{ "id": 5667277, "name": "AHN BROTHERS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DOMINIC J. BUTTITTA et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ahn Bros. v. Buttitta", "decision_date": "1986-05-09", "docket_number": "Nos. 84-1079, 84-1141 cons.", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3157944 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3385336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" }, { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337230 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523544 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3242108 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997468 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" }, { "page": "762-63" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3165803 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/278/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625115 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 723, "char_count": 15258, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8451403686756425e-08, "percentile": 0.3630661478719416 }, "sha256": "234c72bda26776e8cf46c654bb222d07c48df50a183da040451510a0483533a4", "simhash": "1:8c6757af394e9f9c", "word_count": 2445 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:23.440803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AHN BROTHERS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DOMINIC J. BUTTITTA et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STROUSE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs appeal from two orders of the trial court \u2014 one which directed a finding in favor of defendants on the declaratory judgment count of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, and the other which dismissed with prejudice the remaining counts of the complaint.\nPlaintiffs, Ahn Brothers, Inc., Dongkee Ahn and Sungkee Ahn, filed this tort action against defendants, Dominic J. Buttitta and Dominic A. Buttitta, seeking to recover damages and to set aside a release. Defendants owned and operated a shopping center located at 716 South Barrington Road in Streamwood. In August 1978, plaintiffs purchased a restaurant located in that shopping center and, in conjunction with the purchase, took an assignment of lease for the premises occupied by the restaurant. Pursuant to the assignment, plaintiffs assumed all liabilities of the lease, including rent, late-payment charges, shared-increased-property-tax expense, shared-common-area expense, shared-common-area lighting, and reimbursement for reasonable attorney fees and costs upon default.\nIn June 1980, plaintiffs sold the restaurant to N.J., Inc. for $78,000, payable in installments over four years and backed by a security interest in the restaurant and equipment. N.J., Inc. took an assignment of the lease covering the restaurant premises, with plaintiffs remaining liable in the event of default. \u2022\nIn the fall of 1980, N.J., Inc. encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay its monthly rental payments. Defendants contacted plaintiffs in December 1980 and demanded N.J., Inc.\u2019s December rent. Plaintiff Dongkee Ahn then met with Jack Mishler, one of the principals of N.J., Inc., and entered into a oral agreement whereby plaintiffs retook possession of the restaurant and agreed to resume making rent payments to defendants.\nPlaintiffs paid the December and January rent and penalties. No other payments were made.\nIn February 1981, Mishler ceased operation of the restaurant and abandoned it. Plaintiffs went into the restaurant a few times to clean it, but they did not reopen it. In April, Defendants changed the locks. Plaintiff Dongkee Ahn testified that he then telephoned defendant Dominic A. Buttitta and asked him why he changed the locks. Buttitta\u2019s response was, \u201cBring the rent. If you bring the rent, you can open the door.\u201d Plaintiff claimed, and defendants denied, that plaintiffs later unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the keys in person from defendant.\nDefendant Dominic J. Buttitta explained in his answers to interrogatories that the front-door lock was rekeyed on April 1, 1981, so that the premises could be secured from vandalism. Prior to this, defendant did not have a key to the front door. Plaintiffs took no other action and never reentered the premises.\nIn August 1981, defendants\u2019 attorney sent plaintiffs a release in which plaintiffs would be excused from any obligation to pay back rents, taxes, late charges and interest, in exchange for plaintiffs\u2019 release of any and all claims they had under the lease and to all personal or trade fixtures located at the restaurant. Plaintiffs signed the release both individually and for the corporation.\nPlaintiffs filed suit in June 1982 to set aside the release and to recover damages against defendants for their allegedly tortious conduct. The cause proceeded to trial on plaintiffs\u2019 fifth amended complaint which sought: (1) damages for trespass to realty, (2) damages for conversion, (3) damages for interference with prospective business advantage, and (4) declaratory judgment to test the validity and binding effect of the release.\nOn November 1, 1984, a bench trial was held on the declaratory judgment count. At the close of plaintiff\u2019s case, the court granted defendants\u2019 motion for a directed finding and thereby declared the release to be valid and binding. The court also set the remaining three counts for trial. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as to this order on November 13, 1984. Prior to trial on the remaining counts, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619). Following argument, the court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding that the release extinguished all remaining claims under the complaint. Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal as to this order. The appeals have been consolidated by this court.\nPlaintiffs first argue that, in directing a finding in favor of defendants on the declaratory judgment count, the trial court was required to follow the standard set forth in Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, namely, whether all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiffs, so overwhelmingly favors defendants that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Defendants submit that the proper standard is set forth in section 2 \u2014 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1110), which requires the court in a bench trial at the close of the plaintiffs proofs to \u201cweigh the evidence, considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and quality of the evidence.\u201d\nIt is well settled that in a bench trial the defendant may move for judgment at the close of the plaintiffs case. (McHenry State Bank v. City of McHenry (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 82, 84; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1110.) The trial court must first determine, as a legal question, whether the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case and must grant the defendant\u2019s motion if the plaintiff has failed to do so. If the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the court must then weigh the evidence considering the credibility of the witnesses and the quality of the evidence. (Kokinis v. Kotrich (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 151, 154-55; McHenry State Bank v. City of McHenry (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 82, 84; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1110.) If this weighing process negates some of the evidence necessary to the plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case, the court should enter judgment for the defendant. However, the motion should be denied if sufficient evidence remains to establish the plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case. Contrary to the Pedrick standard, the court is not to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. On appeal, the decision of the trial court should not be reversed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Kokinis v. Kotrich (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 151, 154.\nConsequently, the Pedrick standard the plaintiffs seek to impose is not appropriate under the present circumstances. The trial court proceeded under the correct standard as set forth in section 2\u20141110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon a review of the record, we conclude the trial court\u2019s determination is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the directed finding that the release was valid and binding will not be reversed.\nPlaintiffs then make a series of arguments directed at the trial court\u2019s finding that the release was valid and binding. They first argue that where a landlord violates the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 9 \u2014 101 et seq.), the exculpatory release is invalid and that the landlord may not seize the tenants\u2019 property in payment for rent unless there is a separate court action for distress (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 9 \u2014 301), whereby a warrant must be filed and the action proceeds in the circuit court (see Faubel v. Michigan Boulevard Building Co. (1934), 278 Ill. App. 159, 170).\nSecond, plaintiffs argue that the release is void for lack of valid consideration. They maintain the defendants\u2019 wrongful conduct (locking plaintiffs out of the restaurant and interfering with their efforts to sell) was the sole \u201cconsideration\u201d and, thus, the release was unenforceable.\nThird, plaintiffs argue that the release is unenforceable because of defendants\u2019 fraudulent misrepresentations. Plaintiffs claim that defendants misrepresented the amounts due under the lease and, based on these misrepresentations, plaintiffs signed the release. Plaintiffs allegedly owed only $2,500 (two months\u2019 rent), whereas defendants demanded approximately $14,000, including $2,794 in attorney fees and a mechanic\u2019s lien claim of $2,054.75.\nFourth, plaintiffs argue that the release is void because it was executed under duress, claiming that economic duress or business compulsion invalidates the release. They contend that they were coerced into signing the release because they were locked out of the restaurant and that the wrongful act of locking them out was the trigger for the action. Plaintiffs argue that defendants\u2019 wrongful conduct caused severe economic hardship and left plaintiffs with no viable alternatives.\nFifth, plaintiffs argue the release is unconscionable in that plaintiffs were required to give up $78,000 in restaurant equipment in exchange for a $7,500 rent obligation.\nTo all of these arguments, defendants reply that a mutual release is a contract subject to contract law (Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 762; Touhy v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 508, 512), which may be set aside only for fraud in the execution, fraud in the inducement, mutual mistake or mental incompetence (see Rudolph v. Santa Fe Park Enterprises, Inc. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374). Plaintiffs primarily focus on the issue of duress, while defendants claim that plaintiffs freely and voluntarily signed the release.\nThe trial court order specifically held that the release was \u201cvalid and binding\u201d and \u201cnot void due to duress or fraud.\u201d In so holding, the court found the issues of fact against the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs finished their proofs. The trial court considered the following facts.\nPlaintiffs owned the restaurant which was sold. The purchaser had financial difficulty and abandoned the restaurant. Plaintiffs became liable for lease payments and paid two months\u2019 rent through January and then stopped. The restaurant was closed in February, with no real effort to reopen by plaintiffs, and no further payment. The landlord testified that there had been vandalism in the restaurant and a break-in, which was the reason for changing the lock in April when plaintiffs claim they were evicted. Plaintiffs never tried to reenter thereafter and continue the business. While they claimed they were trying to sell the restaurant, no contract of sale was ever signed nor were any genuine buyers produced. Plaintiffs stopped putting money and effort into the business in February. They took no action until August when they executed a release, relieving themselves of the expense burden that had accumulated since January. Plaintiffs testified that after signing the release they thought that \u201ceverything was over [and] perfectly cleared up.\u201d\nThe issue of fraud and duress is one of fact, to be judged in light of all the circumstances surrounding a given transaction. (Schlossberg v. E.L. Trendel & Associates, Inc. (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 939, 943.) We conclude that the trial court\u2019s determination that the release was valid is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we uphold the finding in favor of defendants on the issues of fraud and duress.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final contention is that, even if the release is valid and enforceable, it does not bar their other tort claims of trespass to realty, conversion, and interference with a prospective business advantage. The relevant language of the release provides that plaintiffs \u201cagreed to release any and all claims which [they] may have under the lease agreement dated April 10, 1977, and to any and all personal or trade fixtures located at [the restaurant].\u201d Plaintiffs maintain that the release is limited to claims \u201cunder the lease\u201d or contract actions alleging a breach, not claims in tort. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the parties intended the release to be a general release which is valid as to all claims of which the signing parties had actual knowledge or could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.\nIt is well established that the intention of the parties controls the scope and effect of the release. Such intent is discerned from the language of the instrument when read in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. (Gladinus v. Laughlin (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 694, 696; see Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 762-63.) When an instrument contains recitals of, or other reference to, specific claims and also words of general release, the words of general release are limited to the particular claim to which reference is made. 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 763; see Gladinus v. Laughlin (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 694, 696.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claim for trespass is based on their possessory right to the premises under the terms of the lease. In fact, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel admitted in argument that the trespass count was barred by the release. Thus, the parties intended any claim for trespass to be released, and plaintiffs cannot now assert otherwise.\nSimilarly, plaintiffs\u2019 claim for conversion is barred by the release. That claim is based on the alleged \u201clock out\u201d by defendants and the resultant conversion of the property within the premises. The release specifically states that plaintiffs \u201cagreed to release any and all claims which [they] have *** to any and all personal or trade fixtures located at [the restaurant].\u201d To now claim that damages for conversion are warranted is in direct conflict with this language of the release having such a claim.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim for interference with a prospective business advantage is based on defendants\u2019 failure or refusal to negotiate with a prospective purchaser regarding an assignment of plaintiffs\u2019 lease. Plaintiffs allege that under the terms of the lease defendants were obligated to consent to the assignment and they frustrated those efforts. The elements of the tort of interference with prospective advantage are set out in Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 547. The plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of entering a valid business relationship, and defendant must purposely interfere and defeat this legitimate expectancy, thereby causing harm to the plaintiff. (90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 552.) Here, it is apparent that the business relationship contemplated by the plaintiffs was the assignment of the lease. This relationship depended upon the right to occupy the premises, and all rights to occupancy under the lease were released in August. These were within the scope of the release, and the trial court properly dismissed the three tort counts of plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH, P.J., and HOPF, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STROUSE" } ], "attorneys": [ "L. Steven Platt, of Arnold & Kadjan, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Roger C. Nelson, Jr., of Wheaton, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AHN BROTHERS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DOMINIC J. BUTTITTA et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNos. 84\u20141079, 84\u20141141 cons.\nOpinion filed May 9, 1986.\nL. Steven Platt, of Arnold & Kadjan, of Chicago, for appellants.\nRoger C. Nelson, Jr., of Wheaton, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 381 }