{ "id": 3495469, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVE REDMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Redman", "decision_date": "1986-03-06", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201485\u20140356", "first_page": "691", "last_page": "705", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 691" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 1272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599264 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5476093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3015080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529151 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677824 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871719 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2840068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3353665 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489336 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092628 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 965", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 892", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3082935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5438887 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 844", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6355104, 6353346, 6352195, 6353541, 6354822, 6353190, 6352841, 6354601, 6353929, 6354412, 6352652, 6353006, 6353743, 6354160, 6352434 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0844-15", "/us/464/0844-07", "/us/464/0844-01", "/us/464/0844-08", "/us/464/0844-14", "/us/464/0844-06", "/us/464/0844-04", "/us/464/0844-13", "/us/464/0844-10", "/us/464/0844-12", "/us/464/0844-03", "/us/464/0844-05", "/us/464/0844-09", "/us/464/0844-11", "/us/464/0844-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3097694 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3262489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 38", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958370 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0038-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1088, "char_count": 30172, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5112658797290353e-07, "percentile": 0.8105439737992447 }, "sha256": "d5cacd3bf0cc4ee6ab64630dfa2267d49aad50d70eb7c65e17eb4a807b2904d9", "simhash": "1:e379b18bfae5c405", "word_count": 4829 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:34.513048+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVE REDMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Sangamon County, defendant, Steve Redman, was convicted of rape in violation of section 12 \u2014 13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. St\u00e1t., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13) and home invasion in violation of section 12 \u2014 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 11). Defendant was sentenced to 22 years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals. We now affirm.\nDefendant was charged by information with the rape of the complainant and the home invasion of complainant\u2019s home.\nPrior to trial defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the State be precluded from impeaching defendant\u2019s credibility with defendant\u2019s prior convictions, July 24, 1984, for rape, deviate sexual assault, armed robbery, and a prior conviction, theft over $300, May 7, 1980. The court denied the motion and ruled that all four prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes.\nA jury trial was held. The following witnesses testified on behalf of the State.\nThe 18-year-old complainant testified that in May 1984 she lived in a two-bedroom house in Springfield. Complainant lived with a roommate, Kathy Prosise.\nDuring the afternoon of May 22, 1984, complainant, Prosise, and another friend, Debbie Durheim, drove to Lake Springfield for a party at which they met defendant. After the party complainant returned home. While complainant was home alone, defendant came to her residence looking for Prosise. Defendant waited until Prosise returned. When Prosise returned, she and defendant went into Prosise\u2019s bedroom. Defendant spent the night with Prosise. Complainant next saw defendant as he was walking out of the bathroom the following morning.\nDuring the evening of May 25, 1984, Prosise stayed with Durheim\u2019s children at Durheim\u2019s home while Durheim and complainant drove around and talked. Before she had gone out with Durheim, complainant had not seen defendant at her own residence. On cross-examination complainant stated that Prosise had told her earlier that she would be spending the night at Durheim\u2019s residence.\nAt approximately 2:15 a.m. on May 27, 1984, complainant returned home alone. At approximately 2:30 a.m., complainant went to bed and to sleep, leaving the lights on as she ordinarily did.\nAt approximately 3 a.m. complainant awoke, believing that she heard the storm door rattling. When complainant entered the living room, she saw defendant without a shirt. On cross-examination, complainant stated that she did not see a ring on defendant\u2019s right hand. Defendant immediately switched off the ceiling light which had been on in the living room.\nWhen complainant asked defendant why he was there, defendant responded that he heard someone say, \u201cCome in.\u201d When complainant responded that no one had said, \u201cCome in,\u201d defendant stated, \u201cWell, it must have been on the radio.\u201d No radio was on at the time. When defendant asked about Prosise\u2019s whereabouts, complainant told him that Prosise was at Durheim\u2019s residence. On cross-examination, complainant stated that defendant said that Prosise told him to meet her at her own residence. Complainant also stated on cross-examination that she was not afraid of defendant since he had stated he came to see Prosise. Defendant asked if he could use the bathroom and complainant responded that he could. Although a telephone was present, complainant did not telephone anyone while defendant was in the bathroom.\nWhen defendant came out of the bathroom he was holding a knife approximately six to seven inches long. He put a hand on complainant\u2019s shoulder and told her to do exactly as he said or he would kill her. Defendant pushed complainant into her bedroom, shoved her onto the bed, and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Complainant stated that defendant did not ejaculate during intercourse. Afterwards, defendant apologized profusely and drove away in his automobile.\nAfter defendant left, complainant was frightened, so she decided to leave. She first drove to her boyfriend\u2019s house, but he was not at home. She next drove to Durheim\u2019s residence. Complainant told Prosise and Durheim that she had been raped by defendant. Complainant then went to the hospital, and the police were notified.\nComplainant testified that prior to May 26, 1984, the window screens on the outside of the house had not been cut. Upon her return home from the hospital, complainant saw that the window screen outside Prosise\u2019s bedroom had been cut. Photographs of the house and the cut screen were identified and admitted into evidence.\nComplainant identified two exhibits as photographs of her face taken the day after the rape which depicted a mark upon her lip. Complainant testified that the mark resulted from defendant slapping her during the rape.\nOn May 31, 1984, complainant attended a lineup at which she identified defendant as her assailant.\nKathy Prosise testified next. She stated that she met defendant at a party at Lake Springfield on May 22, 1984, and that defendant stayed with her in her bedroom the night of the party. Prosise\u2019s testimony substantially corroborated complainant\u2019s testimony with respect to the events at Durheim\u2019s residence before and after the alleged rape. Prosise stated that she had not seen defendant at her residence prior to going over to Durheim\u2019s residence on May 25, 1984. Prosise added that complainant was carrying a knife when she arrived at Durheim\u2019s house at approximately 4 a.m.\nProsise also testified that when she returned home on May 26, 1984, she noticed that her bed had been moved and that the alarm clock which normally sat on the windowsill had been knocked onto the floor. Prosise stated that she normally leaves her window open six inches. She did not look at her window until several days later, at which time she noticed that the screen had been cut.\nDebbie Durheim\u2019s testimony also corroborated complainant\u2019s testimony concerning the party at Lake Springfield and the events immediately before and after the alleged rape.\nJoseph Goulet, a detective with the Springfield police department, testified that on May 26, 1984, he spoke with complainant at Memorial Hospital in Springfield. On cross-examination, Officer Goulet stated that he did not see any visible marks of injury on complainant. Officer Goulet also stated during cross-examination that complainant made no mention of the initial conversation which complainant stated took place between her and defendant in the living room. After speaking with complainant, Pro sise, and Durheim, Officer Goulet directed other officers to go to defendant\u2019s residence and arrest him for sexual assault.\nWhen defendant was brought to Officer Goulet\u2019s office, he was immediately advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant told Officer Goulet that he had stopped by complainant\u2019s residence at approximately 7 p.m. on May 25, 1984, and had spoken with complainant and Prosise. Defendant stated that later in the evening he went out on a date with a girl named Linda whose last name defendant did not know. Defendant stated that he took Linda to her home approximately at midnight and then he went immediately home. Defendant told Officer Goulet that he met complainant at Lake Springfield the previous week. Defendant stated that he neither touched complainant nor had sexual intercourse with her.\nOfficer Goulet testified that during the course of his investigation, he investigated complainant\u2019s residence. During the investigation Officer Goulet saw fresh footprints in the mud and trampled weeds in different locations around the house. The weeds around the house were approximately a foot high, and Officer Goulet became wet as he walked among the weeds. Officer Goulet also saw that the screen outside the window of Prosise\u2019s room had been slashed. Also during the course of his investigation, Officer Goulet went to defendant\u2019s residence to supervise a search for a knife, but no knife was found.\nMargaret Barrett, a Springfield police officer, testified that she went to Memorial Hospital a little after 4 a.m. on May 26, 1984, to assist in taking a rape report. She then went to defendant\u2019s residence to arrest him. When Officer Barrett advised defendant he was under arrest for rape, he denied having committed the offense. As defendant dressed he picked up a pair of wet pants and said, \u201cI\u2019m not going to put these on. They got wet last night.\u201d Officer Barrett saw that the pants were wet from the bottom of the shin area on both legs. Lying next to the pants was a pair of leather work boots which were muddy and covered with small pieces of weeds and grass near the sole. Officer Barrett identified two exhibits as the pair of pants and the pair of boots which were taken from defendant\u2019s bedroom.\nBonnie Lowe, a crime scene technician, testified that the grass around complainant\u2019s house was high but had been trampled along the edge of the house. Lowe dusted the house for fingerprints. No suitable fingerprints could be lifted from the inside of the house. Lowe found a fingerprint on the right hand side of the window outside Prosise\u2019s bedroom. William Sours, an evidence technician for the Springfield police department and an expert in fingerprint analysis, identified the fingerprint found by Lowe as the print of defendant\u2019s right thumb. Sours identified 16 characteristics common to both prints.\nThe parties stipulated that the examplars containing defendant\u2019s fingerprints were in fact defendant\u2019s fingerprints. The parties further stipulated that laboratory tests conducted during complainant\u2019s examination at Memorial Hospital for the purpose of determining the presence of semen revealed that no semen was present.\nThe State rested its case. The following witnesses testified on behalf of the defense. Defendant did not testify.\nCharles Ramey, an emergency room physician, thoroughly examined complainant during the early morning hours of May 26, 1984. An examination was conducted to determine whether there was any evidence of trauma, such as marks, bruises, or abrasions. Dr. Ramey found no evidence of trauma. However, Dr. Ramey stated that it is possible that he may have missed a mark on a lip and not have categorized such a mark as trauma. Dr. Ramey prepared specimens for testing the presence of semen. Dr. Ramey testified that semen could be present even if intercourse has occurred without ejaculation.\nRick Hinds, a Springfield police officer, testified that he spoke with complainant at Memorial Hospital. According to Officer Hinds, complainant stated that following the rape, she drove around the area trying to lose her assailant in fear that he was still in the area. Complainant stated that she eventually ran out of gas and then walked to an acquaintance\u2019s residence.\nRobert L. Redman, defendant\u2019s father, testified that defendant had learning disabilities and was hyperkinetic and functionally illiterate. He also stated that the primary piece of jewelry defendant wears is a large silver and turquoise ring.\nNorma Redman, defendant\u2019s mother, testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on May 25, 1984, defendant came home with a woman named Linda. As Mrs. Redman went to bed, her son and Linda were upstairs. About 11:45 p.m. defendant left to take Linda home.\nThomas Appleton, an attorney, testified that he was present at the lineup at which complainant identified defendant as her assailant. Appleton stated that complainant did not appear nervous, but instead, appeared extremely calm.\nLinda Smith testified that she went to a party with defendant on May 25, 1984. It rained during the evening. The party was large and took place in a trailer. Because there was only one bathroom in the trailer, defendant stepped outside the trailer. At approximately 11 p.m. they left the party and went to defendant\u2019s home. At approximately 11:45 p.m. defendant took Smith home. Between 12:30 and 1 a.m. on May 26, 1984, she and defendant talked on the telephone. Smith was unaware of defendant\u2019s whereabouts at 3 a.m. on May 27, 1984.\nThe defense rested its case.\nDuring closing argument the following exchange occurred:\n\u201c[Prosecutor]: I ask you on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois who I represent, and on behalf of the victim in this case\u2014\n[Defense counsel]: That is improper.\n[Prosecutor]: \u2014to find\u2014\nTHE COURT: I believe that it may be. Don\u2019t\u2014\n[Defense counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.\n[Prosecutor]: That victims also are defenseless in situations such as this. She is telling you exactly what occurred, and her testimony is uncontradicted, ladies and gentlemen. I ask you now to return the only verdict which is based upon the evidence in this case, and that is the verdict of guilty as charged. Thank you, very much.\u201d\nFollowing the closing arguments defendant made an oral motion for a mistrial based upon the above comments made by the prosecutor. The trial court denied the motion, stating that even if the comment was improper, it was corrected by the court\u2019s admonition to the prosecutor.\nFollowing the court\u2019s instructions and the jury\u2019s deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty with respect to both rape and home invasion.\nAt a hearing held May 20, 1985, defendant\u2019s post-trial motions were denied. At the same hearing defendant was sentenced to serve 22 years\u2019 imprisonment. The court stated that defendant\u2019s sentence was based upon the presentence investigation report, the evidence heard in mitigation and aggravation, the arguments of counsel, and the statement of defendant himself. Defendant\u2019s previous convictions for rape, deviate sexual assault, armed robbery, and theft had been brought to the attention of the court at the sentencing hearing.\nOn appeal defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion in limine requesting the exclusion of evidence of defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) the statements made by the prosecutor during the closing argument resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant\u2019s convictions for home invasion and rape; and (4) defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing if his prior convictions are reversed on appeal. The State disputes defendant\u2019s first three arguments but concedes the fourth.\nDefendant argues first that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from introducing defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The State argues that defendant\u2019s claim was not properly preserved for review and, in any event, that defendant\u2019s motion was properly denied.\nIn support of its argument that defendant\u2019s claim was not properly preserved for review, the State cites Luce v. United States (1984), 469 U.S. 38, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 105 S. Ct. 460. In Luce, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who does not testify at trial is not entitled to appellate review of a trial court\u2019s ruling denying a motion in limine seeking to forbid the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The court noted that \u201c[a]ny possible harm flowing from a district court\u2019s in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative.\u201d (469 U.S. 38, 41, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 447, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463.) The court noted that a court\u2019s preliminary ruling is subject to change as the case unfolds and that the government may elect not to use an arguably inadmissible prior conviction. Without the defendant\u2019s testimony a court experiences difficulty in balancing the probative value of a prior conviction against the prejudicial effect to the defendant as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) (Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)). The court stated that because an accused\u2019s decision of whether to testify seldom turns on the resolution of one factor, a court cannot presume that a defendant decided not to testify due to the denial of his motion in limine. If such a presumption were made, a reviewing court would never be unable to conclude that the denial of the motion in limine was harmless since an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying could not logically be categorized as harmless error. Therefore, requiring the defendant to testify would discourage the making of motions in limine for the sole purpose of \u201cplanting\u201d reversible error in the event of conviction.\nThe only case in which an Illinois court has addressed appellate evidence of review of a trial court\u2019s order denying a defendant\u2019s motion in limine seeking to exclude prior convictions is People v. Smith (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 577, 392 N.E.2d 347. In Smith, the Fifth District of the Appellate Court noted that a motion in limine is a proper method of bringing an issue concerning use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes to the attention of the court, and, for that reason, the court held that a defendant need not take the stand and testify and then object to the attempted introduction of his prior conviction. However, even in Smith, the court noted that the better practice would be for the court to delay its ruling on the preliminary motion until after presentation of the State\u2019s evidence.\nBecause we find the rationale underlying the decision in Luce more persuasive, we respectfully disagree with the Fifth District. Because defendant failed to testify in the trial court, he cannot challenge on appeal the trial court\u2019s adverse ruling with respect to his motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from introducing defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Even if defendant had properly preserved the issue for review it would have failed on the merits.\nIn People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, our supreme court adopted then proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (Fed. R. Evid. 609) as the rule in Illinois with regard to use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The court noted that the \u201c \u2018most significant feature of the rule is the requirement that the evidence of conviction be excluded if the judge determines that its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u2019 \u201d (47 Ill. 2d 510, 517, 268 N.E.2d 695, 699.) In determining whether the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction outweighs its probative value, the court should examine the following factors: (1) whether the prior conviction is veracity-related, (2) the recency of the prior conviction, (3) the witness\u2019 age and other circumstances surrounding the prior conviction, (4) the length of the witness\u2019 criminal record and his conduct subsequent to the prior conviction, (5) the similarity of the prior offense to the instant offenses thus increasing the danger of prejudice, (6) the need for the witness\u2019 testimony and the likelihood he would forego his opportunity to testify, and (7) the importance of the witness\u2019 credibility in determining the truth. People v. Medreno (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 425 N.E.2d 588.\nIn the instant case defendant\u2019s recent convictions for rape (1984), deviate sexual assault (1984), armed robbery (1984), and theft (1980) were all related to defendant\u2019s veracity. The record reflects neither special circumstances surrounding the prior convictions which would mitigate their probative value nor any rehabilitation as reflected by defendant\u2019s conduct subsequent to the prior convictions. Although the need for defendant\u2019s testimony was great, since apparently no other witnesses could establish defendant\u2019s whereabouts at the time of the instant offenses, the exclusion of the prior convictions would have deprived the State of using the only effective means of attacking defendant\u2019s credibility. (See People v. Medreno (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 402 N.E.2d 588.) Defendant\u2019s credibility would have been a key to the jury\u2019s ability to determine the truth. Although the previous offenses of rape and deviate sexual assault were identical or similar to the instant rape offense, similarity alone does not demand exclusion. (People v. Medreno (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 425 N.E.2d 588.) Defendant asserts that the trial court could have avoided prejudice resulting from the similarity of the offenses by allowing impeachment by the prior convictions for armed robbery and theft while precluding impeachment by the prior convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault. However, the State had the right and the obligation to use all of the admissible impeaching evidence it possessed in order to destroy defendant\u2019s credibility. People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, cert, denied (1983), 464 U.S. 844, 78 L. Ed. 2d 136,104 S. Ct. 145.\nA review of the record indicates that the court properly balanced the probative value of defendant\u2019s prior convictions with the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant. Therefore, even if defendant\u2019s claim had been properly preserved for review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from introducing evidence of defendant\u2019s prior convictions.\nDefendant argues next that remarks made by the prosecutor during the State\u2019s closing argument resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant. Improper remarks made by a prosecutor do not require reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused. (People v. Medley (1983), 111 Ill. App. 3d 444, 444 N.E.2d 269.) Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly placed the integrity of the office of the State\u2019s Attorney behind the credibility of the complainant when the prosecutor told the jury that \u201cshe was telling you exactly what occurred.\u201d While it is improper for a prosecutor to place the integrity of the office of the State\u2019s Attorney behind the credibility of a witness, the prosecutor may discuss the witnesses and their credibility, and the prosecutor is entitled to assume the truth of the State\u2019s evidence. (People v. Bibbs (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 892, 428 N.E.2d 965.) As the instruction to the jury provides, closing arguments are made by the attorneys to dismiss the facts and circumstances and should be confined to the evidence \u201cand *** reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.03 (2d ed. 1981).) Therefore, the prosecutor\u2019s statement was within the permissible bounds of closing argument. Defendant also attacks the prosecutor\u2019s statement that the complainant\u2019s testimony was \u201cuncontradicted.\u201d However, a prosecutor may comment upon the uncontradicted nature of the State\u2019s evidence and the testimony of its witnesses. (See People v. Dixon (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 346, 438 N.E.2d 180.) Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s statement that \u201cvictims also are defenseless\u201d was calculated to inflame the jury. The prosecutor\u2019s remark was in response to defendant\u2019s argument that he is defenseless in the prosecution against him. A defendant ordinarily cannot claim error where a prosecutor\u2019s remark was in reply to the defense counsel\u2019s argument. (See People v. Dixon (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 346, 438 N.E.2d 180.) Even if any of the remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument were improper, given the strength of the State\u2019s evidence and the brevity of the remarks, there is no reasonable basis for believing that the jury was prejudiced by, or even influenced by, the remarks.\nDefendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for rape and home invasion due to inconsistencies and improbabilities in complainant\u2019s testimony. He also stresses the lack of scientific evidence to corroborate complainant\u2019s testimony. The State argues that the proof at trial was not so unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIn a prosecution for rape, the testimony of the complainant must. be clear and convincing or corroborated by other facts or evidence. (People v. Daniels (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 894, 473 N.E.2d 517.) However, clear and convincing evidence is not synonymous with uncontradieted or unimpeached testimony. (People v. Graham (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 377 N.E.2d 179.) Minor variances in the testimony may occur, and, if so, these variances constitute mere discrepancies going only to credibility. (People v. Wright (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 829, 279 N.E.2d 398.) It is the task of the trier of fact to weigh these discrepancies, and if the discrepancies are so minor as not to detract from the reasonableness of the victim\u2019s story, her testimony may be found clear and convincing. People v. Graham (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 377 N.E.2d 179; People v. Wright (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 829, 279 N.E.2d 398.\nDefendant argues that the complainant\u2019s testimony was not clear and convincing since it conflicted with other evidence. Defendant points to complainant\u2019s failure to tell the police about the conversation between complainant and defendant when she first discovered his presence in her house and to the inconsistency between complainant\u2019s testimony that she drove to Durheim\u2019s residence and complainant\u2019s statement to Officer Hinds that her car ran out of gas before reaching Durheim\u2019s residence. Defendant also states that complainant\u2019s belief that she heard the storm door rattling is inconsistent with the evidence that her assailant entered through a window in Prosise\u2019s bedroom. Any inconsistencies between complainant\u2019s testimony and other evidence concerning complainant\u2019s statements to the police may be explained by the fact that she talked with the police at a time when she was nervous and frightened, immediately after the rape. Complainant\u2019s statement that she heard the storm door rattling must be read in conjunction with complainant\u2019s statement that a noise awakened her, a noise she believed to be the storm door rattling. The alleged inconsistencies in complainant\u2019s testimony are minor and do not detract from the reasonableness of her story.\nDefendant argues further that complainant\u2019s testimony was not clear and convincing due to the improbabilities of her own account of her behavior. Defendant emphasizes complainant\u2019s testimony that she was not in fear when defendant turned off the lights. At the time defendant turned off the lights, complainant assumed that defendant was present only to see Prosise and defendant had done nothing else which would place complainant in fear. Defendant states that it is improbable that complainant would not attempt to escape or telephone for assistance. A rape victim\u2019s failure to escape or seek assistance depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. (See People v. Daniels (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 894, 473 N.E.2d 517.) Given that defendant had done nothing to place complainant in fear prior to going into the bathroom and that defendant came out of the bathroom carrying a knife and making threats, complainant\u2019s failure to escape is not unreasonable. There is no requirement that a rape victim attempt to escape where to do so would endanger her life. (People v. Hendon (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 745, 338 N.E.2d 472.) Complainant\u2019s failure to telephone for assistance after defendant left the house is not unreasonable in light of her frightened condition and the fact that she immediately sought assistance by driving to her boyfriend\u2019s residence and to Durheim\u2019s residence. We conclude that complainant\u2019s testimony was reasonable as well as clear and convincing.\nEven assuming arguendo that complainant\u2019s testimony was not clear and convincing, her testimony was sufficiently corroborated. The State produced evidence linking defendant to the scene of the crime, including his fingerprint on the windowsill and the fact that his pants and boots were wet and muddy. The State also introduced photographs of complainant which depicted a mark on her face which was allegedly caused by defendant. Also, the record reveals that complainant made a prompt complaint to her friends and to the authorities. A prompt complaint can be sufficient corroboration of a victim\u2019s testimony in order to sustain a conviction for rape. (People v. Ellison (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 463 N.E.2d 175; People v. Graham (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 377 N.E.2d 179; People v. Sims (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 727, 283 N.E.2d 906.) Defendant also stresses the lack of physical evidence supporting complainant\u2019s claim that sexual intercourse occurred. While the lack of physical evidence of rape may tend to weaken the State\u2019s case, it is not fatal to the State\u2019s case. People v. Szudy (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 599, 439 N.E.2d 137; People v. Morrow (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 995, 433 N.E.2d 985.\nWe conclude that complainant\u2019s testimony is both clear and convincing and corroborated by other testimony and evidence. Questions of credibility are for the jury to weigh, and we cannot overturn a guilty verdict unless the proof is so unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Szudy (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 599, 439 N.E.2d 137.) The proof herein is sufficient to sustain defendant\u2019s convictions for rape and home invasion.\nFinally, defendant argues, and the State concedes, that defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in the event that defendant\u2019s prior convictions, which were considered by the court in sentencing defendant, are reversed on appeal. Because the Supreme Court of Illinois has recently denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (People v. Redman (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 534, 481 N.E.2d 1272, appeal denied (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 560, the issue has been rendered moot.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and SPITZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "J. William Roberts, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Kevin T. McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVE REDMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201485\u20140356\nOpinion filed March 6, 1986.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJ. William Roberts, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Kevin T. McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0691-01", "first_page_order": 713, "last_page_order": 727 }