{
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  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. VAN KAMPEN, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Van Kampen",
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    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. VAN KAMPEN, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant John A. Van Kampen was convicted of aggravated battery, resisting or obstructing a peace officer and possession of a loaded gun in a vehicle. He was sentenced to a 30-month term of probation for aggravated battery, conditioned, inter alia, on serving 16 days of periodic imprisonment, forfeiting all weapons during the probationary period, not possessing fish or game licenses until March 1, 1987, and paying a $5,000 fine and court costs. On the resisting and possession offenses, defendant was sentenced to a probationary term of one year, to be served concurrently with the 30-month probationary sentence.\nDefendant appeals from his convictions and the sentences imposed on them. Because defendant claims that the State\u2019s evidence was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we initially recite the facts as they were presented at trial.\nDepartment of Conservation Officer Merlin Howe testified that on December 7, 1984, he observed defendant\u2019s pickup truck parked along Mallott Road in Whiteside County. December 7 was one of the days of the deer hunting season, and the officer was checking for deer hunters. Howe was 71 years old. He knew defendant to be a deer hunter and knew that he had taken his limit, one deer, in Whiteside County earlier in the season. Howe pulled up and peered into the pickup, where he observed an empty gun case, an empty binocular case and a couple of empty . 12-gauge-cartridge slug boxes on the floor.\nHowe decided to move his marked vehicle into the bushes to a point where he could observe defendant\u2019s truck. About an hour later, defendant walked up from behind Howe\u2019s car. Defendant was wearing an orange hunting vest and cap, appropriate apparel for deer hunting.\nHowe, in full uniform, got out of his car and asked defendant what he was doing. Defendant said he was \u201cenjoying nature.\u201d Howe did not accept the explanation, and asked where defendant had hidden his gun and deer permit. Defendant suggested that they go down to his truck and he would undress so that Howe could search him. They walked to defendant\u2019s pickup, and Howe inquired abut the empty gun case he had observed in the truck. Defendant explained that he kept it in the truck in case he found a gun. He further stated that he had a loaded rifle behind the seat.\nHowe opened the door to the pickup and found the cased, allegedly loaded rifle. He told defendant he was under arrest for having a loaded gun in the truck. According to Howe, when he tried to pull the gun out of the case, defendant grabbed the weapon, twisted Howe\u2019s wrist around to break his grip and punched the officer in the chest and right shoulder. Howe determined that he could not handle the situation without back-up. He went back to his car to radio for help. Howe moved his car to face defendant\u2019s truck and was able to observe defendant ejecting shells from the rifle and then placing the shells behind the seat and the rifle and its case on the seat.\nOfficers McCorkle and Bartels, of the Conservation Department and State Police, respectively, arrived to assist Howe. The three officers asked defendant to get out of the truck. When he refused, they physically pulled him out and placed him in Bartels\u2019 vehicle for transportation to the Sheriff\u2019s office. An unloaded .22 rifle and ammunition from behind the seat were collected from defendant\u2019s pickup.\nHowe and McCorkle searched the surrounding field for further evidence. They found a .12-gauge shotgun containing three slugs, binoculars and a deer permit hidden in the grass at the top of a knoll. The permit was issued to Loren Van Kampen of Fulton, defendant\u2019s brother, and authorized the taking of a deer from Carroll County.\nMcCorkle and Bartels also testified for the State, substantially corroborating the facts related by Howe.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that he had gone to his brother\u2019s (Loren\u2019s) home on the morning of December 7, intending to be a chaser for Loren to hunt deer. He wore his hunting clothes, but removed them in the house waiting for Loren to decide what he wanted to do. Loren decided to go to work instead, so defendant grabbed some clothes, mistaking his brother\u2019s vest for his own, and left to go rabbit hunting.\nDefendant testified that he kept his unloaded, cased rifle behind the seat in the pickup for target practice. On Mallott Road, defendant parked the pickup and took his .12-gauge shotgun out to look for rabbits. He saw neither rabbits nor deer. Then, defendant decided to put slugs in the shotgun to sight it in for the next deer season, a year away. Through his binoculars, defendant saw Howe\u2019s car. He hid the gun, binoculars and the deer-permit tag from his brother\u2019s vest, believing that no game warden would believe that he was only sighting in the shotgun.\nDefendant\u2019s version of the physical encounter with Howe was that Howe \u201cleaned into\u201d defendant when defendant tried to show the rifle to Howe instead of handing it over as Howe requested. Defendant asserted at trial that the rifle was not loaded, but that he had said, \u201cSure, Merlin, whatever you say,\u201d in response to Howe\u2019s inquiry at the scene about the gun, knowing the officer\u2019s \u201creputation.\u201d Defendant explained that the shells found behind the seat in his truck were merely shells that were out of their boxes.\nIn addition to the foregoing occurrence witnesses, two other witnesses were called at trial before the close of defendant\u2019s case to testify to defendant\u2019s reputation as a peace-abiding citizen.\nDefendant, in response to the State\u2019s pretrial discovery request, had indicated that he would introduce the testimony of Linda Van Kampen, a relative by marriage, who would testify that within the past four years she had heard Merlin Howe state that he \u201cis going to get John Van Kampen.\u201d The prosecutor moved in limine to exclude this testimony on grounds that it constituted irrelevant hearsay. The motion was heard and allowed by the court. The matter was not raised thereafter in an offer of proof during defendant\u2019s presentation of evidence at trial.\nDefendant contends on appeal that the trial court\u2019s ruling on the State\u2019s motion in limine was reversible error. He contends that Linda Van Kampen\u2019s testimony would have established Howe\u2019s bias and motive to testify against defendant. The record on appeal, however, fails to provide any support for defendant\u2019s position. As a general rule, an offer of proof is required to preserve error on appeal \u201cunless \u2018a question shows the purpose and materiality of the evidence and if it is in proper form and clearly admits of an answer relative to the issue.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Samier (1985), 129 Ill. App. 3d 966, 967, 473 N.E.2d 601, 602, quoting People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 494, 520-21, 129 N.E.2d 709.) Here, Linda Van Kampen never testified in an offer of proof, by affidavit or otherwise. The sole indication of record of what she might have said appears in the following paragraph extracted from defendant\u2019s pretrial disclosure pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 413(d):\n\u201cDefendant believes that Linda Blanche VanKampen will testify that within the last four (4) years she heard Merlin Howe make a statement to another person that he was going to \u2018get John VanKampen.\u2019 \u201d\nClearly, the foregoing statement falls far short of the Moretti test. Without any contextual information, the alleged statement is ambiguous. Without a better indication of the time frame in which the statement was allegedly made by Howe, its materiality to the case at hand cannot be determined. Moreover, the alleged statement as it appears in the record does not clearly establish that Howe\u2019s in-court testimony was the product of bias or personal antagonism toward this defendant, or otherwise not credible. Accordingly, we must conclude that defendant\u2019s failure to make a proper offer of proof of Linda Van Kampen\u2019s testimony constitutes a waiver of the issue for appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s reasonable-doubt issue, which we address next, is premised on defendant\u2019s position that Howe\u2019s testimony was fundamentally unbelievable because of his \u201clong-standing bias\u201d against defendant. However, again we are restricted to the record properly before us on appeal. Defendant does not argue that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(b)(6)), resisting or obstructing a peace officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 1), and possessing a loaded gun in a vehicle (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 61, par. 2.33(n)). Howe\u2019s credibility was not impeached at trial. His testimony was corroborated by that of Officers Bartels and McCorkle. As stated above, we do not find error in the trial court\u2019s exclusion of Linda Van Kampen\u2019s alleged testimony. The jury, moreover, was not required to believe defendant\u2019s version of the facts as they conflicted with the officers\u2019 testimony. Nor was the jury required to accept defendant\u2019s subjective explanations for circumstances that culminated in the charges brought against him. The trier of fact is in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses by their demeanor in court. It is apparent that the jury resolved the credibility issues in this case in favor of the State\u2019s witnesses. On appeal, we will not disturb the jury\u2019s verdict unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 490, 442 N.E.2d 154.) The State\u2019s evidence as it appears in the record before us amply supports the jury\u2019s verdicts of guilty. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s challenges to his convictions.\nLastly, defendant contends that the court erred in imposing sentences on his convictions. Defendant suggests that the sentencing court failed to specify its reasons for imposing the 30-month probationary period with conditions, as aforesaid. We find, however, that defendant has waived a statement of reasons by failing to request such at the sentencing hearing. People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 462 N.E.2d 473.\nDefendant\u2019s further suggestion that the court erred in not making findings required by section 5 \u2014 6\u20141(a) of the Illinois Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(a)), is similarly unavailing. The factors enumerated therein are required when a sentence of imprisonment is imposed. Here, the sentence imposed is one of probation, and one of the conditions is that defendant serve time in periodic imprisonment. While it is true that the statutory factors apply to this situation, we have previously held that the factors of section 5 \u2014 6\u20141(a) need not be recited if the record indicates substantial compliance \u2014 ie., the sentencing court reviewed and considered all of the factors presented at the sentencing hearing. People v. McPherson (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 313, 483 N.E.2d 592.\nOur review of the record on appeal demonstrates that the substantial-compliance test was satisfied. At the time of the incident, defendant was 40 years old and the victim, Howe, was 71. Defendant\u2019s conduct threatened serious bodily harm. Moreover, defendant\u2019s criminal record included a prior conviction for resisting a peace officer. The foregoing matters were presented to and considered by the sentencing court before defendant\u2019s sentence was pronounced. Under the circumstances, a further recital of the section 5 \u2014 6\u20141(a) factors is not required to support the imposition of periodic imprisonment as a condition of defendant\u2019s probationary sentence.\nDefendant\u2019s challenge to the length of his sentences on the misdemeanor offenses \u2014 resisting a police officer and possession of a loaded gun in a vehicle \u2014 is unsupported by the record. The court\u2019s sentencing order clearly belies defendant\u2019s assertion on appeal that concurrent 30-month probationary sentences were imposed, rather than the statutorily authorized one-year period of probation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20142(b)(3)), which was, in fact, the sentence imposed for the misdemeanors. Finally, we are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s bald assertion that the 30-month sentence of probation and the conditions attached thereto for the felony offense \u2014 aggravated battery \u2014 were either unauthorized or clearly excessive. Suffice it to say, our review of the record demonstrates that the conditions imposed upon sentencing defendant to probation were within the court\u2019s authority (People v. Whittington (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 504, 409 N.E.2d 150), and we find no abuse of the court\u2019s discretion in the length of the probationary sentence imposed.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County.\nAffirmed.\nWOMBACHER and HEIPLE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BARRY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert E Chudada and Luciano Panici, both of Cifelli, Baczynski & Scrementi, Ltd., of Chicago Heights, for appellant.",
      "Gary L. Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. VAN KAMPEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-85-0767\nOpinion filed September 17, 1986.\nRobert E Chudada and Luciano Panici, both of Cifelli, Baczynski & Scrementi, Ltd., of Chicago Heights, for appellant.\nGary L. Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0181-01",
  "first_page_order": 203,
  "last_page_order": 209
}
