{ "id": 3572608, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1986-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201485\u20140306", "first_page": "45", "last_page": "53", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 45" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499125 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3436205 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437474 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1045", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012326 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3282453 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139376 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092555 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562211 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163903 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 854", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2940819 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0854-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5608950 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430447 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629507 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295784 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991135 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141216 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 638", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336877 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "1341-42" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "1343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524661 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "1725" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "1731" }, { "page": "91" }, { "page": "1731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 F.2d 226", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 311887 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/758/0226-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 937, "char_count": 17556, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.836337855825979e-07, "percentile": 0.7214511347958896 }, "sha256": "d5be7c37b573eb42ccd1d4acfc11c03390fc0fbda84a0790a004963eddbdd61d", "simhash": "1:238c45026355355f", "word_count": 2921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Terry Taylor, was charged with murder, armed robbery, and attempted murder. Defendant\u2019s first trial on the charges resulted in a mistrial due to a hung jury. Upon retrial, defendant was convicted of the charges. Defendant waived his right to have a jury make the sentencing determination in a death penalty hearing. The trial judge declined to impose the sentence of death. Instead, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 55 years on the murder, and 20 years each on the armed robbery and the attempted murder. Defendant appeals his convictions. We affirm.\nAs defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him, only those facts necessary for the purposes of this appeal will be presented. On the evening of March 4, 1984, two black men entered the Dunkin\u2019 Donuts shop in Kankakee. The shop owner and his brother were in the store with an employee. Two college students had previously entered. They were sitting near the entrance. No one in the shop could see the face of either black man. The taller of the two asked for change for a dollar bill from the owner\u2019s brother.\nThe man then pulled a gun and demanded the money in the register. The shorter man went behind the counter to get the money. A struggle ensued. The taller man shot the owner\u2019s brother. The owner and the employee came out from the back room. The gunman shot the employee. The two assailants fled. The employee died from the gunshot wound. The brother survived.\nThe State presented testimony from Patty Howard, defendant\u2019s girlfriend, and Melvin Fulton, the original codefendant. Charges against Fulton were nol-prossed in exchange for his testimony. He was, however, sent to prison on a parole violation based on his conduct in the incident. Howard informed police that defendant admitted committing the crime. The combination of Fulton\u2019s and Howard\u2019s testimony fully implicated defendant.\nThe defense presented witnesses to rebut Fulton\u2019s and Howard\u2019s stories. The defense theory was that a man other than defendant helped Fulton in the robbery. Defendant did not testify.\nDefendant was convicted and sentenced. He brings this appeal, raising many points.\nThe first issue we shall examine is whether the trial court\u2019s use of the Witherspoon test in voir dire prejudiced defendant. We decline to further consider the issue. Defendant\u2019s claim was based on Grigsby v. Mabry (8th Cir. 1985), 758 F.2d 226. That case, however, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on appeal sub nom. (Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S__, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 106 S. Ct. 1758). Our supreme court has also recently rejected such a claim in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nDefendant next contends that the prosecutor\u2019s use of peremptory challenges improperly kept blacks off the jury. He cites the recent case Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S._, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, as being controlling. While Batson overruled the Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, requirement of a showing of systematic exclusion of blacks, nothing in the majority opinion leads us to believe that the case holding applies retroactively. We also note that four justices did not think retroactive application was proper. Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. __,__, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 90, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1725 (White, J., concurring); 476 U.S__, __, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 97, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1731 (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring); 476 U.S.__,__, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 91,106 S. Ct. 1712, 1731 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).\nWe decline to give Batson retroactive application. In making the determination, the following criteria are analyzed: (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. (Solem v. Stumes (1984), 465 U.S. 638, 643, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579, 587, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1341-42.) The potential problems posed by retroactive application when examined under criteria (b) and (c) nearly mandate prospective application. \u201cWhen a court has overruled a past precedent *** the reliance and effect factors in themselves \u2018have virtually compelled a finding of nonretroactivity.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d 465 U.S. 638, 646, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579, 589, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343.\nWe also note that our supreme court expressly relied upon Swain in its latest ruling on the issue (People v. Gaines (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 79, 88 473 N.E.2d 868). It is on the basis of this authority, and other such precedent, that the trial court did not allow defendant\u2019s motion to discharge the jury.\nDefendant may have made the prima facia showing required in Batson; we do not decide the issue. However, we are not going to remand the cause for the trial court in order to allow the State\u2019s Attorney to explain, by neutral reason, why he excused the black veniremen. To do so would allow every defendant on either direct or collateral appeal to have his voir dire examined and reconstructed. This would be a massive waste of judicial resources. No explanation was required of the State\u2019s Attorney at the time of the trial. We will not penalize the State by reversing the case for not doing something that it was not required to do.\nThe next two issues we shall examine deal with the jury instructions and verdict forms. The State claims that the errors were waived and do not amount to plain error. The first contention is that the jury was improperly instructed on attempted murder. The necessary mental state for attempted murder is that the defendant have the specific intent to kill. (People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331.) The instant attempted-murder instruction stated that the defendant had to act with the intent to commit murder. The statutory definition of murder was given elsewhere in the instructions.\nPeople v. Roberts held that an improper instruction on attempted murder, as in the present case, is subject to the waiver rule. However, the court stated that the rule does not apply \u201cto substantial defects in the instructions if the interests of justice require.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (People v. Roberts (1979), 175 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 387 N.E.2d 331.) The exception to the waiver rule is applied in cases in which the evidence is closely balanced. 75 Ill. 2d 1,14, 387 N.E.2d 331.\nDefendant claims that the instant case against him is closely balanced. While we do not agree with the State that the evidence is overwhelming, we do not think that this is a close case. The evidence against defendant was quite strong. While witnesses may have been impeached, certain elements still remain. Defendant had purchased a revolver (the same caliber as the murder weapon) before the incident; his accomplice identified him as the gunman; and his ex-girlfriend stated that he confessed the crime to her. Therefore, we shall not apply the exception to the waiver rule to this issue.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention deals with murder-verdict form. The jury was instructed on the three types of murder, intentional, knowing, and felony murder. However, the jury only received a general murder-verdict form. This was done over defense counsel\u2019s objection. Defendant claims the jury may have convicted him of felony murder and armed robbery. As such, the armed-robbery conviction would have to be vacated as the lesser included offense of felony murder. The State cites the general rule that a finding of guilt is presumed to be based on any good count in an indictment to which the proof is applicable. (People v. Feagans (1984), 119 Ill. App. 3d 941, 457 N.E.2d 459.) Also, ambiguities in jury verdicts do not have to be construed in favor of a defendant. 119 Ill. App. 3d 941, 457 N.E.2d 459.\nIn the present case, the evidence shows that in shooting the victim, defendant could have done so with the intent to do great bodily harm. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1).) Defendant also could have acted knowing that his acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm. (Ill. Rev Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(2).) A guilty verdict under either theory would not require the vacatur of an accompanying armed-robbery conviction. As such, defendant was not prejudiced by the use of a general-verdict form given over his objection.\nDefendant also claims many instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Again, the State raises a claim of waiver as most of the comments were not objected to. Defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the comments deprived him of a fair trial. He further asks us to examine the statement under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) regarding plain error. 87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).\nIt is clear that prosecutors should refrain from improper argument (People v. Harbold (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734), distorting the burden of proof (People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 156, 398 N.E.2d 68), or inflammatory conduct or argument (People v. Thomas (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 854, 318 N.E.2d 342). We first analyze whether it was error for the prosecutor to call defendant a \u201cpimp.\u201d Defendant claims this was done to be an inflammatory comment and an attempt to play on the juror\u2019s passions. We do not believe so. We think the comment to be a fair comment based on reasonable inferences from the evidence.\nWe find no error in the comment. Both sides agree that Patty Howard, defendant\u2019s girlfriend, was a prostitute. There was evidence that defendant insisted that she work and give him the proceeds. That defendant was her pimp was a reasonable inference. Arguments based on facts or the reasonable inferences therefrom are within the scope of proper argument (People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 508, 460 N.E.2d 746) even if they reflect unfavorably on the accused (People v. Turner (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 784, 469 N.E.2d 368.) While inflammatory remarks are to be avoided, argument will not be limited merely because defendant was placed in a bad light. People v. Mays (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 251, 437 N.E.2d 633.\nDefendant also complains that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof and called attention to defendant\u2019s not testifying. The first comment in this area was that nothing rebutted Fulton\u2019s statement that defendant was the gunman. Defendant claims that this was an improper comment on his exercise of his right to remain silent. People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 478 N.E.2d 402.\nDefendant\u2019s theory as far as Fulton\u2019s testimony is concerned was that another man was Fulton\u2019s accomplice. This was the main thrust of defense counsel\u2019s argument on this point. However, there was no evidence, other than Fulton\u2019s statements, on the identity of the gunman. A prosecutor may comment on the uncontradicted nature of the testimony. People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630.\nThis can be done \u201ceven though defendant is the only one who could have contradicted it \u2014 provided it was not \u2018 \u201cintended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant\u2019s neglect to avail himself of his legal right to testify.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 390, 478 N.E.2d 402.) The comments in the present case were a legitimate response to the defendant\u2019s claim that someone else was Fulton\u2019s accomplice.\nLikewise, defendant complains comments stating that defendant had only proved inconsistencies in the State\u2019s case were also improper in that they shifted the burden of proof. The comment was:\n\u201cWhat did the defense prove? They proved that there was [sic] inconsistencies. *** They didn\u2019t prove that Melvin Fulton or Patty Howard or any of our witnesses was [sic] unbelievable.\u201d\nWe agree with the State that the above statement was not an attempt to shift the burden of proof. Taken in context, the prosecutor was arguing the strength of the evidence and the credibility of the State\u2019s witnesses. This was in response to defense counsel\u2019s claim that Fulton and Howard, the State\u2019s key witnesses, were not believable because of the inconsistencies in their testimony. While the use of \u201cproved\u201d was unfortunate and not the best choice of words, it was not intended to shift the burden of proof. We also note that the jury was properly instructed as to the burden of proof. Thus, the prosecutor\u2019s wording, while unfortunate, was not improper.\nDefendant also claims that another comment amounted to a claim that a post-trial conference with the attorneys could substitute for the jury\u2019s questions on the sufficiency of the evidence. (People v. Martinez (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 280, 395 N.E.2d 86.) The State claims that this was merely a proper response to defense counsel\u2019s claim that if a juror had wished that the prosecution had asked a question, that wish amounted to reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit. The prosecutor had told the jury to follow the instructions and go on the evidence. He also stated that there was sufficient evidence to convict, and that he had presented all of it. The comment did not amount to an attempt to lessen the burden of proof.\nDefendant contends next that an extremely lengthy passage of argument amounted to an inflammatory appeal to the jury\u2019s fears and prejudices. The statements merely amount to a zealous appeal for the fearless administration of the law. As such, the statements were not erroneous. People v. Jones (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 880, 439 N.E.2d 1011.\nDefendant\u2019s last complained of comment was an improper response to defense counsel\u2019s argument about convicting the wrong man. Defense counsel asked the jury how they would feel if they had wrongly convicted defendant. The prosecutor replied, \u201cIf two years or three years or five years from now, you wake up *** and somebody else got killed along Court Street by Terry Taylor, what will you think then ***?\u201d This comment was a proper use of invited comment. However, it was not promptly objected to. Prior to instructing the jurors, the trial judge and counsel conferred. At this point, defense counsel complained of the \u201claw and order\u201d argument by the prosecutor. Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial was denied. However, 45 minutes after deliberations had begun, the trial judge decided to instruct the jury to disregard the comment. Defendant\u2019s renewed request for a mistrial was denied.\nDefendant does not complain of the trial court\u2019s added instruction to disregard. He instead complains that the statement was so prejudicial as to amount to plain error. We do not agree. The instruction to disregard, while not contemporaneous with the statement, helped ameliorate any prejudice that might have attached. This lone improper comment, with its prejudicial effect reduced, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.\nDefendant\u2019s final point of error is that the trial court erred in not appointing independent counsel to argue defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. In the post-trial motion, defense counsel alleged, inter alia, that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel due to counsel\u2019s failure to make timely motions and objections. Thus, defendant argues that defense counsel operated under a per se conflict of interest at the post-trial motion, citing People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045.\nWe note that Krankel has not been read to mandate a per se conflict in cases where a defendant alleges his counsel was incompetent. (People v. Mallette (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 67, 475 N.E.2d 237; People v. Jackson (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 128, 474 N.E.2d 466.) However, we note the unique situation in the instant case, defense counsel has raised his own incompetence as an issue.\nDefendant claims this is analogous to situations where one assistant public defender argues the ineffectiveness of another assistant from the same office. We think this case is more similar to cases where counsel is forced to argue his own incompetence when defendant raises the issue pro se. In such cases, a per se conflict does not exist. A conflict is determined by examining the underlying allegations of incompetence. People v. Johnson (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610.\nThe instant allegation claimed the failure to make timely motions and objections. The standard of examining claims of ineffective assistance were announced in this State in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246. There our supreme court agreed with the United States Supreme Court in that \u201c[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice *** that course should be followed.\u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070.) The present allegations pertain to counsel\u2019s decisions not to object, decisions that go to the exercise of counsel\u2019s trial judgment and discretion. These grounds are insufficient to support an ineffectiveness claim. People v. Johnson (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the circuit court of Kankakee County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "William Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201485\u20140306\nOpinion filed July 21,1986.\nRehearing denied August 22, 1986.\nRobert Agostinelli and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nWilliam Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0045-01", "first_page_order": 67, "last_page_order": 75 }