{
  "id": 3571321,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS GOSS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Goss",
  "decision_date": "1986-08-08",
  "docket_number": "No. 85\u20141936",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS GOSS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial defendant, Louis Goss, was found guilty of unlawful use of weapons and \u201cfailure to carry tan armed guard training card\u201d and was sentenced to serve a one-year period of conditional discharge. On appeal defendant contends that he was entitled to the \u201cwatchman\u201d exemption to the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 2(aX4)) and that the failure to carry the training card is not a criminal offense. The State concedes that the presence or absence of a training card pertains to an exemption to the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute and does not constitute a substantive criminal offense. Accordingly, we vacate the court\u2019s \u201cfinding\u201d on the complaint charging defendant with the \u201coffense\u201d of \u201cfailure to carry tan armed guard training card.\u201d\nChicago police officer M. Bresman testified that at 3:25 a.m. on May 7, 1985, two men were engaged in an argument on the sidewalk outside of an A&P gas station and mini-mart located at 112 West North Avenue. One of the men approached the officer and his partner and told them that the other man, defendant, had a gun in his possession. Defendant started to walk back to the gas station. As Bresman proceeded to investigate the matter, he observed a .38-caliber revolver tucked into defendant\u2019s waistband. Defendant identified himself as a security guard. He did not wear a uniform. Bresman disarmed defendant, who then explained that he was employed as a security guard for the mini-mart. Defendant produced an expired city of Chicago registration card for the weapon, a firearm owner\u2019s identification card and the \u201cblue copy\u201d of a certificate from the Department of Registration and Education authorizing 40 hours of training \u201cfor some type of security business.\u201d At the time of defendant\u2019s arrest a cashier was working at the mini-mart.\nDefendant testified that on March 29, 1985, David Bullock, the part owner and manager of the A&P Mini-Mart, hired him as a \u201cclerk-watchman\u201d for the mini-mart, which is open 24 hours per day. His position combined the duties of a regular clerk with those of a watchman. As part of his job, defendant wore a gun. He was paid $4.50 per hour and worked 40 hours each week. He did not have a written contract of employment. Bullock corroborated this testimony. Defendant never applied to the Department of Registration and Education to become a private security contractor or held himself out as one. At the time of his arrest he was not employed as a security guard by a licensed security agency.\nDefendant denied having an argument with another man in front of the mini-mart. He explained that he had told the man to leave the store. After the man left, he sat down on one of the gas pumps. Defendant then walked outside and told him that if he did not leave the premises he would have to call the police. Defendant also denied telling the officers that he was a security guard. According to defendant he informed them that he was a \u201cclerk-watchman.\u201d At the time of his arrest defendant was wearing a badge that identified him as a watchman. He purchased the badge from a uniform supply store when he was working for Wells Fargo Security Agency.\nDefendant contends that he was entitled to the \u201cwatchman\u201d exemption to the unlawful use of weapons statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 2(aX4)). We disagree.\nDefendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the exemption set forth in section 24 \u2014 2(a)(4) for watchmen \u201cwhile actually engaged in the performance of the duties of their employment.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 2(a)(4); see People v. Smith (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 95, 105-110, 374 N.E.2d 472.) In our judgment defendant failed to meet that burden.\nThe term \u201cwatchman\u201d is not defined in the statute and has not been judicially construed. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2581 (1971) defines watchman as \u201cone who is employed to stand watch over or to patrol property for the purpose of protecting it against theft, fire, or other damage\u201d or \u201cone who keeps guard at a particular place to warn persons of imminent danger.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1426 (5th Ed. 1979) defines watchman as \u201c[o]ne whose general duties consist of guarding, patrolling, and overseeing a building, group of buildings, or other property.\u201d\nAlthough it is arguable that defendant was a \u201cwatchman\u201d in the dictionary sense of the word, we do not believe that the legislature intended that the statutory exemption should be given such a broad interpretation. (See generally People v. Free (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 449, 451-53, 445 N.E.2d 529.) The exemptions to the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute must be strictly construed. (People v. Lofton (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 67, 71-72, 370 N.E.2d 517.) To adopt defendant\u2019s argument would effectively eviscerate significant portions of the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute. An employer could denominate any employee as a \u201cwatchman\u201d and thereby permit him to carry a firearm in a place of business open to the public or other employees during regular working hours notwithstanding the employee\u2019s lack of training and suitability for such responsibility, his failure to wear a uniform or any other identification indicating his position, and his obligation to perform nonsecurity functions. Compare People v. Rinehart (1967), 81 Ill. App. 2d 125, 127-28, 225 N.E.2d 486.\nIn light of the stringent training requirements the legislature has imposed on security guards (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 24\u2014 2(a)(5), (a)(6), we believe that it would be inconsistent with the manifest purposes of the unlawful-use-of-weapons statute to allow an employee who is expected to deal with the general public or other employees during regular working hours to claim the exemption for \u201cwatchmen.\u201d In our judgment, the watchman exemption must be limited to employees who guard, patrol or oversee a building or other property of the employer which is closed to the public and other employees outside of normal working hours. Based on the evidence presented at trial, defendant was not entitled to claim the exemption for \u201cwatchmen, while actually engaged in the performance of the duties of their employment.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 2(aX4).\nFor the foregoing reasons we vacate defendant\u2019s \u201cconviction\u201d for \u201cfailure to carry a tan armed guard training card\u201d and affirm his conviction for unlawful use of weapons.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and PINCHAM, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joel S. Miller, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Paula M. Carstensen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS GOSS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20141936\nOpinion filed August 8,1986.\nJoel S. Miller, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Paula M. Carstensen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0723-01",
  "first_page_order": 745,
  "last_page_order": 748
}