{ "id": 3570849, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL F. BEDNAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, and CAROL BEDNAR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Bednar", "decision_date": "1986-07-24", "docket_number": "Nos. 85\u20142113, 85\u20142191 cons.", "first_page": "704", "last_page": "713", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 704" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3387741 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3023996 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 Mass. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 896000 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/395/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 1120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5484494 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 1293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567620 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2794882 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2641999 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557477 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3184636 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3178206 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.Y.S.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 A.D.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3243072 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/80/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.W.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10668179 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/353/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.W.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10672496 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/355/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 N.W.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10669987 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/339/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 P.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2484049 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/213/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.W.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10665889 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/361/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.Y.S.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Misc. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1941050 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/103/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.W.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10670817 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/338/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ariz. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1470052 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/147/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3350015 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5554324 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997022 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5497422 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3014590 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5668013 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108025 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626700 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5500634 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3225466 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 860", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3281579 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "1985 Ill. Laws 767", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 865, "char_count": 22110, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.080365257876121e-07, "percentile": 0.8579509847871439 }, "sha256": "9adced44e4b5c9776c0d96d2d797be66ac3849fdf4e4275e3c80eb40ce8e5818", "simhash": "1:ada870dc6be78466", "word_count": 3667 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL F. BEDNAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, and CAROL BEDNAR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to this court\u2019s allowance of her petition for leave to seek permissive interlocutory appeal in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 308 (87 Ill. 2d R. 308), Carol Bednar (Carol) appeals from the order of the Cook County circuit court which denied her motion to dismiss the petition of her former husband, Michael Bednar (Michael), to remove Bradford, the son of Carol and Michael, from the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois. Carol and Michael had previously agreed to the joint custody of Bradford, with Michael to have physical residence of the son and Carol to have substantial and specific rights of visitation. This agreement was embodied in a trial court judgment which dissolved the parties\u2019 marriage in 1984. Since Michael\u2019s petition for removal from Illinois was filed within a few months following the marriage dissolution, Carol filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that a petition for removal where both parents are granted joint custody is, in effect, a petition for modification of custody under section 610 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Dissolution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610). The trial court denied Carol\u2019s motion to dismiss the removal petition, and we granted permissive interlocutory appeal based upon the following pertinent findings and conclusions contained in the trial court\u2019s order of certification:\n\u201cThe Court finds that Order of June 20, 1985, denying Defendant\u2019s Motion to Strike involved a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation; and that\nThe question of law involved in the June 20, 1985, order is whether Plaintiff\u2019s Petition for Removal which was filed less than three months after the date of the Court\u2019s joint custody judgment herein is governed by Section 603.1 and Section 610 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and whether Plaintiff\u2019s Petition for Removal is fatally deficient as a matter of law as a result of its failure to include affidavits showing that there is reason to believe the child\u2019s present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, as required by Section 610 which states that no motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than two years after its date, unless the Court permits it to be made on the basis of such affidavits.\u201d\nWe conclude that Michael\u2019s petition for removal is governed by section 609 of the Dissolution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 609) regarding removal petitions and does not constitute a \u201cmodification of custody\u201d under sections 603.1 and 610 of the Dissolution Act (HI. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, pars. 603.1, 610). Consequently, we find that Michael\u2019s petition for removal was not deficient as a matter of law because of its failure to include affidavits alleging that there was reason to believe the child\u2019s present environment might endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610(a).) Accordingly, we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nBackground\nCarol and Michael Bednar were married on January 8, 1977. One child, Bradford, was born to the marriage, on February 18, 1978. Their marriage was dissolved pursuant to judgment entered in the Cook County circuit court on June 12, 1984, retroactive to May 2, 1984. At that time, Carol was 27 years old, Michael was 34 years old, and Bradford was 6.\nPursuant to the judgment of dissolution incorporating the parties\u2019 agreement, Michael received residential custody of their son and Carol was granted specified rights of visitation. The trial court\u2019s judgment for dissolution of marriage and other relief of June 12, as ultimately corrected by the trial court in an order entered May 2, 1985, effective nunc pro tunc to June 12, 1984, provided for joint custody as follows:\n\u201cThat both parties are fit and proper persons to have the joint care, custody, control, health, education and religious training of the minor child, and it is in the best interests of child that both parties have the joint care, custody, control, health, education and religious training of the minor child and, accordingly, the care, custody, control, health, education and religious training of the minor child of the parties shall be jointly vested in the parties.\nMICHAEL F. BEDNAR shall have the right of physical (residential) custody of the minor child, and the minor child shall reside primarily with him, subject to the rights of visitation of CAROL S. BEDNAR, which such visitation is as follows:\na. Each Thursday, from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m.\nb. The first and third weekend of each month from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 8:00 a.m., Carol to return said child to said child\u2019s babysitter.\nc. Alternating national and legal holidays.\nd. Father\u2019s Day with the father, Michael.\ne. Mother\u2019s Day with the mother, Carol.\nf. On either the 2nd or 4th weekend of the month from 6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m. Saturday.\u201d\nMichael\u2019s petition to remove Bradford from the State of Illinois was filed pursuant to leave of court on September 6, 1984. In it Michael alleged that he was presently earning $1,000 per month in pretax salary, and that he had been offered an opportunity for employment as a drywall patchman in the State of Colorado, which provided a starting salary of $600 per week. Michael\u2019s petition also stated that his mother, who lived in California, advised him that she would leave her residence in California and take up residency with him in Colorado, thereby enabling her to provide \u201cconstant supervision for the minor child of the parties during such time as [Michael] is employed.\u201d Michael stated in his petition that the present babysitting for the child in Illinois was not accomplished by individuals who are related to Michael.\nMichael also alleged in his petition that it would be in Bradford\u2019s best interests for the court to permit removal of the child to Colorado with his father, on the ground that \u201cremoval will permit [Michael] to substantially increase his earnings, thereby making greater funds available for the necessary care, health, and welfare of the minor child, and that by virtue of [Michael\u2019s] mother being available to provide both supervision and babysitting chores during the period that [Michael] is at work.\u201d\nMichael\u2019s pleading further noted that he was \u201cwilling to make adequate provisions\u201d for Carol\u2019s visitation with Bradford to preserve her relationship with the child. He also observed that the increase in his salary \u201cwould more than offset any reduction which the Court might grant to [Carol] in the current support allowances provided by her.\u201d\nCarol\u2019s motion to dismiss Michael\u2019s petition for removal was filed on September 28, 1984. In it she argued that Michael\u2019s petition amounted to a request for modification of custody pursuant to section 610 of the Dissolution Act, and that as such the petition was deficient for failure to allege facts showing that the child\u2019s present environment might seriously endanger his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610.\nMichael subsequently filed a response to Carol\u2019s motion to dismiss, and the parties thereafter filed memoranda of law in support of their positions and presented oral argument to the trial court on their respective views. In its oral pronouncements denying Carol\u2019s motion to dismiss Michael\u2019s removal petition, on June 20, 1985, the court observed that it was denying the motion \u201con the theory that physical custody [is] in the father, [he is] not asking for a change, physical custody will still be in the father *** joint custody is just a placebo, and physical custody is what matters.\u201d\nThe trial court denied Carol\u2019s motion to dismiss the removal petition on July 19, 1985. Subsequently, this court allowed Carol\u2019s petition for permissive interlocutory appeal based upon Supreme Court Rule 308 (87 Ill. 2d R. 308).\nOpinion\nThe question presented for our review, one of first impression in Illinois, is whether a parent\u2019s petition for removal constitutes a petition to modify custody governed by section 610 of the Dissolution Act when the judgment for dissolution of marriage awards both parents joint custody. We conclude that a removal petition, filed by the residential custodial parent, is not a petition for modification of custody where both parents are granted joint custody of the child.\nSection 603.1 of the Dissolution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 603.1 (repealed by Public Act No. 84 \u2014 795 (1985 Ill. Laws 767), and replaced by section 602.1 of the Dissolution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 602.1))) provides in pertinent part that an award of joint custody may be modified or terminated under the standards of section 610. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 603.1(c).) Under section 610 of the Act, any custody award (sole or joint) may be modified by the trial court within two years from the date such judgment is entered only where the moving parent demonstrates in his or her petition that the child\u2019s current environment seriously endangers the child\u2019s physical, emotional, mental, or moral well-being. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610(a).) A custody determination may be modified more than two years following judgment where the moving parent demonstrates that there has been a substantial change in circumstances in the child\u2019s environment and that the proposed modification would be in the child\u2019s best interests. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610(b).\nA petition for removal of a child from the jurisdiction of this State is governed by section 609 of the Dissolution Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40; par. 609.) Under this section, a trial court \u201cmay grant leave, before or after judgment, to any party having custody of any minor child or children to remove such child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is in the best interests of such child or children.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 609.\nCarol argues that a removal petition by a residential custodial parent pursuant to a joint-custody award should be construed as a petition to modify custody. She claims that this interpretation is appropriate because the allowance of a removal petition will so substantially affect the nonresidential custodial parent\u2019s opportunity to interaction with the child that the joint custody will be reduced to a nullity.\nOur analysis of the relevant provisions of the Dissolution Act and its policy does not support the view suggested by Carol. The Act makes a clear distinction between removal petitions and requests to modify custody awards. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, pars. 609 (removal), 610 (modification); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 607 (visitation).) There is nothing in the Act or its jurisprudential application to indicate that this distinction applies only to sole-custody awards, but not to joint-custody awards, as Carol\u2019s argument necessarily assumes. Moreover, if we were to adopt Carol\u2019s reasoning, it would follow that where one parent is granted traditional, sole custody and the other parent visitation rights, removal of the child by the custodial parent to a distant State or foreign country could also so substantially hamper the noncustodial parent\u2019s opportunity to see the child that, in effect, the noncustodial parent might be deprived of virtually any meaningful contact with the child. If Carol\u2019s analysis were to be adopted, removal under these similar circumstances would also constitute a \u201cmodification\u201d or \u201ctermination\u201d of custody under section 610. This contention has been rejected by the courts, however (see In re Custody of Mueller (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 860, 395 N.E.2d 677), and we find Carol\u2019s argument similarly unpersuasive.\nCarol\u2019s contention is founded on the premise that removal will adversely affect her involvement with Bradford to such a degree that she will no longer, in fact, have joint custody of her son. From this she concludes that the removal petition constitutes an attempt to modify custody. The fact that Carol\u2019s custodial rights will be affected by removal (cf. People v. Harrison (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 530, 402 N.E.2d 822), does not also mean that her rights will be modified as a matter of law pursuant to section 610 of the Dissolution Act by removal of Bradford to Colorado. (See In re Custody of Myer (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 27, 426 N.E.2d 333; see also In re Rider (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 447 N.E.2d 1384.) Instead, a joint-custody award is \u201cmodified\u201d under section 610 where there is a \u201cchange in physical [i.e., residential] custody, despite the retention of joint custody.\u201d (In re Marriage of Gargus (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 598, 606, 423 N.E.2d 193; see In re Marriage of Kartholl (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 228; Kraft v. Kraft (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 590, 439 N.E.2d 491, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 568; In re Marriage of Friedman (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 794, 427 N.E.2d 261; see also In re Marriage of Kessler (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 61, 441 N.E.2d 1221, appeal denied (1983), 92 Ill. 2d 574; In re Marriage of Potts (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 518, 404 N.E.2d 446; Gallagher v. Gallagher (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 376 N.E.2d 279.) Cases from other jurisdictions have adopted a similar view. (See, e.g., Bloss v. Bloss (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663; In re Marriage of Frederici (Iowa 1983), 338 N.W.2d 156; Rusin v. Rusin (1980), 103 Misc. 2d 534, 426 N.Y.S.2d 701; Olson v. Olson (N.D. 1985), 361 N.W.2d 249; see also In re Marriage of Paradis (Mont. 1984), 689 P.2d 1263; In re Marriage of Gordon (Minn. 1983), 339 N.W.2d 269; In re Marriage of Hegerle (Minn. App. 1984), 355 N.W.2d 726; In re Marriage of Sumner (Minn. App. 1984), 353 N.W.2d 251; Bazant v. Bazant (1981), 80 A.D.2d 310, 439 N.Y.S.2d 521.) As the court observed in Rusin, \u201cMere miles in itself does not nullify the beneficial aspects of joint custody.\u201d Rusin v. Rusin (1980), 426 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703.\nIn our view, the possibility that removal of a child from the jurisdiction of this State to another may adversely affect the noncustodial parent\u2019s interaction with the child does not compel the conclusion that a removal petition is, as a matter of law, a petition for modification of custody. Instead, the impact of removal upon the rights of the nonresidential custodial parent is a significant and important factor the trial court considers in its adjudication of whether removal would be in the child\u2019s best interests.\nThus, where removal to a distant State will substantially alter the parent\u2019s involvement with the child, it is for the trial court to examine the potential harm to the child which may result. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Siklossy (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 124, 409 N.E.2d 29, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 606; In re Marriage of Burgham (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37.) Similarly, the fact that less than two years has elapsed since the trial court\u2019s initial custody determination is also a matter for the trial court to consider in its examination of whether removal would serve the best interests of the child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brady (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 521, 450 N.E.2d 985.\nThe policy of the Dissolution Act in custody matters, stated explicitly in the Act in its recent amendment as well as in prior judicial interpretation of the Act, is, inter alia, to \u201csecure the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of the children during and after the litigation.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 102(7) (added by Pub. Act No. 84 \u2014 795 (1985 Ill. Laws 767)).) \u201cThe court shall presume that the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of their child is in the best interests of the child.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 602(c) (added by Pub. Act No. 84 \u2014 795 (1985 Ill. Laws 767)); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 602(a)(3); Blazina v. Blazina (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 159, 356 N.E.2d 164; Anderson v. Anderson (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 869, 336 N.E.2d 268.\nA trial court\u2019s examination of a removal petition is guided by this policy in the same manner and to the same degree as any other petition regarding parental involvement with the child that is presented for the court\u2019s adjudication. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, pars. 602, 603.1, 607, 609, 610; see generally In re Marriage of Lichtenstein (1986), 139 Ill. App. 3d 881, 487 N.E.2d 1293.) Moreover, it is incumbent upon the party who seeks such removal to establish that removal would serve this policy of maximum parental involvement, in order to serve the child\u2019s best interests. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40 par. 609; In re Marriage of Brady (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 521, 450 N.E.2d 985; In re Marriage of Feliciano (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120; In re Marriage of Burgham (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37.) Thus it is the province of the trial court to determine whether removal of Bradford from Illinois to Colorado would permit a degree of involvement and cooperation between Michael, Carol, and Bradford that would foster their son\u2019s physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being, in the context of the circumstances presented here. See, e.g., Bloss v. Bloss (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663; Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas (1985), 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153.\nWe do not subscribe to the view that joint custody is, in the words of the trial court, \u201cjust a placebo.\u201d Particularly in light of recent amendments regarding joint custody to the Dissolution Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 602.1, added by Pub. Act 84 \u2014 795, effective January 1, 1986), joint custody remains a viable and distinct custody award wherein both parents, by agreement or upon court order, share parental decision-making regarding matters such as the child\u2019s education, religious training, and health care, regardless of the amount of \u201cparenting time\u201d accorded to either parent. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 602.1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 603.1; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Manuele (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 438 N.E.2d 691.) This parental cooperation may be more easily facilitated where all concerned reside in close geographic proximity in the same State. Therefore, where both parents have joint custody of the child, a parent\u2019s request to remove the child from this jurisdiction should be given particularly close judicial scrutiny. The promotion of parental cooperation and involvement, however, does not in our opinion justify the imposition of section 610\u2019s requirements upon the removal petition of every joint-custodial parent who wishes to reside with the child beyond the boundaries of the State of Illinois.\nWe recognize that removal of Bradford from Illinois would, in all likelihood, require a change in Carol\u2019s present visitation schedule and involvement in his parenting on a day-to-day basis. Whether this change would serve Bradford well or ill is a matter for evidentiary hearing before the trial court. We decline to adopt the view that this alteration, ipso facto and as a matter of law, mandates the adherence to a legal standard which would transform all removal petitions into requests for modification of custody whenever parties are granted joint custody of a child. Under Carol\u2019s analysis, a parent who has personal care and physical residence of a child, and who wishes to change residence to a nearby location over State lines (e.g., from East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, or from Chicago, Illinois, to Hammond, Indiana), would be required to comply with the prerequisites of section 610. In our view, such a result would be imprudent and without justification. The Dissolution Act is tailored to permit a trial court sufficient flexibility to fashion appropriate custody awards that balance the oftentime divergent interests of a residential custodial parent, a nonresidential custodial parent, and their children. (See, e.g., Temple v. Temple (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 851, 368 N.E.2d 192.) This objective would be poorly served were we to adopt the position that a removal petition is, for the purposes of legal analysis, a petition for modification of custody whenever parents are granted joint custody.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we resolve the certified question of the trial court as follows:\n1. Michael\u2019s petition for removal which was filed less than three months after the date of the court\u2019s joint custody judgment is not governed by section 603.1 and section 610 of the IMDMA;\n2. Michael\u2019s petition for removal is not fatally deficient as a matter of law as a result of its failure to include affidavits showing that ' there is reason to believe the child\u2019s present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health, as required by section 610 of the Dissolution Act.\nIn view of this disposition, we need not consider appeal No. 85\u2014 2113, which is Carol\u2019s application for permissive interlocutory appeal based upon Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(l)(v). (87 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(l)(v).) Accordingly, her petition for such permission is denied, and appeal number 85 \u2014 2113 is hereby dismissed.\nNo. 85 \u2014 2113\u2014Application for leave to appeal denied; cause dismissed.\nNo. 85 \u2014 2191\u2014Appeal granted; certified question answered; cause remanded for further proceedings.\nJIGANTI and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marvin A. Miller and Vincent L. DiTommaso, both of Chicago (Washlow, Chertow & Miller, of counsel), for appellant.", "Charles Locker and Michael Mallen, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL F. BEDNAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, and CAROL BEDNAR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNos. 85\u20142113, 85\u20142191 cons.\nOpinion filed July 24,1986.\nMarvin A. Miller and Vincent L. DiTommaso, both of Chicago (Washlow, Chertow & Miller, of counsel), for appellant.\nCharles Locker and Michael Mallen, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0704-01", "first_page_order": 726, "last_page_order": 735 }