{ "id": 3571757, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES WARNER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Warner", "decision_date": "1986-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20141637", "first_page": "370", "last_page": "383", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 370" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "424 U.S. 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12059105, 12058212, 12058469, 12058919, 12058572, 12058156, 12058860, 12058639, 12058387, 12058772, 12058293, 12059001, 12058717 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0970-13", "/us/424/0970-02", "/us/424/0970-05", "/us/424/0970-11", "/us/424/0970-06", "/us/424/0970-01", "/us/424/0970-10", "/us/424/0970-07", "/us/424/0970-04", "/us/424/0970-09", "/us/424/0970-03", "/us/424/0970-12", "/us/424/0970-08" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2519555 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3418098 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160723 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141517 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146347 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 1241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130148 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S. Ct. 1602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 298", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299279 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "232-33" }, { "page": "1294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 1106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529456 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 L. Ed. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6200579 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" }, { "page": "488-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 L. Ed. 2d 631", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6206467 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 N.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3349675 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863889 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448512 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073786 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S. Ct. 1469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 L. Ed. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966897 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336129 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "1143-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 L. Ed. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6204292 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "1140-41" }, { "page": "421-24" }, { "page": "1142-45" }, { "page": "424-25" }, { "page": "1144" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 F.2d 615", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1947797 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/732/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 F. Supp. 760", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3532817 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/556/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 F.2d 1540", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1123324 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/708/1540-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 F.2d 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 472452 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/665/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6190887 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958689 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "495-96" }, { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 A.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Md. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1971093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/293/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 A.2d 1190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Conn. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 692420 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/196/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 282", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11329864 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 A.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.H. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4443476 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/118/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11071127 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/391/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ind. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1823635 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/271/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 F.2d 554", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2037797 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/374/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 1039", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196866 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/1039-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 638", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336877 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "1343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "1884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175104 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 17, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474-75" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "1628" }, { "page": "465-66" }, { "page": "718-19" }, { "page": "1623" }, { "page": "457-58" }, { "page": "714" }, { "page": "1619" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "1624" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1349, "char_count": 34748, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.327985818427657e-08, "percentile": 0.48040715887296903 }, "sha256": "e443a90142d87bd57dee4f97832d8e9175f252cfec12b93488a9f9b99bc9185b", "simhash": "1:ebf2355957674b07", "word_count": 5693 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES WARNER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Charles Warner, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 200 to 500 years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 9-l(a)(l), 1005-8-l(b)(l), 1005-8-1(c)(1).) On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in its denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress an oral inculpatory statement he made to Chicago authorities during custodial interrogation. Defendant claims that his waiver of counsel during questioning initiated in Chicago by Chicago authorities was invalid as a matter of law because it violated his right to remain silent and to speak to an attorney. Defendant\u2019s claim is based on the ground that he had requested counsel during prior custodial interrogation in Florida by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Defendant\u2019s return to Illinois from Florida resulted from his voluntary, consensual waiver of his right to an extradition hearing in Florida following consultation with counsel in Florida. Defendant also contends that the trial court\u2019s sentence amounted to an abuse of discretion.\nFor the reasons set forth more fully below, we conclude that the defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel in Chicago was not involuntary per se; that his interrogation by Chicago authorities did not violate his right to counsel; that any assumed error in the admission of the inculpatory statement made by defendant during his interrogation in Chicago was harmless; and that the trial court\u2019s sentence did not constitute an abuse of discretion.\nBackground\nDefendant was prosecuted for the July 1977 murder of Christanna White in Chicago. White\u2019s body was found in defendant\u2019s apartment in the city of Chicago when an officer of the Chicago police department investigated the apartment because of odors that were emanating from the residence. Defendant did not dispute at trial that he had killed White. Instead he argued that his conduct amounted either to self-defense or voluntary manslaughter.\nEvidence produced at trial established that on the evening of July 8, 1977, defendant and White were seen together at a cocktail lounge located across the street from defendant\u2019s apartment. Defendant and White were served quite a bit of liquor and, after three hours, left the lounge together.\nWhite\u2019s body was subsequently discovered in defendant\u2019s apartment on July 11 by an officer of the Chicago police department. She was unclothed, lying face up on a mattress, and was surrounded by considerable blood. Eleven stab wounds had been inflicted to her chest and abdominal regions. Her body had been mutilated and dismembered. There was no visible sign of a struggle in the apartment. After the officers removed her body from the apartment, they found a knife under the mattress on which White\u2019s body was lying. The knife found under the mattress had been given to defendant by his employer for use in the performance of his janitorial duties, and was usually stored on a shelf in the employer\u2019s shipping and receiving department.\nOn the morning of July 15, 1977, defendant visited his place of employment to obtain his pay check and return a loan which he had received from his immediate supervisor, Wyatt Akin. During a brief conversation, Akin pointed to a newspaper article which reported WHiite\u2019s death and asked defendant if he had done \u201cthis,\u201d to which defendant replied, \u201cYes, I did.\u201d When Akin expressed disbelief, defendant told Akins that he and WThite had both been drunk, that she was to engage in sexual acts with defendant for money, and after a disagreement, she tried to take some money from him and had threatened to kill him if he did not comply with her demand for more money than originally agreed. Defendant stated that he had taken a knife away from her and killed her. Defendant agreed with Akin that he should surrender himself to the police. After defendant left the premises, Akin noticed that the knife which had been used by the defendant in connection with his janitorial duties was missing.\nDefendant did not surrender to police, but instead went to Miami, Florida, where he obtained employment. He was subsequently located there in 1982 by officers of the Chicago police department, who notified the FBI that defendant was in Miami and informed the Miami police department of the existence of a Chicago warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest in connection with the White homicide.\nOn July 14, 1982, special agents of the Miami office of the FBI arrested defendant at his place of employment in Miami, where he had been working for four years. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and taken to the FBI\u2019s Miami office for processing. Defendant then told the agents \u201cthat he wished to speak to a lawyer prior to answering any questions\u201d and the agents immediately refrained from asking any questions. No formal interview of defendant was ever conducted by the FBI agents. Defendant was turned over to the Florida authorities, who detained him in a Florida prison. The FBI agents did not notify the Chicago police department of defendant\u2019s arrest. One of the agents did prepare a 302 report (an interview form used by the FBI to summarize its contact with individuals) which he sent to the Chicago office of the FBI, but did not disseminate this report, the contents of which are not of record, to any other individual or agency.\nSubsequent events which transpired in Miami following defendant\u2019s arrest by the FBI In July 1982 and preceding his return to Chicago in October 1982 are not set forth in the record in detail. The record does disclose, however, according to defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his confession, \u201c[tjhat he was arrested in Florida on the warrant issued in the within cause and thereafter, after appointment of counsel, waived extradition.\u201d\nOn October 22, 1982, Detectives Liberty and Jonda of the Chicago police department flew to Miami to return the defendant to Illinois. At the Dade County Correctional Facility in Miami, the Chicago officers received transmittal papers from jail officials. These documents did not include any report prepared by the FBI. Defendant was handcuffed and given his Miranda rights. He did not indicate that he wished to consult with an attorney. The trial court found, following the suppression hearing, that no interrogation of defendant occurred during the flight from Miami to Chicago. This factual determination is not disputed by defendant in this appeal.\nAfter the flight from Miami to Chicago, defendant was transported to a police station where he was placed in an interrogation room. That evening, Barry Pechter, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, came to the room to speak with defendant. Pechter was aware that defendant had been brought back from Florida, but did not know which agency had effectuated the arrest and had not spoken to the FBI or any Florida authorities before speaking to defendant. In the presence of Chicago police officers, Pechter introduced himself to defendant and advised him that although he was an attorney, he was not defendant\u2019s attorney, but rather was an assistant State\u2019s Attorney working with the police in their investigation of the stabbing of White. Pechter advised defendant of his Miranda rights. After each right was communicated, defendant acknowledged that he understood the right. Defendant then agreed to speak with Pechter.\nDefendant told Pechter that he and White had returned to his apartment after meeting at a cocktail lounge. After drinking liquor in his apartment, White agree to have sexual relations with defendant in exchange for defendant\u2019s paying her $30. Subsequently White demanded more money; when defendant refused, White picked up a $20 bill that was on a coffee table and inserted it into her body. She refused to return the money, threatening him with \u201cgang violence.\u201d Defendant became angry, took a knife on the coffee table, and stabbed White once in the chest. Thinking White was dead, defendant used the knife to cut and dismember her body in order to recover the money she had taken. He then left the apartment.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to Chicago authorities argued that his interrogation by Chicago officials violated his fifth amendment right to counsel which he had invoked when questioned by the FBI in Miami in July 1982. He also contended in the alternative that he did not voluntarily waive his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney when he was interrogated by Chicago authorities in October 1982. The defendant does not dispute on appeal the trial court\u2019s factual finding that his waiver of his Miranda rights in Chicago pursuant to questioning here was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; as a result, we need not state in detail the evidence presented to the trial court with regard to this aspect of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement on the ground that interrogation in Chicago violated the fifth amendment right to counsel which defendant had invoked during FBI interrogation of him in Miami, the trial court noted that defendant had not invoked his right to counsel in the presence of the Chicago officers who escorted him back to Chicago. The court also found no evidence that the Miami FBI had advised any other agency of defendant\u2019s request for counsel. The court considered it unreasonable to impute knowledge of defendant\u2019s request for counsel from the FBI to the Chicago authorities, in view of the 90-day interim between defendant\u2019s request for counsel in Miami and his interrogation in Chicago, the distance between cities, and the different jurisdictions involved.\nThe jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder. After a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court found that the killing was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty and sentenced defendant to serve 200 to 500 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendant asserts that the oral inculpatory statement he made during custodial interrogation by an attorney of the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office in Chicago on October 22, 1982, was procured in violation of his right to be free from self-incrimination under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV.) Defendant argues that he invoked his fifth amendment rights to remain silent and to speak to an attorney when questioned by the FBI in Miami, Florida, in July 1982, and that the Chicago authorities could not, except in violation of his fifth amendment rights, thereafter interrogate him on their own initiative in October 1982 following his voluntary return to Illinois.\nThe fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part that \u201c[n]o person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. V.) An accused who is the subject of custodial interrogation is entitled to admonition of his fifth amendment right prior to the commencement of any questioning, i.e., he must be advised of his right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney, and of the consequences of his waiver of those rights. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.\nOnce a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent during police interrogation, his subsequent waiver of this right upon police-initiated reinterrogation will be deemed nonetheless legally valid if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321.) However, where an accused has invoked his right to an attorney during police questioning, rather than solely his right to remain silent, his later waiver of the right to counsel upon police-initiated reinterrogation will not be given legal cognizance; instead it will be deemed involuntary as a matter of law. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880.) The per se involuntary waiver of the right to counsel rule adopted in Edwards is thus an exception to the standard generally applied to waivers, viz, \u201cwhether, as an individual, case-by-case matter, a waiver of the right to counsel had been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [Citation.]\u201d Solem v. Stumes (1984), 465 U.S. 638, 647, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579, 589, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343; see also 465 U.S. 638, 647-48 n.7, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579, 590 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1351 n.7; Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), 462 U.S. 1039, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405, 103 S. Ct. 2830; Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 474-75, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 724, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628.\nDefendant asserts that because he invoked his right to counsel during FBI questioning in Miami in July 1982, he could not be the subject of police-initiated interrogation by Chicago authorities in October 1982. He argues that the FBI\u2019s knowledge of his assertion of his right to counsel should be attributed to Chicago authorities. In reliance upon Edwards, he further contends that his waiver of his right to counsel during Chicago interrogation was involuntary as a matter of law, and that as a result the ensuing inculpatory remark he gave to Chicago authorities should not have been admitted at trial.\nThe record does not disclose whether the FBI attempted to question the defendant regarding his extradition to Illinois, his involvement in the White homicide, or both. The arguments of the defendant and the State on appeal assume that this absence of any clear evidence on the scope of FBI questioning is relevant to a disposition of the defendant\u2019s arguments herein. We question the premise of the parties\u2019 contentions on this point, however, as it would appear that a defendant has no fifth amendment right to remain silent pertaining to extradition interrogation, because extradition is not a criminal proceeding per se. (See United States ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood (2d Cir. 1967), 374 F.2d 554; Cobb v. Gilman (1979), 271 Ind. 223, 391 N.E.2d 618; Reeves v. Cox (1978), 118 N.H. 271, 385 A.2d 847; see generally e.g., Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521, 99 S. Ct. 530; State v. Falcon (1985), 196 Conn. 557, 494 A.2d 1190; Utt v. State (1982), 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582.) We therefore will assume, for the purpose of analysis, that the FBI attempted to interrogate the defendant regarding the White homicide.\nWe note at the outset that Edwards is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Edwards, the accused asserted his right to counsel during interrogation by officers of a particular police unit. He was returned to detention in that jurisdiction and interrogation was terminated. Later, officers of the same police unit that had earlier questioned the suspect returned and initiated further interrogation. The defendant waived his right to counsel and made an inculpatory statement. The Supreme Court held that the accused\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel was invalid because police initiation of subsequent interrogation violated the defendant\u2019s right to an attorney. Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880.\nEdwards recognized that a suspect\u2019s request for counsel represents the accused\u2019s expression that he views the questioning as overwhelming and coercive, that he does not feel himself capable of dealing with the police at arm\u2019s length on his own, and that he desires the advice of counsel. (See Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85; see also Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 465-66, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 718-19, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1623.) Thus subsequent decisions have also applied the Edwards rule to factual circumstances similar to those presented in Edwards, viz, where the second police interrogation without the benefit of counsel requested by the accused is, in its impact upon the suspect, nothing more than an extension of the original questioning and forms a single, continuous period of coercive interrogation. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 105 S. Ct. 490 (per curiam); Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), 462 U.S. 1039, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405, 103 S. Ct. 2830; Wyrick v. Fields (1982), 459 U.S. 42, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214, 103 S. Ct. 394 (per curiam); see also United States v. Downing (1st Cir. 1981), 665 F.2d 404; United States v. Scalf (10th Cir. 1983), 708 F.2d 1540; United States ex rel. Karr v. Wolff (N.D. Ill. 1983), 556 F. Supp. 760, vacated & remanded in light of Solem v. Stumes (7th Cir. 1984), 732 F.2d 615.\nIn the case at bar, in contrast, the defendant asserted and was provided counsel pursuant to FBI questioning in Florida. The record is devoid of any indication, and defendant does not contend, that he was questioned by anyone at any time in Florida following his request for counsel, in violation of Edwards. Furthermore, for the reasons stated more fully below with respect to whether knowledge of the defendant\u2019s request for counsel should be imputed to the Chicago authorities, the facts of this case do not present circumstances that can be said to amount to a single, continuous period of coercive custodial interrogation in the mind of an accused.\nDefendant argues instead that the FBI\u2019s knowledge of his assertion of his fifth amendment right to counsel should be attributed to Chicago authorities who questioned him in Illinois following his voluntary, consensual return to Illinois three months later. He claims that if the FBI\u2019s knowledge of his invocation of the right to counsel is imputed to the Chicago authorities, then his questioning in Illinois violated Edwards, and his waiver of his right to counsel in Chicago was involuntary as a matter of law. It follows from defendant\u2019s argument that if knowledge is not imputed from the FBI to Chicago authorities, then his questioning in Illinois did not contravene Edwards, and his waiver was valid if it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, defendant\u2019s argument raises the question of whether the validity of his waiver should be determined on the basis of the per se standard of Edwards,, or the totality of the circumstances rule generally applied to waivers of a fifth amendment right during custodial interrogation. Resolution of this question depends upon a determination of which of these standards would best serve the purposes of the fifth amendment protections enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona.\nThe procedural safeguards adopted in Miranda are designed to ensure that questioning of an accused by police authorities does not degenerate from careful investigation to overzealous inquisition in an \u201catmosphere [that] carries its own badge of intimidation *** [that is] destructive of human dignity *** [and] is at odds with one of our Nation\u2019s most cherished principles \u2014 that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.\u201d (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 457-58, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 714, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1619.) By requiring the admonition of Miranda warnings prior to the onset of custodial interrogation, courts are provided an objectively verifiable means to determine if an accused\u2019s statement to authorities is the product of his own free will and not caused by the overbearing compulsion created by his isolation in police custody. 384 U.S. 436, 467, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 719, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624; see Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. _,_, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 420, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41; Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), 465 U.S. 420, 430, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 421, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1143-44.\nThe imputation of police knowledge of an accused\u2019s assertion of his fifth amendment right to counsel is also designed to achieve a related objective. This goal is to prevent an accused\u2019s request for counsel during interrogation from being nullified by police authorities \u201cby the expedient of transferring his custody for questioning to an officer who would be unaware of the request for an attorney\u201d (People v. White (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 288, 294, 335 N.E.2d 457, 461, cert. denied (1976), 424 U.S. 970, 47 L. Ed. 2d 738, 96 S. Ct. 1469), and to prevent \u201can attempt by police to avoid responsibility by dividing it among different individuals\u201d (People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 98, 398 N.E.2d 574, 579). See also People v. Medina (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 254, 261, 375 N.E.2d 78; People v. Blanchard (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 69, 73, 224 N.E.2d 813; People v. Stone (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 378 N.E.2d 263; cf. Michigan v. Jackson (1986), 475 U.S._, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631,106 S. Ct. 1404 (sixth amendment).\nFifth amendment jurisprudence regarding a suspect\u2019s rights during custodial interrogation is not intended, however, to establish a per se rule that an attorney be present during all custodial interrogation, nor is it designed to transform police authorities into an accused\u2019s \u201cpreliminary attorney\u201d until counsel is in fact requested by the accused during the course of questioning (See Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S____, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 421-24, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142-45.) Instead, its purpose is to strike a balance between an accused\u2019s right to be free from coercive custodial interrogation which undermines his ability to make independent decisions, and society\u2019s right to effective police investigation and law enforcement. (475 U.S._, _, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 424-25, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144; cf. Maine v. Moulton (1985), 474 U.S_, _, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 497-98, 106 S. Ct. 477, 488-89 (sixth amendment).) It achieves this balance between the accused\u2019s rights and those of the community at large by according to \u201cthe defendant the power to exert some control over the course of interrogation\u201d (emphasis in original) (Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S _,_, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 424, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144) by exercising his right to remain silent and to speak with counsel.\nIn our view the danger of coercive or compulsive interrogation does not arise in a factual setting such as the one at bar. The record here demonstrates that the defendant was taken into custody by the FBI, given his Miranda rights, and requested assistance of counsel. He was not questioned thereafter by any police authority while in Florida awaiting his possible extradition to Illinois. Following his consultation with an attorney, defendant waived his right to formal extradition proceedings and consented voluntarily to his return to Illinois. There is nothing in the record to suggest, nor does defendant argue, that there was any impropriety whatsoever in his treatment in Florida. Upon his voluntary return to Illinois three months later, defendant was advised by authorities of his Miranda rights, knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights, and made an oral inculpatory statement.\nIn light of these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the FBI\u2019s knowledge of defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to counsel should be attributed to the Chicago authorities when defendant was questioned in Chicago three months later. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the FBI or the Chicago authorities engaged in a course of conduct, either intentional or unintentional, which would have the effect of shifting a defendant\u2019s custody and interrogation from one unit to another so that the authorities could avoid the responsibility of respecting an accused\u2019s request for counsel, and in essence thereby force the suspect to confess to his involvement in criminal activity. (Cf. People v. Bates (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 205, 478 N.E.2d 1106, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 574.) Nor indeed can we conclude that the mere attempt by Chicago officials upon a defendant\u2019s return to Chicago to determine whether the susp\u00e9ct wished to speak to an attorney rather than to be interrogated by the authorities regarding his part in a criminal offense would amount to a coercively charged atmosphere which would threaten to destroy a defendant\u2019s sense of free will such that he would feel compelled to speak out and incriminate himself rather than to remain silent. Cf. People v. Fleming (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 562, 480 N.E.2d 1221, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 575.\nConsequently, we are unable to conclude that the facts of this case present circumstances wherein \u201cthe authorities through \u2018badgerpng]\u2019 or \u2018overreaching\u2019 \u2014 implicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional-might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel\u2019s assistance.\u201d Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 98, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 495-96,105 S. Ct. 490, 494-95 (per curiam).\nWe find it noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court does not automatically and in all circumstances impute police refusal to honor a suspect\u2019s fifth amendment rights from one interrogating authority to another. Even where the first interrogation occurred without the giving of any Miranda rights to an accused, the Supreme Court has recognized that \u201c[w]hen a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, [and] the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether the coercion has carried over into the second confession.\u201d (Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298, 310, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 232-33, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1294.) Thus, the coercive effect of an interrogation made without the aid of any advisement of Miranda rights can be dissipated and leave untarnished a subsequent interrogation. It follows from this analysis that a stronger and more compelling case of noncompulsive police questioning is presented where, as here, the accused is fully advised of his Miranda rights, granted his request for counsel during initial interrogation, and is then later \u201ctaken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and [again] adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them.\u201d Westover v. United States (1965), 384 U.S. 436, 496, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 736, 88 S. Ct. 1602, 1639.\nAs a result we determine that the FBI\u2019s knowledge that the defendant here asserted his right to counsel during FBI questioning in Miami in July 1982 should not be imputed to Chicago authorities when they initiated interrogation of the accused upon his return to Chicago in October. Based upon this determination, we conclude that defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel in Chicago was valid if it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Following a suppression hearing the trial court found that defendant\u2019s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Defendant does not dispute this factual determination on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement to Chicago authorities was properly admitted into evidence at defendant\u2019s trial.\nII\nAs an alternative holding, we determine that even if the introduction of defendant\u2019s October 1982 statement were error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824.) Our review of the trial record as a whole compels the conclusion that there is overwhelming evidence to support the defendant\u2019s conviction of murder. See People v. R. C. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 349, 355-56, 483 N.E.2d 1241; People v. Gonzalez (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 332, 338-39, 472 N.E.2d 417, 420-21.\nEvidence in the record to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was substantial. It was established at trial that defendant and White left the cocktail lounge together on July 8, 1977. Three days later her body was found in defendant\u2019s apartment. It had 11 stab wounds and was mutilated and dismembered. It was apparent that she had been dead for some time, as her decomposing body had begun to give off odors noticeable to others in the building. A knife discovered under the mattress where White was found had been given to defendant to perform his janitorial duties in Chicago. The medical examiner testified that White\u2019s wounds were produced by a weapon with a slim blade and a sharp edge, characteristics which corresponded with the weapon produced by the State. Although the knife was normally stored on a shelf at the defendant\u2019s place of employment, it was found by the police in defendant\u2019s apartment. Other than the blood found surrounding White\u2019s body, no other evidence of blood was found in the apartment and there was no visible sign of any altercation or struggle. On July 15, defendant admitted to his supervisor that he had killed White, and he thereafter fled to Miami, Florida. All of this evidence proved defendant guilty of the murder of White.\nDefendant argues that admission of his October 1982 statement cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it contradicted and thereby called into question the credibility of his earlier statement to his supervisor. According to this earlier statement, defendant killed White because she threatened him with a knife; defendant then took the weapon away from White and stabbed her. Defendant reasons that the jury could have reasonably concluded, based upon this admission, that defendant acted either in self-defense in killing White, or that his conduct amounted to voluntary manslaughter.\nWe are unpersuaded by this argument. Defendant\u2019s statement to his supervisor indicated only that White threatened defendant with the possibility of physical harm if he attempted to recover the additional money she had taken, rather than with the certainty of fatal physical injury sufficient to justify his killing her. More importantly, the physical evidence established that there was no struggle in the apartment, that White was stabbed almost a dozen times, and that her body had been mutilated and dismembered. This evidence demonstrated that defendant did not act in either an unreasonable or a reasonable belief of self-defense when he killed White. As a result we cannot conclude that the evidence produced below, absent defendant\u2019s October 1982 inculpatory statement, failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murder of White.\nIll\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s sentence of 200 to 500 years\u2019 imprisonment is reversible error as an abuse of discretion. Specifically he claims that the trial court failed to take into account his potential for rehabilitation.\nDefendant elected to be sentenced under the Unified Code of Corrections in effect in 1977. Under the 1977 Code, a defendant convicted of murder could be imprisoned for a minimum term of 14 years and a maximum term in excess of 14 years; the court has the authority to set a higher minimum term upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(b)(1), 1005\u2014 8 \u2014 1(c)(1).\nIt has long been recognized that \u201cthe spirit and purpose of the law are upheld when a sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and gives adequate consideration to the rehabilitative potential of the defendant.\u201d (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 587, 404 N.E.2d 233, 243.) The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the impropriety of a reviewing court substituting its judgment or preference as to punishment for that of the sentencing court, on the ground that the trial judge is in a superior position to tailor a sentence to the needs of each individual case. (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 323, 473 N.E.2d 1300; People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 375, 462 N.E.2d 473.) Thus a trial court\u2019s decision regarding sentencing is entitled to great deference and weight and absent a clear abuse of discretion may not be disturbed on review. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882.\nDefendant argues that the trial court did not consider his rehabilitative potential and that its failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. The trial court was not required to make specific findings concerning the defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential, however. (People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 493, 431 N.E.2d 344.) Furthermore, an examination of the record reveals that the trial court considered all the relevant factors of the case, including counsel\u2019s arguments during the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, in reaching its decision as to sentencing. The record here clearly indicates the seriousness of the crime of which defendant was convicted, as well as the brutality with which it was committed. In our opinion the mitigating factors of defendant\u2019s work history, absence of a criminal record, and length of residence, when compared to the heinousness of defendant\u2019s acts, afford insufficient basis upon which to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court. (See People v. Baker (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 401, 372 N.E.2d 438; People v. Henry (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 429, 306 N.E.2d 668, appeal denied (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 584.) We therefore cannot conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was reversible error as an abuse of discretion.\nFor the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINN, P.J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.\nDefendant does not claim that the interrogation occurred in derogation of his right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) In fact, during oral argument before this court, defendant\u2019s attorney was questioned from the bench whether defendant was relying upon his fifth amendment right to counsel under Miranda, or his sixth amendment right to counsel, or both. Counsel for defendant replied that he was relying solely upon his fifth amendment right to counsel. As a result, we do not address the question of whether defendant\u2019s interrogation by Chicago authorities violated defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel, nor whether that right had attached at the time he was questioned by the FBI in July 1982 or the Chicago authorities in October 1982. Cf. People v. Fleming (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 562, 480 N.E.2d 1221, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 575.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Clark and Karen Michaels, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Inge Fryklund, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES WARNER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 84\u20141637\nOpinion filed June 26, 1986.\nRehearing denied August 19, 1986.\nSteven Clark and Karen Michaels, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Inge Fryklund, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0370-01", "first_page_order": 392, "last_page_order": 405 }