{ "id": 3537041, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL CARTER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Carter", "decision_date": "1986-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201485\u20140473", "first_page": "985", "last_page": "989", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 985" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073237 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2910797 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971950 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12807 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852796 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565984 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 L. Ed. 2d 713", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1532150 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 969", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156641 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 N.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2589117 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/363/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126872 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 9793, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.240935862583806e-08, "percentile": 0.2689608544745273 }, "sha256": "4e67e32165be8e97501a47a9b2dde0105dd40ecb712614a3f145444a731317ed", "simhash": "1:ae240cfab8708f0b", "word_count": 1616 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:42.287354+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL CARTER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Darrell Carter, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and murder. A jury convicted him of both offenses. He was sentenced to 20 years only on the murder charge. He brings this appeal. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged, with codefendants Gerald Chamberlain and Norman Gates, with the conspiracy to murder and the murder of John Thomas. The evidence against defendant consisted of his statement to the police, various statements by codefendants to the police, and the statement of one of defendant\u2019s cell mates in the Will County jail. In a conversation with the police, defendant stated that the victim was a friend of his. Defendant stated that he, the victim, and the codefendants were in the victim\u2019s car. The victim was driving. On the way to codefendant Gates\u2019 girlfriend\u2019s home, the victim stopped the car to check the trunk lid. As he re-entered the car, codefendant Gates shot him. Defendant stated that he knew something was going to happen to the victim; he did not know what it would be.\nCodefendant Gates\u2019 statement was also used as evidence against defendant. He stated that Gerald Chamberlain and defendant were planning the death of the victim. Gates\u2019 story essentially matched that of defendant\u2019s. However, Gates stated that he only shot the victim once; Chamberlain fired another shot at the victim. Chamberlain\u2019s case was severed but Gates and defendant were tried together,\nRonnie Harris also testified against defendant. He stated that he was in the Will County jail at the same time as defendant. Defendant stated that defendant and the codefendants had planned to commit the murder of John Thomas because the victim owed money for some drugs. Defendant\u2019s story in the jail was that the victim was shot once by Gates, and defendant took the gun and shot the victim again.\nHarris was testifying pursuant to an agreement with the Will County State\u2019s Attorney. Harris had two armed-robbery charges pending against him. Pursuant to the agreement, the armed-robbery charges would be reduced to robbery. Harris was to receive three years\u2019 imprisonment for his guilty plea on the robbery charges.\nOther evidence admitted at trial was that defendant and the codefendants were found in the victim\u2019s car. A .45-caliber pistol was found in the car. The registration of the victim\u2019s car and a warning citation issued to the victim were found in defendant\u2019s wallet on his arrest.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that Gates had killed the victim. He also stated that he had not participated in any plans to kill the victim. After the killing, Gates threatened to kill defendant. He also stated that he did not tell Ronnie Harris that he had shot the victim. He explained his statement that he knew something was going to happen by saying he thought there was going to be a fist fight or something to that effect.\nCodefendant Gates also testified. He stated that he and Chamberlain were members of the Vice Lords street gang. Gates had withdrawn from the gang. Chamberlain had a position of power in the gang and threatened Gates\u2019 life for not \u201crepresenting\u201d the gang any longer. Chamberlain had given Gates the gun. While they were in the car and the victim was out of the car, Defendant and Chamberlain discussed how to \u201cfuck [the victim] up.\u201d Gates felt compelled to shoot the victim because of Chamberlain\u2019s presence and the threat on his life.\nThe jury convicted defendant of both charges. His post-trial motions were denied. He was sentenced to 20 years. He appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in not granting defendant\u2019s motion for a severance. Generally, defendants jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless fairness to one of the defendants requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice. (People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349.) The decision rests in the discretion of the trial judge. It will be reversed only on an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion. (109 Ill. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349.) Defendant raised two issues in his motion. The first we shall examine is whether the defenses of the codefendants were antagonistic. The basis for the claim of antagonism is that Gates\u2019 compulsion defense conflicted with defendant\u2019s. Defendant likens this case to one where the antagonistic defenses \u201cproduced a spectacle where the People frequently stood by and witnessed a combat in which the defendants attempted to destroy each other.\u201d (People v. Braune (1936), 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839.) We do not believe that defendant has presented such a situation. Defendant\u2019s theory apparently was that he knew some type of action was going to be taken against the victim. Gates\u2019 theory was that he was compelled by Chamberlain\u2019s position of power in the gang and the death threat. There was not the obvious risk of prejudice inherent in the case that the trial judge has to find in making his prediction about the likelihood of prejudice at trial. People v. Daugherty (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 533, 468 N.E.2d 969.\nDefendant\u2019s other ground for a severance was that the confession of codefendant Gates would have violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. (Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620.) The State claims that no Bruton problems existed due to the fact that Gates testified. However, in reviewing a motion for severance, courts of review do not consider the subsequent happenings at trial. (People v. Daugherty (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 533, 545, 468 N.E.2d 969.) Therefore, we are unable to decide the issue on this basis.\nThe trial court apparently based its decision on the plurality holding of Parker v. Randolph (1979), 442 U.S. 60, 60 L. Ed. 2d 713, 99 S. Ct. 2132. The plurality of the Supreme Court held that admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions conform to constitutional requirements.\nDefendant\u2019s various statements correspond in many important respects with codefendant Gates\u2019. In his statements to Harris, defendant completely inculpated himself. He also admitted to having knowledge of some form of action being taken against the victim. Gates\u2019 statement claimed that defendant knew of the plan to kill the victim. On either evidence, the conviction would have been proper. As such, defendant was not prejudiced by being jointly tried with a codefendant where both have admitted participation in the crime and where their defenses are now shown to be antagonistic. People v. Williams (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 126, 483 N.E.2d 306; People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483, 244 N.E.2d 136.\nDefendant, though, claims that the recent Supreme Court case of Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. _, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514, 106 S. Ct. 2056, controls the present situation. We do not agree as the facts of Lee make the case distinguishable. The codefendant\u2019s statement in Lee was admitted as substantive evidence against Lee. The trial judge expressly considered the codefendant\u2019s confession against defendant Lee. Neither defendant testified. Therefore, it was only on the basis of the codefendant\u2019s statement that Lee was found guilty. The present situation is not similar. We therefore decline to read Lee to apply to the present situation, and find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.\nDefendant also challenges the verdicts of guilty, claiming that the evidence failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We will only reverse the conviction if the evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant\u2019s guilt. It is the function of the trier of fact to determine the accused\u2019s guilt. (People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489.) Where the credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the proper weight to be given the testimony is the function of the jury. (People v. Arndt (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 390, 280 N.E.2d 230.) The trial court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489.\nThe evidence against defendant supports the jury\u2019s conclusion of guilt. Harris testified that defendant admitted to participating in the murder. Gates stated that the defendant was in on the plan to kill the victim. Defendant\u2019s testimony was that he had no knowledge of any plan and that he did not participate in the murder. The essential question, for the jury to decide, was defendant\u2019s participation in and knowledge of the murder. The trier of fact is not bound to believe the defendant\u2019s testimony against the State\u2019s evidence when there is a conflict. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313.) We therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict of guilt.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention, an error confessed by the State, is that the conviction for the inchoate offense should be vacated in light of the conviction for the principal offense. The conviction for conspiracy to commit murder should have been vacated upon the conviction for murder. (People v. Hill (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 465, 401 N.E.2d 517.) Accordingly, we hereby vacate defendant\u2019s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder.\nTherefore, defendant\u2019s conviction for murder is hereby affirmed. The conspiracy conviction is vacated.\nVacated in part and affirmed.\nSCOTT, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeffrey D. Foust, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Edward Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201485\u20140473\nOpinion filed August 7, 1986.\nJeffrey D. Foust, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nEdward Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0985-01", "first_page_order": 1007, "last_page_order": 1011 }