{ "id": 5668388, "name": "WAUCONDA COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 118, LAKE COUNTY, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. La SALLE NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Counterplaintiffs-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Wauconda Community Unit School District No. 118 v. La Salle National Bank", "decision_date": "1986-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 85-156", "first_page": "52", "last_page": "60", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 52" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "18 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2561462 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 P.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10497406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/358/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.E. 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3315508 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/214/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632436 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29" }, { "page": "627-28" }, { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5483576 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5328631 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0618-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 701, "char_count": 19606, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36537709341355423 }, "sha256": "5b191d0bbc5e0dbeac1ba0e11088992ebc2cd6b2f3662eb27bcb4c406e8e2c97", "simhash": "1:672ee056bfdfa6c5", "word_count": 3208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:23.440803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WAUCONDA COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 118, LAKE COUNTY, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. La SALLE NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Counterplaintiffs-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Wauconda Community Unit School District No. 118, Lake County (Wauconda), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the La Salle National Bank, as trustee, and John Crown and unknown beneficiaries of the trust (collectively hereinafter called Crown) to determine the rights of the parties with respect to a deed for land and its reversion provision. The property had previously been given by Crown to Wauconda to establish a public school, now known as the Robert Crown Elementary School (Crown School). Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted Wauconda\u2019s motion for summary judgment, essentially finding that the discontinuance of regular classroom instruction at Crown School and the proposed use of the property for storage of school property, athletic activities, and other school purposes, as set forth in the school board\u2019s resolution, did not cause the property to revert to Crown.\nCrown raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment, and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting Wauconda\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying Crown\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment.\nThis declaratory judgment action was filed by Wauconda on March 20, 1984, and alleged, in pertinent part, that certain real estate was conveyed to Wauconda as a charitable donation by Crown on March 1,1971, and contained a reversion provision, as follows:\n\u201c*** provided however that the party of the second part [SCHOOL DISTRICT] by accepting this charitable donation does hereby agree that the real estate herein described shall at all times be used solely and exclusively for public school purposes and that in the event the party of the second part [SCHOOL DISTRICT] shall at any time hereafter cease to use said real estate solely and exclusively for public school purposes then title to the same shall forthwith revert to the party of the first part [LA SALLE NATIONAL BANK] or its successors, heirs and assigns to their sole use and benefit forever and without compensation to party of the second part [SCHOOL DISTRICT], its successors and assigns.\u201d\nIt is further alleged that Crown School was built by Wauconda on the real estate and that the school has been continuously used for school purposes, including regular classroom instruction. The complaint set forth that on March 1, 1984, Wauconda adopted a resolution to temporarily discontinue regular classroom instruction at Crown School at the beginning of the 1984-85 academic year because of declining enrollment and financial constraints. The resolution further stated that the administration was to continue to use the Crown School and property upon which it is located for school purposes, including storage of school property, use of adjacent grounds for school athletic activities, and other school purposes. The resolution provided that Wauconda was to continue to maintain property-damage and liability insurance on the property, and directed its attorneys to commence legal action to determine whether temporary discontinuance of regular classroom instruction at the school would jeopardize its ownership of the property. The complaint alleged that there was an actual controversy over whether discontinuance of regular classroom instruction would cause the property to revert to Crown and sought an adjudication of the rights of the parties under the provisions of the deed.\nCrown answered and counterclaimed, alleging, in substance, that the proposed changes in the use of the property will constitute a violation of section 16\u20141 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 16\u20141), pertaining to gifts to a public school district, and also will cause title of the property to revert to Crown under the terms of the deed. Crown requested that a declaratory judgment be issued in its favor declaring that the proposed changes in use will, if implemented, create a reversion and cause title to revert under the terms of the deed.\nOn July 25, 1984, Wauconda filed its motion for summary judgment which, along with legal argument, included the affidavit of H. Darrell Dick, the school superintendent. The affidavit stated, inter alia, that in conjunction with the previous resolution, pupils and teachers at Crown School were being reassigned for the school year beginning August 27, 1984. Crown filed a lengthy memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment containing a statement of facts and argument. A deposition and affidavit of John Crown and other discovery materials were filed and referred to in the memorandum. Crown then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on September 4, 1984, stating \u201cthere exists no material issue of fact\u201d and it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The motion adopted the deposition and documents referred to in the memorandum in opposition to Wauconda\u2019s summary judgment motion and asserted that Wauconda does not have any plans or programs to use the property for storage, athletic activities, or other school purposes if classroom instruction is discontinued. The motion further stated that whether the classroom instruction was discontinued temporarily or otherwise, the property would revert to Crown by the terms of the deed.\nIn a memorandum order filed January 21, 1985, the trial court found that parol evidence of the intent of the grantor to the deed was not admissible and there were no controverted facts on all essential elements of both motions for summary judgment; that the words in the deed \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d are merely precatory language, suggestive of the use to be made of the property, but did not limit the use of the property or control the separate reverter provision; that the term \u201cschool purposes\u201d in the reverter clause does not require the property to be used solely and exclusively as the site of a public school holding regular classroom instruction; that the proposed use of the property for storage of school property, use of the adjacent grounds for school athletic programs, and other such purposes as the board deems proper, as set forth in the resolution, would constitute school purposes; and that whether and how the resolution is implemented were beyond the issues raised in the declaratory judgment action.\nCrown contends that summary judgment should not have been granted because numerous issues of material fact are raised pertaining to the veracity of Wauconda\u2019s plans to use the property for storage of school equipment and for athletic activities. Crown maintains that various affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and other documents dispute the resolution which sets forth Wauconda\u2019s decision to temporarily discontinue regular classroom instruction at Crown School for financial reasons and the proposed school purposes for the property. Wauconda responds that in requesting a declaratory judgment concerning the effect of the resolution, it sought a judicial ruling that the temporary discontinuance of classroom instruction would not \u201ctrigger\u201d the reverter clause of the deed and the court was called upon only to interpret the reversion provision in the deed.\nWauconda\u2019s complaint for declaratory judgment was filed on March 20, 1984, while Crown School was in full operation. Suit was brought to determine whether the resolution adopted March 1, 1984, to discontinue regular classroom instruction for the following school year and use the school for other school purposes such as storage of school property and athletic activities would cause the property to revert under the terms of the deed. It is evident from the pleadings that Wauconda hoped to expedite the proceedings and obtain a determination by the court prior to the beginning of the coming school year so that in the event of a ruling adverse to it, there could be a reevaluation of the decision to discontinue regular classroom instruction. In this light, the declaratory judgment action was not based on the actual implementation of the proposed school purposes upon closure of Crown School, but at issue was whether discontinuance of regular classroom instruction and the proposed use for other school purposes would cause a reversion of the property. Crown\u2019s counterclaim for declaratory judgment clearly was directed at the same issue of whether the proposed change by resolution in the use of Crown School would cause title in the property to revert to Crown.\nThus, while in discovery, evidence may have been developed which might reveal factual disputes as to the future proposed school uses of the property, any such factual questions were not material to the issue sought to be determined concerning a construction of the deed and reversion provision as it pertains to discontinuance of regular classroom instruction. (See Illinois Power Co. v. City of Jacksonville (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 618, 624, 165 N.E.2d 300; Boylan v. Martindale (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 335, 340, 431 N.E.2d 62.) Whether the actual use of the Crown School upon discontinuance of regular classroom instruction was for public school purposes is a matter not before the court in this proceeding. (See Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 628-29, 466 N.E.2d 322.) When this proceeding was not resolved prior to closing the school, Crown did not seek to amend its pleadings to include any issue concerning the actual use of the school upon discontinuance of regular classroom instruction. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that this declaratory judgment action could be determined as a matter of law on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Any factual disputes arising from discovery were not material to the legal issue before the court.\nThe principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the discontinuance of regular classroom instruction at Crown School and the proposed use of the school for other public school purposes would cause a reversion of the property to Crown under the terms of the deed originally conveying the property to Wauconda. The deed, in pertinent part, is as follows:\n\u201cWITNESSETH, that said party of the first part, in eeasidera-t-ion of the sum of ------------------------ Dollars {$-) and ether good and valuable considerations in as a charitable donation hand paid, / does hereby grant, sell and convey unto said party of the second part, the following described real estate, situated in Lake County, Illinois, to wit:\n[Legal Description]\ntogether with the tenements and appurtenances thereunto belonging., to be used as a public school site.\nTO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto said party of the second part as aforesaid and to the proper use, benefit and behoof of said party of the second part forever.; provided however, that the party of the second part by accepting this charitable donation does hereby agree that the real estate herein described shall at all times be used solely and exclusively for public school purposes and that in the event that party of the second part shall at any time hereafter cease to use said real estate solely and exclusively for public school purposes then title to the same shall forthwith revert to party of the first part or its successors, heirs and assigns to their sole use and benefit forever and without compensation to party of the second part, its successors and assigns.\u201d\nCrown contends that the trial court\u2019s decision, which relied on Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 466 N.E.2d 322, which interpreted the term \u201cfor school purposes only\u201d in a deed, is not controlling here because Crown\u2019s deed was more detailed and also contained the words \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d and \u201cat all times.\u201d Crown argues that the term in the deed \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d defines and limits the term \u201cpublic school purposes\u201d in the reversion clause and precludes a finding that Wauconda can discontinue classroom instruction without causing a reversion of the property.\nIn Mahrenholz, a deed to land was given to the school district which provided: \u201cThis land to be used for school purposes only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein.\u201d The appellate court, in a well-reasoned opinion discussing authority from other jurisdictions, held that, as the phrase is used in the deed, the term \u201cschool purpose\u201d does not require the actual holding of classes and that some alternate use is permissible that would still be within the realm of \u201cschool purpose.\u201d (Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 627-28, 466 N.E.2d 322.) Summary judgment for the school district was reversed, however, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the actual use of the property. 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 631-32, 466 N.E.2d 322.\nContrary to Crown\u2019s contention, we believe the decision in Mahrenholz pertaining to the phrase \u201cschool purposes\u201d to be correct and controlling as to the deed in question here. The deed in the instant case conveyed the property to Wauconda \u201cto be used as a public school site.\u201d This grant was then followed by the words \u201cprovided, however, *** the real estate *** shall at all times be used solely and exclusively for public school purposes and that in the event that party of the second part shall at any time hereafter cease to use said real estate solely and exclusively for public school purposes then title *** shall forthwith revert.\u201d Crown contends that the words \u201cat all times\u201d make the instant deed more comprehensive than the deed in Mahrenholz and require that the property be used as a public school site \u201cat all times.\u201d However, the phrase is only used in the reversion clause which states \u201cshall at all times be used solely and exclusively for public school purposes\u201d which does not have a different meaning than \u201cschool purposes only.\u201d We believe the words \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d are merely declaratory of the general purpose of the conveyance, but they do not of themselves render the estate conditional. (See Downen v. Rayburn (1905), 214 Ill. 342, 347, 73 N.E. 364.) Nor do the words, as used in this deed, \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d convey a more restrictive or distinctive meaning than \u201cfor public school purposes.\u201d The operative words which cause the title to revert are contained in the reversion clause and follow the words \u201cprovided however.\u201d The words in the reversion clause chosen by the grantor state that if Wauconda shall cease to use the property solely and exclusively \u201cfor public school purposes,\u201d title reverts to the grantor.\nCrown relies on Craig v. Unknown Heirs (Okla. 1961), 358 P.2d 835, and points out the similarity in the use of the words \u201cTo Be used for a School House site only\u201d contained in the deed in issue there to the words \u201cto be used as a public school site\u201d in the instant case. In Craig, the court held that the use of the school for storage of school seats from another school and for community activities did not show an intention to use the land for any purpose connected with maintaining a public school on it. We note that the words of limitation in the deed in Craig were contained in the reversion clause, not merely following the property description as here. Also, the case does not stand for the proposition urged by Crown that classroom instruction must take place in the school under the words of that deed. Thus, Craig is not helpful to Crown.\nAs the words \u201cfor public school purposes\u201d in the reversion provision control, we agree with the decision in Mahrenholz, and the numerous out-of-State authorities cited therein, that this term does not require the actual holding of classes and that some alternate use is permissible which is within the realm of \u201cschool purposes.\u201d (Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 628, 466 N.E.2d 322.) Despite Crown\u2019s arguments which attempt to distinguish Mahrenholz from this case, we find the basic question presented there quite similar and the analysis persuasive.\nCrown also argues that parol evidence should be examined as an aid to the deed\u2019s interpretation. Crown urges that the deposition of John Crown and other affidavit and documentary evidence establish that the school site was donated to serve as a public school holding regular classroom instruction. While we have examined this material and do not believe it supports Crown\u2019s position, parol evidence was properly not considered by the trial court. The parol-evidence rule requires that the nature and extent of the estate granted shall be determined, as a matter of law, from the deed itself. It is not proper to go, beyond the four comers of the deed to ascertain the intention of the parties (Rockford Trust Co. v. Moon (1938), 370 Ill. 250, 253, 18 N.E.2d 447) or to limit the estate granted to a greater extent than the words in the deed indicate (Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 619, 626, 466 N.E.2d 322).\nCrown finally contends that section 16\u20141 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, par. 16\u20141) requires Wauconda to find some other alternative to closing Crown School. Section 16\u20141 provides:\n\u201cWhenever any grant, gift, donation or legacy of real or personal property has been or shall be, directly or indirectly, made to or for the use of any public school district and the deed, will or other instrument by which such grant, gift, donation, or legacy is made declares in terms or in substance that such property shall be held, managed, improved and invested or otherwise disposed of for the use and benefit of the public schools in such district, the title to such property shall be vested in the school board of such district for the use so expressed and shall be held, managed, improved, invested or disposed of by such board in such manner as will best promote and carry into effect the intention of the person making such grant, gift, donation, or legacy as expressed in the instrument by which it was made.\nThis Section does not apply in any case where the deed, will or other instrument effectively vests the title and control of such property in a trustee or grantee named in such instrument unless the trustee or grantee is incapable of taking or administering the trust, or refuses or fails to accept the trust, in which case the title and control thereof shall vest as provided in the preceding paragraph.\nThis Section does not validate any legacy which but for this enactment would have been invalid.\u201d\nWe do not find this provision to enhance Crown\u2019s position, nor does Crown explain how it does. The statute, in effect, provides that title to property given to a school district shall vest in the school board of the district, which shall hold, manage, improve, invest, or dispose of the property as best will promote the intention of the person giving the property. The statute has not been violated under the circumstances which have been described herein.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH, P.J., and UNVERZAGT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Louis R. Hegeman and Kathryn S. Mueller, both of Gould & Ratner, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Michael A. Loizzi and Elinor R Swiger, both of Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WAUCONDA COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 118, LAKE COUNTY, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. La SALLE NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 85\u2014156\nOpinion filed May 5, 1986.\nLouis R. Hegeman and Kathryn S. Mueller, both of Gould & Ratner, of Chicago, for appellants.\nMichael A. Loizzi and Elinor R Swiger, both of Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0052-01", "first_page_order": 74, "last_page_order": 82 }