{ "id": 3449447, "name": "HELEN RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLOSSOM BLAIR, Defendant (IMAC Realty, Inc., a/k/a Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Richmond v. Blair", "decision_date": "1985-11-27", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20142156", "first_page": "251", "last_page": "257", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 251" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5453646 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3481720 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494483 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965216 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579992 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5471435 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5449739 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008" }, { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082276 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-08" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0300-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 685, "char_count": 14281, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.438726253670951e-07, "percentile": 0.6527036904468175 }, "sha256": "c5bd8a80852b29b358da38aadbd882f9f258d90dadc22c379b6ca5f6c3cfe4fb", "simhash": "1:67fe09268e48a693", "word_count": 2279 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:38.085084+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HELEN RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLOSSOM BLAIR, Defendant (IMAC Realty, Inc., a/k/a Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Helen Richmond, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing her third amended complaint containing amended counts II and III of her previous complaint against defendants, IMAC Realty, Inc., realtors, formerly known as Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Quinlan & Tyson), and Dorothy Valko, one of its brokers. The court dismissed the counts as being substantially insufficient in law, in violation of section 2 \u2014 615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615(a)).\nWe reverse and remand.\nPlaintiff alleged that on October 16, 1981, she visited and examined the home of Blossom and David Blair, at 4242 West Birchwood Avenue, Skokie. Plaintiff further alleged that at that visit Dorothy Valko, a real estate broker with Quinlan & Tyson, gave plaintiff a tour of the house, including the basement. Plaintiff alleged that while in the basement of the house, the following conversation took place:\n\u201cDorothy Valko said to plaintiff: \u2018Please don\u2019t walk on the basement floor in the extra bedroom. It has just been painted because there was a problem with water coming in.\u2019\nPlaintiff asked Dorothy Valko: \u2018Is the basement sound and free of water problems?\u2019\nThe response of Dorothy Valko was: 'There was a problem with water seepage in the past, but the problem has been completely corrected.\u2019\nPlaintiff then stated to Dorothy Valko: T want to be sure that if I buy this house that there will not be water or flood problems.\u2019\nThe response of Dorothy Valko was: \u2018You can feel secure and confident with the home. It will be totally free of water leaks or seepage.\u2019 \u201d\nPlaintiff further alleged that based on the statements of defendants Blair and Valko she bought the home. Soon after the purchase, she discovered that the basement flooded and leaked after each heavy rainfall or melting of snow, and that she spent $6,646.38 to eliminate the flooding and leakage.\nPlaintiff filed her original complaint on February 23, 1982. Count I proceeded only against Blair, alleging that she breached several warranties in the purchase contract. In count II, plaintiff alleged that Blair\u2019s realtor, Quinlan & Tyson, acting through its employee, Valko, made representations about the basement, upon which plaintiff relied to her detriment.\nOn June 30, 1982, the trial judge allowed plaintiff to file an amended complaint to include count III, which added Valko as a defendant and sought relief solely against her. Defendants Quinlan & Tyson and Valko asked the trial court to dismiss the amended complaint because (1) it contained more than one cause of action per count, contrary to section 2 \u2014 603(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 603(b)); (2) Valko owed no duty of investigation to a prospective buyer; and (3) plaintiff\u2019s damages were purely economic and, therefore, not recoverable in tort. On November 3, 1982, the trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, but granted her leave to replead.\nPlaintiff filed her second amended complaint on November 16, 1982. Defendant Quinlan & Tyson and Valko asked the trial court to dismiss this complaint for the same reasons that they asked the court to dismiss the previous amended complaint. The trial court dismissed counts II and III of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint and granted her leave to file another pleading.\nPlaintiff filed her third amended complaint on November 10, 1983, which was comprised of new counts II and III against defendants Quinlan & Tyson and Valko. The third amended complaint read the same as the second amended complaint except for more specific allegations of Valko\u2019s representations. Defendants Quinlan & Tyson and Valko moved to strike and dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that the complaint contained the same deficiencies as the second amended complaint. The trial court, on August 9, 1984, struck the third amended complaint, finding that counts II and III were substantially insufficient in law, and dismissed with prejudice Quinlan & Tyson and Valko. The court expressly found that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of its order. Count I, naming Blair as a defendant, remains in the trial court. Plaintiff appeals the order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).\nThe purpose of pleadings is to present, define and narrow the issues, and limit the proof needed at trial. Pleadings are not intended to erect barriers to a trial on the merits but instead to remove them and facilitate trial. The object of pleadings is to produce an issue asserted by one side and denied by the other, so that a trial may determine the actual truth. (People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 300, 307-08, 430 N.E.2d 1005, 1008.)\u2018Courts should liberally construe pleadings, and a motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded. In considering a motion to dismiss, however, courts are to construe pleadings strictly against the pleader. The purpose of attacking defects in pleadings is to point out the defects so that the complainant will have an opportunity to cure them before trial. The granting of a motion to strike and dismiss is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Harvey v. Mackay (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 582, 586, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1025.\nI\nPlaintiff claims the trial court erred in finding that her third amended complaint was substantially insufficient at law. Explaining this pleading requirement, our supreme court stated:\n\u201cTo pass muster a complaint must state a cause of action in two ways. First, it must be legally sufficient; it must set forth a legally recognized claim as its avenue of recovery. When it fails to do this, there is no recourse at law for the injury alleged, and the complaint must be dismissed. [Citations.] Second and unlike Federal practice, the complaint must be factually sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized cause of action alleged. If it does not, the complaint must be dismissed. [Citation.]\u201d (People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 430 N.E.2d 1005, 1009.)\nPlaintiff contends that she set forth a legally recognized claim against defendants for intentional misrepresentation and one for negligent misrepresentation.\nIn an action for intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege \u201c(1) that defendant made a statement, (2) of a material nature as opposed to opinion, (3) untrue, (4) known by the person making it to be untrue, *** or made in culpable ignorance of its truth or falsity, (5) relied upon by the victim to his detriment, (6) made for the purpose of inducing reliance, and (7) such that the victim\u2019s reliance led to his injury.\u201d (Gordon v. Dolin (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 319, 324, 434 N.E.2d 341, 345.) In an action for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege the necessary elements of an action for negligence: a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, a breach of that duty and injury proximately resulting from such breach. There can be no recovery in tort for negligence unless the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. (Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 259, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625.) The existence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. Lindquist v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725, 353 N.E.2d 156, 158.\nDefendants contend that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff\u2019s third amended complaint was substantially insufficient at law because they owed to plaintiff no duty of independent investigation and because her damages were purely economic and, thus, not recoverable in tort.\nDefendants rely on Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 389 N.E.2d 623, for their claimed absence of a duty to plaintiff. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held in Lyons that a seller\u2019s realtor has no duty to a prospective buyer to independently substantiate the seller\u2019s representations, i.e., representations that the realtor made to the buyer on the seller\u2019s behalf. (71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 259.) Defendants argue that they were mere conduits, as plaintiff alleged, passing along to plaintiff statements about the basement that the seller made to them. Thus, defendants argue, according to Lyons, they owed no duty to plaintiff to independently investigate the seller\u2019s statements about the basement.\nLyons, however, involved an action for only negligent misrepresentation; that court expressly distinguished actions for intentional misrepresentation, stating that \u201c[t]he rule we follow would permit a finding of fault only in situations where the real estate agent knew or should have known that the representation might be false.\u201d (Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 260, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625.) Plaintiff pleaded the required elements for intentional misrepresentation: that Valko made material statements about the basement; that they were untrue; that Valko recklessly made the statements with disregard for their truth or falsity; that she relied on the statements to her detriment; that Valko made the statements to induce her reliance; and that her reliance on Valko\u2019s statements led to her costs of repairing the basement.\nSubsequent to the appellate court\u2019s decision in Lyons, our supreme court rendered its decision in Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849. In Sawyer, the court held that realtors occupy a position of trust with respect to prospective buyers with whom they are negotiating and owe a duty to exercise good faith in their dealings with such buyers, even absent an agency relationship between the realtor and the buyer. (Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 379, 385-86; see also Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 257, 262, 389 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Moran, P.J., dissenting).) The Appellate Court for the Second District has intimated that, based on Sawyer, misrepresentations of material facts made intentionally by a realtor could be the basis for a cause of action for fraud and deceit, and misrepresentations of material fact made negligently could be the basis for a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Buzzard v. Bolger (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 887, 891, 453 N.E.2d 1129, 1131.\nWe agree with the Appellate Court for the Second District and hold that, based on Sawyer, an action for intentional misrepresentation can lie against a realtor who makes an intentional or reckless misrepresentation, and that an action for negligent misrepresentation can lie against a realtor who negligently makes a misrepresentation of a material fact. Of course, a plaintiff bringing one of these actions must allege all of the required elements of the action brought. Plaintiff pleaded the required elements of negligent misrepresentation: that Valko owed a duty to her to be knowledgeable and accurate in giving her information regarding the property; that Valko breached the duty by negligently making statements about the basement without actual knowledge of their truth or falsity; and that Valko\u2019s breach of duty proximately caused her injuries. We hold that plaintiff set forth legally recognized causes of action against Quinlan & Tyson and Valko for intentional and negligent misrepresentation.\nII\nRelying on Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, defendants next contend that plaintiff\u2019s damages, the costs of repairing her basement, are purely economic and, therefore; not recoverable in tort.\nThe Moorman court reasoned that the law of contracts is appropriate and sufficient to govern the economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 88.) The court, however, enumerated two exceptions to the general rule prohibiting recovery of economic losses in tort: economic loss is recoverable where one makes intentional misrepresentations and where one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions makes negligent misrepresentations. (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 88-89; see also Black, Jackson & Simmons Insurance Brokerage, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282.) Defendants contend that the case at bar falls squarely within the rule of Moorman and not within its exceptions.\nWe disagree. We earlier held that plaintiff pleaded a cause of action against defendant for intentional misrepresentation. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s allegations fall within the first exception to Moorman and the prohibition against recovery does not apply. Additionally, defendants are in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions; it was their business to supply information to plaintiff for guidance in her business transactions with the seller. Plaintiff\u2019s allegations, therefore, fall also within the second exception to the rule of Moorman.\nIn summation, we hold that plaintiff has pleaded legally recognized causes of action against defendants Quinlan & Tyson and Valko for intentional and negligent misrepresentations. We further hold that plaintiff\u2019s allegations fall within the two exceptions to the rule of Moorman which prohibits the recovery of purely economic damages in tort.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and LINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerome C. Brezinsky, of Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, of Chicago (Donald E Spak, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HELEN RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLOSSOM BLAIR, Defendant (IMAC Realty, Inc., a/k/a Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 84\u20142156\nOpinion filed November 27, 1985.\nRehearing denied December 20, 1985.\nJerome C. Brezinsky, of Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, of Chicago, for appellant.\nArvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, of Chicago (Donald E Spak, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0251-01", "first_page_order": 273, "last_page_order": 279 }