{ "id": 3536167, "name": "TEMICA WILLIAMS a/k/a Rebecca Jean Holloway, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUHAMMAD ALI, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Ali", "decision_date": "1986-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 85\u2014964", "first_page": "458", "last_page": "463", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 458" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 N.E. 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2408292 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/274/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345287 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2548183 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 F.2d 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2172973 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/416/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 F.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 141655 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/509/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 F. Supp. 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3809301 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/396/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 F. Supp. 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3882705 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/419/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785531 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166726 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 871112 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/96/0629-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 624, "char_count": 12850, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.043030007048877e-08, "percentile": 0.5043156956254978 }, "sha256": "46b9f7c628609aec888b8e2be622c752eb64988db92a0b7cd6c21c4b4b3c2958", "simhash": "1:6ef272f5e8251cd0", "word_count": 2169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:42.287354+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TEMICA WILLIAMS a/k/a Rebecca Jean Holloway, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUHAMMAD ALI, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Temica Williams, also known as Rebecca Jean Holloway, appeals from a circuit court order dismissing count I and striking count II of her amended complaint against defendant, Muhammad Ali. Count I of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint sets forth an action in tort for sexual assault. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss asserts that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202). The challenged order also granted Ali\u2019s motion to strike count II of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint as immaterial, presumably because the sole remedy of the minor child allegedly fathered by defendant is a claim for support under the Paternity Act and not an action in tort as claimed in the amended complaint.\nWe affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.\nBackground\nTemica Williams (Williams) originally brought this action against Muhammad Ali (Ali) on April 2, 1981. She filed her amended complaint on September 21, 1982. In count I of her amended complaint, Williams seeks actual, punitive and exemplary damages from Ali for his alleged sexual assault of her when she was still a minor. The acts complained of assertedly began in the year 1975, and Williams alleges that she became pregnant with Ali\u2019s child sometime in 1976. The record discloses that she gave birth to a son, Osmon Caliph Williams, on July 10, 1977. Although Williams claims that she was 12 years old in 1975, the information she provided for her son\u2019s birth certificate in 1977 indicates that she was 17 years old at the time the child was born. As a result, Williams would have reached majority on or before July 10,1978.\nIn count II of her amended complaint, Williams alleges that she and her minor child were abandoned by Ali on March 1, 1978. Consequently, she seeks in count II support and damages from Ali on behalf of the minor child. Ali\u2019s paternity has not been established in this case.\nOn February 23, 1984, Ali filed a motion to dismiss both counts of Williams\u2019 amended complaint. Ali alleged that count I was barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202) since Williams failed to file her action within two years of reaching majority (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 211). Ali also argued to dismiss count II of the amended complaint on the ground that a prior action for paternity had already been filed in the municipal division of the circuit court of Cook County. That paternity complaint was dismissed without prejudice by the circuit court on April 9, 1984, pursuant to Williams\u2019 own motion. Consequently, Ali withdrew his motion to dismiss count II and, on July 27, 1984, filed in its place a motion to strike count II pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615) arguing that the minor child\u2019s sole remedy was statutory under the Paternity Act for support only, and that the minor had no cause of action in tort.\nOn December 19, 1984, the circuit court granted Ali\u2019s motions to dismiss count I and strike count II of Williams\u2019 amended complaint. Williams\u2019 motion for reconsideration was denied on March 4, 1985, and on April 2, 1985, Williams filed notice of appeal from the December 19, 1984, order disposing of her cause of action. In her initial brief on appeal and at oral argument, Williams conceded that: (1) she had reached majority on or before July 10, 1978; and (2) the sole remedy of her minor child, Osmon Caliph Williams, is a claim for support under the Paternity Act.\nOpinion\nThe sole issue before this court is whether Williams\u2019 action for sexual assault is barred by the statute of limitations. Section 13\u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure states in part that:\n\u201cActions for damages for an injury to the person, or for false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, or for a statutory penalty, or for abduction, or for seduction, or for criminal conversation, shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action accrued ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13-202.)\nIt has long been a tenet of Illinois law that a civil action for sexual assault falls within this two-year limitation period. (Thomas v. Morgan (1901), 96 Ill. App. 629 (where a female plaintiff\u2019s action for damages resulting from \u201cassault with criminal knowledge\u201d was governed by the two-year statute of limitations).) In addition, since Williams also claims that she was a minor at the time the alleged cause of action accrued, she had two years from the date of her reaching majority in which to bring this action. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 211.\nAccording to Williams\u2019 complaint, the acts complained of began in 1975. In any event, they could not have occurred at any time after March 1, 1978, the date that Ali allegedly abandoned Williams and her minor child. Although Williams claims that she was a minor when Ali allegedly sexually assaulted her, she admits that she reached majority on or before July 10, 1978. This being so, and given the fact that Williams filed this action on April 23, 1981, under the perceived application of the above rules, Williams has admittedly failed to file her action within the statutory two-year period. Consequently, unless we are to espy some legally recognizable principle to the contrary, we must necessarily conclude that Williams\u2019 action is barred.\nIn the instant case, Williams has erroneously attempted to resuscitate her action for sexual assault by linking it to Ali\u2019s failure to support her minor child. Williams contends that she was injured because she was forced to support her minor son, Osmon Caliph Williams, allegedly born as a consequence of Ali\u2019s sexual assault upon her. Thus, according to Williams, Ali\u2019s failure to support her minor son resulted in a tort against her. Williams has, however, conceded that no Illinois case has ever recognized her theory that an alleged parent\u2019s failure to support a minor child results in tort liability against the custodial parent. She has also conceded that Ali\u2019s paternity, although alleged, has not been established.\nIn our view, Williams is actually alleging a new tort in an effort to breathe life into her stale claim for sexual assault. Williams fashions this new claim as a consequence of the underlying sexual assault, which she alleges against Ali. We note that in In re Marriage of Highsmith (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 69, our supreme court recognized the failure to support a child as a tortious act for the limited purposes of subjecting a noncustodial parent to jurisdiction under the Illinois long-arm statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 209). There, a father who had never been in Illinois was subjected to in personam jurisdiction in an action by his former wife for child support under the section of the Code of Civil Procedure which gives Illinois jurisdiction over a party where that party has committed a tortious act within the State. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 209(2).\nIn defining the limits of the exercise of long-term jurisdiction in this context, the Highsmith court cited its landmark decision in Nelson v. Miller (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 378, 391-92, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680, as follows:\n\u201c \u2018The jurisdictional fact, in the language of section 17(1)(b) is \u201cthe commission of a tortious act within this State.\u201d The word \u201ctortious\u201d can, of course, be used to describe conduct that subjects the actor to tort liability. For its own purposes, the Restatement so uses it. (Restatement, Torts, sec. 6.) It does not follow, however, that the word [tort] must have that meaning in a statute that is concerned with jurisdictional limits.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) (In re Marriage of Highsmith (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 69, 73-74.)\nThe Highsmith court further noted:\n\u201cThe Federal courts have held that a \u2018tortious act\u2019 as used in the statute encompasses any act which constitutes breach of duty to another imposed by law. Florendo v. Pan Hemisphere Transport, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1976), 419 F. Supp. 16; United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists (N.D. Ill. 1975), 396 F. Supp. 565; Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke (7th Cir. 1975), 509 F.2d 1137; Welch Scientific Co. v. Human Engineering Institute, Inc. (7th Cir. 1969), 416 F.2d 32.\u201d In re Marriage of Highsmith (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 69.\nAlthough Highsmith reaffirms the view expressed by our supreme court that the word \u201ctortious\u201d as used within the well-defined parameters of the Illinois long-arm statute goes beyond the common definition of a tort (see also Poindexter v. Willis (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1), we do not read it as creating tort liability against a noncustodial parent for failure to provide child support. Rather, we read Highsmith as a method of effectuating jurisdiction where a party\u2019s actions in Illinois make it fair and reasonable to require him to defend an action filed against him in this jurisdiction; nothing more, nothing less.\nIn our view, Williams\u2019 new claim is the result of her refusal to bring a paternity action on behalf of her minor son. Our conclusion is based on Williams\u2019 repeated references to various sections of the Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1351 et seq.) and the Non-Support of Spouse and Children Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1101 et seq.) to establish Ali\u2019s duty of support. Most notably, Williams cites section 2 of the Paternity Act which establishes a father\u2019s duty to support his minor children born out of wedlock as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1352), as well as sections 9 and 10 of the Non-Support of Spouse and Children Act which classify the failure to support a minor as a \u201ccontinuing offense\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, pars. 1112, 1113). Relying on the law of domestic relations, Williams argues that the two-year statute of limitations for injury to the person has not been activated in this case due to the continuing nature of the wrong set in motion by Ali\u2019s alleged sexual assault of Williams.\nIt is abundantly clear to us that Williams has, whether purposefully or inadvertently, confused her son\u2019s statutory remedy under the Paternity Act with her remedy in tort for sexual assault. We do not see these two causes of action as being inextricably mixed. Whereas the continuing duty to support is owed to the minor child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1352), and this is true only upon establishment of Ali\u2019s paternity (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1352), Williams herself admits that her damages are ramifying consequences of the alleged sexual assault upon her. As such, we refuse to equate the damages resulting from a father\u2019s breach of his statutory duty to support his minor child with those injuries claimed by a mother to be the consequence of the invasion of her person through an act or acts of sexual assault. As we see it, the damages Williams seeks for Ali\u2019s failure to support her son would not have been incurred had she pursued an act for paternity on her minor son\u2019s behalf. Accordingly, we reach the inescapable conclusion that Williams\u2019 action is one for damages resulting from and only from the injuries she sustained due to the act of sexual assault alleged against Ali.\nIt is well settled that the statute of limitations is determined by the injury resulting to the plaintiff. (Hundt v. Burhans (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 415, 300 N.E.2d 318.) Accordingly, the injury plaintiff complains of is governed by the two-year limitation period stated in section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202; see, e.g., Thomas v. Morgan (1901), 96 Ill. App. 629). To adopt Williams\u2019 argument that the statute of limitations in this case has not been activated would create an arbitrarily longer period of liability for cases such as the one before us, a practice our supreme court long ago refused to sanction. See Handtoffski v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co. (1916), 274 Ill. 282, 113 N.E. 620.\nIn conclusion, for all of the reasons stated above and given the facts and circumstances of this case, Williams\u2019 action is barred by the statute of limitations and the decision of the circuit court of Cook County is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJOHNSON and McMORROW, JJ., concur.\nFormer section 17, as amended, contained substantially the same provisions as section 2 \u2014 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 209).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore H. Zimmerman, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Hopkins & Sutter, of Chicago (Michael M. Conway, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TEMICA WILLIAMS a/k/a Rebecca Jean Holloway, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUHAMMAD ALI, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 85\u2014964\nOpinion filed June 12, 1986.\nTheodore H. Zimmerman, of Chicago, for appellant.\nHopkins & Sutter, of Chicago (Michael M. Conway, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0458-01", "first_page_order": 480, "last_page_order": 485 }