{ "id": 3448621, "name": "WILLIAM P. SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sanders v. United Parcel Service", "decision_date": "1986-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 85\u2014193", "first_page": "362", "last_page": "367", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 362" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3351109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 884", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12143498 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0884-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 U.S. 197", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6139848 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/305/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2712597 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0473-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 595, "char_count": 11731, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7526614093747725e-07, "percentile": 0.7087509735123554 }, "sha256": "c646a4d8c9c66efcaa0c59361eac3864565737f486bfb32cc293ee1bfeac47a7", "simhash": "1:2ae5a9e67f93e4f4", "word_count": 1872 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:38.085084+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM P. SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, William P. Sanders, sought judicial review of an order of the Illinois Human Rights Commission dismissing his charge of an unfair employment practice against defendant United Parcel Service (UPS). Plaintiff alleged that UPS discriminated against him on the basis of his physical handicap. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed the Commission\u2019s order and plaintiff appeals.\nThe record, which includes the Department of Human Rights investigation report, reveals the following. In June 1970, plaintiff worked for UPS as a sorter, which involved lifting and sorting approximately 800 parcels per hour, each weighing approximately 12 to 50 pounds. That month, plaintiff suffered a work-related injury when a package fell on his shoulder.\nOn October 22, 1974, Dr. Jacob Pomerantz, UPS\u2019 doctor, examined plaintiff and found that his shoulder had full function and range of motion, and that plaintiff could work. Plaintiff worked until November 1974, when he took a medical leave of absence to seek further treatment for his shoulder. On November 8, 1975, Dr. Richard Celine examined plaintiff and later submitted a report of the examination to UPS\u2019 insurer. The report stated that plaintiff experienced some shoulder pain, but had a full range of motion in his shoulder, and in Dr. Celine\u2019s opinion, plaintiff was capable of returning to his regular job.\nOn December 13, 1975, Dr. Joel M. Levin, an arthritis specialist, wrote a letter stating that plaintiff was \u201cnot capable of lifting or using the right upper extremity.\u201d In June 1976, the Illinois Industrial Commission found that plaintiff had suffered a permanent 25% loss of the use of his arm. On September 20, 1976, Dr. Saul Haskell, an orthopedic surgeon who had been treating plaintiff for six years, wrote a letter stating: \u201cWilliam Sanders has been treated for a shoulder condition. He may return to work.\u201d\nIn October 1976, plaintiff asked UPS to return to work as a porter, a position which he believed would be light duty work. Plaintiff provided UPS with copies of the Industrial Commission decision, the letter from Dr. Levin, and the letter from Dr. Haskell. UPS told plaintiff he could only return to his former position as sorter.\nOn November 24, 1976, plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination against UPS. Following various procedural delays, a fact-finding conference was scheduled for March 4, 1983. On July 11, 1983, the Department of Human Rights issued an investigation report and issued a notice of dismissal of the charge based on a lack of substantial evidence. The report noted that UPS \u201chad no way of knowing that complainant was subject to light duty or lifting restrictions, since complainant\u2019s doctor had simply released him to return to work.\u201d The report noted further that plaintiff worked as a sorter for four years following the injury and then left work voluntarily rather than under a doctor\u2019s order.\nOn December 12, 1983, the Commission, on review, ordered the charge dismissed for lack of substantial evidence. The Commission made specific findings, including: that plaintiff returned to UPS with a \u201cgeneral work release\u201d which \u201cdid not indicate that [plaintiff] should be assigned light duty\u201d; that the position requested by plaintiff requires stripping, waxing, buffing floors, cleaning washrooms, washing windows, and is not light duty; that plaintiff never provided UPS \u201cwith the necessary medical documentation indicating that he should be restricted to light duty work\u201d; that UPS did not have light duty work available; and that plaintiff\u2019s \u201chandicap was related to his ability to perform the basic job duties of sorter and/or porter.\u201d On December 10, 1984, the trial court affirmed the Commission\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s charge against UPS. The trial court held that the decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable.\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court used the wrong standard of review. Plaintiff points out that the proper standard is whether the Commission abused its discretion in finding a lack of substantial evidence, and that this means plaintiff need only meet the \u201crelatively light burden\u201d of simply producing more than a mere scintilla of evidence of discrimination. We find that the trial court used the proper standard of review.\nUnder the Human Rights Act, if the Commission determines after investigation that there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the employee\u2019s charge of a civil rights violation, the Commission may dismiss the charge. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 68, par. 7\u2014 102(D)(2)(a).) This court has held that the standard was deliberately left vague to permit the Commission some degree of discretion in ascertaining and evaluating the facts. (Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 473, 334 N.E.2d 370.) The \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d that must support an employee\u2019s charge under a different statute, however, has been defined as \u201cmore than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d (Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB (1938), 305 U.S. 197, 229, 83 L. Ed. 126, 140, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (cited in Chambers v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 888, 422 N.E.2d 130).) This does not mean, as plaintiff implies, that the burden of producing evidence to support a charge of discrimination is a relatively light burden, or requires only slightly more than a mere scintilla. The Commission uses a standard of reasonableness in determining whether the claimant has presented substantial evidence to support the charge, and the \u201cmere scintilla\u201d language is not meant to detract from this reasonableness standard.\nIn determining whether the Commission properly applied its standard, a reviewing court looks to see if the Commission\u2019s dismissal of the charge was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. (Chambers v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 422 N.E.2d 130; Unger v. Sirena Division of Consolidated Foods Corp. (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 840, 377 N.E.2d 266; Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 473, 334 N.E.2d 370.) The difference between the statutory standard of \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d used by the Commission and the \u201carbitrary and capricious\u201d standard used by the courts remains unclear. We do note that the courts generally will substitute their judgment on a question of law within the court\u2019s competence (see, e.g., Chambers v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 422 N.E.2d 130); but the court will limit itself to a reasonableness standard on other questions that are best resolved by the Commission (see, e.g., Unger v. Sirena Division of Consolidated Foods Corp. (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 840, 377 N.E.2d 266. See generally 5 Davis, Administrative Law sec. 29:1, at 332, sec. 29:7, at 357 (2d ed. 1984).) The trial court in the present case found that the Commission\u2019s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. The court used the proper standard of review.\nPlaintiff also complains that the trial court stated the Commission had the duty to interpret and resolve conflicting medical reports which was an incorrect rule to apply because a full hearing was not held. Upon review, a court cannot try the case de novo, whether or not a full hearing is held. (Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 473, 334 N.E.2d 370 (Commission dismissed charge after investigation).) It is within the special province of the Commission to review and weigh conflicting evidence, whether it is at the preliminary investigation level or at a later stage. Thus, the trial court's statement was correct and did not alter the fact that the court used the proper \u201carbitrary and capricious\u201d standard of review.\nWe now look at the evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s decision to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s charge in order to determine if the decision was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. An employer need not accommodate an employee\u2019s alleged handicap unless the employee is actually handicapped and the handicap is unrelated to the person\u2019s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 103(I)(1).) Here, the Commission found that the employee was handicapped but that the handicap was related to his ability to perform the basic job duties of either sorter or porter because they were not light-duty jobs. In addition, the employee\u2019s burden in seeking an accommodation is \u201cto apprise the employer *** of his handicapping condition and submit any necessary medical documentation.\u201d (Human Rights Commission Interpretative Rules on Handicap Discrimination in Employment sec. 4(c).) We agree with the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff failed to meet this burden.\nAfter the 1974 examination, Dr. Pomerantz determined that plaintiff could work. After the 1975 examination, Dr. Celine opined that plaintiff could work at his regular job. The 1976 Industrial Commission decision did not say plaintiff was required to do only light work. The 1976 release from Dr. Haskell was general, and made no reference to any work restrictions. Plaintiff points to Dr. Levin\u2019s 1975 report placing some restrictions on plaintiff\u2019s physical activities. We find, however, that Dr. Levin\u2019s report might reasonably carry less weight before the Commission because his examination took place nine months before Dr. Haskell\u2019s, and Dr. Levin\u2019s statement did not indicate whether he was aware of plaintiff\u2019s job duties. Moreover, after his shoulder injury, plaintiff worked for four years as a sorter. He then left voluntarily, and was not disqualified by a doctor from working. These facts combine to support the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff failed to provide UPS with the necessary medical documentation and therefore failed to produce substantial evidence of a civil rights violation. Thus, we find the decision to dismiss the charge was not arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.\nPlaintiff\u2019s reliance on Chambers v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 422 N.E.2d 130, is misplaced. In Chambers, the court held that the Commission\u2019s decision to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion The court found that the employer had refused to re-employ plaintiff despite the fact that the medical reports showed he was mentally handicapped but that the handicap was unrelated to the performance of his duties. In contrast, UPS has not refused to re-employ plaintiff. Instead, UPS offered plaintiff his job of sorter, but refused to give him a job as a porter when it did not consider the porter job to be a light-duty job, and because it possessed little or no medical documentation showing that plaintiff should be restricted to a light-duty job. Additionally, in Chambers, the court found that the handicap was unrelated to the job duties, while here the handicap is related to plaintiff\u2019s duties.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County affirming the decision of the Human Rights Commission dismissing plaintiff\u2019s charge is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nRIZZI, P.J., and McGILLICUDDY, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jean P. Kamp and Mark J. Heyrman, both of Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (John A. McDonald, Steven H. Adelman, P.C., and Paul J. Gudel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM P. SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 85\u2014193\nOpinion filed March 31, 1986.\nJean P. Kamp and Mark J. Heyrman, both of Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago, for appellant.\nKeck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (John A. McDonald, Steven H. Adelman, P.C., and Paul J. Gudel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0362-01", "first_page_order": 384, "last_page_order": 389 }