThe provisions with relation to administrative employees of the school district are in dramatic contrast to the requirements when an employee is on tenure or continued service. In such instances, the board is required to adopt a motion establishing specific charges against the teacher. A hearing upon the charges is required, unless specifically waived by the teacher. The hearing is conducted before a hearing officer provided by the State Board of Education under uniform standards of procedure established by that board. There is express provision that witnesses may be subpoenaed and express provision for cross-examination of witnesses and the offering of evidence. The testimony is taken under oath and a report of proceedings required, and such proceedings are subject to administrative review in the courts.\nIt thus appears that the legislature has intended to provide, and has in fact provided, separate and discrete methods in dealing with the relationships between administrative officials of the school district and the tenured teachers, and, from the specific terms of the several statutes, it is clear that, as to administrative officials, the legislative use of the word \u2018hearing\u2019 does not contemplate an \u2018evidentiary hearing\u2019 or an adversary proceeding with a burden of proof to support the decision of the board.\u201d Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 475.\nWhile the Swanson decision did not address the question of the conflict between section 10 \u2014 23.8b and sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 of the School Code, it does resolve the question of the extent of the public hearing mandated by section 10-23.8b and the legislative purpose of section 10 \u2014 23.8b. Under the reasoning of Swanson, which we find persuasive, the legislative intent of section 10 \u2014 23.8b is simply to provide school principals with notice and an opportunity to discuss the reasons for the reclassification with the school board; the principal is not afforded the opportunity to contest the board\u2019s reasons since the validity of the reasons is not in issue. Swanson v. Board of Education (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 466, 474-75; see also Lyznicki v. Board of Education (7th Cir. 1983), 707 F.2d 949, 952.\nWe conclude the defendants in the case at bar followed the proper procedures for the reclassification of plaintiff to a teaching position for which a lower salary is paid. Since the focus of section 10\u2014 23.8b is to permit plaintiff to merely discuss and not contest the reasons for reclassification, a public hearing before the school board satisfies that procedural safeguard.\nWhile both parties cite numerous cases dealing with the procedures under sections 24 \u2014 11 and 24 \u2014 12 (e.g., Lane v. Board of Education (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 742; VanDyke v. Board of Education (1969), 115 Ill. App. 2d 10; Lester v. Board of Education (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 269), those cases were decided on facts which occurred prior to the enactment of section 10-23.8b, which took effect October 1, 1975. Moreover, Hicks v. Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 974, is distinguishable as not addressing the applicability of section 10 \u2014 23.8b; in fact, it is not clear whether plaintiff Hicks was even a principal, as the decision refers only to his demotion from his \u201cadministrative position.\u201d\nWe hold that section 10 \u2014 23.8b was designed to include the precise factual situation in the case at bar \u2014 where a principal with two or more years of administrative service in the school district is returned to a teaching position with a reduction in salary. Plaintiff was entitled to a private hearing and a public hearing before the board, and a hearing before an impartial hearing officer was not required.\nAccordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nNASH, P.J., and REESEHARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STROUSE" } ], "attorneys": [ "David R Kula and John M. Izzo, both of Scariano, Kula, Ellch & Himes, of Chicago Heights, for appellants.", "Van R. Richards, Jr., and Lynn M. Richards, both of Schnell, Richards, Brown, Ritt, Freeman & Dalton, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE MEADOWS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT U-46, COUNTIES OF KANE, DuPAGE and COOK, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 85\u20140039\nOpinion filed February 27, 1986.\nDavid R Kula and John M. Izzo, both of Scariano, Kula, Ellch & Himes, of Chicago Heights, for appellants.\nVan R. Richards, Jr., and Lynn M. Richards, both of Schnell, Richards, Brown, Ritt, Freeman & Dalton, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0335-01", "first_page_order": 357, "last_page_order": 365 }