{ "id": 3604725, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG MARTIN LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lewis", "decision_date": "1986-08-27", "docket_number": "No. 85\u2014626", "first_page": "249", "last_page": "258", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 249" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3416249 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591118 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.E. 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5021912 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/299/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 1075", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3403939 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "2539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3018960 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563980 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5470098 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146378 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163237 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907836 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 N.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905198 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2515721 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525987 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906557 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "459-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2795447 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0516-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 886, "char_count": 21005, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.812944511744781e-07, "percentile": 0.7180771929174249 }, "sha256": "5a605fba850d1a84e858c3d8c0aec692fdbe2d7c29793e267acbef4748860349", "simhash": "1:38ab0b4e36efafc4", "word_count": 3441 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:28.954445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG MARTIN LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, the trial court found defendant Craig Lewis not guilty on 17 counts of a 20-count indictment, but guilty on one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The court found that the three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse merged into one, and therefore it entered no finding regarding two of the counts. The court sentenced defendant to four years\u2019 probation. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the counts on which he was convicted were void; (2) the State failed to prove that any crime occurred; (3) the State failed to prove the crimes alleged in the counts; and (4) the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay into evidence.\nThe grand jury charged in count 12 of the indictment that:\n\u201c[0]n or about September 23, 1984 at and within the county of Cook Craig Martin Lewis committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in that he, a person 17 years of age or over, committed an act of sexual conduct, to wit: sexual intercourse with [O.S.], a person under 13 years of age, in violation of chapter 38, section 12 \u2014 16\u2014C(l) of the Illinois Revised Statutes 1983 as amended ***.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.)\nThe other two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, counts 13 and 14, have the same words, except the phrase \u201csexual intercourse\u201d is replaced with \u201canal intercourse\u201d and \u201coral copulation.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the three counts are void because each specifies an act of \u201csexual penetration,\u201d and not an act of \u201csexual conduct,\u201d as defined in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 12(e), (f)). The State argues that the terms \u201csexual intercourse,\u201d \u201canal intercourse,\u201d and \u201coral copulation\u201d are mere surplusage which the trial court properly disregarded. Surplusage is defined as \u201cimmaterial matters, or matters which may be omitted from an indictment without rendering it insufficient or doing damage to the material averments.\u201d People v. Figgers (1962), 23 Ill. 2d 516, 519, 179 N.E.2d 626.\nIf the phrase \u201cto wit: sexual intercourse\u201d is omitted from the indictment, the indictment essentially tracks the language of the statute defendant allegedly violated. That statute reads:\n\u201c(c) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if:\n(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act was committed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12-16(c)(l).)\nAs our supreme court has stated: \u201cIt is sufficient to allege an offense in the language of a statute if the words so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is informed with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he is charged.\u201d (People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 446, 459, 271 N.E.2d 37.) Illinois courts have found that the term \u201clewd fondling,\u201d used in an indictment, informs a defendant with sufficient specificity of the crime with which he is charged (People v. Bradley (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 372, 378, 470 N.E.2d 1121); similarly, an indictment which alleged that defendant committed an \u201cindecent act\u201d was found sufficient (People v. Johnson (1946), 392 Ill. 409, 411, 64 N.E.2d 878).\nThe Criminal Code of 1961 defines \u201csexual conduct\u201d as: \u201cany intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(e).) The fact that the word \u201cor\u201d is used several times in the statutory definition does not, in and of itself, render the term \u201csexual conduct\u201d imprecise. (People v. Bradley (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 372, 378, 470 N.E.2d 1121.) Applying the statutory definition of sexual conduct, we find that section 12 \u2014 16(c)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 essentially provides that any touching of a child under 13 years of age, for the purpose of sexual arousal, constitutes sexual conduct. We find that the words \u201csexual conduct,\u201d standing alone in counts 12, 13 and 14, without the phrases \u201cto wit: sexual intercourse,\u201d \u201cto wit: anal intercourse,\u201d and \u201cto wit: oral copulation,\u201d were sufficiently specific to inform defendant with reasonable certainty of the offense with which he was charged. Therefore, those phrases may be omitted from counts 12, 13 and 14 without rendering them insufficient. People v. Figgers (1962), 23 Ill. 2d 516, 179 N.E.2d 626.\nDefendant claims that these phrases cannot be regarded as mere surplusage because each specifies a crime distinct from aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Defendant relies principally on People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 446, 271 N.E.2d 37, and People v. Heard (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 501, 266 N.E.2d 340. In Abrams, defendant was charged with assaulting police officers, in that she \u201cdid without lawful authority strike the officers) about the arms and body.\u201d (People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 446, 459, 271 N.E.2d 37.) Our supreme court stated: \u201cIf there has been any touching or other form of physical contact with the victim, a battery has been committed and not an assault ***.\u201d (48 Ill. 2d 446, 459-60, 271 N.E.2d 37.) In Heard the court found a complaint for gambling void because it employed several disjunctives between disparate acts. \u201cThe use of the disjunctive under these circumstances causes uncertainty and conjecture as to which of the alternatives the accused is charged with committing.\u201d People v. Heard (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 266 N.E.2d 340.\nWe find that the instant case is more nearly parallel to People v. Simpkins (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 106, 268 N.E.2d 386. Defendants in Simpkins were charged by complaint with disturbing the peace. The complaints tracked the language of the statute, except that in the complaints the phrase \u201cby firing a revolver\u201d was added. (48 Ill. 2d 106, 110, 268 N.E.2d 386.) Our supreme court stated that \u201c[t]he particular means by which each defendant participated in the creation of the disturbance was not critical, and the fact that none of the individual defendants had fired a revolver was immaterial.\u201d (48 Ill. 2d 106, 111, 268 N.E.2d 386.) In Simpkins, unlike Abrams, the court found that without the offending language, the complaints adequately charged defendants with crimes. Similarly, in the instant case, the indictments adequately stated charges of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, but for the inclusion of the phrases, \u201cto wit: sexual intercourse,\u201d \u201cto wit: anal intercourse,\u201d and \u201cto wit: oral copulation.\u201d The inclusion of the phrases did not mislead defendant in the formulation of his defense, and his defense, if successful, would have barred further prosecution for the offense. (People v. Smith (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 467, 471, 459 N.E.2d 1357.) Therefore, we find that those phrases were mere surplusage which the trial court appropriately disregarded. People v. Simpkins (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 106, 111, 268 N.E.2d 386.\nDefendant next contends that the State failed to prove the crime charged in the indictment. At trial the State placed in evidence a statement defendant signed at the police station on September 27, 1984. According to the statement, defendant was living with his family on September 23, 1984, when his sister-in-law, Tina Lewis, came over to the house with her three children. Tina\u2019s four-year-old daughter went down to the basement to defendant\u2019s bedroom. Defendant sent her upstairs to ask her six-year-old half-sister to come downstairs. Both children went downstairs and defendant told the four-year-old to go back upstairs. According to the statement which defendant signed, defendant took off the six-year-old child\u2019s blue jeans and pulled his own pants down. He rubbed his penis against her vagina and her buttocks, and he put his penis up to her mouth. She turned away. He put her pants back on and she went upstairs.\nThe State presented the testimony of Tina Lewis, who stated that she took her children to visit her husband\u2019s family on September 23, 1984. Around 3 o\u2019clock in the afternoon, she saw her four-year-old daughter come up from the basement, and she heard her tell her six-year-old daughter that Craig wanted her to come downstairs. Both children went downstairs. About 15 minutes later, Tina noticed that the four-year-old had come back upstairs but the six-year-old had not. Tina asked the four-year-old child where her sister was. Tina testified over objection that the child answered that the older daughter was in the basement, and that Craig made the younger one come upstairs. The court stated that it overruled the objection and admitted the testimony solely for the purpose of explaining Tina\u2019s subsequent behavior.\nTina testified that she went to the basement and while she was on the stairs her six-year-old daughter started coming upstairs. Tina noticed that her zipper was down. Tina became angry and threatened to whip her. The six-year-old child did nothing. Tina took her outside and told her she would not whip her if she told the truth. Tina testified that her daughter told her, \u201c[\u2018JCraig *** rubbed his penis on my boo-tie and my cootch[\u2019J and tried to make her suck his thing.\u201d Tina explained that \u201cbootie\u201d meant buttocks, \u201ccootch\u201d meant vagina, and \u201chis thing\u201d meant his penis. Tina told the daughter to tell her grandmother, Craig\u2019s mother Emma Lewis, the same story. Tina testified that she took her children home at 4 p.m. and she reported the incident to the police at 9 p.m., after she talked with her husband. She took her daughter to Cook County Hospital for examination the following morning.\nOn cross-examination, Tina admitted signing a letter in which she stated that the incident was \u201ca big misunderstanding\u201d which arose as a result of Craig cursing and yelling at the six-year-old child. Tina also stated on cross-examination that she taught her daughter to say \u201cbootie\u201d for her buttocks. On redirect, Tina testified that she signed the letter because she found out that the State charged Craig with kidnaping.\nThe State attempted to present the six-year-old child as a witness. The court after examination found that she was not qualified to testify. She had serious trouble taking the oath; she stated that she did not know her last name; and she frequently answered by nodding or shaking her head despite repeated requests to speak up.\nDefendant testified that he was in his bedroom in the basement of his family\u2019s home on September 23, 1984. He did not see any of Tina\u2019s children in the basement. When he went outside, somewhat after 3 p.m., Tina called him back and told him his mother wanted to talk to him. Defendant testified that he did not write the statement which the State put into evidence, and he signed it because the police officer told him all charges would be dropped if he signed the statement.\nEmma Lewis, defendant\u2019s mother and Tina\u2019s mother-in-law, was a defense witness. She testified that sometime during the afternoon of September 23, 1984, Tina brought her six-year-old daughter to talk to her. Emma testified that the child said, \u201cCraig put me out his room and he cursed me.\u201d Emma testified that she confronted Craig with this and told Craig to apologize. Craig denied cursing the child, but he apologized anyway. Tina and her children, including the six-year-old, stayed for dinner. They left around 6 p.m.\nDefendant contends that the State failed to prove the crime alleged in the indictment because the State did not prove that defendant had sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, or oral copulation with the child. Since we have found those allegations to be surplusage, we agree with the trial court holding that the State did not need to prove those allegations. The State needed to prove only acts of sexual conduct, and defendant\u2019s signed confession adequately supports the trial court finding that defendant committed such acts.\nDefendant next claims that the State did not adduce adequate evidence that any crime occurred. An uncorroborated confession cannot alone establish the corpus delicti of the offense, which consists of the fact that an injury occurred and the fact that the injury was caused by a criminal act. (People v. Lambert (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 375, 378, 472 N.E.2d 427.) The State principally relies upon Tina\u2019s testimony regarding her daughter\u2019s out-of-court statement to her for corroboration of the confession. Defendant contends that this testimony was hearsay, improperly admitted into evidence. The State maintains that the statement was properly admitted into evidence as a spontaneous declaration.\nFor an out-of-court statement to be admissible under the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule, it must meet three criteria: (1) it must have resulted from an occurrence which was so startling that it was likely to cause an observer to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) it must have been made before there was time to fabricate the statement; and (3) it must have related to the occurrence. (People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 488, 491, 434 N.E.2d 395.) The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether a statement meets these criteria, and this court will reverse the trial court only if the trial court has abused its discretion. People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 385, 468 N.E.2d 1285.\nThe trial court in this case determined that the child\u2019s statement to Tina qualified as a spontaneous declaration under the reasoning of People v. Watson (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 691, 438 N.E.2d 453. In that case, defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with his three-year-old daughter. Her vaginal canal had suffered lacerations, and defendant, both at trial and when his wife came home following the incident, stated that his daughter sustained the injury when she fell on a rocking chair, and he had cleaned the blood off the rocker. The child\u2019s mother took her to a nearby hospital more than an hour after the injuries occurred. A nurse from the hospital testified that she asked the child to tell her who had washed the rocking chair, and the child answered, \u201cI didn\u2019t fall on the rocking chair.\u201d (107 Ill. App. 3d 691, 695, 438 N.E.2d 453.) The appellate court held that the statement was properly admitted as a spontaneous declaration despite the lapse of time and despite the child\u2019s calm demeanor at the time she made the statement. 107 Ill. App. 3d 691, 695-96, 438 N.E.2d 453.\nIn the instant case, the child had much less time in which to fabricate a story. One would expect an occurrence of such a startling nature to produce an unreflecting statement from a child, and in accord with Watson, we find that the child\u2019s calm demeanor does not require a finding that the statement was not spontaneous. It clearly related to the occurrence. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the out-of-court statement was a spontaneous declaration.\nDefendant asserts that the introduction of the statement into evidence was erroneous also because it deprived him of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. (U.S. Const., amend VI.) The United States Supreme Court stated:\n\u201c[Wjhen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate \u2018indicia of reliability.\u2019 Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d (Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539.)\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s determination that the six-year-old child was incompetent to be a witness rendered her unavailable. The spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule was created because such declarations carry the required \u201cindicia of reliability\u201d: they are caused by, and related to, startling occurrences which cause unreflecting statements, and they are made before the declarant has had time either to fabricate a statement or to forget the event.\nDefendant argues that the grounds for finding the child incompetent are also grounds for excluding her out-of-court statement. The trial court found the child incompetent because the court doubted her ability to understand the significance of the oath and because she had difficulty answering simple questions. Her spontaneous declaration was not affected by these problems. It was made so soon after the event that she did not have time to fabricate the story. Thus, her inability to understand the oath is irrelevant. Her spontaneous declaration was clearly stated, so her inability to answer simple questions is also irrelevant. We find that the trial court decision to admit Tina\u2019s testimony regarding her daughter\u2019s out-of-court statement did not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.\nDefendant, relying on People v. Linkogle (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 830, 368 N.E.2d 1075, maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence Tina\u2019s testimony regarding the meanings of \u201ccootch,\u201d \u201cbootie,\u201d and \u201chis thing\u201d in her daughter\u2019s statement. Defendant contends that without Tina\u2019s interpretations of those words, the statement does not corroborate his confession. In Linkogle, the defendant met an eight-year-old girl at a swimming pool and invited her to come over to his home. The child testified that the defendant started to \u201cwriggle his thing\u201d while changing his pants. The child\u2019s mother testified that she thought \u201cwriggle his thing\u201d meant \u201can up-and-down motion of his penis.\u201d (54 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832, 368 N.E.2d 1075.) There was no indication that the child was using the word \u201cwriggle\u201d in a sense distinct from its sense as an English word. The appellate court held that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the child\u2019s mother to testify regarding the meaning of the child\u2019s testimony.\nWe agree that \u201ca witness may not state his opinion or conclusion concerning an out-of-court statement, but is required to recite the statement as nearly as possible.\u201d (People v. Linkogle (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833, 368 N.E.2d 1075.) However a witness may properly testify regarding matters of which the witness has personal knowledge. (People v. Rosenbaum (1921), 299 Ill. 93, 95, 132 N.E. 433.) In the instant case, Tina testified that when her daughter said \u201ccootch\u201d she meant vagina, when she said \u201cbootie\u201d she meant buttocks, and when she said \u201chis thing\u201d she meant his penis. We find that Tina testified only regarding her personal knowledge of the meanings Tina taught her daughter to associate with those words. We note that mothers frequently teach their children the meanings of words. We find that the trial court did not err in admitting Tina\u2019s testimony regarding the meanings of words her daughter used. Tina\u2019s testimony corroborated defendant\u2019s confession, and thus we find that there was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of the offense.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence Tina\u2019s testimony regarding the out-of-court statements made by her younger daughter. Tina testified that her younger daughter told her that Craig made the younger child go upstairs and the six-year-old sister was in the basement with Craig. The trial court allowed this testimony solely for the purpose of explaining why Tina went down the stairs towards the basement. When the testimony is used for this limited purpose and not for the purpose of establishing the truth or falsity of the out-of-court utterance, it does not constitute hearsay. (People v. Jones (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 576, 589, 449 N.E.2d 547.) Since the instant case was tried by the judge as finder of fact, we must presume that he considered the evidence only for the limited, nonhearsay purpose for which it was introduced. (People v. McNeal (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 132, 138, 371 N.E.2d 926.) We find that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence Tina\u2019s testimony regarding her younger daughter\u2019s out-of-court statements.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA and McGILLICUDDY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WHITE" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG MARTIN LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 85\u2014626\nOpinion filed August 27, 1986.\nRehearing denied October 7, 1986.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry and Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0249-01", "first_page_order": 271, "last_page_order": 280 }