{ "id": 5668041, "name": "LAURA PUTZBACH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Putzbach v. Allstate Insurance", "decision_date": "1986-06-05", "docket_number": "No. 85-0202", "first_page": "1077", "last_page": "1082", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 1077" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3082145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083008 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 964", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633382 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984010 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075623 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-25" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "423-25" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0420-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 13985, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8903280802195876e-07, "percentile": 0.728908905499896 }, "sha256": "f9581179093f69c2ecad411313b41e5b5782f1e9a16d6a77e8a58e053a23d771", "simhash": "1:297e249c5551c746", "word_count": 2228 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:23.440803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LAURA PUTZBACH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REINHART)\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Laura Putzbaeh, brought this complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, requesting the circuit court of Du Page County to declare the rights and liabilities of the parties relative to the uninsured motorist provisions under a specified automobile.insurance policy issued to the plaintiff\u2019s father. Plaintiff had previously been paid the $15,000 limit under the uninsured motorist provisions of a separate policy where she was the named insured. Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615(e)) contending that plaintiff could not \u201cstack\u201d the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies because various provisions of her father\u2019s policy specifically denied multiple coverage. Following the denial of defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s oral motion for judgment on the pleadings and found that her father\u2019s policy provided uninsured motorist coverage to her up to the $15,000 limit.\nThe issue on appeal is whether plaintiff is entitled to stack insurance coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of her father\u2019s policy which contains \u201climits of liability\u201d and \u201cother insurance\u201d sections which defendant contends precludes the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages.\nThe facts in this case are not in dispute. On June 2, 1981, plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on an uninsured motor vehicle (a motorcycle) which was involved in a \u201cone-car\u201d accident. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was the named insured under an automobile insurance policy written by defendant. Additionally, plaintiff, as a resident relative in the same household, was an unnamed insured under a policy also written by defendant for plaintiff\u2019s father. Each policy provided for uninsured motorist coverage in the maximum amount of $15,000 per person, and plaintiff\u2019s policy further provided for $5,000 medical payments coverage. Plaintiff made a claim pursuant to her policy, and defendant paid to her $4,231.60 for medical expenses and $15,000 for her uninsured motorist limits pursuant to her policy. Plaintiff then made a demand, as a resident member of her father\u2019s household, for payment under the uninsured motorist coverage of her father\u2019s policy which was denied by defendant. There is no dispute that plaintiff was covered by both policies. Defendant took the position that certain provisions of these two policies clearly and unambiguously limit the total uninsured motorist benefits payable under the policies to the $15,000 already paid.\nThe insurance policy issued to plaintiff\u2019s father which is at issue here contains two provisions in part V of the policy (uninsured motorist insurance coverage) which defendant maintains preclude the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage, as follows:\n\u201cLimits of Liability\nThe coverage limit stated on the declarations page for:\n(1) \u2018each person\u2019 is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident.\n(2) \u2018each accident\u2019 is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one motor vehicle accident.\nThe uninsured motorists limits apply to each insured auto as stated on the declarations page. This means the insuring of more than one person or auto under this or other auto policies will not increase our uninsured motorists limit of liability beyond the amount shown for any one auto, even though a separate premium is charged for each auto.\nDamages payable will be reduced by:\n(1) All amounts paid by the owner or operator of the uninsured auto or anyone else responsible. This includes all sums paid under the bodily injury liability coverage of this or any other auto policy.\n(2) All amounts payable under any workers compensation law, disability benefits law, or similar law, Personal Medical Payments, or any similar automobile medical payments coverage.\nIf There is Other Insurance\nIf the injured person was occupying a vehicle you do not own which is insured for this coverage under another policy, this coverage will be excess. This means that when the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages in excess of the other policy limit, we will only pay the amount by which the limit of liability of this policy exceeds the limit of liability of that policy.\nIf more than one policy applies to the accident on a primary basis, the total benefits payable to any one person will not exceed the maximum benefits payable by the policy with the highest limit for uninsured motorists coverage. We will bear our proportionate share with other uninsured motorists benefits. This applies no matter how many autos or auto policies may be involved whether written by Allstate or another company.\u201d\nExamining first the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision, we agree with the parties that the first paragraph of that provision is factually inapplicable here because it refers to a vehicle plaintiff was occupying which is insured under another policy. The motorcycle on which plaintiff was a passenger was not insured by the owner. Focusing on the second paragraph, defendant contends that the language of that clause clearly and unambiguously precludes stacking. It cites, in particular, the language of the third sentence of that paragraph which provides that \u201c[tjhis applies no matter how many *** auto policies may be involved whether written by Allstate or another company.\u201d Defendant maintains that reading that sentence together with the first sentence of the paragraph, which provides that benefits \u201cwill not exceed the maximum benefits payable by the policy with the highest limit for uninsured motorists coverage,\u201d leaves no doubt that plaintiff cannot stack the policies. Defendant contends that the policy language prohibiting stacking, as in Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539, is permissible where clear and unambiguous.\nPlaintiff responds that the second paragraph of the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision is inapplicable because it is only operative if more than one policy applies to the accident on a \u201cprimary\u201d basis. Plaintiff argues that as plaintiff\u2019s own policy is \u201cprimary\u201d and her father\u2019s is \u201cexcess or secondary,\u201d the provision is not applicable. Plaintiff also contends that because the second sentence of the paragraph contains the language that provides for proration with other uninsured motorists benefits, the clause is ambiguous under the rationale in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247, and Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150.\nIn Glidden, a case in which an \u201cother insurance\u201d provision provided for proration between uninsured motorist provisions of different policies, our supreme court found that the apparent purpose of the proration clause was to distribute responsibility among multiple insurers and, as such, has no meaningful purpose when applied to coverages issued by the same company. (Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 312 N.E.2d 247.) The provision provided:\n\u201cExcept as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.\u201d (57 Ill. 2d 330, 334, 312 N.E.2d 247.)\nBecause it was found to have no meaningful purpose when applied to the same company, it was held to be ambiguous and did not prevent stacking of policies all issued by the same company. See also Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150.\nIn Menke, however, the court held that a clause in the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy prohibited stacking of coverage of multiple insurance policies issued by one insurer. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423-25, 401 N.E.2d 539.) The pertinent provision stated:\n\u201cWith respect to any occurrence, accident, death or loss to which this and any other automobile insurance policy issued to the Named Insured by the Company also applies, the total limit of the Company\u2019s liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability or benefit amount under any one such policy.\u201d (78 Ill. 2d 420, 423, 401 N.E.2d 539.)\nThis provision did not contain a proration clause but did, as in the instant case, specifically make the clause applicable whether the multiple policies were written by the same company or another company, unlike the provision in Glidden. The court determined that the clause was unambiguous, valid, and not against public policy. Menke v. County Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423-25, 401 N.E.2d 539.\nIn light of the decisions in Glidden and Menke, our inquiry is whether the clause is unambiguous, for if it is, the clause may be applied as written and prevent the stacking of these two insurance policies. The construction of an insurance policy presents only a question of law and can be determined on review independent of the trial court\u2019s judgment. (See Uhwat v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 295, 302, 465 N.E.2d 964.) In determining whether there is an ambiguity, the clause must be read in its factual context and not in isolation. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 429 N.E.2d 1203; Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 424, 401 N.E.2d 539.\nHere, as in Menke, an examination of the clause at issue clearly reveals that if more than one policy applies, the total benefit payable to any one person will not exceed the maximum benefits payable by the policy with the highest limit for uninsured motorists coverage. The provision further expressly provides that this \u201capplies no matter how many auto policies may be involved whether written by Allstate or another company.\u201d Were these the only two sentences in the provision and assuming all provide primary coverage, plaintiff concedes that the language precludes the policies from being stacked. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that the inclusion of the sentence on proration of benefits makes the whole clause ambiguous. We disagree.\nWhile the inclusion of a proration clause was found to make the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision in issue in Glidden ambiguous, the language of the policy in Glidden did not contain the express language present in the third sentence of the provision here which applies to policies \u201cwhether written by Allstate or another company.\u201d Thus, the proration clause, read in the factual context of all three sentences in the policy at issue here, clearly can only refer to the situation where other insurance is written by another company. Such a proration clause is necessary in an insurance policy to make certain that one insurance company does not pay a disproportionate amount of a loss which is to be shared with another company. Reading the entire paragraph in its factual context and not taking the proration clause in isolation (see Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 424, 401 N.E.2d 539), we find the entire paragraph is unambiguous and is clearly applicable both to multiple coverages provided by one insurance company and of another company. Accordingly, coverage cannot be stacked.\nNor are we persuaded by plaintiff\u2019s argument that the clause in question is inapplicable because it specifies multiple policies applying to the accident on a \u201cprimary\u201d basis. Plaintiff contends that as her own policy was \u201cprimary\u201d and her father\u2019s policy was \u201cexcess or secondary,\u201d the clause against stacking is inapplicable under the facts of this case. Insurance companies are liable according to the terms of their agreements, and insurance policies should be construed like any other contract (see Dotson v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 804, 807, 428 N.E.2d 1002); and whether a policy is \u201cprimary\u201d or \u201csecondary or excess\u201d depends upon the terms of the policy. The only part of the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision of plaintiff\u2019s father\u2019s policy which refers to \u201cexcess\u201d coverage is in the first paragraph, and, the parties agree, the first paragraph is not applicable here because plaintiff was not injured while occupying an unowned vehicle which was insured under another policy. The motorcycle plaintiff was riding on as a passenger was not insured. Plaintiff has not pointed out any language in either of the policies which would make one policy excess and the other primary under the circumstances here. We therefore conclude that both policies are primary as to the uninsured motorist clause in issue under the circumstances here.\nAs we have determined that the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision prevents the stacking of the two insurance policies, we need not consider defendant\u2019s additional argument on appeal that the \u201climits of liability\u201d provision also precludes the stacking of the two policies.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff and enter judgment for defendant on its motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nJudgment reversed and judgment entered for defendant.\nNASH, P.J., and UNVERZAGT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REINHART)" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven M. Levy and William T. Barker, both of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago, for appellant.", "George N. Avgeris, Chartered, of Hinsdale, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAURA PUTZBACH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 85 \u2014 0202\nOpinion filed June 5, 1986.\nRehearing denied July 7, 1986.\nSteven M. Levy and William T. Barker, both of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago, for appellant.\nGeorge N. Avgeris, Chartered, of Hinsdale, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1077-01", "first_page_order": 1099, "last_page_order": 1104 }