{ "id": 3604197, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM BURMEISTER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Burmeister", "decision_date": "1986-08-26", "docket_number": "No. 85\u2014596", "first_page": "218", "last_page": "227", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 218" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 S. Ct. 1179", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 L. Ed. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 1121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1083", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430058 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531366 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5556567 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12141006 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 273", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6405124, 6405222, 6405325, 6406317, 6405935, 6405421, 6405041, 6405555, 6404951, 6405786, 6405661, 6406111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0894-03", "/us/434/0894-04", "/us/434/0894-05", "/us/434/0894-12", "/us/434/0894-10", "/us/434/0894-06", "/us/434/0894-02", "/us/434/0894-07", "/us/434/0894-01", "/us/434/0894-09", "/us/434/0894-08", "/us/434/0894-11" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926001 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/106/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859650 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12124713 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3150722 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468346 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "1983 Ill. Laws 7251", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 19796, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.28187993933504e-07, "percentile": 0.8707976797102843 }, "sha256": "16e45108ce0759dd312e50917b642e3a2de2b324e833b6f1ca781bafe2498ce6", "simhash": "1:b0b07c9af8a620cb", "word_count": 3219 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:28.954445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM BURMEISTER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCHNAKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, William Burmeister, was convicted at a jury trial of one count of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(3)) and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(b).) On each count, he was sentenced to concurrent four-year periods of probation and fined $25. The conditions of probation included concurrent 120-day terms of imprisonment followed by concurrent 150-day terms of periodic imprisonment (work release). Defendant appeals, contending (1) that the statutes which define the offenses of which he was convicted, and which determine the possible sentences therefor, are an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the State\u2019s police power in violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of law; (2) that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury; (3) that his two convictions of aggravated criminal sexual abuse should be vacated because they arose from the same act as his conviction of criminal sexual assault; and (4) that the condition of probation requiring him to serve a 150-day term of periodic imprisonment is illegal and should be vacated.\nBecause defendant does not maintain that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, an extended discussion of the facts is unnecessary. The complaining witness, S.H., was the 14-year-old stepdaughter of defendant. She testified that on August 9, 1984, defendant attempted to rape her. In the course of the attack, he fondled her vagina with his hand and \u201cused his mouth\u201d on her breasts and her vagina. Defendant testified, denying the accusations.\nThe offenses of which defendant was convicted were created by Public Act 83 \u2014 1067 (1983 Ill. Laws 7251). That act repealed various sex offense statutes and enacted statutes creating the offenses of criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The new law, as amended, defines two forms of sexual activity: \u201csexual penetration\u201d and \u201csexual conduct.\u201d Section 12 \u2014 12(f) of the new law states:\n\u201c \u2018Sexual penetration\u2019 means any contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person, including but not limited to cunnilingus, fellatio or anal penetration. Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual penetration.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(f).)\nSection 12 \u2014 12(e) of the new law provides:\n\u201c \u2018Sexual conduct\u2019 means any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(e).)\nThe criminal-sexual-assault offenses occur when the offender commits an act of \u201csexual penetration\u201d under certain defined circumstances. The criminal-sexual-abuse offenses involve acts of \u201csexual conduct\u201d or \u201csexual penetration.\u201d The assault offenses are punished more severely than the abuse offenses. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16.\nThe constitutional requirement of due process of law places limitations on the State\u2019s exercise of its police power. A legislative enactment is required to bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective. (People v. Wick (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676.) Defendant maintains that the legislative objective of the new law was \u201cto provide a coherent pattern for criminalizing sex offenses by creating a statutory framework which would cover the spectrum of sex offenses, including offenses not previously covered.\u201d The State does not dispute this contention, and we agree that creating a coherent pattern of sex offenses was one of the primary purposes of this legislation.\nDefendant\u2019s challenge to the constitutionality of the new law has three parts. First, he notes that the statutory definition of \u201csexual penetration\u201d is different from the ordinary meaning of that term. \u201cPenetration\u201d normally connotes an act of passing into or through. (See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1670 (1966).) The statutory definition of \u201csexual penetration,\u201d however, insofar as it involves contact between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, does not require a penetration in this ordinary sense. Only contact is required. Defendant argues that \u201c[f]or the legislature to create crimes with reference to \u2018penetration\u2019 and yet go on to define \u2018penetration\u2019 as \u2018contact\u2019 makes no sense at all.\u201d He maintains that this \u201cunreasonable\u201d definition frustrates the legislative objective of creating a coherent pattern of sex offenses. We cannot agree. The legislature may define terms in a statute so that they have a broader or narrower meaning than they otherwise would have. (See People v. McCarty (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 247, 427 N.E.2d 147; People v. Hope (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 171, 491 N.E.2d 785.) The fact that the term \u201csexual penetration\u201d has been given a broader meaning than its dictionary definition does not mean that a coherent pattern of sex offenses has not been created.\nDefendant\u2019s second challenge to the new law involves a comparison of the statutory definitions of \u201csexual penetration\u201d and \u201csexual conduct.\u201d He maintains that because the ordinary definition of \u201cpenetration\u201d was not used, and \u201csexual penetration\u201d includes mere \u201ccontact,\u201d the term is indistinguishable from \u201csexual conduct\u201d which involves \u201ctouching or fondling.\u201d This alleged failure to draw a meaningful distinction between these two terms results, defendant maintains, in a failure to distinguish the more serious offenses from the less serious ones. For example, under section 12 \u2014 13(a)(1) criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony, is committed when the accused commits an act of \u201csexual penetration\u201d by the use of force or threat of force. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1).) And under section 12 \u2014 15(a)(1) criminal sexual abuse, a Class A misdemeanor, is committed when the accused commits an act of \u201csexual conduct\u201d by the use of force or threat of force. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 15(a)(1).) (Compare also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 13(a)(2), 12 \u2014 13(a)(3) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 15(a)(2), 12 \u2014 16(b).) Defendant maintains that these subsections prohibit the same conduct, and that the legislative objective of creating a coherent pattern of sex offenses has, therefore, been lost.\nWe cannot agree. The weakness of defendant\u2019s argument is that he has focused on only a portion of the definition of \u201csexual penetration,\u201d i.e., the word \u201ccontact.\u201d He has ignored the requirement that the contact be between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person. The \u201ctouching or fondling\u201d of the sex organs, anus, or breast of the victim included in the term \u201csexual conduct\u201d may be done with the hands or any other part of the accused. Thus, there is a very real distinction between the terms \u201csexual penetration\u201d and \u201csexual conduct,\u201d and in our judgment, the legislative determination that sex offenses involving \u201csexual penetration\u201d are generally more serious than those involving \u201csexual conduct\u201d is an eminently reasonable one. An improper act of \u201csexual penetration\u201d would generally be a greater affront to the personal dignity of the victim than an improper act of \u201csexual conduct.\u201d The supposed similarity of the terms does not, therefore, render the statute an unreasonable exercise of the State\u2019s police power.\nDefendant\u2019s final challenge to the new law involves the mental state required for the differing offenses. He notes that the definition of \u201csexual penetration\u201d does not include any mental state. The definition of \u201csexual conduct,\u201d however, requires that the touching or fondling be either \u201cintentional or knowing\u201d and \u201cfor the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d Defendant maintains that the offenses based on \u201csexual penetration,\u201d which are generally punished more severely, require no mental state, whereas the offenses based on \u201csexual conduct,\u201d which are generally punished less severely, require a mental state. He maintains that this \u201canomaly\u201d renders the statute unconstitutional. He also maintains that because the definition of \u201csexual penetration\u201d does not include a mental state, the new law \u201creaches too far and punishes innocent conduct\u201d and is, therefore, invalid.\nWe cannot agree with defendant\u2019s contention. Section 4 \u2014 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that absolute liability (liability without a culpable mental state) obtains only if the crime is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 9.) The offenses based on \u201csexual penetration\u201d set forth in the new law are all punishable by incarceration, and we cannot find any for which the statute clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability with respect to the element of sexual penetration. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16; see also People v. Farrokhi (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 421, 414 N.E.2d 921.) Accordingly, for those offenses involving \u201csexual penetration\u201d for which no mental state is explicitly set forth, a mental state of either intent, knowledge, or recklessness will be implied. (See 91 Ill. App. 3d 421, 414 N.E.2d 921; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 4\u2014 3(b).) So construed, the statutes do not create the \u201canomaly\u201d suggested by defendant, nor do they punish innocent conduct. We note in this regard that section 12 \u2014 18(b) exempts from criminal liability medical examinations and procedures conducted by parents, caretakers, physicians, or other medical personnel for purposes and in a manner consistent with reasonable medical standards. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 18(b).) We also note that defendant has not suggested how a person could engage in an act of \u201csexual penetration\u201d unintentionally. The challenges defendant has made to the constitutionality of the new law are without merit.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant\u2019s argument in this regard has two parts. First, he contends that juror Don Brotz should not have been allowed to serve. This argument is based on a revelation Brotz made to the court during trial to the effect that he lived next door to defendant and saw the police arrest him in connection with this case. He also saw the police remove some bedding from defendant\u2019s home. Defendant has waived this complaint about Brotz\u2019 qualifications. When the matter was brought to the court\u2019s attention, Brotz said that he had not and would not discuss the incident with the other jurors. Defense counsel was permitted to question Brotz, and concluded his examination by stating, \u201cI have no objection to Mr. Brotz remaining on.\u201d The issue was not raised in defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. Accordingly, it may not be raised in this court. See People v. Kirwan (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 121, 421 N.E.2d 317.\nThe second part of defendant\u2019s argument concerning the jury involves a report made by one of the witnesses, a nurse who had been involved in a medical examination of the complaining witness, that after her testimony was completed, a juror approached her during a recess and commented about how hard it is for a person to be on the witness stand and be composed. The nurse responded by saying that she could not talk about it. Following this revelation defendant moved for a mistrial. The court responded by suggesting that the jurors be questioned so that the juror involved could be identified and replaced with an alternate juror. Defense counsel stated that he did not want the jurors questioned, and that he would \u201cstand\u201d on his motion for a mistrial. The court thereupon denied that motion, and defendant argues that the denial was improper. We disagree. In order to justify the declaration of a mistrial because of an improper communication involving a juror, it is necessary to show that defendant was prejudiced. (See People v. Williams (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224.) Here, defendant failed to show sufficient prejudice to warrant a mistrial because the juror involved could have been replaced by an alternate. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial was properly denied. See 38 Ill. 2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224; People v. D'Argento (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 36, 245 N.E.2d 501.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that his two convictions of aggravated criminal sexual abuse should be vacated because they arose from the same act as his conviction of criminal sexual assault. In order to decide this issue, it will be helpful to review two opinions of our supreme court: People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1, and People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert, denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273.\nIn Cox the defendant was convicted of two counts of indecent liberties with a child based upon a single transaction. One count was predicated on an act of sexual intercourse, and the other on an act of deviate sexual assault. The court noted that the two counts involved acts almost simultaneous in time with the same victim, and that each act was one of three prohibited by the indecent-liberties statute. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that only one conviction could stand. The court explicitly distinguished cases where the multiple convictions were for different offenses.\nKing involved the latter situation. In King the court held:\n\u201cPrejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts, exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrent sentences should be permitted in all other cases where a defendant has committed several acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. \u2018Act,\u2019 when used in this sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense. We hold, therefore, that when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838.\nIn the instant case defendant\u2019s conviction of criminal sexual assault (count I of the amended information) was based on his act of placing his mouth on the victim\u2019s vagina. His two convictions of aggravated criminal sexual abuse were based on his conduct in fondling her vagina with his hands (count III) and in fondling her breasts (count II). The State has conceded that under Cox one of the convictions of aggravated criminal sexual abuse must be vacated. We agree. The acts were almost simultaneous in time; they involved the same victim; and they were different violations of the same statute.\nWe next consider whether one of the remaining two convictions should be vacated. Because separate offenses are involved, we turn to King to resolve this question. It is readily apparent that aggravated criminal sexual abuse under section 12 \u2014 16(b) is not, by definition, a lesser included offense of criminal sexual assault under section 12 \u2014 13(a)(3). The former offense can be, and here was, based upon fondling of the victim\u2019s breasts, an element that is not included in the latter offense. Moreover, it is equally clear that defendant\u2019s convictions were based on separate acts within the meaning of King. Accordingly, separate convictions of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse are proper. (See People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 700, 421 N.E.2d 961 (separate convictions of rape and indecent liberties based on the same transaction upheld where rape involved penetration and indecent liberties was predicated on kissing and fondling of victim\u2019s face and breasts).) Defendant has brought to our attention People v. Ford (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 57, 403 N.E.2d 512, where the court held that separate convictions of attempted rape and indecent liberties with a child could not be sustained even though the latter offense was based on kissing, and the former was based on defendant\u2019s conduct in ordering the victim to remove her clothing, in removing his own clothing, and in getting on top of the victim. In our judgment Ford is inconsistent with King, and we decline to follow it. See People v. Boastick (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 78, 488 N.E.2d 326 (Ford criticized for failing to recognize the importance of the fact that two different offenses were involved).\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the condition of probation requiring him to serve a 150-day term of periodic imprisonment is illegal and should be vacated. Under the circumstances of this case, the State has confessed error on this point, and we accept the State\u2019s concession. As noted above, on each conviction defendant was sentenced to concurrent 4-year periods of probation and fined $25. The conditions of probation included concurrent 120-day terms of imprisonment followed by 150-day terms of periodic imprisonment (work release). Defendant has already served the concurrent 120-day terms of imprisonment. Section 5 \u2014 7\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose a sentence of periodic imprisonment if it imposes a sentence of imprisonment upon the defendant in excess of 90 days.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 7\u20141(c).)\nUnder this enactment, either the 120-day terms of imprisonment or the 150-day terms of periodic imprisonment must be vacated. (See People v. Evans (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 634, 464 N.E.2d 1083, cert, denied (1985), 469 U.S. 1121, 84 L. Ed. 2d 328, 105 S. Ct. 1179.) Because defendant has already served the 120-day terms of imprisonment, we vacate the concurrent 150-day terms of periodic imprisonment.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Boone County entered on the charges of criminal sexual assault in count I and aggravated criminal sexual abuse in count II, with the modification that the conditions of probation relating to periodic imprisonment are vacated. We vacate the judgment entered on the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in count III.\nAffirmed as modified in part; vacated in part.\nHOPF and STROUSE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCHNAKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and William A. Delaney II, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gerald Grubb, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Kenneth R. Boyle, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, and William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM BURMEISTER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 85\u2014596\nOpinion filed August 26, 1986.\nRehearing denied October 21, 1986.\nG. Joseph Weller and William A. Delaney II, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGerald Grubb, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Kenneth R. Boyle, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, and William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0218-01", "first_page_order": 240, "last_page_order": 249 }