{ "id": 3498911, "name": "THEO KOMAREC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Komarec v. Illinois Department of Labor", "decision_date": "1986-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201485\u20140253", "first_page": "1105", "last_page": "1112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 1105" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 1081", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3434996 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/1081-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716760 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632174 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676747 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 L. Ed. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12103272, 12103312 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0935-01", "/us/400/0935-02" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897332 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592288 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591252 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3518523 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597342 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629126 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594522 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631935 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3147836 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559403 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0185-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 665, "char_count": 14950, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.743229100877124e-07, "percentile": 0.7073323579868942 }, "sha256": "cccb0b3a48e17e87bdcedc168617548e8152e9ce09244ef7e856d35025a9f8c9", "simhash": "1:4fa5f4446ab17471", "word_count": 2407 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:09:36.612611+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THEO KOMAREC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Board of Review (Board) and Illinois Department of Labor (Department), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Winnebago County, entered in an administrative review proceeding, which reversed the Board\u2019s determination that plaintiff, Theo Komarec, was not qualified for unemployment-insurance benefits under the provisions of section 601(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 431(A)). Defendants argue that the trial court\u2019s order must be reversed because the Board\u2019s prior determination that plaintiff left work without good cause attributable to his employer is supported by substantial evidence in the record. We affirm.\nPlaintiff had been employed as a $12-per-hour machinist with the Kotter Transmission Company before he was laid off. He filed a claim for unemployment-insurance benefits with the Division of Unemployment Insurance.\nIn April 1983, while collecting benefits, Komarec registered with the Norrell Service Company (Norrell), a temporary placement service, in order to supplement his employment benefits. For the first two months plaintiff received two temporary assignments, totaling 13 hours of work. On June 10, 1983, Norrell assigned plaintiff to Carnear Industries (Carnear), in the position of laborer, to substitute for a vacationing employee. Plaintiff\u2019s employment at Carnear continued for approximately four weeks at a wage of $3.35 per hour. While assigned to Carnear plaintiff was considered an employee of Norrell and received his checks from Norrell. At the end of this period Carnear offered plaintiff an additional week of employment. He refused, however, stating that he would be gone for seven to ten days on his annual fishing trip. He told Carnear, as well as Norrell, that he would be available for work on his return. When plaintiff returned from his trip he continued to receive calls from Norrell regarding possible employment.\nPlaintiff did not apply for unemployment benefits for the week he was gone. He subsequently applied for and received weekly benefits from July 17 through August 13, 1983. Norrell filed an Employer Notice of Possible Ineligibility with the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, stating on the form that plaintiff \u201c[q]uit voluntarily for personal reasons.\u201d The claims adjudicator determined that on July 8, 1983, plaintiff left work at Norrell \u201cvoluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer\u201d and found plaintiff ineligible for benefits during the period July 17 through August 13, 1983.\nThereafter plaintiff filed a notice of reconsideration and appeal from the claims adjudicator\u2019s decision to the referee. During a hearing on plaintiff\u2019s appeal, plaintiff testified that his work at Carnear was \u201cvery boring and tedious,\u201d the wages he received from Norrell began at $4.75 but were later reduced to $3.35, and that the benefits at Norrell were \u201cnil.\u201d He further testified that he did not \u201cquit\u201d Carnear; he merely advised them he would be gone several days and stated, \u201cI will be back. I -will be available for work ***.\u201d After the hearing the referee affirmed the claims adjudicator\u2019s decision that plaintiff\u2019s reason for leaving work was a personal reason not in any respect attributable to the employer and, thus, plaintiff left work voluntarily without good cause.\nThereafter plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Review. The Board found that the referee\u2019s findings of fact and decision were supported by the record and law and affirmed the referee\u2019s decision.\nOn administrative review the circuit court of Winnebago County reversed and found that the work offered plaintiff was unsuitable within the meaning of section 603 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 433) and Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 185. The court also found the decision of the Department to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe issue in this appeal is the validity of the Board\u2019s initial determination that Komarec was ineligible for unemployment-insurance benefits because he voluntarily left work without cause. Section 601(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAn individual shall be ineligible for benefits for the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit and, thereafter, until he has become reemployed ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 431(A).\nOur function on review of the Board\u2019s determination is limited to ascertaining whether its finding of facts are sustained by the evidence (Yadro v. Bowling (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 889.) It is axiomatic that an agency\u2019s findings concerning factual questions are prima facie true and correct and the agency\u2019s decision should not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014110). (Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 381; Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 185, 189; Thompson v. Board of Review (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4.) If the issue merely involves conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witness, the agency\u2019s determination should be upheld. (Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 383.) Also, given its limited function in an unemployment-compensation case, the judiciary will not reweigh the evidence adduced at its administrative hearing (Sheff v. Board of Review (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 347, 350; Thompson v. Board of Review (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4) or substitute its judgment for that of the agency unless the administrative findings are without substantial support in the record (Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 381; see James v. Department of Labor (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527). (See Clark v. Board of Review (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 559, 562.) A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. (Doran v. Department of Labor (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 471, 474; Meyers v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291; see Thompson v. Board of Review (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5; Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Golden (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 300, 308.) However, if, after reviewing all the evidence, the appellate court determines that the administrative decision was erroneous, it has a duty to reverse the agency\u2019s determination. Sheff v. Board of Review (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 347, 350.\nThe cardinal purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.) is to provide compensation benefits to unemployed individuals in order to alleviate their economic distress that was occasioned by involuntary unemployment. (Wadlington v. Mindes (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 447, 452, appeal dismissed (1970), 400 U.S. 935, 27 L. Ed. 2d 242, 91 S. Ct. 252; Clark v. Board of Review (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561; Lipman v. Board of Review (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 176, 179.) The receipt of unemployment-insurance benefits in this State is a conditional right, and a claimant bears the burden of establishing eligibility before the agency. (Clark v. Board of Review (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561; Lipman v. Board of Review (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 176, 181; Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188; Thompson v. Board of Review (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7; James v. Department of Labor (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527.) In order to be eligible for benefits, however, claimant must satisfy the terms and conditions the Unemployment Insurance Act prescribes. (Clark v. Board of Review (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 559. 561.) In the present case, the Board merely adopted the referee\u2019s findings of fact that plaintiff left work to take a fishing trip and, thus, was ineligible for benefits. The referee\u2019s decision made no reference to the nature of the work offered by Carnear.\nOn appeal defendants contend that plaintiff left work solely because the job Carnear offered him interfered with his annual fishing trip. It is apparent that the defendants focused only on one of plaintiff\u2019s reasons for leaving the job when analyzing whether plaintiff was eligible for unemployment benefits. A further issue also warranted consideration, however, namely whether designation of the job as unsuitable would have allowed payment of benefits to plaintiff even if unsuitability were not the only reason he left the position. We have considered the issue and conclude that the referee applied an incorrect interpretation of section 601(B)(5). We believe that the plain meaning of the statute militates against the agency\u2019s conclusion.\nAn examination of the other provisions of section 601(B) indicates by their wording that all of the factual situations set forth, with the exception of section 601(B)(5), must constitute the actual and immediate reason for leaving the job. In contrast, section 601(BX5) read together with the introductory section states:\n\u201cThe provisions of this Section shall not apply to an individual who has left work voluntarily:\n* * *\nWhich he had accepted after separation from the other work, and the work which he left voluntarily would be deemed unsuitable under the provisions of Section 603.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 431(B)(5).\nIt is clear that the Unemployment Insurance Act must be construed liberally for the benefit of unemployed workers. (Davis v. Board of Review (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72.) Construing the Act liberally, we interpret section 601(B)(5) as applying not only in situations where the only reason for voluntary departure from a job was its unsuitability, but also where the unsuitable nature of the work was already apparent under the provisions of section 603. We also conclude that the trial court properly found that plaintiff met the burden of establishing eligibility under section 601(B)(5) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 431(B)(5)).\nFirst, it is undisputed that plaintiff accepted employment at Morrell after separation from his employment at Ko.tter Transmission. Second, and contrary to defendants\u2019 contention that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiff\u2019s work was unsuitable, plaintiff\u2019s Application for Reconsideration stated six reasons why the claims adjudicator\u2019s decision should be reversed: X\n\u201c(1) part-time employment; would have worked maybe one more week;\n(2) unsuitable work for my skills;\n(3) very unsuitable pay for what I was getting from the job I am layed off [sic] at;\n(4) no raise after three months with company;\n(5) no benefits with company; and\n(6) people working at [Carnear] getting two or three times amount of pay for same work I was doing.\u201d\nIn addition, plaintiff testified at the hearing that for the past five years he was employed as a skilled, union-certified steel machinist. Plaintiff\u2019s employment at Carnear through Morrell was as a laborer, a job which plaintiff described as boring and tedious.\nIt is well settled that a claimant is justified in refusing employment where the job offers a level of skill not commensurate with previous employment, depending on the circumstances in each case. (Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 185.) Good cause for refusing work must involve circumstances which are real, substantial, and reasonable, not arbitrary, immaterial or capricious. (Thompson v. Board of Review (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1.) Additionally, a claimant is entitled to benefits for a reasonable period of time to enable him to seek work at a level of skills and a rate of pay commensurate with his or her previous employment. Keystone Steel & Wire Division, Keystone Consolidated Industries v. Department of Labor (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 704.\nIn this regard plaintiff testified that as a machinist he earned $12 per hour. At Norrell plaintiff earned $3.35 per hour, a reduction of 72%. In Crocker, this court found that an approximately 30% pay reduction rendered work unsuitable. (Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 185, 189.) See also Keystone Steel & Wire Division, Keystone Consolidated Industries v. Department of Labor (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 704, 708.\nLoss of fringe benefits in the form of medical insurance, holiday pay, and sick pay could also render subsequent employment unsuitable. (Mangan v. Bernardi (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 1081.) At the hearing plaintiff testified that \u201cthe benefits are nil, nothing, I have no health insurance, dental insurance just no benefits whatsoever. $3.35 sir, I can not live on that at all.\u201d From this testimony the trial court could infer that plaintiff\u2019s employment at Kotter Transmission Company provided the benefits he alluded to so as to find that plaintiff raised the issue of lack of benefits in the context of differences between his past and present employment. Specifically, plaintiff indicated that he received two weeks vacation at his former employment. At Norrell the benefits are \u201cnil.\u201d This disparity in benefits, as held in Mangan, rendered plaintiff\u2019s subsequent employment unsuitable.\nFinally, section 603 provides in part:\n\u201cNotwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this Act to any otherwise eligible individuals for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:\n*** if the wages *** are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 433.\nPlaintiff testified that though he was making $3.35 per hour, Carnear hired persons \u201coff the street\u201d at $7.01 per hour to perform the same job. Because Carnear paid $7.01 for the job plaintiff performed, the inference could be drawn that this was the prevailing wage in the locality. Since plaintiff\u2019s wage of $3.35 per hour was less than half of the prevailing wage, we believe the trial court correctly found plaintiff\u2019s subsequent work unsuitable.\nWe conclude that the trial court properly found that the offered work was unsuitable within the meaning of the statute and under Crocker. We believe that the Board\u2019s decision was therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the circuit court correctly reversed that decision.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim for unemployment benefits should be granted and the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOPF and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Candida Miranda and Jill Wine-Banks, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.", "David Taylor, of Prairie State Legal Services, of Rockford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THEO KOMAREC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201485\u20140253\nOpinion filed June 26, 1986.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Candida Miranda and Jill Wine-Banks, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nDavid Taylor, of Prairie State Legal Services, of Rockford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1105-01", "first_page_order": 1127, "last_page_order": 1134 }