{ "id": 3571884, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES EALY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ealy", "decision_date": "1986-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 84\u2014649", "first_page": "557", "last_page": "567", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 557" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640134 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "2259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 174", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 878", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6396355, 6396939, 6396717, 6396622, 6396815, 6396469, 6396153, 6396253 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0878-03", "/us/459/0878-08", "/us/459/0878-06", "/us/459/0878-05", "/us/459/0878-07", "/us/459/0878-04", "/us/459/0878-01", "/us/459/0878-02" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5583362 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 979", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5476417 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522406 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" }, { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106132 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1010, "char_count": 24738, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1284982177203527e-07, "percentile": 0.575231992289898 }, "sha256": "976b7bc4e474a0ca57603ca5d55a8b2db911bfac5b1ad27807872e8aa9c88fba", "simhash": "1:19e13c8c63c52797", "word_count": 4120 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES EALY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant James Ealy was found guilty of four counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) and sentenced to natural life imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections, the sentence to be served consecutively with a previously imposed 23-year sentence on a conviction for rape. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) based on the ground that his arrest was illegal, the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his confession and evidence obtained as a result of two searches of his residence; (2) the State\u2019s failure to produce photographs and a microanalyst\u2019s notes during discovery violated his right to due process; and (3) the prosecutor\u2019s improper remarks during closing rebuttal argument constituted reversible error. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.\nThe record reveals that at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motions to suppress, the following testimony was presented. On August 16, 1982, at approximately 12:55 p.m., Chicago Police Officer Dennis Vavrin discovered the bodies of Christine, Mary Ann, Cora and Jontae Parker in their seventh floor apartment located in the Rockwell Gardens housing project at 2515 West Jackson, in Chicago. Christine, the 33-year-old mother of 15-year-old Mary Ann and 13-year-old Cora, was found in a bedroom of the apartment. Mary Ann and her 3-year-old son, Jontae, were discovered in the bathroom. Cora was found in a closet, next to the bathroom. All of the victims bore ligature marks around their necks, with the exception of Mary Ann who was discovered with a green cloth wrapped around her neck. A later examination of the premises by police evidence technicians revealed no fingerprints suitable for comparison. Dr. Robert Stein, the Cook County medical examiner who had been called to the scene, pronounced the victims dead and their bodies were removed from the apartment.\nShortly thereafter the police conducted a canvas of the building residents. Police officers went to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s apartment located on the fourth floor and questioned her. Defendant, who was 17 years old, was present at that time but was not questioned. Later that afternoon, the police returned to Mrs. Ealy\u2019s apartment and spoke with defendant, who told them that he had dated Mary Ann Parker until earlier that year, he knew the other Parkers and that he did not know anyone who might have killed them. At approximately 11 p.m., several police officers reappeared at the apartment asking to see defendant and, finding he was not at home, told Mrs. Ealy to have him call them if he had any more information regarding the Parker homicides.\nThe next day, August 17, autopsies were performed on the victims by Dr. Stein. In attendance was Detective Thomas Blomstrand of the Chicago police department. Dr. Stein\u2019s examination disclosed that each victim had died as a result of ligature strangulation. His examination of Mary Ann revealed that the green cloth around her neck was a leg portion of a pair of green surgical pants. After removing the cloth from Mary Ann\u2019s neck, Dr. Stein also discovered a piece of tan material knotted on the right side and tied tightly around her neck. His examination of Jontae further revealed that he had been raped.\nThereafter, Detective Blomstrand reported to Area 4 police headquarters and communicated Dr. Stein\u2019s findings to other detectives present at a 5 p.m. roll call. Detectives Terrence Thedford and Patrick Harrington were among those in attendance. They were assigned to interview two of five individuals, one of whom was defendant, who were known to frequently watch television in the victims\u2019 apartment. Thedford and Harrington arrived at defendant\u2019s residence, without a warrant, allegedly at 9 p.m. They identified themselves to Mrs. Ealy, stated they were working on the Parker homicides and asked to speak with defendant. Mrs. Ealy invited them in and sent her younger son to get defendant, who was outside on the playground area of the building. When defendant arrived, the detectives asked him if he would come to the police station with them. Both detectives testified that they did not tell defendant that he had to go with them, and defendant never indicated that he did not want to go with them. On direct examination of defendant, defense counsel orally made an offer of proof that defendant would testify that \u201che felt they [the detectives] would force him to go if he didn\u2019t cooperate\u201d and \u201cthat one of the officers was standing by the door, blocking the door from his exit.\u201d\nThey then left the apartment \u2014 one detective in front of and one in back of defendant. Defendant was not handcuffed and the officers \u201cdid not pull their guns on him.\u201d He was transported to the police station in a squad car which was equipped with a wire screen between the front and rear seats and which lacked handles to the windows and doors in the rear.\nUpon arriving at the Area 4 station at approximately 9:40 p.m., the detectives placed defendant in a second-floor interview room, but did not give him Miranda warnings at that time. The room was windowless and contained a table and three chairs. The officers left defendant in the room for 20 minutes, then returned and interrogated him for 30 minutes, asking him to account for his whereabouts during the early morning hours of August 16. Determining that some discrepancies existed between defendant\u2019s account of his activities and the one previously given by his mother, the detectives left the room to discuss the inconsistencies. While out of the room, they became aware of the presence of Mrs. Ealy and told her about the inconsistencies between defendant\u2019s and her account of defendant\u2019s whereabouts on August 16. Contrary to Mrs. Ealy\u2019s testimony, they then asked Mrs. Ealy if she would speak to defendant about his story and she agreed. Contrary to defendant\u2019s testimony, they further testified that they asked defendant if he would speak with his mother and that he refused to do so.\nShortly thereafter, Thedford and Harrington were informed by another detective that defendant recently had been arrested for a rape which occurred in the same building where defendant and the Parker family lived. After reviewing the case report of that rape, Thedford and Harrington returned to the interview room at approximately 11 p.m. and gave defendant Miranda warnings. Defendant said he understood his rights and the officers interrogated him for another 30 minutes. During that time, defendant was asked and agreed to sign a consent to search his bedroom. The detectives did not seek to obtain a search warrant. The officers also testified, contrary to Mrs. Ealy\u2019s testimony, that she had agreed to sign a consent to search form.\nThe next shift of detectives, Ralph Vucko and Victor Switski, were informed by Thedford and Harrington of the status of the investigation. Detective Vucko testified he prepared a consent to search form for Mrs. Ealy\u2019s signature. At approximately 1:30 p.m. on August 18, after finding that Mrs. Ealy had left the station, Vucko and Harrington took the form into the interview room. Vucko stated he asked defendant to sign the consent form after reading its contents to him and advising him that he was waiving \u201chis right to the police having to have a search warrant to look in [his] house.\u201d Defendant, however, testified that although he signed the form, its contents were not read to him and he did not read it.\nAt approximately 1:45 a.m., Detectives Vucko and Switski arrived at defendant\u2019s residence. They testified they showed Mrs. Ealy the consent to search form signed by defendant, she permitted them to enter the apartment, and she showed them to defendant\u2019s bedroom. Mrs. Ealy, however, testified that the detectives asked her to sign a consent form, she asked them if it was a search warrant, they said no, and she said she would not sign it. She stated that they then pushed her aside, entered the apartment and went into defendant\u2019s bedroom. The detectives subsequently found a \u201cbundle\u201d underneath defendant\u2019s bed. It contained numerous items, including two lengths of khaki-type material, one of which was knotted at each end and the other with one knot in it. Other items found in the bundle were a bone-colored knife handle, a green pair of surgical pants, some bed sheets with red stains, a child\u2019s sweater, and a red sock. Vucko took the khaki material and some shoelaces he had found in defendant\u2019s dresser.\nThe detectives then left the apartment and went to Detective Blomstrand\u2019s home. They showed him the khaki material taken from the bundle and he told them it looked like the same material he had observed around Mary Ann Parker\u2019s neck at the autopsies he attended. Vucko and Switski then returned to the Parkers\u2019 apartment. Vucko discovered a khaki-colored trench coat in a closet and noticed that although the coat had belt loops, the belt was missing. He also found a knife blade in the closet which appeared to him to match the handle he had seen in the bundle in defendant\u2019s bedroom. Vucko took both items and he and Switski returned to the police station, arriving at approximately 4 a.m. on August 18. At that time, Switski testified that he went to the interview room occupied by defendant and locked the door.\nAt approximately 5 a.m., Vucko and Switski entered the interview room. Detective Thedford also entered, \u201ctook defendant\u2019s underwear and gym shoes\u201d away from him and then left. Defendant was again given his Miranda rights, he indicated he was willing to further discuss the Parker homicides, and the officers confronted him with the items they had recovered from his bedroom and the Parker crime scene. Thereafter, defendant told the officers that on August 15, at about 11:30 p.m., he was near the Parkers\u2019 apartment and saw a large black man running from the apartment carrying a large bundle which he dropped. After picking up the bundle, defendant went into the Parkers\u2019 apartment and found the victims\u2019 bodies. He said he then left, the apartment, taking the bundle with him to his mother\u2019s apartment, placed the bundle under his mother\u2019s bed and went to sleep. Defendant, however, later denied giving this account to Detectives Vucko and Switski. Defendant also denied that he signed a second consent to search form at the end of this interrogation session, even though he later acknowledged his signature on the form which was admitted into evidence.\nAt approximately 6 a.m., Detectives Vucko and Switski went to defendant\u2019s residence bearing the second consent form. They testified that they showed Mrs. Ealy the consent form and told her that they were there to pick up the rest of the items which were left in the bundle. Contrary to Mrs. Ealy\u2019s testimony, Vucko and Switski stated that she permitted them to enter the apartment and to take the items. Mrs. Ealy testified that the detectives shoved her, entered her apartment and went into defendant\u2019s bedroom. Finding that the bundle had been removed from its previous location, they told Mrs. Ealy to bring it to them, she did so, and they left.\nVucko and Switski returned to the Area 4 station with the bundle and interviewed defendant again at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 18. Switski gave defendant Miranda warnings, and Detective Vucko then told defendant that his previous story did not make sense. At that point, defendant became excited, started crying and said he \u201cwould tell the truth.\u201d Vucko and Switski stated that defendant then told them that on August 15 he had been drinking with friends. He later went to the Parkers\u2019 apartment at approximately 11:30 p.m. and several members of the Parker family \u201cmade fun of his red eyes.\u201d Defendant then described to the detectives how he strangled the four victims.\nThereafter, Detective Switski called the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Christine Campbell arrived at Area 4 at 10:45 a.m. After explaining her position to defendant and giving him Miranda warnings, defendant repeated his confession to her and agreed to make a written statement. At 1 p.m., defendant signed a waiver of his constitutional rights, his statement was taken down by a court reporter and at approximately 2:30 p.m. he signed the statement. At 3 p.m., defendant was allowed to see his mother. She had arrived at the station at approximately 10 a.m. and had been told she had to wait before seeing defendant. During that time, Mrs. Ealy called Beverly Bearden, a case worker volunteer for Catholic Charities, who arrived at the station at 2:30 p.m. and was also told she would have to wait to speak to defendant.\nDefendant testified that when he spoke with his mother and Bear-den, he told them he confessed because he \u201ccouldn\u2019t take it\u201d any more. He stated that he had not had anything to eat or drink throughout his detention, that the officers would not permit him to sleep and that they would not let him leave. Defendant further stated that he had been repeatedly \u201cpunched in the ribs\u201d by an unidentified officer and threatened that he would not be able to sleep or to see his mother until he signed a confession. He also stated that he in fact did not kill the Parkers, that he had been high on wine when he found a bundle by the garbage chute on the seventh floor where the Parker apartment was located, that he had used the bundle as a basketball, tossing it into garbage cans as he made his way down to his mother\u2019s apartment on the fourth floor, and that he went home to sleep when he reached his mother\u2019s apartment, tossing the bundle on the floor of his bedroom.\nAt the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court denied the motions to suppress defendant\u2019s confession and evidence obtained as a result of the two searches. The court also subsequently denied defendant\u2019s motion to exclude the photographs and microanalyst\u2019s notes pertaining to the evidence obtained from the searches, but advised defense counsel that he could again raise his objection to this evidence at trial.\nAt trial, the witnesses\u2019 testimony was virtually the same as their testimony at the suppression hearing. Defendant, however, did not testify. In addition, when defense counsel again raised his objection to admission of the photographs and the microanalyst\u2019s notes, the motion was denied. Defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, citing alleged prejudicial and inflammatory statements made by the State in closing rebuttal argument, was also denied, as was his post-trial motion.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his confession and the evidence obtained as a result of the two searches of his bedroom. Specifically, defendant argues that the police, lacking probable cause, arrested him at the time they took him from his residence and, therefore, his confession and other incriminating evidence were the fruits of an illegal arrest, requiring suppression.\nProbable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known by the arresting police officers are sufficient to cause a reasonable man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed the offense. (People v. Creach (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 96, 101, 402 N.E.2d 228.) An arrest occurs when the police detain a person in a manner such that a reasonable, innocent person in the same situation would not consider himself free to go. (People v. Reynolds (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 160, 165, 445 N.E.2d 766.) All evidence directly traceable to an arrest made without probable cause must be suppressed where there are no intervening events to break the connection between a defendant\u2019s illegal detention and the evidence obtained as a result therefrom. People v. Travis (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 676, 462 N.E.2d 654.\nHere, the State concedes that no probable cause to arrest defendant existed at the time he was taken from his residence, but argues defendant was not \u201cseized\u201d at that time so as to require probable cause. Instead, the State argues that defendant was not considered under arrest until 4 a.m., at which time probable cause existed, and that defendant\u2019s consent to the searches and his confession were voluntarily made. In support of its contention that defendant was not seized at the earlier time, the State relies on People v. Reed (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 331, 432 N.E.2d 979, and People v. Gale (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 23, 390 N.E.2d 921. We find these cases unpersuasive.\nIn Reed, police officers investigating a murder and robbery did not ask the defendant if he wanted to be questioned at his apartment, but instead asked him to accompany them to the police station. At the station, the defendant was given Miranda warnings and, after four hours of interrogation, confessed to the crimes. In Gale, the defendant, was asked to accompany an officer to the police station regarding a theft investigation. At the station, the defendant was given Miranda warnings, but was not told he was under arrest. After being interviewed for 30 minutes, he confessed to committing the theft. Both the Reed and Gale courts concluded that the defendants were not illegally arrested because a reasonable, innocent person in the same position as defendants would not have considered himself under arrest.\nThe circumstances of defendant\u2019s detention in the present case greatly differ from those in the Reed and Gale cases. Here, defendant was continuously interrogated for an 18-hour period during which time he was deprived of the basic necessities of life. For 18 hours defendant had nothing to eat or drink and disputedly was not allowed to sleep. Only once during the entire time was a restroom made available to him. On the other hand, in Reed and Gale, the defendants were only detained for four hours and 30 minutes, respectively, and were not subjected to the deprivations defendant here endured. We further note that the Reed court, in fact, specifically considered the absence of a continuous, lengthy interrogation in concluding that Reed had not been illegally arrested.\nWe find that the circumstances in the present case are more analogous to those in People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32, 435 N.E.2d 103, cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 878, 74 L. Ed. 2d 143, 103 S. Ct. 174. There, as here, the defendant was questioned over a lengthy period of time by the police. On the basis of a vague physical description given by a rape victim, the police asked the defendant to accompany them to the police station instead of questioning him at his home. At the station, he was placed in an interview room and interrogated five times during a 12-hour period, during which time he was repeatedly given Miranda warnings. The police obtained the defendant\u2019s consent to search his home and car, they never told him he was free to leave and they subsequently obtained a confession from him. The Townes court, relying on the apposite case of Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, held that the defendant\u2019s detention resembled a traditional arrest and the circumstances indicated that a reasonable person in the same position as the defendant would not have believed he was free to leave. The court also held that the seizure of the defendant had an improper \u201cquality of purposefulness\u201d in that it appeared that the police were conducting an \u201cexpedition for evidence\u201d in the hope of obtaining sufficient information upon which to predicate the probable cause necessary for an arrest. People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32, 37-38; Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 218, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 839, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259.\nWe believe the circumstances in the instant case present far more compelling reasons than Townes for requiring reversal of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Here, in addition to the obvious similarities of this case and Townes, the police continuously interrogated defendant eight times during an 18-hour period \u2014 three interrogation sessions more and six hours longer than the interrogation of the defendant in Townes. Throughout his 18-hour detention, as previously noted, defendant also was deprived of the basic necessities of life. He was not offered anything to eat or drink for 18 hours. A restroom was made available to him on only one occasion during his detention. Although it is disputed whether defendant was permitted to sleep during this time, we note that if in fact he did so he would have had to sleep on the floor or sitting up, since there was no bed in the room. In addition, any sleep that defendant may have gotten would have been, at best, minimal due to the interruptions created by the re-\" peated interrogation sessions which usually lasted at least 30 minutes each, i.e., 11 p.m., 1:30 a.m., 5 a.m., 9:30 a.m., 10:45 a.m., 1 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Finally, we note that defendant was subjected to having his underwear and gym shoes, which he had been wearing, taken away from him prior to giving any confession.\nUnder the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant\u2019s detention, like that of the defendant in Townes, resembled a traditional arrest and indicates that a reasonable, innocent person in defendant\u2019s position would not have believed he was free to leave. We also find that the unconstitutional misconduct of the police was a purposeful expedition for evidence in the hope of obtaining sufficient information upon which to predicate the probable cause necessary for defendant\u2019s arrest. We note that even though the detectives stated they had probable cause to arrest defendant at 4 a.m. as a result of the evidence obtained from their first search of his bedroom, they nonetheless did not call in an assistant State\u2019s Attorney at that time, but instead interrogated defendant two more times until obtaining a second consent to search form and a confession from him at 9:30 a.m. Accordingly, since the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant at the time they took him from his residence, which the State concedes, we hold that defendant was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment.\nWe recognize, although the State does not so argue, that the illegality of an arrest does not per se render incriminating evidence inadmissible where there are intervening events to break the connection between a defendant\u2019s illegal detention and the evidence obtained as a result therefrom. (People v. Travis (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 676, 462 N.E.2d 654.) Under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, clearly no intervening events occurred. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s confession and the evidence obtained as a result of the two searches required suppression since the taint of the illegal arrest was not dissipated.\nIn light of the above disposition, we need not address defendant\u2019s further contentions raised on appeal. We feel compelled, however, to comment on the State\u2019s closing rebuttal argument because similar remarks complained of by defendant could recur at retrial. We find that a number of the State\u2019s remarks were grossly improper, prejudicial, inflammatory and designed to arouse the passions of the jury against defendant. These remarks could not possibly aid the jury in weighing or evaluating the evidence. (People v. Potenik (1950), 407 Ill. 337, 348, 95 N.E.2d 414.) \u201c[N]o matter how reprehensible [a defendant\u2019s crime], \u2018be he sinner or a saint, [he] has the right to expect that his fate will be fixed with reference only to the circumstances of the crime with which he is charged.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Hope (Feb. 21, 1986), No. 58462, slip op. at 9, quoting People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 601, 606, 177 N.E.2d 120.) We accordingly so admonish the State.\nFinally, we believe that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not mean we are making a finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial, but rather our consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence admitted at trial will remove the risk of subjecting defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309, 391 N.E.2d 366.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nLORENZ and PINCHAM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert L. Graham and Randall E. Mehrberg, both of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Peter D. Fischer, and Donald G. Schweihs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES EALY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 84\u2014649\nOpinion filed March 31,1986.\nRobert L. Graham and Randall E. Mehrberg, both of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Peter D. Fischer, and Donald G. Schweihs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0557-01", "first_page_order": 579, "last_page_order": 589 }