{ "id": 5665230, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDDIE L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Anderson", "decision_date": "1986-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 5-85-0114", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "571", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 1041", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1044" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N,E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5492960 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141137 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2485353 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590403 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 510, "char_count": 11657, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.227407161137016e-07, "percentile": 0.6048758055006296 }, "sha256": "ad0e2eb8cb2f04dd70167cf885d8ab24c3bcc7e17bc2fe3f2008434cf3b18b4c", "simhash": "1:b9af6b9d2a71a6cb", "word_count": 1959 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:23.440803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDDIE L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery County granting defendant\u2019s, Eddie L. Anderson\u2019s, motion to dismiss a charge of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute.\nDefendant was arrested on October 28, 1984, and subsequently charged by information with the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1.) A preliminary hearing was held on November 8, 1984, at which time Sergeant Fred Fowler testified that, while working undercover, he observed a white Cadillac pull into a rest area off of Interstate 55. Two females exited the Cadillac and approached a truck containing two undercover officers. The officers were allegedly offered, in exchange for money, oral sex and intercourse by the females. The females and defendant were placed under arrest. One of the females, a 15-year-old, informed an investigating officer that defendant had brought her to the rest stop for the purpose of performing oral sex and intercourse in exchange for money. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On January 21, 1985, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the ground that the acts alleged in the information did not constitute the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute. Also on January 21, 1985, an additional information was filed charging defendant with pandering. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11\u2014 16(a)(2).\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether count I of the information, alleging that defendant directed a prostitute under the age of 16 to a rest area knowing that such direction was for the purpose of prostitution, is sufficient to charge defendant with the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute.\nSection 11 \u2014 15.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that \u201c[a]ny person who violates any of the provisions of section 11 \u2014 15(a) of this Act commits soliciting for a juvenile prostitute where the prostitute for whom such person is soliciting is under 16 years of age.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1(a).) The applicable portion of section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code provides that a person who \u201c[djirects another to a place knowing such direction is for the purpose of prostitution\u201d commits soliciting for a prostitute. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3).\nThe State contends that the term \u201canother\u201d should be construed broadly to refer to either the prostitute or the prospective patron. According to the State\u2019s position, the act of directing a prostitute to a particular place for the purpose of prostitution is sufficient to bring this conduct within the purview of section 11 \u2014 15(a)(3) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3)). Defendant asserts that the term \u201canother\u201d refers only to the patron and not to the prostitute. Accordingly, defendant maintains that because there was no direct contact between himself and a prospective patron, the trial court correctly granted the motion to dismiss the charge of soliciting for a prostitute.\nThe State cites People v. Blair (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d. 655, 449 N.E.2d 172, in support of its argument that the term \u201canother\u201d refers to either the prostitute or the patron. In Blair, the defendant allegedly approached an undercover policewoman and offered her $15 in exchange for an act of oral copulation. (114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 449 N.E.2d 172.) Defendant was convicted of soliciting for a prostitute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1); People v. Blair (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 449 N.E.2d 172.) On appeal, defendant argued that the statute did not proscribe soliciting a prostitute, but proscribed conduct by third persons that aided and abetted the transaction between the prostitute and the patron. (114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 656, 449 N.E.2d 172, 173.) In support of his contention, defendant cited the committee comments set forth in the Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes which state that subsection (a)(1) \u201cenvisions one who actively seeks out customers for the prostitute, those who initiate the suggestion to the prospective patron.\u201d (People v. Blair (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 656, 449 N.E.2d 172, 173.) The court, in rejecting defendant\u2019s argument, stated that, \u201c[wjhen a statute uses words which have a well-known legal meaning, courts will assume that is the meaning intended by the legislature. [Citation.] [and] [i]f the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, there should be no resort to extrinsic aids such as legislative history. [Citation.]\u201d (114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 657, 449 N.E.2d 172, 173.) The court concluded that the language of the statute was easily understood and held that the statute proscribed both soliciting a prostitute and soliciting another on behalf of a prostitute. 114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 656-57, 449 N.E.2d 172,173.\nWe agree with the statement in Blair that the terms \u201csolicit\u201d and \u201cprostitution\u201d are so well and universally understood as to require no further definition. (People v. Blair (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 656, 449 N.E.2d 172, 173, quoting People v. Rice (1943), 383 Ill. 584, 50 N.E.2d 711.) However, we do not believe that the term \u201canother,\u201d as set forth in the statute at issue here (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3)) and in Blair (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1)), has such a clear and unambiguous meaning so as to prohibit the use of extrinsic aids in our interpretation of the statute. Additionally, Blair is distinguishable from the instant case because it did not involve application of the soliciting for a juvenile prostitute statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1.\nIn our endeavor to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the statute must be read as a whole and all relevant parts considered. (City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 341, 473 N.E.2d 1313, 1315; People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576.) Section 11 \u2014 15.1 requires consideration of the provisions of section 11 \u2014 15, therefore, the language in the soliciting for a juvenile prostitute statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1) is instructive on the issue of whether the term \u201canother,\u201d as used in the soliciting for a prostitute statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3)), refers to either the prostitute or the patron. The relevant language of the section 11 \u2014 15.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1) provides that:\n\u201cAny person who violates any of the provisions of Section 11 \u2014 15(a) of this Act commits soliciting for a juvenile prostitute where the prostitute for whom such person is soliciting is under 16 years of age.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe believe that the underscored language clearly indicates that the person to be charged under the soliciting for a juvenile prostitute statute is one who acts on behalf of the juvenile prostitute in procuring customers. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1.\nBecause the soliciting for a prostitute statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15) is ambiguous, it is proper to look beyond the language of the statute itself in an effort to ascertain the intent of the legislature. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475-76, 433 N,E.2d 674, 677.) The committee comments contained in the Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes are a proper source to consider in seeking legislative intent. (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 356, 263 N.E.2d 840, 846.) \u201c[Subsection (a)(1)] envisions one who actively seeks out customers for the prostitute, those who initiate the suggestion to the prospective patron.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1), Committee Comments, at 341 (Smith-Hurd 1979).) \u2018\u2022\u2018[Subsection (a)(3)] deals with directing the prospective patron to a prostitute or a place of prostitution.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3), Committee Comments, at 341-42 (Smith-Hurd 1979).) While certainly not dispositive of the issue at hand, the committee comments provide additional support for the interpretation that the legislature\u2019s intent is to punish the conduct of the prostitute\u2019s consort in procuring customers on behalf of the prostitute. Furthermore, the use of the language \u201csoliciting for a prostitute\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)) also supports this interpretation.\nReading the soliciting for a prostitute statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15) in conjunction with the soliciting for a juvenile prostitute statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1), and in light of the committee comments, we conclude that the legislature intended section 11 \u2014 15(a)(3) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3)) to apply to those persons who direct prospective patrons to a place knowing such direction is for the purpose of prostitution. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nOur interpretation of section 11 \u2014 15(a)(3) does not mean that conduct between the prostitute\u2019s consort and the prostitute is not subject to sanctions. Conduct of this type is covered by the pandering statute of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 16.) Defendant was subsequently charged with violating section 11\u2014 16(a)(2) in that he arranged a situation, in exchange for money, in which a female could practice prostitution. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 16(a)(2).) Defendant does not challenge the charge of pandering on appeal. Although this appeal does not directly involve application of section 11 \u2014 15(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1)), we feel compelled to address the impact of our interpretation of the term \u201canother\u201d upon this section of the soliciting for a prostitute statute. Absent a contrary indication, a term used in one section of a statute will be given the same meaning in a separate section of that same statute. (People v. Hudson (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1044, 448 N.E.2d 178, 181.) Therefore, having construed the term \u201canother\u201d in section 11 \u2014 15(a)(3) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(3)) to refer only to the prospective patron of the prostitute, the same meaning also applies to section 11\u2014 15(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. ll-15(a)(l)). The impact of our interpretation is that a prospective patron who solicits a prostitute for the purpose of prostitution cannot be properly charged with violating section 11 \u2014 15(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11\u2014 15(a)(1)). Thus, we are in disagreement with the decision in Blair. Where, however, the patron enters or remains in a place of prostitution with the intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct or where the patron actually engages in an act of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a prostitute, he commits the offense of patronizing a prostitute in violation of section 11 \u2014 18 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 11 \u2014 18(a)(1), (2)).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARRISON and WELCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Gregory B. Grigsby, Public Defender, of Taylorville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDDIE L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 85\u20140114\nOpinion filed May 22, 1986.\nBarbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nGregory B. Grigsby, Public Defender, of Taylorville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 589, "last_page_order": 593 }