{ "id": 3572979, "name": "I.F., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "I.F. v. Department of Children & Family Services", "decision_date": "1986-07-28", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20142956", "first_page": "68", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 68" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 1323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 1307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3024951 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3009857 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3074917 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 9833, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.272931914376389e-07, "percentile": 0.6152150183273233 }, "sha256": "93c3a11948cabea0e65e6fd86574b9c737ae991a81580ed209050431d34ec5d4", "simhash": "1:d8aeefe78873e41b", "word_count": 1589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "I.F., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe subject of this appeal is a judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to a complaint for administrative review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103) affirming the decision of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), denying petitioner\u2019s request to expunge a report that indicated there was credible evidence of child abuse regarding petitioner\u2019s discipline of her three-year-old son. Petitioner contends that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous as a matter of law and fact.\nDuring the evidentiary hearing, Barbara Korasek, an investigator for the Division of Child Protection of DCFS, testified that she interviewed petitioner and her three-year-old son during the afternoon of March 31, 1984. The child told Korasek that he had been \u201cbad to his sister,\u201d i.e., that he had taken cookies from her, and that his mother had \u201chit\u201d him.\nKorasek also testified that there was a half-inch mark on the child\u2019s temple, a one-inch mark under his right eye, and a one-half-inch mark under his left eye near his cheek. The petitioner told the investigator that her child had become \u201cmore out of control than usual,\u201d and he had taken a cookie from his sister and had been \u201cvery physically aggressive towards her.\u201d Petitioner reacted by \u201cslapping\u201d his face and \u201cthrowing\u201d him into his crib. When the petitioner subsequently noted that the child\u2019s nose, bedding and pajamas were bloody, she telephoned the pediatrician who made a home visit. The doctor determined that the blood was a result of the petitioner\u2019s slapping the child and throwing him onto the bed. The petitioner told the investigator that she had never slapped her child so hard in the past.\nJohn Freeman, an investigator for the Division of Child Protection, testified that at 8:40 a.m. on March 31, 1984, the agency received a report of \u201cexcessive force\u201d inappropriate to the child\u2019s age. The report also stated that the petitioner had \u201clost all control,\u201d i.e., on the evening of March 30, 1984, the petitioner \u201cslapped the child around\u201d and \u201cthrew the child into a crib.\u201d When the petitioner observed blood on the child\u2019s face, she became hysterical and called the pediatrician who administered tranquilizers to the petitioner during a home visit at two o\u2019clock in the morning. The doctor also examined the child and found \u201conly red cheeks \u2014 no bruises, or other visible injuries.\u201d Investigator Freeman added that according to the report, the petitioner had \u201clost control\u201d and had hit the child in the past.\nSubsequently, the investigator interviewed petitioner\u2019s husband who had been out of town at the time of the incident, but had returned in response to a telephone call from the family therapist who had been counseling the petitioner and her husband regarding their marital problems. In separate interviews the husband and therapist informed the investigator that petitioner had been \u201cgoing through a stressful period.\u201d\nWhen Investigator Freeman interviewed the pediatrician, the latter stated that he regularly provided medical treatment to the child. When the doctor arrived at petitioner\u2019s residence, petitioner was anxious, nervous, tired and frightened. The doctor remained there an hour. His knowledge that the family was in therapy caused him some concern about the child being struck by petitioner. The doctor thought it was an isolated incident, but reported it because he believed that petitioner\u2019s condition may precipitate a recurrence of the incident. The doctor added that although he had been aware that petitioner had disciplined the child with corporal punishment, he had not been aware of the extent of the punishment. The investigator stated that petitioner\u2019s physician had treated petitioner for stress and headaches but that he had not anticipated the instant incident. Finally, Investigator Freeman stated that petitioner had inflicted excessive punishment on her child, that a parenting class was necessary for her, and that the case should be maintained with DCFS so that it could be certain that petitioner participated in the class.\nWe shall now consider petitioner\u2019s contention that the trial court erroneously affirmed the DCFS decision to deny her request for an expunction of a report which indicated that there was credible evidence of child abuse regarding petitioner\u2019s discipline of her three-year-old son. An abused child is one whose parent inflicts excessive corporal punishment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2053(e).) Under section 4 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, any physician having reasonable cause to believe a child known to him in his professional or official capacity may be an abused child shall immediately report or cause a report to be made to the Department of Children and Family Services (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2054). \u201cAn indicated report\u201d means a report made under the statute if an investigation determines some credible evidence of the existence of the alleged abuse or neglect. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2053(e).) A person who is named in a report may seek to expunge it pursuant to section 7.16 of the statute.\n\u201cAt any time subsequent to the completion of the Child Protective Service Unit investigation, a subject of a report may request the Department to amend, expunge identifying information from, or remove the record of the report from the register. If the Department refuses to do so or does not act within 30 days, the subject shall have the right to a hearing within the Department to determine whether the record of the report should be amended, expunged, or removed on the grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with this Act. *** In such hearings, the burden of proving the accuracy and consistency of the record shall be on the Department and the appropriate Child Protective Service Unit. A court finding of child abuse or neglect shall be presumptive evidence that the report was not unfounded. The hearing shall be conducted by the Director or his designee, who is hereby authorized and empowered to order the amendment, expunction, or removal of the record to make it accurate and consistent with this Act.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2057.16.\nOn administrative review, neither this court nor the circuit court is to reweigh the evidence or the determination of the credibility of the witnesses, which is to be made by the agency. (Dotson v. Bowling (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 340, 430 N.E.2d 44.) When an agency is the finder of fact as well as the interpreter of the law below, a reviewing court is in a less than plenary position. While this court is not formally bound by the administrative decision as to the legal effect of statutory language, it should give that conclusion great weight, using it as a substantial factor in its own construction of the statute. (Ranquist v. Stackler (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198.) Nevertheless, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative purpose and intent of the statute. (Reynolds Metals v. Pollution Control Board (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 156, 438 N.E.2d 1263.) The statute as a whole must be evaluated with each provision being construed in connection with every other provision and in light of the statute\u2019s general purposes. (Braun v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1323, 465 N.E.2d 589.) It is plainly required that the legislative intent is primarily to be derived from a consideration of the language used therein. Hill v. Butler (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 721, 437 N.E.2d 1307.\nIn the instant matter the facts are undisputed. Petitioner struck the young child on his face and threw him into his crib after he took a cookie from his younger sibling and exhibited aggressive behavior toward her. Subsequently, petitioner discovered that the child\u2019s nose, bedding and pajamas were bloody. She then telephoned the child\u2019s pediatrician who examined the child and administered tranquilizers to petitioner during a home visit. Thereafter, the doctor reported the incident to DCFS. Investigators from the Division of Child Protection interviewed petitioner, the child, and other interested persons.\nDCFS found that there was sufficient credible evidence which indicated child abuse based on excessive corporal punishment and recommended family counseling. The circuit court affirmed the agency decision and denied petitioner\u2019s request to expunge the record. In an action for expunction under the statute, the burden of proving the accuracy and consistency of the record is upon the agency. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2057.16.) Our review leads us to conclude that DCFS has sustained its burden of proof. As we have stated, the facts here are uncontested and the record thereof is consistent and accurate. Although this court may sympathize with petitioner\u2019s concern for expunction of the record, the court must effectuate the statutory purpose and intent of protecting children who may be the subject of abuse. Additionally, \u201cidentifying information\u201d on this cause may be removed from the DCFS register no later than five years after the case is closed should there be no recurrences. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2057.14.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nQUINLAN, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ryan & Miller, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rita M. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "I.F., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 85\u20142956\nOpinion filed July 28, 1986.\nRyan & Miller, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rita M. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0068-01", "first_page_order": 90, "last_page_order": 94 }