{ "id": 3570257, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY McCLENDON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McClendon", "decision_date": "1986-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201485\u20140672", "first_page": "1004", "last_page": "1014", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 1004" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414765 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434196 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570538 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130376 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173628 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933607 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174956 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500160 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933261 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 1029", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3086643 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499788 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11767201, 11766531, 11766566, 11766759, 11767023, 11767089, 11766834, 11766972, 11767158, 11766684, 11766623 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0972-11", "/us/402/0972-01", "/us/402/0972-02", "/us/402/0972-05", "/us/402/0972-08", "/us/402/0972-09", "/us/402/0972-06", "/us/402/0972-07", "/us/402/0972-10", "/us/402/0972-04", "/us/402/0972-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 945, "char_count": 20656, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1481122148075315e-07, "percentile": 0.7681762527467818 }, "sha256": "86d325c66cf3811d88969bb13ed54212a112a0ae84026b34102e5f2b77a65941", "simhash": "1:f203ba485ec484eb", "word_count": 3474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:17.515999+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY McCLENDON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEBBER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, together with eight other persons, was charged in the circuit court of Vermilion County with the offenses of mob action and aggravated battery in violation of sections 25 \u2014 1(c) and 12 \u2014 4(b)(8) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 25 \u2014 1(c), 12 \u2014 4(b)(8)). Five of the persons so charged entered pleas of guilty. Defendant and two others were tried by a jury. The record does not indicate any disposition as to the ninth person.\nThe jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty on both charges and he was sentenced by the trial court to three years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated battery and one year\u2019s imprisonment for mob action, the sentences to run concurrently. One of his codefendants was found not guilty on both charges; as to the other, the verdict was guilty as to mob action but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on aggravated battery.\nDefendant has appealed raising five issues: (1) admission of evidence concerning his purported gang membership; (2) refusal of the trial court to permit impeachment of the complaining witness; (3) refusal of the trial court to permit impeachment of a State\u2019s witness; (4) excessive sentence; and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel. We find reversible error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow impeachment of the complaining witness and hence reverse and remand for a new trial. This being so, the other issues become largely moot, but we will comment on them for guidance at retrial.\nSince no issue is raised concerning reasonable doubt, we will not indulge in a lengthy recitation of the facts, but a brief recapitulation will be in order so that the issues raised may be more readily comprehended.\nThe complaining witness, Joe Rapier, testified that as he was walking out of Jimmy Harold\u2019s tavern he bumped into Freddie Mc-Clendon, a relative of defendant. Herman Strong was standing next to Freddie and told Rapier that he would blow his head off. Rapier and Freddie then started fighting in the tavern. The fight was broken up by bystanders and the two combatants then adjourned to the street where the fight was resumed. Rapier stated that defendant and seven others, naming them, followed him and Freddie out into the street and there attacked him. He claimed that he was knocked down, beaten, and kicked by defendant and the others and that defendant struck him on the head with a bottle. Eventually Rapier was able to escape his attackers.\nOther persons present, including the two codefendants, testified as to their versions of the melee. Both of the codefendants maintained that defendant did not fight with Rapier; that it was Freddie and Rapier who were fighting. One witness, who was not charged, testified that she was present and saw defendant swinging at Rapier and that defendant was in the middle of the fight. She estimated the participants in the fight and the bystanders at about 15 to 20 people. Additional facts, as necessary, will be considered in connection with the several issues.\nThe issue concerning gang membership arose during the direct and cross-examination of Rapier. He stated that he had known all of his attackers for years. The State\u2019s Attorney then asked him what they had in common. Over defense objection, he stated that they were all related and \u201chung around\u201d together. He was next asked if they belonged to any group or organization. Again over objection, he stated that they belonged to a street gang known as the Disciples. He further testified that he had been a member of a different gang, the Vice Lords, for five years.\nRapier further testified that about a week before the fight he had seen defendant making gang signs at a local mall and had heard him tell a companion of Rapier, \u201cI be B.G.D.\u201d It was established that the acronym meant Black Gangster Disciples.\nOn cross-examination Rapier stated that he knew defendant to be a gang member and assumed that the codefendants were also members because they associated with defendant. He further stated that while the fight was going on, defendant talked about the Disciples and heard gang slogans being shouted. He heard people yelling, \u201cYou don\u2019t f\u2014 with the Disciples.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the admission of the testimony concerning gang membership was prejudicial and warrants a new trial. His argument is twofold: (1) that gang membership can be established only through expert testimony, and (2) even if Rapier can be established as an expert, there was insufficient testimony to show that the offenses were gang-related.\nThe rule has been established that proof of gang membership is admissible only if there is sufficient proof to show that such membership is related to the offense charged. Otherwise, it is prejudicial as showing that defendant is a bad person. (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 972, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 1658.) Defendant cites People v. Calderon (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 657, 424 N.E.2d 671, for the establishment of a new rule that gang membership must be proved by expert testimony.\nWe do not so understand Calderon. In that case three occurrence witnesses for the State testified that a group of persons approached them yelling \u201cking love.\u201d On cross-examination by the defense, they testified that the term signified the Latin Kings, a gang, but denied being members of another gang, the Imperial Gangsters. In his case in chief, the defendant testified that he knew members of the Latin Kings and the Imperial Gangsters but denied being a member of either. In rebuttal the State called a police officer who had done investigative work in the gang-crimes unit. He testified that based upon his experience and his observation of the defendant in the area of the offense he believed that the defendant was a member of the Latin Kings.\nThe Calderon court pointed out that the issue of gang membership was elicited by the defense and that the expert opinion of the officer was presented in rebuttal only after the defendant himself had denied gang membership. These were two separate issues. In the instant case defendant attempts to combine them into a new rule. We disagree.\nExpert testimony is required only when the subject being examined is beyond the knowledge and experience of an average juror. (Perschall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 233, 446 N.E.2d 570.) We cannot conceive that gang membership is so abstruse as to be beyond the ken of a juror. If defendant\u2019s theory were pressed to its logical extreme, it would be necessary to call the Chairman of the State Board of Elections to establish that James R. Thompson is Governor of Illinois. The Calderon court simply reiterated the familiar rule found in Hairston that gang membership was relevant to show common design or purpose. Its other holdings dealt only with the mechanics of proof. The fact that the rebuttal testimony came from an experienced officer was coincidental.\nDefendant\u2019s second argument on this issue, namely, that there was insufficient testimony that the offenses were gang-related, is also without merit. Rapier testified that he heard gang slogans being shouted while he was being beaten by defendant and others; that defendant joined in the shouting; and that he knew defendant to be a member of the Disciples. He also stated that the other defendants, as a group, were either Disciples or associated with the Disciples.\nThe instant case resembles that found in People v. Miller (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 428 N.E.2d 1038. In that case the victim was confronted, beaten, and shot by four individuals. Earlier in the day he had had a minor altercation with one of them and had no reason to expect animosity from the other three. The court found gang membership relevant to explain motive and to explain why all four joined in the beating.\nHere Rapier bumped into Freddie McClendon and outside the tavern he was accosted and beaten by several others; charges were filed against nine of them; other than with Freddie there had been no prior confrontations.\nNo error occurred in the admission of the gang membership testimony.\nThe second issue, that of impeachment of Rapier, is more serious and is determinative of this appeal. Although he was an adult at the time of trial, Rapier had a prior adjudication as a delinquent for armed robbery. The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion in limine to bar presentation of that adjudication as an attack upon Rapier\u2019s credibility. The court based its ruling on Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (Fed. R. Evid. 609), as adopted by our supreme court in People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695. Under subparagraph (d) of that rule the court held that the prior adjudication was not necessary for a fair determination of the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\nIn pertinent part Rule 609 states:\n\u201c \u2018(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n* * *\n\u2018(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The judge may, however, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the judge is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. ***\u2019 \u201d (47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-17, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698-99; see 28 U.S.C. App. 703 (1982).)\nAlthough Montgomery did not involve the impeachment of a juvenile, the supreme court later interpreted Montgomery to have adopted Rule 609 in its entirety, thereby adopting section 609(d). People v. Ray (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 377, 297 N.E.2d 168.\nPrior to Montgomery section 2 \u2014 9(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (the Act) contained an absolute prohibition against the admission of a juvenile adjudication in any adult proceeding:\n\u201cAdmissibility of Evidence in Other Proceedings. (1) No adjudication, disposition or evidence given in proceedings under this Act is admissible as evidence against the minor for any purpose whatever in any civil, criminal or other cause or proceeding except in subsequent proceedings under this Act concerning the same minor.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 702 \u2014 9(1).)\nRule 609(d), as adopted in Montgomery, created an exception to the absolute prohibition. People v. Puente (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 936, 424 N.E.2d 775.\nThe United States Supreme Court declared the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses included the right to use juvenile court records to impeach a witness for possible bias. (Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105.) The Illinois Supreme Court similarly allowed the use of juvenile court records in order to show a witness received or was promised lenient treatment from the State in return for his testimony. (People v. Norwood (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852.) Thus, the constitutional right to confront witnesses, including impeachment for possible bias, provided a second exception to section 2 \u2014 9(1) of the Act.\nIn an apparent reaction to these authorities, the legislature, in 1982, amended sections 2 \u2014 9 and 2 \u2014 10 of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 37, pars. 702 \u2014 9, 702 \u2014 10.) Section 2 \u2014 10 replaced section 2 \u2014 9 as the statute dealing with the admissibility of juvenile adjudications in other proceedings. In pertinent part, it states:\n\u201cAdmissibility of Evidence and Adjudications in Other Proceedings. (1) Evidence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible: (a) in subsequent proceedings under this Act concerning the same minor; or (b) in criminal proceedings when the court is to determine the amount of bail, fitness of the defendant or in sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections; or (c) in proceedings under this Act or in criminal proceedings in which anyone who has been adjudicated delinquent under Section 2 \u2014 2 is to be a witness, and then only for purposes of impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 37, par. 702-10.\nIn our opinion section 2 \u2014 10 of the Act has supplanted Rule 609(d) and prior adjudications are now freely admissible for the purposes of impeachment without the balancing test required in Rule 609(d).\nIt is well established that the legislature can enact rules of evidence {People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 137, 461 N.E.2d 410), although it may not enact statutes which infringe on the administrative authority of the supreme court (People v. Joseph (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 36).\nWe find support for our holding in People v. Triplett (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 463, 485 N.E.2d 9. In that case the trial court had prohibited the introduction of the juvenile court record of a minor witness because it believed it had the power to do so under Rule 609(d). The supreme court reversed as to certain portions of the minor\u2019s record. The court cited section 2 \u2014 10 of the Act in support of its holding that the witness would be impeached for possible bias by the fact that he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections as a result of an adjudication of delinquency on a burglary charge. The court did not refer to, nor discuss, Montgomery or Rule 609(d) in its holdings but based its decision squarely on section 2 \u2014 10. We believe that the supreme court has accepted section 2 \u2014 10 as the sole basis for governing admission of juvenile records in other proceedings.\nThe parties have debated the meaning of the final clause of section 2 \u2014 10, \u201cpursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.\u201d The argument is based on the concept that Rule 609(d) is a rule of evidence and therefore is incorporated into section 2 \u2014 10 by the final clause. We do not agree. It would be utterly illogical for a statute which purports to repeal a prior rule of evidence to incorporate the same rule which it abolishes. In our opinion the final clause is directed at the manner of proof of a prior conviction or adjudication. (See Peo ple v. Gober (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 499.) In addition, the ordinary rules of competency, materiality, and relevancy, plus the timeliness under Montgomery, would apply.\nThe State has argued that Triplett was concerned with bias and not impeachment for general credibility. Citing People v. Harrell (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 241, 445 N.E.2d 496, it maintains that impeachment for bias has a constitutional basis while impeachment for general credibility does not. Suffice it to say, the statute makes no such distinction. Although section 2 \u2014 10 may undermine the confidentiality of juvenile records, that is the prerogative of the legislature with which we decline to interfere.\nThe case at bar concerns only the impeachment of a witness, not the defendant himself. We offer no opinion as to the applicability of section 2 \u2014 10, or any possible interplay with Rule 609(d), in the case of a defendant as a witness in his own behalf.\nThe trial court applied the wrong standard in allowing the motion in limine barring Rapier\u2019s prior record and we cannot say that this did not affect the outcome of the trial. Rapier was the State\u2019s premier witness. Although all witnesses agreed that the melee occurred, a factual dispute was present as to defendant\u2019s degree of participation. The failure to allow impeachment of Rapier so prejudiced the case against defendant as to deny him a fair trial.\nDefendant\u2019s third issue concerns the refusal of the trial court to allow impeachment of a State\u2019s witness by reason of a felony charge pending against him. Lonnie Smith testified that he drove Rapier to the tavern on the night of the fight but remained outside while Rapier entered the tavern. He saw Rapier leave with a large group of people but could not see what happened next. The crowd disappeared down the street, and he did not see Rapier again that night.\nSmith had a felony charge of unlawful use of weapons pending against him, but the trial court ruled that he had not testified on any material issue and denied the use of the charge as impeachment of him. Defendant argues that if he had been able to impeach Smith it would have shown that Rapier associated with bad people and thus damage his credibility. While this may have been one result, it would be an improper use of the impeachment process which is limited only to the believability of the witness being impeached. (See Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.12 (2d ed. 1981).) Furthermore, since we have already determined that Rapier may be impeached in retrial, the rationale of the argument must fail.\nIn any event, we agree with the trial court that Smith\u2019s testimony was insignificant and not on any material issue. No error occurred.\nDefendant next maintains that he received a disparate sentence. As has been indicated above, nine persons were charged as a result of the incident. Five of them pleaded guilty and each was sentenced to probation for terms varying from 1 year to 30 months.\nDefendant was tried with two others. One of them was found not guilty on both offenses; the other was found guilty of mob action, but the jury was hung on the aggravated battery charge, and the record reflects no disposition of his case.\nDefendant, having been found guilty of both aggravated battery and mob action, was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment on the former and one year\u2019s imprisonment concurrently on the latter. The sentence range for aggravated battery is two to five years\u2019 imprisonment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(6)). Thus, defendant received one year over the minimum for aggravated battery and the minimum for mob action. The trial court, among other things, commented that the sentences were imposed because of defendant\u2019s extensive juvenile record.\nDisparate sentences are not per se improper. Defendant was the only one of the nine convicted of both offenses and five of the nine entered pleas of guilty. It is proper for a trial court to grant leniency to a defendant who by his plea has insured prompt and certain application of correctional measures, acknowledged his guilt, and showed willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct. (People v. Sivels (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 102, 324 N.E.2d 422.) Thus, defendant cannot properly compare his sentence with those imposed on persons who have entered a plea of guilty.\nThe sentences were within the statutory range, and we find no basis upon which to be critical of them.\nLastly, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective. This grew out of the testimony of a witness called by defense counsel as part of his case in chief. The witness was Nathaniel Small. Defense counsel asked him if he knew a person named \u201cFreddie.\u201d He stated that he remembered a \u201cFreddie\u201d and that only \u201cFreddie\u201d and Rapier were fighting. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked him who the man dressed in black was. (It was defendant.) Small stated that he knew that man as \u201cFreddie.\u201d\nDefendant argues that defense counsel was deficient in calling a witness who testified against his client. This may be generally true and generally indicates that counsel has made inadequate preparation for trial. However, since we have determined that the case must be retried, the error, if any, has become moot and will not reoccur.\nIn summary, the error in denying the defendant the opportunity to impeach the State\u2019s principal witness is sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. The judgment and sentence of the circuit court of Vermilion County is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and MORTHLAND, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEBBER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Allen H. Andrews, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Craig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Patrick T. Curran, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY McCLENDON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201485\u20140672\nOpinion filed September 3,1986.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Allen H. Andrews, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCraig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Patrick T. Curran, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1004-01", "first_page_order": 1026, "last_page_order": 1036 }