{ "id": 3572914, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL W. STROPOLI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stropoli", "decision_date": "1986-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201485\u20140262", "first_page": "667", "last_page": "674", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 667" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3205263 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172302 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "1633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/381/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909854 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3080755 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "225-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 445", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525216 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" }, { "page": "959" }, { "page": "1060" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 363", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11337414 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" }, { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 1282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3013905 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598843 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 1371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482359 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633652 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3439482 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3435705 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 1370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559532 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101524 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826501 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2625047 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5432329 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12141394 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3024495 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3112538 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" }, { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 1073", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493968 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1078" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/1073-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12134899 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631804 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0467-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 841, "char_count": 17204, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.410778018453719e-08, "percentile": 0.4432378103897177 }, "sha256": "c5481bad0bdec68d6c9c408185a91c59d5194ef6f9a99538fb00f476ab213fcd", "simhash": "1:be3e380cf2271dc5", "word_count": 2836 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL W. STROPOLI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial defendant, Michael W. Stropoli, was convicted of reckless driving (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 503) and sentenced to six months of court supervision and fined $50. He appeals, contending (1) the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to charge the necessary elements of reckless driving; (2) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the court erred in refusing to give defendant\u2019s tendered jury instructions; and (4) the court violated defendant\u2019s right to be present at all proceedings when it responded to jury questions outside the presence of defendant and his counsel.\nOn October 11, 1984, defendant, a 17-year-old high school student, was driving his father\u2019s automobile westbound on Raven Lane when he approached a dead-end intersection with Thrasher Drive in a residential subdivision of Bloomingdale. Mrs. Janice Schumacher, who was doing yardwork outside her home, located at the southeast comer of the intersection, heard defendant\u2019s tires squealing and then saw defendant stop at the intersection. Cora Schumacher, her 3^-year-old daughter, was standing on a neighbor\u2019s front lawn on the northeast corner of the intersection approximately 10 feet north of Raven Lane.\nMrs. Schumacher testified defendant backed up a distance of approximately six car lengths at a fast rate while squealing his tires. Defendant then drove forward and made a wide right turn onto Thrasher Drive, again squealing his tires. While making the turn onto Thrasher Drive defendant\u2019s vehicle occupied a major portion of the road and the vehicle\u2019s left rear end slid or \u201cfishtailed\u201d as it turned the comer, causing the front end of the car to aim toward the child. Defendant then straightened the car and proceeded down Thrasher Drive. Mrs. Schumacher notified the Bloomingdale police, who arrested defendant shortly thereafter.\nDefendant testified that as he approached the intersection at 20 miles per hour, he observed the child standing on the property to his right and stopped. He then backed up one car length, made a wide turn onto Thrasher Drive to avoid losing sight of the child, and proceeded northbound. Although defendant admitted the car wheels squealed, he denied the car fishtailed or pointed at the child.\nGerald Stropoli, defendant\u2019s father, testified the vehicle was equipped with a high performance differential, causing the wheels to rotate quickly and squeal when the vehicle is accelerating.\nOfficer Carolyn Valias of the Bloomingdale police force testified the streets in that area of Bloomingdale have neither curbs nor sidewalks, but are bounded only by a small amount of gravel and the neighboring lawns. The blacktop streets have no lane markings and are approximately 20 to 25 feet across. The speed limit in that area is 25 miles per hour. Valias stated defendant told her he had been driving 30 miles per hour on Raven Lane.\nPrior to trial, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to set forth a sufficient factual basis was denied by the court. The court also refused to submit jury instructions tendered by defendant which defined \u201cwillful and wanton conduct\u201d and required the jury to conclude defendant\u2019s conduct constituted a \u201cgross deviation\u201d from the reasonable standard of care in order to find him guilty. During deliberations, the jury requested a legal definition of \u201cwanton\u201d and a dictionary. The court refused the requests without consulting or communicating with defendant or his counsel. After deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty and the court sentenced him to six months of court supervision and imposed a $50 f\u00edne. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant first contends the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint because it failed to charge the necessary elements of the offense of reckless driving as required by section 111\u2014 3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111 \u2014 2(a)). The purpose of section 111 \u2014 3(a) is to inform the accused of the nature and elements of the offense against him so that he may prepare his defense and protect himself from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. People v. Smith (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 467, 471, 459 N.E.2d 1357; People v. Thompson (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 665, 672, 466 N.E.2d 380, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 550; People v. Puleo (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 457, 463, 421 N.E.2d 367.\nThe offense of reckless driving is committed when one \u201cdrives any vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 503(a).) Neither intoxication nor actual damage to persons or property are necessary elements of the offense. People v. Cox (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1078, 475 N.E.2d 248; People v. Tuell (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 849, 852, 423 N.E.2d 954.\nThe complaint at issue here charged:\n\u201cReckless driving in violation of Section 11 \u2014 503 (a) of Chapter 95 V2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes of said State, in this to wit; that the said defendant drove a motor vehicle, a 1984, blue, Chevrolet, IL, 85, LY7457, with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons, specifically, Cora B. Schumacher, age 3 yrs., and property, in that Michael W. Stropoli drove his vehicle W/B on Raven Lane approaching Thrasher Lane at a high rate of speed. [He] drove the vehicle in reverse at a high rate of speed, squealing the tires, and then drove forward at a high rate of speed onto N/B Thrasher and driving in wrong lane.\u201d\nDefendant argues the complaint is fatally defective because it fails to identify what property was threatened or define how his conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or such property.\nAlthough it is true the precise property threatened and the manner in which defendant\u2019s conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or such property are not particularized in the complaint, these details are not necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 111 \u2014 3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. Ill \u2014 3(a)). The test is whether, by the language used, a defendant is \u201capprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged.\u201d (People v. Graves (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 449, 455, 437 N.E.2d 866; People v. Miles (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 721, 725, 422 N.E.2d 5.) The complaint here adequately informed defendant of the time, place and manner of his conduct which constituted the basis of the charge of reckless driving. The State is under no obligation to itemize each act of the accused surrounding the commission of the offense, but must merely allege all the necessary elements of the offense. People v. Smith (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1036, 446 N.E.2d 260, aff\u2019d (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 467, 459 N.E.2d 1357; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a).\nDefendant cites People v. Johnson (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 974, 333 N.E.2d 258, for the proposition that a charge of reckless driving requires the presence of \u201caggravated circumstances which reasonably could be construed to endanger life or property.\u201d (30 Ill. App. 3d 974, 976, 333 N.E.2d 258.) However, that case involved the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the accused\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the court did not find it necessary to discuss the sufficiency of the complaint. Moreover, unlike the complaint in Johnson, the present complaint specifically alleged the presence of a young child in the immediate vicinity which formed the basis of the charge.\nWe conclude the complaint adequately informed defendant with reasonable certainty of the necessary elements of the specific offense with which he was charged such that he was able to prepare his defense and protect himself against subsequent prosecution. See People v. Parr (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 212, 264 N.E.2d 850.\nDefendant also contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing that the State failed to show his conduct actually endangered or threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or any property.\nFrom our review of the record, we find there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant\u2019s conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher and the nearby residential property. Mrs. Schumacher testified defendant rapidly backed his vehicle six car lengths for no apparent reason, squealing his tires in the process. He then made a wide turn around the comer at a fast rate, causing the car to \u201cfishtail\u201d to the left and take up a major portion of the road. A result of defendant\u2019s conduct was that the vehicle pointed directly at Cora Schumacher, a 3V2-year-old child. Although defendant disputes this version of the facts, the credibility of witnesses is uniquely a matter for the trier of fact to determine and its judgment will not be set aside lightly. (People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 169, 175, 442 N.E.2d 836; People v. Bergman (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 100, 107, 458 N.E.2d 1370, appeal denied (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 530.) A jury\u2019s verdict of guilty will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Holloway (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 290, 309, 475 N.E.2d 915, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 579; People v. Steffens (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147, 475 N.E.2d 606, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 559.) In our view, the evidence offered, if believed by the jury, amply supported the State\u2019s argument that defendant\u2019s conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher and was sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing certain instructions tendered by defendant. Instruction No. 4 stated:\n\u201cTo find the defendant guilty of reckless driving requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant\u2019s conduct at the time and place charged was a gross deviation from the standards of care a reasonable person would exercise under the same circumstances.\u201d\nThis instruction is based upon language contained in the dissenting opinion of People v. Tuell (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853, 423 N.E.2d 954. Although the instruction is a correct statement of the law based upon section 4 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 6), the decision whether to give a non-pattern jury instruction (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI)) is within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Peebles (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 217, 465 N.E.2d 539, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 574; People v. Barnes (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 965, 975, 453 N.E.2d 1371, appeal denied (1983), 101 Ill. 2d 568.) A non-IPI instruction should be given only when there is no pattern instruction which accurately states the applicable law. People v. Matthews (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713-14, 467 N.E.2d 996; People v. Stamps (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 280, 298-99, 438 N.E.2d 1282, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 571.\nHere, the jury was provided with a proper instruction defining recklessness based upon the statutory definition of recklessness (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 6) and Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 5.01 (2d ed. 1981), which stated:\n\u201cTo find the defendant guilty of \u2018recklessness\u2019 sufficient to support a reckless driving charge requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in conscious disregard for the safety of other persons or property.\u201d\nAs this instruction accurately and sufficiently defines the term of \u201crecklessness,\u201d we find the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give defendant\u2019s tendered instruction No. 4 to the jury.\nDefendant also tendered his instructions Nos. 7 and 8, defining \u201cwillful and wanton conduct,\u201d which provided:\n(7) \u201cWhen I use the expression \u2018wilful and wanton conduct\u2019 I mean a course of action which shows actual or deliberate intention to harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.\u201d\n(8) \u201cWhen I use the expression \u2018wilful and wanton conduct\u2019 I mean a course of action which shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.\u201d\nThe basis of the two instructions was Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 14.01 (2d ed. 1971), and the court rejected the instructions on the ground that they were civil rather than criminal IPI instructions.\nWe conclude the trial court did not err in rejecting these instructions. Section 4 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states, \u201c[a]n act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 6.) This directive permits the use of an instruction defining recklessness to serve as a definition of wantonness. As an IPI criminal instruction defining recklessness was given to the jury, additional IPI civil instructions defining \u201cwillful and wanton\u201d behavior were not required. Furthermore, defendant\u2019s tendered instructions require a finding by the jury of an actual or deliberate intention to harm or an utter indifference to the safety of others, requirements which do not appear to be contemplated in the IPI criminal instruction defining recklessness. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the additional civil instructions offered by defendant.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in giving the State\u2019s tendered instruction No. 8, which states:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of reckless driving when he drives any vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u201d\nHe asserts this instruction refers to a threat to the safety of property and there was no evidence that property was endangered. We find no merit to this argument as the evidence demonstrated Cora Schumacher, who was threatened by defendant\u2019s conduct, was standing on residential property at that time. There was evidence that defendant\u2019s conduct was in disregard for the safety of both persons and property.\nDefendant finally contends the trial judge erred by communicating with the jury outside the presence of defendant and his counsel. In response to the jury\u2019s request during its deliberations for the legal definition of \u201cwanton,\u201d the judge responded, \u201c[t]he jury instructions are the only legal definitions that you may have.\u201d The jury then asked, \u201c[m]ay we have a dictionary?\u201d and the judge answered, \u201c[n]o.\u201d\nIt is well established that any judgment based upon a communication between the court and jury during deliberations, unless made in open court, violates the accused\u2019s right to be present and participate in every stage of the proceedings. (Parker v. Gladden (1966), 385 U.S. 363, 364-65, 17 L. Ed. 2d 420, 422-23, 87 S. Ct. 468, 469-70; Jenkins v. United States (1965), 380 U.S. 445, 446, 13 L. Ed. 2d 957, 959, 85 S. Ct. 1059, 1060; People v. Rhoden (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 223, 226, 427 N.E.2d 1292.) However, such communications are not conclusively prejudicial; defendant must establish that the conduct involved \u201csuch a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed inherently lacking in due process.\u201d People v. Tobe (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 538, 544, 276 N.E.2d 294, citing Estes v. Texas (1965), 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 550, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1633.\nIn the present case, the trial judge correctly and appropriately responded to the jury\u2019s questions and did not supply the jury with further instructions or unapproved materials. As we stated in People v. Jedlicka (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 483, 405 N.E.2d 844, it is not error for a trial court to simply admonish the jury to follow the instructions provided them. We also there expressed our belief that the trial judge should not provide a dictionary to a jury experiencing difficulties reaching a verdict. (84 Ill. App. 3d 483, 492, 405 N.E.2d 844.) Another case involving parallel circumstances is People v. Rhoden (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 223, 225-26, 427 N.E.2d 1292, where the jury requested a magnifying glass and the trial judge responded, \u201c[n]one available.\u201d Just as that trial court\u2019s denial of the jury\u2019s request was determined to be nonprejudicial to the accused\u2019s sixth amendment right to be present during all proceedings, we consider that the trial court\u2019s conduct did not prejudice the defendant in the present case.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOPE and STROUSE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward T. Graham, of Wheaton, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Kenneth R. Boyle, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, and William L. Browers and Andrea Becker, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL W. STROPOLI, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201485\u20140262\nOpinion filed September 4, 1986.\nRehearing denied September 25, 1986.\nEdward T. Graham, of Wheaton, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State's Attorney, of Wheaton (Kenneth R. Boyle, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, and William L. Browers and Andrea Becker, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0667-01", "first_page_order": 689, "last_page_order": 696 }