{ "id": 5666311, "name": "GARY ECKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE POLICE PENSION FUND FOR THE CITY OF ELGIN et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Eckman v. Board of Trustees for Police Pension Fund", "decision_date": "1986-05-21", "docket_number": "No. 2-85-0259", "first_page": "757", "last_page": "765", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 757" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3235760 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5187075 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/18/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436910 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 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App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2454911 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/39/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112193 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127018 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134628 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127690 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519212 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625413 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 1123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530365 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530042 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0566-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 698, "char_count": 18445, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.026521975624541e-07, "percentile": 0.8542586845796801 }, "sha256": "c8904251afa6ed60371defd0514a9a418dde84ee97c73cc0d08fb379da0c65a4", "simhash": "1:1ea7d98ca70ac23f", "word_count": 2957 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:23.440803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GARY ECKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE POLICE PENSION FUND FOR THE CITY OF ELGIN et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Gary Eckman, filed a complaint for administrative review of an action taken by the defendant board of trustees of the police pension fund for the city of Elgin (board), wherein the board, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 151 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code), reduced plaintiff\u2019s disability pension benefits in an amount equal to workers\u2019 compensation benefits he was to receive from the city of Elgin. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1O81/2, par. 3 \u2014 151 (now codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 3 \u2014 114.5).) The board filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint, alleging that the board\u2019s action was not subject to administrative review. The trial court denied the board\u2019s motion to dismiss. At a subsequent hearing on plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review the court ruled in plaintiff\u2019s favor, reversing the board\u2019s decision to reduce plaintiff\u2019s disability pension benefits pursuant to section 3 \u2014 151 of the Code. The board appeals.\nIn this court the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the board\u2019s interpretation and application of section 3\u2014 151 of the Code was unconstitutional; that the board\u2019s action in reducing plaintiff\u2019s disability pension benefits did not constitute an administrative decision subject to review; and that the board\u2019s action, if subject to administrative review, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOn October 21, 1983, plaintiff, a police officer employed by the city of Elgin and a contributor to the police pension fund administered by the board, applied for disability pension benefits. Plaintiff sought work related disability benefits, maintaining that he had incurred certain injuries to his back on August 27, 1982, and October 21, 1982, while on duty. The board sent plaintiff to three doctors for their respective opinions regarding plaintiff\u2019s physical condition. All agreed that plaintiff\u2019s condition presently prevented him from performing regular or even light duty. Based on the opinions of these doctors but also on the fact that the board believed the plaintiff had not incurred the injuries while on duty in August and October 1982, the board decided to award plaintiff nonduty disability pension benefits, or benefits worth 50% of his former salary as a police officer. In a letter dated December 13, 1983, the board informed plaintiff that it had elected to place him on \u201ca regular disability pension.\u201d\nOn or about March 20, 1984, plaintiff, who had also filed a claim against the city of Elgin for workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the August and October 1982 injuries, entered into a lump-sum settlement agreement with the city. On April 19, 1984, the board, upon receipt of a letter indicating plaintiff\u2019s lump-settlement award by-workers\u2019 compensation, reduced plaintiff\u2019s pension payments by the amount equal to plaintiff\u2019s settlement award, pursuant to section 3\u2014 151 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 3 \u2014 151 (now codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 3 \u2014 114.5).) The board notified plaintiff of this reduction in a letter dated April 20,1984.\nOn June 8, 1984, plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review of administrative decision, requesting that the board\u2019s April 19 decision reducing plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits be reversed and that the board be ordered to pay the benefits to plaintiff without deduction for monies received by plaintiff as a result of the workers\u2019 compensation settlement. Alternatively, plaintiff requested the court to modify the board\u2019s December 1983 decision placing plaintiff on a non-duty-related disability pension to a duty-related pension, awarding plaintiff, retroactively, pension benefits of 65% of his former salary rather than benefits of 50%, as formerly determined by the board.\nThe board filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the board\u2019s administrative act of reducing plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits did not constitute a decision subject to administrative review, as its action was mandated by section 3 \u2014 151 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 3 \u2014 151 (now codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 3 \u2014 114.5).) Additionally, the board maintained that the plaintiff was barred from seeking modification of the board\u2019s December 1983 decision since plaintiff did not seek administrative review of that decision within 35 days of his receipt of that decision as required by the Administrative Review Law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.) At a hearing conducted on the board\u2019s motion to dismiss on October 9,1984, the court denied the motion.\nSubsequently, the board filed a record of proceedings of the board of trustees for the Elgin police pension fund pertaining to the disability pension due plaintiff. This record was supplemented with plaintiff\u2019s letter to the board regarding his injuries. After consideration of this record and the supporting memoranda of the parties, the trial court interpreted section 3 \u2014 151 of the Code to mean that an individual\u2019s disability pension benefits should be reduced by the amount of his workers\u2019 compensation benefits only when a work-related pension is involved. To interpret the statute as referring to both the work-related and non-work-related pension benefits, as the board did, would, in the trial court\u2019s opinion, permit \u201cdouble recovery\u201d by the board. The court found the board\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 151 to be unconstitutional and further recommended that the legislature should amend the language of the statute to \u201cclarify and specifically provide that the reduction of pension benefits by a lien against workers\u2019 compensation proceeds may only occur in work-related pensions and not in non-work-related pensions.\u201d\nThe court reversed the board\u2019s decision reducing plaintiff\u2019s benefits and ordered the board to pay plaintiff pension benefits without reduction for benefits received in conjunction with the workers\u2019 compensation settlement as well as to reimburse plaintiff for pension benefits the board had previously deducted.\nThe board filed a timely notice of appeal.\nWe first consider whether the trial court erred in finding that the board\u2019s interpretation and application of section 3 \u2014 151 of the Illinois Pension Code was unconstitutional. In its order the trial court found the board\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 151 to be unconstitutional, as it would permit \u201cdouble recovery\u201d by the board. In reality, however, the question addressed by the trial court did not concern the constitutionality of the board\u2019s interpretation of the statute but rather the reasonableness. It is this question of reasonableness which we consider in this opinion.\nThe parties have presented no cases dealing with an interpretation of section 3 \u2014 151. Our research has revealed only one, a case from this district, Taft v. Board of Trustees (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 566, 479 N.E.2d 31, which did involve section 3 \u2014 151. In Taft, this court was concerned with the reduction of a police officer\u2019s disability pension benefits by the amount of benefits payable to him under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. However, the reduction was not objected to for the same reasons espoused here (see 133 Ill. App. 3d 566, 479 N.E.2d 31), and the case did not require this court to construe the statute.\nAdditionally, our review of other pension statutes which contain language nearly identical to that found in section 3 \u2014 151, e.g., General Assembly Retirement System (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 2 \u2014 121.2), firefighters\u2019 pension fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 4 \u2014 114.2), Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 7 \u2014 222), and Judges Retirement System of Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1081/2, par. 18 \u2014 128.2), has disclosed only one other case pertaining to the effect of workers\u2019 compensation benefits upon disability pension benefits. That case, Sellards v. Board of Trustees (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 415, 478 N.E.2d 1123, involved a reduction of a fireman\u2019s disability pension benefits by the amount of payments he was receiving under workers\u2019 compensation. The issue upon review in Sellar\u00e1s was dissimilar to the present issue. However, of note to our determination in the instant case is the fact that the Sellar\u00e1s opinion indicates the injury which resulted in the reduction of the pension benefits was duty related. Likewise, the injury resulting in the pension benefits in Taft was also work related.\nIn circumstances such as exist in the instant case where the statute in question has not yet been judicially interpreted, \u201ca court is guided by both the plain meaning of the language in the statute as well as legislative intent. [Citation.]\u201d (Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 245, 446 N.E.2d 1271.) When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court\u2019s only function is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. (Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 463, 470, 452 N.E.2d 49.) But, where a statute is unclear or susceptible to more than one meaning, as the parties contend here, then an appellate court must interpret the statute to clarify its application. Penman v. Board of Trustees (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 139, 144, 418 N.E.2d 795.\nThe relevant portion of section 3 \u2014 151 provides:\n\u201cWhenever any person is entitled to a disability or survivors benefit under this Article and to benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act or the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act in relation to the same injury or disease, the monthly benefits payable under this Article shall be reduced by the amount of any such benefits payable under either of those Acts ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 151 (now codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 114.5).)\nThe apparent intention of section 3 \u2014 151, in this court\u2019s opinion, is to prevent an individual from recovering twice for the same work-related injury and, therefore, we agree with plaintiff\u2019s interpretation that the phrase \u201cin relation to the same injury or disease\u201d means that the injury or disease in question must be sustained in the police officer\u2019s line of duty. Otherwise, the pension benefits and workers\u2019 compensation benefits could not be related to the same injury, as under the terms of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an individual can only be compensated for an injury which \u201caris[es] out of and in the course of employment.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.2; Unger v. Continental Assurance Co. (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 481 N.E.2d 684.) \u201cArising out of\u201d refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury while \u201cin the course of\u201d employment involves the time, place and circumstances of the injury. 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 481 N.E.2d 684.\nThe board\u2019s argument that all the benefits were for the same injury is not based on the fact that the injury in question was a back injury but on the fact that in claiming both the pension benefits and the workers\u2019 compensation benefits, plaintiff utilized the same dates, August 27, 1982, and October 21, 1982, as the dates on which the injury occurred. Because the dates of the injury were the same for both claims, the board concludes that only one injury, the same injury, was the subject of the pension benefits and the workers\u2019 compensation benefits. This argument totally ignores that the board, in finding that plaintiff\u2019s injury was non-duty-related, noted in its record of proceedings that plaintiff filed no injury report on either of these dates, failed to mention to his superior that he had been injured on these dates, and also stated in the insurance claim for treatment on his back that he did not know how the injury occurred and that he had been bothered off and on since 1977 by the same injury. Thus, the record of the board\u2019s meetings strongly implies that it concluded the injury for which it awarded disability pension benefits did not occur on the August and October dates.\nAs a result of its finding, the board cannot now complain because another agency concluded otherwise and decided to award plaintiff work-related benefits for an injury that agency determined did occur on the August and October 1982 dates. Based on the language of the statute and the fact that the board determined the injury under consideration by it was not work related, we believe that the trial court was correct. in concluding that the injury for which plaintiff received his pension benefits and the injury for which he received his workers\u2019 compensation benefits did not constitute the same injury.\nIn construing a statutory enactment, the primary purpose is to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intention, not only from the language which it has used, but also from the reason and necessity for the act, the evils sought to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought to be obtained. (Cloninger v. National General Insurance Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 419, 424, 488 N.E.2d 548.) In our view, the purpose of the enactment of section 3 \u2014 151 and identical sections in other pension statutes of this State was to prevent an individual from recovering both pension benefits and workers\u2019 compensation benefits for an injury that arose out of and in the course of one\u2019s employment. We conclude that the plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 151 is both reasonable and the one intended by the legislature and that, therefore, the trial court was correct in finding in plaintiff\u2019s favor. Further, we agree with the trial court\u2019s recommendation that the legislature of this State should review the language of section 3 \u2014 151 to clarify its application.\nInterrelated with the issue of the interpretation of section 3\u2014 151 is the board\u2019s contention that its act of reducing plaintiff\u2019s disability pension benefits did not constitute an administrative decision subject to review. It is the board\u2019s position that because section 3\u2014 151 required it to reduce plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits, the board\u2019s subsequent act of compliance equaled nothing more than a ministerial act. Thus, the board argues, the trial court\u2019s denial of the board\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review was erroneous as no administrative decision existed for review. Alternatively, the board argues that if its decision was subject to administrative review, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOn the other hand, plaintiff maintains that the board\u2019s actions constituted an administrative decision as defined in section 3 \u2014 101 of the Administrative Review Law. That section provides:\n\u201c \u2018Administrative decision\u2019 or \u2018decision\u2019 means any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101.)\nPlaintiff argues that since the board\u2019s decision affected his legal rights, duties, or privileges in regard to his receipt of his pension benefits, the board\u2019s decision equaled an administrative decision and, as such, was subject to review by the trial court. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the board\u2019s administrative act of reducing plaintiff\u2019s disability pension benefits was barred by the principle of collateral estoppel and, therefore, was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed to prevent the re-litigation of the same issue which was decided in a prior action and which is also material to the resolution of the present action. (Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 423, 432-33, 447 N.E.2d 834.) The doctrine applies to judgments and issues determined in agency proceedings (McKinney v. City of East St. Louis (1963), 39 Ill. App. 2d 137, 188 N.E.2d 341), as well as to adjudications of issues by courts of competent jurisdiction. Since the board previously decided in December 1983 to award plaintiff a non-duty-related pension instead of the \u201cline of duty\u201d pension for which he applied, we find the board was collaterally estopped from deciding in April 1984 that the disabling condition for which plaintiff was receiving disability pension benefits constituted the same injury for which he was to receive workers\u2019 compensation benefits, or benefits for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. (Deal v. Industrial Com. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 234, 237, 357 N.E.2d 541.) Consequently, the board\u2019s decision to reduce plaintiff\u2019s non-duty-related pension benefits by the amount of his work-related workers\u2019 compensation benefits was clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA board of trustees for a pension fund possesses no powers other than those given to it in the act creating it. (Bowden v. Flannery (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 299, 313, 152 N.E.2d 188.) To give validity to its findings and orders an agency must act in accordance with the powers promulgated by the legislature. (Ragano v. Civil Service Com. (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527, 400 N.E.2d 97.) In the instant case, the act creating the board gave it the power to reduce an officer\u2019s pension benefits only when those benefits were due to the same work-related injury for which he was also receiving workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Therefore, in reducing plaintiff\u2019s non-work-related pension benefits by the sum of his work-related workers\u2019 compensation benefits, the board acted beyond the powers and authority given to it by the Illinois Pension Code. Since the purpose of judicial review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision is to keep the agency within its statutory grant of authority and thus protect the rights of the parties which are guaranteed by the constitution and statutes (80 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527, 400 N.E.2d 97), it was proper for the court to review the agency\u2019s decision.\nBased on all the reasons given above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.\nAffirmed.\nREINHARD and STROUSE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Erwin W. Jentsch and Daniel P. Blond\u00edn, both of Elgin, for appellants.", "William F. Castillo, of Ariano, Anderson, Bazos, Hardy, Kramer & Castillo, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GARY ECKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE POLICE PENSION FUND FOR THE CITY OF ELGIN et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 85\u20140259\nOpinion filed May 21, 1986.\nErwin W. Jentsch and Daniel P. Blond\u00edn, both of Elgin, for appellants.\nWilliam F. Castillo, of Ariano, Anderson, Bazos, Hardy, Kramer & Castillo, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0757-01", "first_page_order": 779, "last_page_order": 787 }